Skip Ribbon Commands
Skip to main content
Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-88-136
Details
Synopsis: ON NOVEMBER 15, 1987, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT 1713, A MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-14, N626TX, WAS OPERATING AS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED, PASSENGER-CARRYING FLIGHT BETWEEN DENVER, COLORADO, AND BOISE, IDAHO. THE AIRPLANE WAS CLEARED TO TAKE OFF FOLLOWING A DELAY OF APPROXIMATELY 27 MINUTES AFTER DEICING. THE TAKEOFF ROLL WAS UNEVENTFUL, BUT FOLLOWING A RAPID ROTATION, THE AIRPLANE CRASHED OFF THE RIGHT SIDE OF RUNWAY 35 LEFT. BOTH PILOTS, 1 FLIGHT ATTENDANT, AND 25 PASSENGERS SUSTAINED FATAL INJURIES. TWO FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND 52 PASSENGERS SURVIVED.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all DC-9-10 series operators to establish detailed procedures for detecting upper wing ice before takeoff. (Superseded by A-91-124)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded
Mode: Aviation
Location: DENVER, CO, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA88MA004
Accident Reports: Continental Airlines, Inc., Flight 1713 McDonnell Douglas DC-9-14, N626TX
Report #: AAR-88-09
Accident Date: 11/15/1987
Issue Date: 11/3/1988
Date Closed: 12/11/1991
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded)
Keyword(s): Icing, Weather

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/11/1991
Response: (PER GREEN SHEET A-91-123 THROUGH -128) Safety Recommendation A-88-136 was classified "Closed--Unacceptable Action/Superseded" by A-91-124.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/30/1989
Response: THE FAA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION AND DOES NOT PLAN TO REQUIRE THAT DC-9-10 OPERATORS ESTABLISH SPECIAL ICE INSPECTION PROCEDURES FOR THE DC-9-10 AIRCRAFT. THE FAA DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANYTHING UNIQUE ABOUT THE DC 9-10 SERIES AIRCRAFT (INCLUDING THE ABSENCE OF SLATS) THAT WOULD WARRANT SPECIAL ICE DETECTION PROCEDURES. IT IS A WELL-KNOWN FACT THAT ANY ICE, SNOW, OR FROST ADHERING TO WINGS, PROPELLERS, OR CONTROL SURFACES CAN CAUSE A DEGRADATION OF AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND AIRCRAFT FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS, THE MAGNITUDE OF WHICH MAY BE SIGNIFICANT AND UNPREDICTABLE. IT APPEARS THAT, IN THE CASE OF THIS ACCIDENT, THE FLIGHTCREW DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES IN THE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL WITH RESPECT TO THE VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE OPERATING PROCEDURES. I BELIEVE THAT ALL AIR CARRIERS MUST CONTINUE TO STRESS TO THEIR FLIGHT AND GROUND CREWS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CLEAN WING CONCEPT AND THE NECESSITY TO COMPLY WITH ESTABLISHED OPERATIONS PROCEDURES. THE FAA BELIEVES THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT TAKEOFF NOT BE ATTEMPTED UNLESS IT HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED THAT ALL OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT ARE FREE OF ICE, SNOW, OR FROST. THE FAA STRESSES THIS "CLEAN WING CONCEPT" IN VARIOUS PUBLICATIONS, INCLUDING AC 20-117 (HAZARDS FOLLOWING GROUND DEICING AND GROUND OPERATIONS IN CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO AIRCRAFT ICING), THE MANUAL ENTITLED WINTER OPERATIONS GUIDANCE FOR AIR CARRIERS, AND VARIOUS AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS BULLETINS.