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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-82-169
Details
Synopsis: ON JANUARY 23, 1982, WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., FLIGHT 30H, A MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-30, WAS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, TO BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, WITH AN EN ROUTE STOP AT NEWARK, NEW JERSEY. FOLLOWING A NONPRECISION INSTRUMENT APPROACH TO RUNWAY 15R AT BOSTON-LOGAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, THE AIRPLANE TOUCHED DOWN ABOUT 2,500 FEET BEYOND THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD OF THE RUNWAY, LEAVING 6,691 FEET REMAINING ON WHICH TO STOP. ABOUT 1936:40, THE AIRPLANE VEERED TO AVOID THE APPROACH LIGHT PIER AT THE DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY AND SLID INTO THE SHALLOW WATER OF BOSTON HARBOR. THE NOSE SECTION SEPARATED FROM THE FORWARD FUSELAGE AFTER THE AIRPLANE DROPPED ONTO THE SHORE EMBANKMENT. OF THE 212 PERSONS ON BOARD, 2 ARE MISSING AND PRESUMED DEAD. THE OTHERS EVACUATED THE AIRPLANE SAFELY, BUT WITH SOME INJURIES. THE REPORTED WEATHER WAS A MEASURED 800-FOOT OVERCAST, 2 1/2 MILE VISIBILITY, LIGHT RAIN AND FOG, TEMPERATURE 35 DEGREES, AND WIND 165 DEGREES AT 3 KNS. THE WET RUNWAY WAS COVERED WITH HARD-PACKED SNOW AND A COATING OF RAIN AND/OR GLAZED ICE.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: CONVENE AN INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT GROUP WHICH INCLUDES THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION TO DEFINE A PROGRAM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RELIABLE TAKEOFF ACCELERATION MONITORING SYSTEM. (Supersedes Safety Recommendations A-74-119 through -121 and A-76-136 and -137)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: BOSTON, MA, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA82AA013
Accident Reports: World Airways, Inc., Flight 30H, McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30CF, N113WA
Report #: SIR-83-02
Accident Date: 1/23/1982
Issue Date: 12/23/1982
Date Closed: 4/1/1988
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/1/1988
Response: The Safety Board is aware that the Society of Automotive Engineers Aircraft Division Data Source: NTSB Recommendations to FAA and FAA Responses released Aerospace Standard 8044 in October 1987 to provide industry guidance for the development and certification of takeoff acceleration monitoring systems. This action complies with the intent of Safety Recommendation A-82-169 which is being reclassified as "Closed--Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/5/1987
Response: The FAA has reviewed the intent of this recommendation in view of the current status of the development of a takeoff acceleration monitoring system (TAMS) and the progress of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) ad hoc committee considering the technical aspects of such a system. The FAA has concluded that there is no viable operational requirement for a TAMS that could be proposed as a significant safety improvement regulation under existing rulemaking policies . The same flightcrew practices and procedures for assessing takeoff acceleration as outlined in detail in the Board's special report on airplane operations on contaminated runways (NTSB/SIR-83/02 dated April 22, 1983) still exist. The concerns for accounting for all real.-world operational considerations and factors still exist and must be addressed to develop a practical and reliable system. The potential adverse safety concerns, such as false alarms which could result in unnecessary high-speed aborted takeoffs and/or flightcrew distractions during a critical period, are still considered valid.The accident record associated with lack of takeoff acceleration as a significant causal factor is extremely rare, and the premise that requiring a TAMS would have precluded those accidents is not clearly evident. The Air Florida Boeing 737 accident, for example, clearly had many factors associated with the accident's occurring, all of which could have been prevented if existing, well-known procedures had been used. The progress of the SAE ad hoc committee will be monitored, and the committee report reviewed when it becomes available. Based on the information outlined in this response, the FAA does not intend to pursue Safety Recommendation A-82-169. I t r u s t t h a t t h e s e a c t i o n s w i l l meet with t h e Board's a p p r o v a l .

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/26/1984
Response: The Safety Board notes that, at the FAA's request, the Society of Automotive Engineers formed an ad hoc committee comprised of representatives of aviation manufacturers, operators, and the FAA to establish the requirements for a takeoff performance monitoring system. The Safety Board appreciates being kept informed of the progress of this committee. Pending review of the committee's final report, Safety Recommendation A-84-169 has been classified as "Open--Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/7/1984
Response: FAA LETTER: THE JOINT AVIATION/INDUSTRY LANDING AND TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE GROUP RECOMMENDED THAT FAA FORM A COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH THE REQUIREMENT FOR A TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE MONITORING SYSTEM. TO THIS END, FAA REQUESTED AND RECEIVED THE COOPERATION OF THE SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS (SAE) WHICH ESTABLISHED AN AD HOC COMMITTEE CHARGED WITH PROVIDING TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION AND CRITERIA INCLUDING MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR THESE SYSTEMS. THIS COMMITTEE WILL BE COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM AVIATION ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ETC., AS WELL AS APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES FROM FAA. THE FAA RECOGNIZES THAT, WHILE MUCH OF THE TECHNOLOGY TO ENABLE SUCH SYSTEMS IS AVAILABLE, THE TASK OF VIABLY INTEGRATING THIS TECHNOLOGY INTO OPERATIONAL USE IS REGARDED AS LONG TERM IN NATURE. WE WILL APPRISE THE BOARD OF A DEFINED PROGRAM AND ITS SCHEDULE WHEN ESTABLISHED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/14/1983
Response: We acknowledge the FAA's contention that the Joint Aviation/Industry Landing and Takeoff Performance Group which was formed to review the recommendations which evolved from the November 1981 Take Off Performance Requirements Conference would be an appropriate body to undertake the actions described in Safety Recommendations A-82-155 and -169. In so far as we are aware, however, there has been no on-going activity by the group nor have we been apprised of any definitive programs or plans to address the concerns of the subject recommendations. We will, therefore, classify Safety Recommendations A-82-155 and -169 as "Open--Unacceptable Action" pending some assurance from FAA that these concerns are receiving positive attention by the task group. We would view a defined program and a program schedule to constitute such assurance.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/1/1983
Response: FAA LETTER: WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN ACTION ON RECOMMENDATIONS A-82-155 AND A-82-169. IN FACT, PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, THE FAA CONVENED THE "TRANSPORT AIRPLANE TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS CONFERENCE" IN NOVEMBER 1981 IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON. THIS WAS A PUBLIC TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ATTENDED BY INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, AND FOREIGN AVIATION AUTHORITY PERSONNEL. WE BELIEVE THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE AGENDA ITEMS DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE. THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (AIA) OFFERED TO FORM A BROAD-BASED INDUSTRY STUDY GROUP TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THAT CONFERENCE AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS TO THE FAA. IN ADDITION, THEY ARE REVIEWING THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS. WE ACCEPT THEIR OFFER; AND HENCE, THE JOINT AVIATION/INDUSTRY LANDING AND TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE TASK GROUP WAS FORMED. IT HAS HELD ITS SECOND MEETING AND WE UNDERSTAND IT IS MAKING PROGRESS. THE TASK GROUP INCLUDES MEMBERS FROM AIA, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION, INC., NATIONAL AIR CARRIER ASSOCIATION, INC., AND REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION.