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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-72-027
Details
Synopsis: AS A RESULT OF OUR INVESTIGATIONS OF A MIDAIR COLLISION BETWEEN A UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RB57C AND A CESSNA 150 AT ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO, ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1971, AND A MIDAIR COLLISION BETWEEN AN EASTERN AIR LINES DC-9 AND A CESSNA 206 AT RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT, NORTH CAROLINA, ON DECEMBER 4, 1971, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD IS FORWARDING TWO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.
Recommendation: REQUIRE THE PILOTS OF ALL AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH AN OPERABLE TRANSPONDER TO HAVE THE TRANSPONDER TURNED "ON" AND ADJUSTED TO REPLY ON THE APPROPRIATE MODE A/3 CODE WHENEVER VFR OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED INTO, OR IN PROXIMITY TO, AN AIRPORT SERVICED BY A RADAR APPROACH CONTROL FACILITY.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Raleigh, NC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: NYC72AN074
Accident Reports: Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
Report #: AAR-72-13
Accident Date: 12/4/1971
Issue Date: 1/26/1972
Date Closed: 4/25/1972
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/3/1975
Response: Closed--acceptable action.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 7/10/1972
Response: This report appears to follow a trend in several recent boardreports which exculpate pilots without supporting facts or logical analysis. With respect to your letter of transmittal on this report, calling our attention to the recommendation section, we should advise you we respond to them on 12 april 1972. We request this letter be made part of the public docket for reading with the board report of this accident.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/9/1972
Response: This document will be released to the public on the date stampedon the cover. No public dissemination of this document should be made prior to that date. The purpose of providing this document in advance of the public release is to give you an opportunity to be acquainted with its contents prior to release, so that you can be prepared to answer inquiries.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 4/12/1972
Response: THIS RECOMMENDATION IS COVERED IN THE AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, PART 1. WHILE NOT A REGULATION, ITS INTENT DOES RESULT IN PILOTS OPERATING VFR ROUTINELY HAVING AN OPERABLE TRANSPONDER TURNED ON THE APPROPRIATE MODEL A/3 CODE. HOWEVER, AN NPRM WILL BE ISSUED TO PROPOSE THAT ALL FLIGHTS, VFR AND IFR, IN TWENTY-ONE OF THE BUSIEST TERMINAL AREAS BE REQUIRED TO HAVE AN OPERATING IMPROVED TRANSPONDER, I.E., WITH 4096 CODES AND ALTITUDE DATA. AT FORTY-TWO ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS, THE IMPROVED TRANSPONDER WOULD BE REQUIRED OF VFR AND IFR FLIGHTS UNLESS THE FLIGHT IS PARTICIPATING IN THE STAGE III RADAR SERVICE PROVIDED IN THESE TERMINAL AREAS. AT THE REMAINING RADAR EQUIPPED LOCATIONS, A MINIMUM OF STAGE II RADAR SERVICE WOULD BE FURNISHED BUT A TRANSPONDER WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 2/6/1969
Response: We are pleased that, as reflected by your letter of 1/9/69, you like our approach and agree that the safety program we have in effect should provide continuing improvement in the overall aviation safety record. We anticipate substantial benefits from the full implementation of these programs and expect to supplement them with other similar measurers as their need is perceived. It is still our opinion that education and all- out encouragement of voluntary updating and up grading of pilot skills offer perhaps the best avenues for increased safety in general aviation operations.