Skip Ribbon Commands
Skip to main content
Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-16-022
Details
Synopsis: On March 5, 2015, at 1102 eastern standard time, Delta Air Lines flight 1086, a Boeing MD-88, N909DL, was landing on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York, when it departed the left side of the runway, contacted the airport perimeter fence, and came to rest with the airplaneā€™s nose on an embankment next to Flushing Bay. The 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 98 of the 127 passengers were not injured; the other 29 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. Flight 1086 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require operators of MD-80 series airplanes to revise operational procedures to include a callout when reverse thrust power exceeds 1.3 engine pressure ratio during landings on a contaminated runway.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Open - Acceptable Response
Mode: Aviation
Location: New York, NY, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA15FA085
Accident Reports: Runway Excursion During Landing Delta Air Lines Flight 1086 Boeing MD-88, N909DL, New York, New York March 5, 2015
Report #: AAR-16-02
Accident Date: 3/5/2015
Issue Date: 10/6/2016
Date Closed:
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Open - Acceptable Response)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/21/2018
Response: -From Jennifer Bartenstein, Director of Safety Management Systems, Allegiant Air: Allegiant Air requires the PM to call out the EPR setting achieved during the landing roll out or aborted take-off, and continue to assist the PF with EPR setting callouts until the correct setting is achieved.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/27/2017
Response: We note that, on October 13, 2016, Boeing issued Temporary Revisions (TRs) 80-2-144 and 80-2-145 to the MD-80 Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM). TR 80-2-144 added language saying that the appropriate reverse thrust EPR for landing should be briefed to the Descent/Approach Expanded Procedures. TR 80-2-145 added that a callout for the pilot monitoring should identify the reverse thrust maximum EPR, as appropriate for the runway conditions, to the Landing Roll Expanded Procedures. Following your review of the operational procedures that you are performing to satisfy Safety Recommendations A-16-20 and -21, you will determine what further action is needed to satisfy this recommendation. We believe that issuing the TRs by Boeing is the first step toward satisfying this recommendation. Pending your developing and issuing the recommended requirement, Safety Recommendation A-16-22 is classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 12/27/2016
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: On October 13. 2016. Boeing issued Temporary Revisions 80-2-144 and 80-2- 145 to the MD-80 Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM). Temporary Revision 80-2-144 added language that the appropriate reverse thrust EPR for landing should be briefed to the Descent/ Approach Expanded Procedures. Temporary Revision 80-2-145 added that a callout for the pilot monitoring should identify the reverse thrust maximum EPR as appropriate for the runway conditions to the Landing Roll Expanded Procedures. If not already present, incorporating these revisions into a carrier's operating procedures and training program requires the FAA's approval. We also note that Boeing informed the FAA that these revisions were already provided to the Board and will be referenced in further responses to the Board. As discussed in our responses to the recommendations above. We are also reaching out to a selected group of operators. following our review of the operational procedures we requested, our consideration of any identified best practices and further discussions with the operators and Boeing considering the recent FCOM revisions. we will determine what further actions are necessary to address this recommendation.