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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-88-137
Details
Synopsis: ON NOVEMBER 15, 1987, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT 1713, A MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-14, N626TX, WAS OPERATING AS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED, PASSENGER-CARRYING FLIGHT BETWEEN DENVER, COLORADO, AND BOISE, IDAHO. THE AIRPLANE WAS CLEARED TO TAKE OFF FOLLOWING A DELAY OF APPROXIMATELY 27 MINUTES AFTER DEICING. THE TAKEOFF ROLL WAS UNEVENTFUL, BUT FOLLOWING A RAPID ROTATION, THE AIRPLANE CRASHED OFF THE RIGHT SIDE OF RUNWAY 35 LEFT. BOTH PILOTS, 1 FLIGHT ATTENDANT, AND 25 PASSENGERS SUSTAINED FATAL INJURIES. TWO FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND 52 PASSENGERS SURVIVED.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: ESTABLISH MINIMUM EXPERIENCE LEVELS FOR EACH PILOT IN-COMMAND AND SECOND-IN-COMMAND PILOT, AND REQUIRE THE USE OF SUCH CRITERIA TO PROHIBIT THE PAIRING ON THE SAME FLIGHT OF PILOTS WHO HAVE LESS THAN THE MINIMUM EXPERIENCE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: DENVER, CO, United States
Is Reiterated: Yes
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA004
Accident Reports: Continental Airlines, Inc., Flight 1713 McDonnell Douglas DC-9-14, N626TX
Report #: AAR-88-09
Accident Date: 11/15/1987
Issue Date: 11/3/1988
Date Closed: 8/1/1995
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/1/1995
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA HAS ISSUED ITS FINAL RULE TO AMEND THE PILOT QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR CARRIER & COMERICAL OPERATORS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENT OF A-88-137 & A-90-108. IN ADDITION, THE RULE REQUIRES THAT THE SECOND-IN-COMMAND OBTAIN OPERATING EXPERIENCE WHILE PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF A SECOND-IN-COMMAND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF AN APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED PILOT CHECK AIRMAN. AS THE ABOVE MEET THE INTENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS A-88-137. A-88-138, & A -90-108, THE BOARD CLASSIFIES THE RECOMMENDATIONS "CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/8/1995
Response: ON 4/21/96 THE FAA ISSUED ITS FINAL RULE TO AMEND THE PILOT QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR CARRIER & COMMERCIAL OPERATORS. THIS RULE UPGRADES EXISTING OPERATING EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS. ESTABLISHED MORE RIGOROUS OPERATING EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS, & ADDS REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INEXPERIENCED PILOT-IN-COMMAND PILOT. THIS RULE REQUIRES THAT THE SECOND-IN-COMMAND OBTAIN OPERATING EXPERIENCE WHILE PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF A SECOND--IN-COMMAND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF AN APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED PILOT CHECK AIRMAN. THIS RULE ALSO ENSURES THAT PILOTS ARE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY WITHIN A LIMITED TIME PERIOD TO USE NEWLY DEVELOPED KNOWLEDGE & SKILLS IN ACTUAL LINE OPERATIONS. I CONSIDER THE FAA'S ACTION TO BE COMPLETED ON THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, & I PLAN NO FURTHER ACTION.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/13/1995
Response: Notation 6532: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed your Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), "Air Carrier and Commercial Operator Training Programs," which was published in Volume 59, Federal Register 64272 on December 13, 1994. The notice, affecting 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135, proposes to revise the training and qualification requirements for certain air carriers and commercial operators by: (1) Requiring certain certificate holders operating under part 135, and permitting certain others, to comply with part 121 training, checking, and qualification requirements, and (2) mandating Crew Resource Management (CRM) training requirements for part 121 and certain part 135 operators. The Safety Board strongly supports this NPRM. Air carrier accident investigation experience has shown repeatedly that shortcomings in flight crew performance have been cited in the majority of commuter and major air carrier accidents. And, human factors research and operating experience have led to significant advances in knowledge about the significance of human performance factors (e.g. communication, decisionmaking, leadership, management) in safe flight operations. Based on this information, the Safety Board has issued numerous safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) advocating the upgrading of air carrier pilot training, checking, and qualification requirements; mandating CRM training requirements; and fostering greater use of aircraft flight simulator devices in training programs. Specifically, the proposed rulemaking is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-94-191, -192, -195, and -196, contained in the recently adopted "Commuter Airline Safety study," as well as several earlier recommendations that advocated upgrading part 135 training, checking and qualification requirements to make them comparable/equivalent to those of part 121. (A-86-101, A-86-108, A-88-126, A-90-128, and A-94-24.) The proposed rule also is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-88-69, A-88-71, A-89-124, A-90-135, A-93-37, and A-94-2 addressed to the FAA, that advocated CRM training for flightcrews of part 121 and part 135 operators. The proposed rule also is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-86-103 and A-93-72 that advocated greater use of aircraft flight simulator devices in the training programs of part 135 operators. Finally, the proposed rule also is responsive to Safety Recommendations A-86-l07, A-88-l37, A-90-l07, and A-90-l08, to the FAA, that advocated upgrading existing pilot operating experience requirements for scheduled part 121 and 135 operations. The Safety Board believes that adoption of this proposed rule would contribute significantly toward improving the level of safety in commuter airline operations, as well as in major air carrier operations. The Safety Board appreciates the opportunity, to comment on this proposed rule.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/19/1993
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA ISSUED TO A NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (NPRM) DOCKET NO. 27210; NOTICE NO. 93-1. THIS NPRM PROPOSES TO AMEND THE PILOT QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR CARRIER PILOTS BY UPGRADING EXISTING OPERATING EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS, ESTABLISHING A NEW OPERATING EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT, AND ADDING REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INEXPERIENCED PIC TO BE SCHEDULED TO FLY WITH AN INEXPERIENCED SIC PILOT. ADDITIONALLY, THIS NPRM PROPOSES TO REQUIRE THAT THE SIC PILOT OBTAIN OPERATING EXPERIENCE WHILE PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF AN SIC PILOT UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF AN APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED CHECK AIRMAN. THE BOARD CITED AS INADEQUATE THE CREW PAIRING RESTRICTIONS OF THE PROPOSED RULE, UNDER WHICH A PIC OR AN SIC PILOT COULD NOT BE ASSIGNED TO THE SAME FLIGHTCREW IF EACH HAS FEWER THAN 75 HOURS OF LINE OPERATING FLIGHT TIME, INCLUDING SUPERVISED OPERATING EXPERIENCE, ON THE AIRPLANE TYPE. THE BOARD BELIEVES THAT AN INITIAL PIC AND AN INITIAL SIC PILOT SHOULD NOT BE PAIRED TOGETHER IF EACH HAS FEWER THAN 100 HOURS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN THE AIRPLANE IN WHICH THEY HAVE MOST RECENTLY QUALIFIED. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND OTHER FAA ACTIONS MENTIONED IN THE SUBJECT NPRM ADDRESS THE MAJOR BOARD CONCERNS, THE BOARD CLASSIFIES RECOMMENDATIONS A-88-137 AND -138 "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE" PENDING FINAL RULEMAKING.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/2/1993
Response: ON MARCH 11, 1993, THE FAA ISSUED A NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (NPRM) DOCKET NO. 27210; NOTICE NO 93-1). THIS NPRM PROPOSES TO AMEND THE PILOT QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR CARRIER PILOTS BY UPGRADING EXISTING OPERATING EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS, ESTABLISHING A NEW KIND OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT, AND ADDING REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INEXPERIENCED PILOT-IN-COMMAND TO BE SCHEDULED TO FLY WITH AN INEXPERIENCED SECOND-IN COMMAND PILOT. THIS NPRM ALSO PROPOSES TO REQUIRE THAT THE SECOND-IN-COMMAND OBTAIN OPERATING EXPERIENCE WHILE PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF A SECOND-IN-COMMAND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF AN APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED PILOT CHECK AIRMAN.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/2/1993
Response: The Safety Board is concerned that, even after the Board's prompting of the FAA regarding the need for vigilance in assigning crews, the crew assignments in the Anniston, Alabama, accident could still occur. The Board believes that the FAA should take prompt action to require minimum experience levels for each pilot-in- command and second-in-command pilot and to prohibit the pairing of pilots who have less than the minimum experience in their respective positions on the same flight. The Board, based on the FAA's lack of action, has classified Safety Recommendation A-88-137 "Open--Unacceptable Response" and reiterates it with this report.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/2/1993
Response: From the accident report controlled collision with terrain GP Express Airlines, Inc., flight 861, a Beechcraft C99, N118GP, Anniston, Alabama on June 8, 1992. The Board adopted this report on 3/2/1993. Additionally, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendations A-88-137 and A-90-135.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/31/1990
Response: THE SAFETY BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA HAS ASKED THE JOINT GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY TASK FORCE TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FAA REGARDING PILOT EXPERIENCE, CREW PAIRING, AND ASSOCIATED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. PENDING THE FAA'S REVIEW OF THE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS, SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-88-137 IS CLASSIFIED AS "OPEN--ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 12/8/1989
Response: THE FAA HAS ASKED THE JOINT GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY TASK FORCE TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FAA REGARDING PILOT EXPERIENCE, CREW PAIRING, AND ASSOCIATED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/27/1989
Response: Safety Recommendation A-88-137 states that minimum experience level should be established for each pilot position, and that such criteria should be used to prohibit pairing of pilots with less than minimum experience in their respective positions. The Safety Board is concerned that the FAA believes that rulemaking to require these scheduling practices is unnecessary because of voluntary compliance by carriers. Although many carriers already have implemented practices similar to the recommended action, the Safety Board believes that these practices should be standardized and promoted by the FAA. The Safety Board requests that the FAA review its position on this safety recommendation. We have classified Safety Recommendation A-88-137 as "Open--Unacceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/30/1989
Response: THE FAA HAS REVIEWED THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION AND HAS DETERMINED THAT IN SOME CASES IT MAY NOT BE PRACTICAL OR POSSIBLE TO SCHEDULE AN EXPERIENCED FLIGHT CREWMEMBER WITH AN INEXPERIENCED FLIGHT CREWMEMBER. FOR EXAMPLE, A NEWLY CERTIFICATED AIR CARRIER MAY CONSIST OF FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE ALL NEW TO BOTH 14 CFR PART 121 OPERATIONS AND TO THE TYPE OF AIRPLANE THEY ARE OPERATING. ALSO, AN AIR CARRIER MAY INITIATE A NEW KIND OF OPERATION (E.G., LONG RANGE INTERNATIONAL FLA OR SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS) IN WHICH THE FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS MAY BE EXPERIENCED IN THE TYPE OF AIRPLANE, BUT HAVE LITTLE OR NO EXPERIENCE IN THESE KINDS OF OPERATION. ON JANUARY 21, 1988, THE FAA ISSUED ACOB 8-88-1, FLIGHT CREWMEMBER EXPERIENCE AND SCHEDULING. THIS ACOB REQUESTS THAT PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS BRING THE ISSUE OF SCHEDULING INEXPERIENCED FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS WITH EXPERIENCED FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS TO THE ATTENTION OF THEIR CERTIFICATE HOLDERS, AND REQUEST THAT THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS DEVELOP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, MINIMUM EXPERIENCE LEVELS WHEN PAIRING PILOTS FOR SCHEDULING PURPOSES. ON JULY 19, 1988, THE FAA ISSUED ACTION NOTICE 8430.22 TO REQUEST THAT THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS REVIEW THEIR CERTIFICATE HOLDER'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE WHAT, IF ANY, ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER TO IMPLEMENT THE GUIDELINES SPECIFIED IN THE APPROPRIATE ACOB OR TO AMEND ANY EXISTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. THE FAA CONDUCTED A SURVEY OF ALL U.S. AIR CARRIERS FOLLOWING THIS REVIEW WHICH SHOWED THAT 41 PERCENT OF THE 14 CFR PART 121 CARRIERS AND 26 PERCENT OF THE 14 CFR PART 135 CARRIERS HAD POLICIES REGARDING MINIMUM EXPERIENCE LEVELS WHEN PAIRING PILOTS FOR SCHEDULING PURPOSES. THE SURVEY ALSO SHOWED THAT 52 PERCENT OF THE 14 CFR PART 121 CARRIERS AND 12 PERCENT OF THE 14 CFR PART 135 CARRIERS HAD PROCEDURES REQUIRING THE PILOT IN COMMAND TO MAKE ALL TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS WHEN EITHER THE PILOT IN COMMAND OR SECOND IN COMMAND IS INEXPERIENCED. THE FAA BELIEVES THAT MOST U.S. AIR CARRIERS WILL DEVELOP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES BASED UPON THE RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND GUIDELINES CONTAINED IN THE ACOB. THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE EXPECTED DEGREE OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE WITH THESE SCHEDULING PRACTICES, COMBINED WITH THE MANY AIR CARRIER TRAINING RULEMAKING INITIATIVES UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE AIRCREW PERFORMANCE, THE FAA BELIEVES THAT RULEMAKING IS UNNECESARY AT THIS TIME. I HAVE ENCLOSED A COPY OF THE ACOB AND A COPY OF THE ACTION NOTICE FOR THE BOARD'S INFORMATION. I BELIEVE THAT THE FAA'S ACTION MEETS THE INTENT OF THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, AND I PLAN NO FURTHER ACTION.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/30/1989
Response: THE FAA IS IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING THIS RECOMMENDATION. AS SOON AS THE REVIEW IS COMPLETED, THE FAA WILL APPRISE THE BOARD OF ITS PLANNED ACTION TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE.