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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-81-165
Details
Synopsis: ON APRIL 17, 1981, AIR U.S. 716, HP-137 (JETSTREAM), AND SKY'S WEST PARACHUTE CENTER'S CESSNA TU-206 COLLIDED IN MIDAIR AT 13,000 FEET M.S.L. NEAR THE FT. COLLINS/ LOVELAND AIRPORT, LOVELAND, COLORADO (SEE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB-AAR-81-18). THE MIDAIR COLLISION ILLUSTRATES CERTAIN SAFETY BOARD CONCERNS RELATED TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES AND EXISTING REGULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PARACHUTE JUMP OPERATIONS.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: ESTABLISH A SPECIAL TRANSPONDER CODE WITH AN APPROPRIATE AND READILY IDENTIFIABLE RADAR DISPLAY FOR ALL PARACHUTE JUMP OPERATIONS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Reconsidered
Mode: Aviation
Location: Loveland, CO, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA81AA015
Accident Reports: Air U.S. Flight 716, HP-137, N11360, and Sky's West Cessna TU-206, N4862F, Midair Collision
Report #: AAR-81-18
Accident Date: 4/17/1981
Issue Date: 1/25/1982
Date Closed: 7/8/1982
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Reconsidered)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 7/8/1982
Response: The potential for confusion, as described in your letter, appears to outweigh the advantages which might accrue through the establishment of a special code for parachute jumping operations. Consequently, we shall classify this as "Closed-- Reconsidered."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/27/1982
Response: FAA LTR: A UNIQUE IDENTIFIER TRIGGERED BY A SPECIAL TRANSPONDER CODE WOULD NOT FACILITATE THE RADAR IDENTIFICATION PROCESS SPECIFIED IN FAA HANDBOOK 7110.65, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD IMPROVE SAFETY. HOWEVER, IT COULD CAUSE UNDUE CONCERN BY CONTROLLERS HAVING JURISDICTIONS OVER THE AIRSPACE (SECTORS) THE JUMP AIRCRAFT TRANSITS WHILE EN ROUTE TO OR FROM A JUMP ZONE AND WHOSE SECTORS DO NOT ACTUALLY ENCOMPASS THE JUMP AREA. THOSE CONTROLLERS COULD BE LED TO BELIEVE THAT A JUMP OPERATION WAS ACTUALLY BEING CONDUCTED (CONTRADICTORY TO THE PRO VISIONS OF 14 CFR 105) WHEN, IN FACT, THE AIRCRAFT WAS STILL MILES FROM THE JUMP ZONE IN ANOTHER CONTROLLER'S SECTOR. BASICALLY, THE UNIQUE IDENTIFIER WOULD ONLY INDICATE THAT AN AIRCRAFT CONTAINED PARACHUTISTS, AND IT WOULD INEVITABLY TRIGGER QUESTIONS INVOLING CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO UNNECESSARILY COMPLEX PROCEDURES.