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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-08-043
Details
Synopsis: On April 12, 2007, about 0043 eastern daylight time, a Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19, N8905F, operated as Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, ran off the departure end of runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers (including 3 lap-held infants) and 3 crewmembers, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. Weather was reported as snowing. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Minneapolis-St. Paul International (Wold-Chamberlain) Airport (MSP), Minneapolis, Minnesota, about 2153 central daylight time (CDT). Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airport operators to include in their airport’s snow and ice control plan absolute criteria for type and depth of contamination and runway friction assessments that, when met, would trigger immediate closure of the affected runway to air carrier operations. Friction assessments should be based on pilot braking action reports, values obtained from ground friction measuring equipment, or estimates provided by airport ground personnel.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Traverse City, MI, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA07FA037
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun During Landing Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712 Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL600-2B19, N8905F
Report #: AAR-08-02
Accident Date: 4/12/2007
Issue Date: 6/17/2008
Date Closed: 9/12/2011
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Runway Safety,

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/4/2015
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) draft Advisory Circulars (AC) 25-X, “Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways,” and AC 25-X, “Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance Assessments,” which were posted for comment on the FAA’s website on January 21, 2015. Both of these draft ACs provide guidance and standardized methods that data providers, such as type certificate (TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and airplane operators can use when developing performance data for transport category airplanes for operations on contaminated runways. The AC also promotes the use of consistent terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel. The NTSB is pleased that the ACs take some steps toward addressing the recommendations of the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC). The NTSB believes that it is valuable to define common methods to assess runway surface conditions along with common terms to report those conditions, and that it is critical to develop a correlation between runway surface condition descriptions, pilot-reported braking action and expected airplane wheel braking coefficients. The related industry-developed Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) tool can support and improve operational decisions on the flight deck, in the back offices, and on the ground. NTSB safety recommendations addressing these issues include: A-07-59 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to provide clear guidance and training to pilots and dispatchers regarding company policy on surface condition and braking action reports and the assumptions affecting landing distance/stopping margin calculations, to include use of airplane ground deceleration devices, wind conditions and limits, air distance, and safety margins. A-07-62 Develop and issue formal guidance regarding standards and guidelines for the development, delivery, and interpretation of runway surface condition reports. A-08-42 Issue a CertAlert to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airports that describes the circumstances of this accident, emphasizes the importance of specific and decisive radio communications, and urges airports to ensure that those criteria are being met in all airfield radio communications. A-08-43 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airport operators to include in their airport’s snow and ice control plan absolute criteria for type and depth of contamination and runway friction assessments that, when met, would trigger immediate closure of the affected runway to air carrier operations. Friction assessments should be based on pilot braking action reports, values obtained from ground friction measuring equipment, or estimates provided by airport ground personnel. The ACs also provide some guidance that data providers can use to develop appropriate data to support operational assessments of takeoff or landing performance on wet or contaminated runways, as well as guidance for incorporating existing advisory performance data into the framework suggested in the ACs.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 9/12/2011
Response: On December 8, 2008, the FAA published a revision to Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-30, “Airport Winter Safety and Operations,” which states that a nil braking action report or assessment by the airport requires that the runway be closed. The AC also requires airport operators at airports with towers to have a letter of agreement with their tower to define the process for closing a runway under nil conditions. The FAA plans to further revise AC 150/5200-30C to include information on the types and depths of contamination that may trigger the closure of a runway, once it has finished analyzing the results of the recent matrix testing discussed above. The NTSB considered whether the revisions to AC 150/5200-30 made in December 2008 satisfied this safety recommendation, the purpose of which was to establish absolute criteria that would trigger the immediate closure of an affected runway. Although the FAA is planning to revise the AC to include information on the types and depths of contamination that would close a runway, the criteria for a nil braking action pilot report or an assessment of nil braking action by the airport constitute absolute criteria that satisfy the recommendation. We encourage the FAA to continue the work described to further revise the AC; however, because the FAA completed the recommended action with its December 2008 revision to AC 150/5200-30, Safety Recommendation A-08-43 is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/26/2011
Response: CC# 201100225: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The ARC described above, as an interim measure, recommended that operations be stopped on any runway that receives a nil braking action report. As a result, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-30C, Airport Winter Safety and Operations, on December 9, 2008. Paragraph 5-6.a. of that AC states: A NIL pilot braking action report (PIREP), or NIL braking action assessment by the airport operator, requires that the runway be closed before the next flight operation. The runway must remain closed until the airport operator is satisfied that the NIL condition no longer exists. The AC also requires airport operators at towered airports to have a letter of agreement with their tower to define the process for closing a runway under nil conditions. After the results of the 2010-2011 winter matrix testing discussed in Safety Recommendation A-07-62 are complete AC 150/5200-30C will be revised to include information on the types and depths of contamination that may trigger the closure of a runway. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and will provide an update by April 2012.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/22/2009
Response: The FAA formed the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to address this recommendation and other issues of winter operations at airports. The TALPA ARC made recommendations on the type and number of pilot reports that should trigger closure of a runway. On December 8, 2008, the FAA published a revision to Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-30, Airport Winter Safety and Operations that contains the TALPA ARC recommendations. The FAA indicated that the TALPA ARC has not yet reached consensus on the types and depths of contaminants that would necessitate a runway closure, but the FAA will further revise the AC once the TALPA ARC makes recommendations about these issues. The NTSB reviewed a copy of the AC and notes that Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-6, Requirements for Runway Closures, contains guidance that is responsive to this recommendation. Pending inclusion in a future revised AC of further criteria for runway closure based on types and depth of contaminants, Safety Recommendation A-08-43 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/8/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/18/2008 11:52:00 AM MC# 2080572: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator: The FAA has formed a Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) who has been tasked to provide the FAA with industry recommendations to address this and other issues of winter operations at airports. To date, the TALPA ARC has reached consensus on the type and number of pilot reports that should trigger the closing of a runway. We are in the process of drafting a revision to Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-30, Airport Winter Safety and Operations, which will provide this guidance to airport operators. We plan to publish the revised AC by October 1, 2008, to provide airport operators guidance for the upcoming winter season. However, since the TALPA ARC has not reached consensus on the types and depths of contaminants, the AC will not address those issues at this time. We will amend the revised AC once we obtain additional input from the TALPA ARC.