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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-78-030
Details
Synopsis: ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1976, A GRUMMAN GULFSTREAM II, N500J, CRASHED MAKING AN INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM APPROACH TO INGALLS FIELD AIRPORT, HOT SPRINGS, VIRGINIA. THE AIRCRAFT WAS OPERATED BY JOHNSON & JOHNSON, INC., UNDER 14 CFR 91 SUBPART D. DURING ITS INVESTIGATION, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DISCOVERED THAT THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FLIGHT DEPARTMENT DID NOT HAVE, NOR WAS IT REQUIRED TO HAVE, A FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL WHICH DETAILED THE OPERATIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND COCKPIT PROCEDURES WHICH JOHNSON & JOHNSON REQUIRED ITS FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS TO FOLLOW. JOHNSON & JOHNSON PILOTS CONFORMED TO WELL KNOWN, UNWRITTEN COMPANY PROCEDURES DURING THE CONDUCT OF THEIR FLIGHTS.
Recommendation: DEVELOP THE CRITERIA TO DETERMINE WHICH CORPORATE/EXECUTIVE FL DEPARTMENTS ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER FORMAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUALS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Hot Springs, VA, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA76AZ039
Accident Reports: Johnson and Johnson, Inc., Grumman Gulfstream II, N500J
Report #: AAR-78-04
Accident Date: 9/26/1976
Issue Date: 4/24/1978
Date Closed: 6/15/1979
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/15/1979
Response: On july 5, 1978, the faa responded, stating that evidence was lacking to support a requirement for the corporate/executive flight departments to operate under flight operations manuals, or to establish criteria for a flight operations manual. In our followup letter of august 23, 1978, we urged the faa to reconsider these recommendations and, if regulatory action was considered impractical, to take alternate action. We suggested as an alternative the issuance of an operations alert bulletin directing field inspectors to encourage the development of flight operations manuals by the corporate/executive operators in their districts. On october 4, 1978, the faa responded, stating that they were unable to find justification for the action and that their position remained unchanged. These recommendations were again discussed by our staff at an ntsb/faa quarterly meeting held on march 2, 1979. There was no change in the faa's position. Therefore, these recommendations are placed in a closed--unacceptable action status.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/5/1978
Response: FAA LTR: WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENT OF CRITERIA TO DETERMINE WHICH CORPORATE/EXECUTIVE FLIGHT DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE UNDER FORMAL OPERATIONS MANUALS IS FEASIBLE OR THAT IT WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON THE CURRENT HIGH LEVEL OF CORPORATE FLIGHT SAFETY. 10/4/78 - FAA LTR: WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANY EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY ACTION TO REQUIRE CERTAIN CORPORATE/EXECUTIVE FLIGHT DEPARTMENTS TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE UNDER FORMAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUALS. IN VIEW OF THE EXCELLENT AND STEADILY IMPROVING SAFETY RECORD OF THESE OPERATIONS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT INCREASING THE FIELD INSPECTOR'S ACTIVITY IN AN ADVISORY ROLE IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.