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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-10-115
Details
Synopsis: On December 20, 2008, about 1818 mountain standard time, Continental Airlines flight 1404, a Boeing 737-500, N18611, departed the left side of runway 34R during takeoff from Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado. A postcrash fire ensued. The captain and 5 of the 110 passengers were seriously injured; the first officer, 2 cabin crewmembers, and 38 passengers received minor injuries; and 1 cabin crewmember and 67 passengers (3 of whom were lap-held children) were uninjured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The scheduled, domestic passenger flight, operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, was departing DEN and was destined for George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas. At the time of the accident, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, with strong and gusty winds out of the west. The flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Work with U.S. airline operators to review and analyze operational flight data to identify factors that contribute to encounters with excessive winds and use this information to develop and implement additional strategies for reducing the likelihood of wind-related runway excursions.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Denver, CO, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA09MA021
Accident Reports: Runway Side Excursion During Attempted Takeoff in Strong and Gusty Crosswind Conditions Continental Airlines Flight 1404, Boeing 737-500, NN18611
Report #: AAR-10-04
Accident Date: 12/20/2008
Issue Date: 7/29/2010
Date Closed: 12/26/2013
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Runway Safety,

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/26/2013
Response: We are disappointed that the FAA does not believe that the identified risk requires additional review of data or the development and implementation of additional strategies for reducing the likelihood of wind-related runway excursions; we continue to believe that additional safety benefits could accrue from studying a range of other, less serious events routinely recorded by airline onboard recording devices for operational use. Because the FAA believes that it has fully responded to this recommendation and plans no further action, Safety Recommendation A-10-115 is classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/6/2013
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: FAA Comment. As stated in our last letter to the Board, the federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agrees with the concept of analyzing data to identify factors that could contribute to a wind related event, and using that information to develop and implement strategies to reduce the likelihood of these events. Before working with industry, the FAA reviewed existing data. The FAA used the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing database, which includes data from the aviation safety reporting system, the National Transportation Safety Board accident database, and the FAA accident/incident data system. This review identified only four crosswind related runway excursions since the Continental incident in December 2008, which triggered this recommendation. Three of these instances occurred on takeoff, and the other occurred on landing. As these incidents had few commonalities, the FAA could find no systemic crosswind related issue to address. In addition, as there were very few similar incidents, the FAA also believes the likelihood of reoccurrence is very low. Based on this risk analysis, the FAA does not plan on working with U.S. air carriers to review data or develop and implement additional strategies for reducing the likelihood of wind-related runway excursions as this recommendation suggests. However, in accordance with our safety risk management process, one of the four components of a safety management system, we will continue to monitor the aerospace system for related events and take appropriate action to mitigate any unacceptable risk that presents itself. The FAA's analysis has shown that the risk of crosswind related runway excursions is very low, therefore, we consider our actions complete.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/6/2013
Response: Our last update from the FAA regarding these recommendations was its October 14, 2010, letter. We are concerned that, although close to 3 years have passed since then, we have received no additional information regarding the agency’s efforts to address these recommendations. Pending our timely receipt of such an update and completion of the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-10-107 and -109 remain classified “Open?Await Response, and Safety Recommendation A-10-115 remains classified OPEN--ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/16/2011
Response: The NTSB appreciates the FAA’s support for Safety Recommendation A-10-115 and its intention to work with industry to determine the appropriate data and the mechanisms available to collect it. Pending completion of these efforts, Safety Recommendation A-10-115 is classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/14/2010
Response: CC#201000393: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The FAA agrees with the concept of reviewing and analyzing data to identify factors or trends that could contribute to an event and using that information to develop and implement strategies to reduce the likelihood of that event. The FAA will work with industry to determine what data can be used to accomplish the recommended action and what mechanisms are available to collect and utilize that information.