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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-72-098
Details
Synopsis: THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS INVESTIGATING AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING AN AMERICAN AIRLINES MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-10, N103AA, WHICH OCCURRED SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF FROM DETROIT METROPOLITAN-WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT ON JUNE 12, 1972. THE AFT LEFT-HAND CARGO DOOR OPENED WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS AT APPROXIMATELY 12,000 FEET. THE CABIN FLOOR OVER THIS CARGO COMPARTMENT THEN FAILED AS A RESULT OF DEPRESSURIZATION LOADING, AND THE FLOOR DROPPED PARTIALLY INTO THE CARGO COMPARTMENT. THIS DISPLACEMENT OF THE FLOOR CAUSED SERIOUS DISRUPTION OF THE CONTROL CABLES WHICH ARE ROUTED THROUGH THE FLOOR BEAMS TO THE EMPENNAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE ENGINE CONTROLS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RIGHT RUDDER PEDAL CABLE, ALL OF THE CABLES ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE FUSELAGE BROKE. THE CABLE RUNS ON THE RIGHT SIDE WERE ALSO DAMAGED -- THE CABLE GUIDES TORE FROM THEIR ATTACHMENTS TO THE FLOOR BEAMS, AND THE CABLES WERE DEFLECTED DOWNWARD BY THE FLOOR STRUCTURE.
Recommendation: REQUIRE THE INSTALLATION OF RELIEF VENTS BETWEEN THE CABIN AND AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT TO MINIMIZE THE PRESSURE LOADING ON THE CABIN FLOORING IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE CARGO COMPARTMENT.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Windsor, On, Canada
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: CHI72AC099
Accident Reports: American Airlines, Inc., McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, N103AA
Report #: AAR-73-02
Accident Date: 6/12/1972
Issue Date: 7/6/1972
Date Closed: 3/11/1976
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/1/1975
Response: Closed--acceptable action.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/17/1975
Response: Major discussions were held with mcdonnell-douglas on march 15, april 30, june 6 and 7, september 25, october 2, 3, and 4, 1974, and most recently on january 7. We have also reviewed the l-1011 and b727 designs with lockheed and boeing representatives on april 30 and may 1, 1974. These many discussions covered specific design improvements including external door designs, floor structure and strengthening, intercompartment venting and isolation of critical systems, and other features. We can advise you shortly of the results of our investigation and the corrective measures to be required. This should be prior to january 31.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/15/1973
Response: We have requested that the manufacturer reassess the dc-10 with regard to the effects on safety of probable large openings in the pressurized fuselage. The manufacturer is to consider rerouting of vital systems, reinforcement of the floor as well as incorporation of additional venting between compartments. These alternatives will include considera- tion of various degrees of venting as recommended in your letter.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/23/1973
Response: With respect to recommendation a-72-98, you observed that a preliminary investigation indicated that it may not be feasible to provide complete venting between cabin and cargo compartments. When your investigation is complete, the board would appreciate knowing if the installation of vents similar to those on other dc-10 cargo compartments is feasible in the aft cargo compartment. If complete venting is not possible, partial venting would be beneficial. Such venting could prevent the collapse of the aft cabin floor, or it couldreduce the amount of floor deflection, and attendant control cable damage in a dc-10.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/7/1972
Response: 3/15/73 - LETTER FROM THE FAA TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE REQUESTED THE MANUFACTURER TO REASSESS THE DC-10 WITH REGARD TO THE EFFECTS ON SAFETY OF PROBABLE LARGE OPENINGS IN THE PRESSURIZED FUSELAGE. THE MANUFACTURER IS TO CONSIDER REROUTING OF VITAL SYSTEMS, REINFORCEMENT OF THE FLOOR AS WELL AS INCORPORATION OF ADDITIONAL VENTING BETWEEN COMPARTMENTS. THESE ALTERNATIVES WILL INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS DEGREES OF VENTING AS RECOMMENDED IN THE BOARD'S LETTER. NOTE: 3/3/74 - TURKISH AIRLINES DC-10 CRASHES NEAR PARIS, FRANCE. WITH 334 DEATHS, THE ACCIDENT IS THE WORST IN CIVIL AVIATION HISTORY. 3/19/74 THE BOARD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE FAA ADMINISTRATOR INDICATING THAT ON 3/5/74 THE ADMINISTRATOR FORMED A TASK FORCE UNDER OSCAR BAKKE, ASSO. ADM. FOR AV. SAFETY, TO REVIEW DC-10 CARGO DOOR MODIFICATIONS. ON 3/6/74, THE FAA ISSUED AN A.D. REQUIRING IMMEDIATE MODIFICATION OF ALL DC-10 CARGO DOORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MCDONNELL DOUGLAS SERVICE BULLETINS 52-27, 52-35, AND 52-37, EXCEPT THOSE MODIFIED BY 52-49. ADDITIONALLY, THE A.D. REQUIRED A FLIGHTCREW MEMBER TO CHECK EACH CARGO DOOR FOR SECURITY PRIOR TO EACH FLIGHT. COPIES OF THE A.D. WERE ALSO SENT TO ALL FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS UTILIZING DC-10 EQUIPMENT. ON 3/7/74, FAA MADE A FLEET-WIDE INSPECTION TO CHECK AD COMPLIANCE BY DC-10 OPERATORS. ON WEEKEND OF 3/15 AND 16, 1974, FAA INSPECTORS MADE A SECOND INTENSIVE FLEET-WIDE AD INSPECTION. (A TOTAL OF 130 INSPECTIONS WERECARRIED OUT) A-72-98 - AD-75-15-05 FULFILLS THE RECOMMENDATION. CLOSED