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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-08-042
Details
Synopsis: On April 12, 2007, about 0043 eastern daylight time, a Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19, N8905F, operated as Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, ran off the departure end of runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers (including 3 lap-held infants) and 3 crewmembers, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. Weather was reported as snowing. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Minneapolis-St. Paul International (Wold-Chamberlain) Airport (MSP), Minneapolis, Minnesota, about 2153 central daylight time (CDT). Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Issue a CertAlert to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airports that describes the circumstances of this accident, emphasizes the importance of specific and decisive radio communications, and urges airports to ensure that those criteria are being met in all airfield radio communications.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Traverse City, MI, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA07FA037
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun During Landing Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712 Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL600-2B19, N8905F
Report #: AAR-08-02
Accident Date: 4/12/2007
Issue Date: 6/17/2008
Date Closed: 6/22/2009
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Communication,

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/4/2015
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) draft Advisory Circulars (AC) 25-X, “Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways,” and AC 25-X, “Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance Assessments,” which were posted for comment on the FAA’s website on January 21, 2015. Both of these draft ACs provide guidance and standardized methods that data providers, such as type certificate (TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and airplane operators can use when developing performance data for transport category airplanes for operations on contaminated runways. The AC also promotes the use of consistent terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel. The NTSB is pleased that the ACs take some steps toward addressing the recommendations of the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC). The NTSB believes that it is valuable to define common methods to assess runway surface conditions along with common terms to report those conditions, and that it is critical to develop a correlation between runway surface condition descriptions, pilot-reported braking action and expected airplane wheel braking coefficients. The related industry-developed Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) tool can support and improve operational decisions on the flight deck, in the back offices, and on the ground. NTSB safety recommendations addressing these issues include: A-07-59 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to provide clear guidance and training to pilots and dispatchers regarding company policy on surface condition and braking action reports and the assumptions affecting landing distance/stopping margin calculations, to include use of airplane ground deceleration devices, wind conditions and limits, air distance, and safety margins. A-07-62 Develop and issue formal guidance regarding standards and guidelines for the development, delivery, and interpretation of runway surface condition reports. A-08-42 Issue a CertAlert to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airports that describes the circumstances of this accident, emphasizes the importance of specific and decisive radio communications, and urges airports to ensure that those criteria are being met in all airfield radio communications. A-08-43 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airport operators to include in their airport’s snow and ice control plan absolute criteria for type and depth of contamination and runway friction assessments that, when met, would trigger immediate closure of the affected runway to air carrier operations. Friction assessments should be based on pilot braking action reports, values obtained from ground friction measuring equipment, or estimates provided by airport ground personnel. The ACs also provide some guidance that data providers can use to develop appropriate data to support operational assessments of takeoff or landing performance on wet or contaminated runways, as well as guidance for incorporating existing advisory performance data into the framework suggested in the ACs.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/22/2009
Response: On September 24, 2008, the FAA issued CertAlert 08-11, NTSB Recommendations for Clear and Concise Airport Communications. Issuance of this CertAlert satisfies Safety Recommendation A-08-42; consequently, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/8/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/18/2008 11:52:00 AM MC# 2080572: Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, FAA, 9/8/08 The Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Airports is in the process of drafting the recommended Cert Alert, which will highlight the shortcomings that led to this accident and provide recommendations on how to address these deficiencies. We plan to issue the Cert Alert by October 31, 2008.