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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-72-101
Details
Synopsis: DURING THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S PUBLIC HEARING REGARDING THE MOHAWK AIRLINES ACCIDENT AT ALBANY, NEW YORK, AN AREA OF DISAGREEMENT DEVELOPED AS TO THE PROPER EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED UPON ENCOUNTERING A CRUISE PITCH LOCK WITHDRAWAL MALFUNCTION. PILOTS OPERATING THE FH-227B AIRCRAFT STATED THAT THEY DISAGREED WITH THE PUBLISHED PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN THE MOHAWK AIRLINES OPERATIONS MANUAL.
Recommendation: REQUIRE THAT ALL CARRIERS OPERATING FH-227B AIRCRAFT REVISE THEIR RECURRENT GROUND TRAINING CURRICULA TO INCLUDE INSTRUCTION ON THE PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FH-227B WHEN OPERATING THE AIRCRAFT WITH A CRUISE PITCH LOCK MALFUNCTION. EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED UPON FLIGHT CONDITIONS INVOLVING A WINDMILLING PROPELLER ON THE CRUISE PITCH OR FLIGHT FINE LOCKS AND THE MINIMUM CONTROL SPEED PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH CONDITIONS.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Albany, NY, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA72AZ009
Accident Reports: Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Fairchild Hiller FH-227B, N7818M
Report #: AAR-73-08
Accident Date: 3/3/1972
Issue Date: 7/7/1972
Date Closed: 4/12/1973
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Flightcrew, Training and Education

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 7/12/1973
Response: Closed--acceptable action.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/14/1973
Response: We have reviewed and evaluated the present cruise pitch lock emergency procedure including rolls royce service bulletin no. 61.10a. The approved flight manual procedures are considered satisfactory. These procedures are not mandatory, however, and do not prohibit an operator from developing and training personnel in alternate, equivalent procedures.2. We agree that operators should be aware of the potential hazards associated with operating an engine with the propeller hung on the cruisepitch lock. While we do not object to inclusion of such information in certificate holder's operations manuals we favor modification of initial and recurrent training programs to include it. This will apprise crews that the airplane can be successfully handled in this configuration in various maneuvers including missed approaches, without damage to the engine. 3. We plan to insert operations bulletins in faa handbooks 8430.1a and 8430.6a. Principal operations inspectors will be directed to revise operators initial and recurrent training programs which we believe will satisfy the intent of recommendations 2 and 3.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/7/1972
Response: THEY PLAN TO INSERT OPERATIONS BULLETINS IN FAA HANDBOOKS 8430.1A AND 8430.6A. PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS WILL BE DIRECTED TO REVISE OPERATORS INITIAL AND RECURRENT TRAINING PROGRAMS WHICH SHOULD SATISFY THE INTENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 100, AND 101. 3/14/73 - RESPONSE FROM THE FAA TO SAY THEY CONSIDER THE PRESENT APPROVED FLIGHT MANUAL PROCEDURES TO BE SATISFACTORY. HOWEVER, THEY PLAN TO INSERT OPERATIONS BULLETINS IN FAA HANDBOOKS 8430.1A AND 8430.6A. ADDITIONALLY, PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS WILL BE DIRECTED TO REVISE THE OPERATORS INITIAL AND RECURRENT TRAINING PROGRAMS.