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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-87-110
Details
Synopsis: ON OCTOBER 25, 1986, PIEDMONT AIRLINES FLIGHT 467, A BOEING 737-222, N752N, WAS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLIGHT OPERATING UNDER 14 CFR 121 FROM NEWARK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO MYRTLE BEACH, SOUTH CAROLINA, WITH AN EN ROUTE STOP AT CHARLOTTE DOUGLAS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA. THERE WERE 114 PASSENGERS AND 5 CREWMEMBERS ON BOARD. THE FLIGHT WAS ROUTINE UNTIL ITS ARRIVAL INTO THE CHARLOTTE AREA, WHERE INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED. AT 2004:17, THE FLIGHT WAS CLEARED FOR THE INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM APPROACH (ILS) TO RUNWAY 36R. THE AIRPLANE TOUCHED DOWN AT 2007:19 AND ABOUT 2007:43 IT DEPARTED THE RUNWAY. THE AIRPLANE STRUCK THE LOCALIZER ANTENNA ARRAY LOCATED ABOUT 300 FEET FROM THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY, STRUCK A CONCRETE CULVERT LOCATED 18 FEET BEYOND THE LOCALIZER, AND CONTINUED THROUGH A CHAIN LINK FENCE. IT CAME TO REST UPON THE EDGE OF RAILROAD TRACKS LOCATED 440 FEET FROM THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY. THE AIRPLANE WAS DESTROYED, 3 PASSENGERS SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES, AND 3 CREWMEMBERS AND 28 PASSENGERS SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES IN THE ACCIDENT.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: DURING ANNUAL INSPECTIONS OF FULL CERTIFICATE AIRPORTS, EMPHASIZE THE IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENT RUNWAY CONDITIONS AND USE APPROVED FRICTION-MEASURING DEVICES TO MEASURE THE DRY RUNWAY COEFFICIENTS OF FRICTION; ENCOURAGE THE AIRPORT OPERATOR TO CORRECT (OR PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NOTICE TO USERS) RUNWAY CONDITIONS THAT DO NOT MEET THE CRITERIA RECOMMENDED IN ADVISORY CIRCULAR 150/5320-12A. (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-82-153)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: CHARLOTTE, NC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA87AA006
Accident Reports: Piedmont Airlines Flight 467 Boeing 737-222, N752N
Report #: AAR-87-08
Accident Date: 10/25/1986
Issue Date: 10/16/1987
Date Closed: 3/26/1993
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/26/1993
Response: THE BOARD NOTES THAT THE FAA HAS REVISED AC 150/5320-12B, MEASUREMENT, CONSTRUCTION, & MAINTENANCE OF SKID-RESISTANT AIRPORT PAVEMENT SURFACES. THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THIS AC ADDRESSES THE INTENT OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS; THEREFORE, THE BOARD CLASSIFIES RECOMMENDATIONS A-87-110 & -111 "CLOSED--ACCEPTABLE ACTION."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 12/23/1992
Response: THE FAA AGREES WITH THE INTENT THESE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS AND HAS REVISED ASVISORY CIRCULAR (AC) 150/5320-12B, MEASUREMENT, CONSTRUCTION, AND MAINTENANCE OF SKID-RESISTANT AIRPORT PAVEMENT SURFACES. THIS AC CONTAINS GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES FOR THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF SKID-RESISTANT PAVEMENT, PAVEMENT EVALUATION WITH OR WITHOUT FRICTION EQUIPMENT, AND MAINTENANCE OF HIGH SKID-RESISTANT PAVEMENTS. A COPY OF THE AC IS AVAILABLE FOR THE BOARD'S INFORMATION. THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THIS AC ADDRESSES THE INTENT OF THESE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 11/8/1990
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board has closely followed the responses to Safety Recommendations A-87-110 and -111 concerning runway friction measurement. We have noted the apparent progress made by the FAA/industry forum on runway friction measurement in revising Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5320-12. We strongly support the efforts of the forum in this endeavor, and we believe the revision would do much to fulfill the intent of these safety recommendations. We urge the FAA to finalize AC 150/5320-12 as soon as possible. Safety Recommendations A-87-110 and -111 are classified "Open--Acceptable Response" pending your final action.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 11/5/1990
Response: LETTER GENERATED AS A RESULT OF MEETING WITH FAA AND INDUSTRY. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BY THE FAA/INDUSTRY FORUM ON RUNWAY FRICTION MEASUREMENT IN REVISING ADVISORY CIRCULAR (AC) 150/5320-12. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE FORUM IN THIS ENDEAVOR, AND WE BELIEVE THE REVISION WOULD DO MUCH TO FULFILL THE INTENT OF THESE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/28/1989
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed former Administrator McArtor's letter in further response to the Safety Board's Recommendations A-87-110 and -111, concerning the use of friction-measurement devices and runway maintenance actions at full certificate airports. The publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking which incorporates the intent of these safety recommendations is encouraged by the Safety Board. We look forward to a review of any rulemaking action issued in this area. Pending further action, Recommendations A-87-110 and -111 will be held in an "Open-- Acceptable Action" status.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/19/1989
Response: THE FAA IS CONDUCTING A FIELD SURVEY OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF RUNWAY FRICTION MEASUREMENT AND RUBBER REMOVAL. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE SURVEY HAVE PRODUCED SUFFICIENT DATA TO CONSIDER THE ISSUANCE OF A NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (NPRM) PROJECT. THE NPRM THAT THE FAA IS CONSIDERING WOULD PROPOSE TO REQUIRE CERTAIN AIRPORT OPERATORS TO CONDUCT PERIODIC RUNWAY FRICTION MEASUREMENT AS A PART OF THE ONGOING PAVEMENT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM. I WILL PROVIDE THE BOARD WITH A COPY OF ANY DOCUMENT THAT MAY BE ISSUED.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/29/1988
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed your letter in further response to the Safety Board's Safety Recommendations A-87-110 and -111, concerning the use of friction-measurement devices at full certificate airports, and does not agree with the FAA's assessment of the limited feasibility of their use. The Safety Board's staff has worked closely with FAA personnel during the testing of friction measuring devices. For runway maintenance purposes, these devices have repeatedly demonstrated their value in assessing the frictional quality of the runway. The Piedmont accident at Charlotte, North Carolina, clearly indicated the value of these devices. Four months prior to the accident, an FAA airports inspector made no comments on his inspection form concerning Runway 18L-36R during his annual inspection. (This inspection is a visual process). After the accident, friction-measuring devices were employed to check the braking quality of the runway. These devices indicated substandard friction in the last 1500 feet of the runway, primarily due to collapsed asphalt grooving. The Safety Board cited this condition as "contributing to the severity of the accident" in the final report. It should be noted that runway 18L-36R at Charlotte was recently repaved largely as a result of the Safety Board's findings subsequent to the accident. The FAA's response also suggests that some parties (American Association of Airport Executives, the Air Transport Association of America, the Air Line Pilots Association, International, and the Allied Pilots Association) need to be consulted prior to making a decision to proceed with regulatory action. These parties have been closely involved with the friction-measurement program for a number of years, and are fully aware of the accuracy of the runway devices when used properly for maintenance purposes. Finally, the FAA's response states that "the logistics of accomplishing this with current FAA airport inspector staffing would be impossible." The Safety Board did not specifically recommend that FAA airport inspectors be tasked to perform the friction measurements. We believe the operation and maintenance of the equipment, and the periodic measurement of runway friction should be the responsibility of the airport operator, not the FAA. We are disappointed that the FAA has been unwilling to accept the use of friction- measurement devices despite repeated successful testing by its own staff. Pending receipt of further correspondence, these recommendations are classified in an "Open- -Unacceptable Action" status.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/12/1988
Response: THERE ARE 700 CERTIFICATED AIRPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE FAA HAS APPROXIMATELY 25 FULL-TIME AIRPORT INSPECTORS WHO PERFORM ANNUAL INSPECTIONS ON THESE 700 AIRPORTS. CURRENT APPROVED FRICTION MEASUREMENT REQUIRES EQUIPMENT THAT MUST BE EITHER DRIVEN OR PULLED BY A VEHICLE. THE LOGISTICS OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS WITH CURRENT FAA AIRPORT INSPECTOR STAFFING WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. ALSO, TO ACCOMPLISH THE INTENT OF THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, FRICTION MEASUREMENT MUST BE DONE MORE FREQUENTLY THAN ONCE A YEAR WHEN AN FAA INSPECTOR IS ON THE AIRPORT. THE FAA BELIEVES THAT IT IS NEITHER COST-EFFECTIVE NOR FEASIBLE FOR THE AIRPORT CERTIFICATION INSPECTORS TO MEASURE DRY RUNWAY COEFFICENTS OF FRICTION. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN OPTION IN ANY POSSIBLE REGULATORY ACTION.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/1/1988
Response: The FAA's December 23, 1987, response to Safety Recommendations A-87-110 and -111 indicates that the FAA will evaluate the results of a current runway friction measurement program and assess the feasibility of requiring airport operators to make periodic measurements of friction coefficients on dry runways. The Safety Board is classifying Safety Recommendations A-87-110 and -111 as "Open--Acceptable Action" pending further FAA action.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 12/23/1987
Response: The FAA is currently engaged in gathering runway friction data at a number of large East Coast airports. Based on the results of the study, the FAA will assess the severity of the problem, determine potential remedies, and consider the feasibility of requiring certain airport operators to make periodic measurements of dry runway coefficients of friction. I will keep the Board apprised of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations.