Skip Ribbon Commands
Skip to main content
Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-08-041
Details
Synopsis: On April 12, 2007, about 0043 eastern daylight time, a Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19, N8905F, operated as Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, ran off the departure end of runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers (including 3 lap-held infants) and 3 crewmembers, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. Weather was reported as snowing. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Minneapolis-St. Paul International (Wold-Chamberlain) Airport (MSP), Minneapolis, Minnesota, about 2153 central daylight time (CDT). Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: As part of the Takeoff/Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee, address the need for initial training on the rationale for and criticality of conducting landing distance assessments before landing on contaminated runways.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Open - Acceptable Response
Mode: Aviation
Location: Traverse City, MI, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA07FA037
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun During Landing Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712 Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL600-2B19, N8905F
Report #: AAR-08-02
Accident Date: 4/12/2007
Issue Date: 6/17/2008
Date Closed:
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Open - Acceptable Response)
Keyword(s): Training and Education

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/4/2015
Response: From CC# 201500140: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) draft Advisory Circulars (AC) 25-X, “Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways,” and AC 25-X, “Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance Assessments,” which were posted for comment on the FAA’s website on January 21, 2015. Both of these draft ACs provide guidance and standardized methods that data providers, such as type certificate (TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and airplane operators can use when developing performance data for transport category airplanes for operations on contaminated runways. The AC also promotes the use of consistent terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel. However, the NTSB is disappointed that the FAA does not plan to undertake rulemaking to require turbojet operators to use a standardized methodology and FAA-approved data to perform takeoff and landing distance assessments for operations on wet or contaminated runways. Although many manufacturers, operators, and airports have elected to incorporate elements of the TALPA ARC recommendations that will improve industry operations and safety, the ACs provide guidance material only. Since the planned AC content is neither mandatory nor regulatory, the recommended data to support takeoff and landing distance assessments may or may not be developed. If the data are developed and optional assessments are performed, operators remain free to choose the performance data basis, the means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions, and the added safety margin, if any. The FAA has no plan to approve existing or future performance data developed by TC holders to support takeoff and landing distance assessments or the accompanying calculation methods that may inadvertently or purposely deviate from the TALPA ARC recommendations. As a result, it is likely that many components of the FAA’s AC guidance will be ignored by segments of the intended audience, even if it is consistent with the TALPA ARC’s vision. In addition, both ACs are aimed at transport category airplanes, but the guidance should, at a minimum, extend to all turbojet airplane operations. Among the NTSB safety recommendations addressing landing distance assessments are: A-07-57 Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Urgent) A-07-59 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to provide clear guidance and training to pilots and dispatchers regarding company policy on surface condition and braking action reports and the assumptions affecting landing distance/stopping margin calculations, to include use of airplane ground deceleration devices, wind conditions and limits, air distance, and safety margins. A-07-61 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. A-08-41 As part of the Takeoff/Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee, address the need for initial training on the rationale for and criticality of conducting landing distance assessments before landing on contaminated runways. One technical problem that should be addressed within the ACs is their reliance, in part, on the wheel braking coefficient model codified in Section 25.109(c) for wet runway stopping performance calculations. However, the Section 25.109(c) model has never been validated by flight test data. To its credit, the FAA has recognized that the wheel braking coefficient model in Section 25.109(c) might be insufficiently conservative, as evidenced by the recent FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) tasked to provide recommendations regarding new or updated standards for airplane performance and handling qualities. Under the subject area of Takeoff and Landing Performance, subtask (b) addresses wet runway stopping performance: b. Wet runway stopping performance. Recent landing overruns on wet runways have raised questions regarding current wet runway stopping performance requirements and methods. Analyses indicate that the braking coefficient of friction in each case was significantly lower than expected for a wet runway (i.e., lower than the level specified in FAA regulations). Consideration should also be given to the scheduling of landing performance on wet porous friction course and grooved runway surfaces. Recommendations may include the need for additional data gathering, analysis, and possible rulemaking. [emphasis added]

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/10/2015
Response: The TALPA ARC’s 2009 recommendations addressed the issues in Safety Recommendation A-08-41, completing the first part of the recommendation. As discussed above, you have stated that you do not plan any new regulations based on the TALPA ARC recommendations, but instead plan to implement the recommendations through non-regulatory means. We believe that the remaining action can be completed without any new regulations if your inspectors receive guidance on elements related to Safety Recommendation A-08-41 to consider when they are reviewing and approving an operator’s existing required training programs. As a result, you may be able to complete the action recommended through improved guidance to FAA inspectors, such as that typically placed in FAA Order 8900.1. Pending your completing the action in Safety Recommendation A-08-41, it remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/28/2014
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: In its December I 6, 2013, letter, the Board recognized that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will be addressing the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) recommendations through non-regulatory means as an interim response. Currently, certain aircraft manufacturers offer products that calculate and convey airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. For example, Airbus offers the Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) to help prevent runway overruns. Airbus decided not to keep its patented ROPS as a product differentiator and plans to release it to competing aircraft builders. Other manufacturers are developing programs that would report braking action to the air carriers' dispatch centers. One airline utilizes Aviation Safety Technologie's (AST's) SafeLand software system, which monitors and measures aircraft systems in real time to display three dimensional aircraft simulation from landing to ground movements. This information is then sent to home base via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System. The AST's algorithm can deliver normalized braking reports as well as runway braking and cornering coefficients. This information will then be shared with aircraft crew members prior to their arrival and can be used to determine real -time braking performance. The FAA encourages the use of such programs and products on a voluntary basis, and we are no longer considering rulemaking related to TALPA or regulating performance data. The FAA does not see a need to conduct a research project on their feasibility because these systems are becoming commercially available. However, as a result of the TALPA ARC recommendations, many document changes will be forth coming, including changes to much of the information currently contained in Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 060 12, with an expected target completion elate of October 2016. We plan to incorporate information contained in SAFO 060 12 into the following documents: • Advisory Circulars; • Aeronautical Information Manual; • Notices to Airmen; • Air Traffic Control guidance and manuals; and • Airport guidance and manuals. In addition to the creation of documents and document changes, we are developing the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) tool. The RCAM takes a known assessment criteria provided from the airport and provides the pilot with a downgrade assessment criterion. This downgrade assessment criterion is based on the reported runway conditions, such as the reported runway friction expressed in mu (m) values and reported braking action. This information will provide the pilot with an expected braking ability to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. The RCAM is still under final development and the procedures required to use this matrix have not yet been addressed. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an update by January 31, 2016.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/16/2013
Response: We are aware that, in mid-2009, the FAA received the recommendations of its TALPA ARC, but that the agency’s planned rulemaking in response to those recommendations has been delayed because the FAA has been forced to reallocate resources needed to develop the regulations to rulemaking projects that Congress mandated under the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law [PL] 111-216) and the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (PL 112-95). Currently, the FAA is developing a program to implement the TALPA ARC recommendations through non-regulatory means. We acknowledge the resource issues created by PL 111-216 and PL 112 95 that impact full implementation of our safety recommendations. Although the details of the FAA’s program for implementing the TALPA ARC recommendations through non-regulatory means are not yet available for our review, these initiatives may constitute effective interim responses until the needed regulatory reforms can be completed. Accordingly, pending the FAA’s completing the actions recommended, Safety Recommendations A-07-58, -59, -63, and A-08-41 remain classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/6/2013
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) received the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) recommendations for landing performance assessments in April 2009 and for contaminated runway takeoff performance in July 2009. The TALPA ARC recommended comprehensive changes to aircraft certification rules in parts 23, 25, and 26; operating rules in parts 1, 91, 121, 125, and 135; airport rules in part 139; as well as FAA internal air traffic control procedures and orders. Rulemaking activity related to these ARC recommendations has been delayed to allocate resources to rulemaking projects mandated under the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of2010 (Public Law 111 -216) and the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of2012 (Public Law 112-95). However, the FAA is developing a comprehensive program to support implementation of the TALPA ARC recommendations through appropriate non-regulatory activity. After extensive testing, which continued into the winter season of 20 1 0 and 2011, the FAA is working to review and analyze the data related to the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. This matrix provides a common language for all users of runway surface condition information and is the cornerstone to most of the TALPA ARC recommendations. The matrix is the first necessary step in development of associated rule and policy changes. Completing this matrix and revising Safety Alert for Operators 06012, Landing Performance Assessments at Time of Arrival (Turbojets), would be part of our comprehensive program. Approval of this program is anticipated in the near future. Specific content of this program is not available because final approval is not yet complete. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an update by June 2014.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/30/2012
Response: Notation 8406: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations,” which was published at 77 Federal Register (FR) 12374 on February 29, 2012. The notice proposes to create new certification requirements for pilots in air carrier operations, including requiring that first officers in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 operations hold an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate and type rating for the aircraft to be flown; allowing pilots with an aviation degree or military pilot experience but fewer than 1,500 hours total time as a pilot to obtain an ATP certificate with restricted privileges; and requiring at least 1,000 flight hours in air carrier operations to serve as pilot in–command (PIC) in Part 121 air carrier operations. The notice also proposes to modify the requirements for obtaining an ATP certificate with an airplane category multiengine class rating or type rating to require 50 hours of multiengine flight experience and completion of a new FAA-approved ATP certificate training program that would include academic training and training in a flight simulation training device. According to the NPRM, these changes would help to ensure that pilots entering an air carrier environment have the training and aeronautical experience necessary to adapt to a complex, multicrew environment in a variety of operating conditions. The NPRM cites the 2009 Colgan Air accident near Buffalo, New York, as an event that focused public, congressional, and industry attention on flight crew experience requirements and training for conducting Part 121 air carrier operations. In February 2010, the FAA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), titled “New Pilot Certification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations” (75 FR 6164, February 8, 2010) that sought input on current Part 121 eligibility, training, and qualification requirements for seconds-in-command (SICs). The current NPRM is based on comments in response to the ANPRM, input received from an aviation rulemaking committee established in July 2010, and statutory requirements for modifying ATP certification outlined in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-216). Adding to that foundation, the NPRM states that the FAA conducted a study of 61 NTSB investigation reports from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through FY 2010 (31 Part 121 accidents and 30 Part 135 air carrier accidents, with 107 fatalities, 28 serious injuries, and 44 minor injuries). The study showed that the accidents examined involved pilot deficiencies in aircraft handling, including stall and upset recognition and recovery, high altitude training, active pilot monitoring skills, effective crew resource management (CRM), stabilized approaches, operations in icing conditions, and hypoxia training. The NPRM asserts that the changes to air carrier pilot qualification would address, in part, 21 NTSB safety recommendations in the following areas: Safety Issue Recommendations Training flight crews to respond to sudden, unusual, or unexpected aircraft upsets: A-96-120, A-04-62, A-07-3, and A-09-113 Developing and conducting stall recovery training and providing stickpusher familiarization training for pilots of stickpusher-equipped aircraft: A-10-22 and -23 Training in high altitude operations: A-07-1 and -2 Training and guidance for rudder use in transport-category aircraft: A-02-2 Airport situational awareness: A-07-44 Stabilized approach concept: A 01 69 and A-08-18 Landing performance calculations: A-07-59 and A-08-41 CRM training: A-03-52 Pilot monitoring duties: A-10-10 Requirements for flight crewmember academic training regarding leadership and professionalism: A-10-15 Training in icing conditions: A-07-14 Hypoxia awareness training: A 00 110 Training in landing and taking off in crosswinds with gusts: A 10-110 and -111 The NTSB is generally supportive of the proposed rule as it relates to many of the issues previously identified in our safety recommendations. Specific comments on several areas of the NPRM follow. Academic Credit To Reduce Flight Experience Requirements Although the NTSB has not made recommendations for flight hour minimums for air carrier pilots (instead focusing its recommendations on specific procedures and training, needed regulations, and needed guidance to crews and operators), we stated in our comments on the ANPRM that: Ensuring a high level of knowledge, skills, and professionalism for flight crewmembers is essential, but total flight hours or an airline transport pilot certificate does not necessarily equate to the level of knowledge, skills, and professionalism required for consistently safe flight operations. The comments went on to state that, “the NTSB recognizes the value of academic training for air carrier pilots, but the NTSB also believes that academic training is not a substitute for practical experience.” An important tenet in the recent NPRM is the concept that, “in certain circumstances, the combination of focused academic training and structured flight training can substitute for actual flight experience” (p. 12379). The NTSB concurs with the FAA’s acknowledgement that there may be multiple pathways to becoming a qualified air carrier pilot. However, there remain unresolved issues for how academic credit should be applied, including student performance within an accredited academic program and the type of degree conferred. These issues are not addressed in the NPRM and require more evaluation before this proposal is implemented. It is essential that the content and rigor involved in academic training be clearly defined and, most importantly, appropriate resources allocated to conduct evaluation and oversight of these alternative methods of qualification. ATP Certification Training Program The NPRM discusses the establishment of an FAA-approved ATP certificate training program for a multiengine class ATP or type rating. The proposed training program outlined under section 61.154 would include 24 hours of classroom training and 16 hours of simulator training (8 in a full flight simulator of at least Level C standards) and is intended to provide pilots with the core knowledge and understanding in areas critical to operating high performance aircraft in a complex and high altitude environment. The training would be provided by an authorized training provider and would be required to be completed before a pilot would be eligible to take the ATP knowledge test. Issued as part of the NPRM, draft Advisory Circular (AC) 61-ATP, “Airline Transport Pilot Certification Training Program for Airplane Category Multiengine Class Rating or Type Rating,” contains an outline of the curriculum topics and objectives for both the classroom and simulator training making up this training program. The AC is intended for use by training providers when developing the program and by the FAA when reviewing and approving the programs. Many of the topics contained in the draft AC address issues from NTSB safety recommendations; in fact, the FAA notes that most of the 21 recommendations cited in the NPRM are addressed, in part, by the proposed amendments and advisory material. Although the NTSB concurs with the FAA’s assessment that, in most cases, the topics addressed will serve to partially satisfy the action requested in existing recommendations, the amount of specificity provided in the proposed rule and AC does not allow a comprehensive review of the degree to which the FAA’s proposed actions would satisfy the intent of the NTSB’s recommendations. In some instances, neither document provides evidence that a recommendation topic is addressed. The NTSB notes that recent safety recommendations in this area have focused on attempts to improve crew response to in-flight emergencies, including task prioritization and training. While AC 61-ATP does include a classroom training objective named “differences between emergency and non-normal checklist procedures and checklists,” the guidance on emergency procedures should be made more explicit to incorporate the issues identified in these NTSB recommendations. CRM is another topic relevant to previous NTSB recommendations and outlined in AC 61-ATP. However, the list of proposed topics in the AC does not explicitly refer to the importance of first officer assertiveness, which is an issue addressed in Safety Recommendation A-11-39. This recommendation is not cited in the NPRM, but the NTSB believes that it is within the scope of the draft advisory material and suggests amending the AC to include information consistent with Safety Recommendation A-11-39 to help support this important aspect of CRM. The NTSB is encouraged that the NPRM proposes to centralize the process for approving ATP certification training programs. Specifically, the NPRM states that only authorized training providers can administer the training required under section 61.154. These providers can be certificate holders providing training and operating under Parts 141, 142, 121, or 135, and each provider must receive approval of their ATP certification training program by the FAA Air Transportation Division (AFS-200). The NTSB notes that, theoretically, centralization should help to ensure standardization of these programs, but suggests that additional guidance documentation with more specific and robust detail about the content of the proposed training is necessary to provide a solid foundation on which the FAA can evaluate the program content (and to assist training providers to develop courses likely to receive FAA approval). For example, additional detail, such as cross-referencing material from draft AC 120-STALL, would be appropriate in the discussion of stall training in AC 61-ATP. In addition, the FAA will need to provide the appropriate oversight resources to these programs—not only in their initial approval but also to conduct ongoing oversight to demonstrate that the content delivered is consistent with the approved program. The rigor with which these programs are implemented and overseen will determine their ultimate influence on improving safety in air carrier operations. Pilot-in-Command Requirements for Air Carrier Operations The NPRM proposes primarily experience-based requirements for new PICs in air carrier operations. However, the NTSB has previously issued safety recommendations addressing the need for a specific leadership training course for upgrading captains. Although the NPRM cites Safety Recommendation A-10-15 and describes it as applicable to leadership and professionalism training, it addresses only the latter topic. The NPRM does not mention Safety Recommendations A-10-13 and -14, which were issued with -15, but the NTSB believes that a leadership training course for upgrading captains is within the scope of the proposed rulemaking and that section 121.436 should be amended to include a specific requirement for such a course. In addition to the requirements already outlined in section 121.434, the NTSB has recommended that Part 135 pilots who need a type rating for the aircraft they fly be required to have a minimum level of initial operating experience. Given the applicability of the NPRM to Part 135 pilots who are engaged in air carrier operations, the NTSB believes it would be appropriate to incorporate similar experience requirements for these pilots as exist for Part 121 pilots. The NTSB supports the use of simulators in training environments and notes that the training program outlined in the NPRM specifies that training on topics such as low energy states/stalls and upset recovery techniques will be conducted in a Level C or higher full-flight simulator. Simulators, regardless of their fidelity, are dependent on their physical limits of motion, as well as the efficacy of the available computer programs (which are often limited in issues of upset training because of the lack of flight test data at the extreme areas of the flight envelope). Simulators are not always adequate in portraying upsets and stalls and may inadvertently introduce negative training. Consistent with Safety Recommendation A-04-62, the FAA should allow flexibility in determining what level of simulation or automation is appropriate for specific training. Summary Observations This NPRM addresses many training issues applicable to becoming an air carrier pilot, including some critical issues demonstrated in recent accident history to be responsible for accidents. The NTSB is encouraged that its recommendations were considered in the development of this proposed rule, especially as the issue areas relate to the core content to be provided to new entrant pilots through the ATP certification training program. However, the intent of our recommendations in this area is for all pilots to receive training in these topics. Therefore, it is important that air carriers provide equally robust training in these topic areas for their current air carrier pilots on a recurrent basis. The NTSB appreciates the opportunity to comment on this NPRM.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/31/2011
Response: The FAA indicated that it is currently evaluating the recommendations n1ade by the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessn1ent (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). The NTSB notes that the FAA is also working with 10 airports and 2 air carriers to validate the accuracy and usability of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the TALPA ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. The FAA's efforts to address Safety Recommendations A-07-61, A-07-63, and A-08-41 are responsive; however, the NTSB encourages the FAA to initiate and complete rulemaking in a timely manner in response to the ARC's recon11nendations. In addition, the NTSB requests that the FAA document the specific actions taken to address Safety Recon1mendations A-07-58 through -60 and -64. Pending our receipt and review of this information, and the FAA's prompt action to address these recommendations, Safety Recon1n1endations A-07-58 through -61, -63, -64, and A-08-41 remain classified OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/23/2010
Response: MC# 201000343: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration received the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee's (ARC) recommendations for landing performance assessment in April 2009 and for contaminated runway takeoff performance in July 2009. The FAA is evaluating the ARC recommendations and intends to initiate rulemaking in 2011. In the interim, the FAA in cooperation with ten airports and two air carriers is in the process of validating the accuracy and usability of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. This matrix forms the cornerstone to many of the recommendations put forth by the TALPA. The FAA also continues to encourage operators to incorporate the safety elements contained in Safety Alert for Operators 06012 pending the completion of the rulemaking process. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an updated response by January 2011.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 7/8/2009
Response: The NTSB is aware that the FAA formed the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in February 2008 and tasked it with developing industry recommendations for accomplishing the safety benefits identified in Safety Alert for Operators 06012. The NTSB notes that, in its review of the initial and recurrent ground and flight training for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways, the TALPA ARC will focus on the process by which air carriers instruct flight crews about how and when to conduct landing distance performance assessments. The NTSB notes that, once received, the FAA will review the TALPA ARC’s recommendations and use them to formulate a notice of proposed rulemaking. The NTSB looks forward to reviewing an update on this information. Pending our receipt and review of the results of the TALPA ARC’s findings, specifically as they relate to the need for initial training on the rationale for and criticality of conducting landing distance assessments before landing on contaminated runways, Safety Recommendation A-08-41 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/25/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/3/2008 10:33:07 AM MC# 2080532: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, FAA, 8/25/08: The Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) has been tasked to provide the FAA with industry recommendations for accomplishing the safety benefits identified in Safety Alert for Operators 06012. In addition, the TALPA ARC has been tasked with obtaining industry recommendations for initial and recurrent ground and flight training for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways. The ground training recommendations should include the process by which air carriers will provide instructions to their flightcrews as to when and how landing distance performance assessments must be conducted. It is expected that these recommendations will include training requirements on the baseline assumptions used by the manufacturers in computing the contaminated runway landing performance data as well as the operational procedures necessary to accomplish those performance values. Once the FAA has received and reviewed the industry recommendations, they will be used in formulating a notice of proposed rulemaking . The FAA will provide a further response by August 31, 2009. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on this safety recommendation.