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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-07-099
Details
Synopsis: On February 7, 2006, about 2359 eastern standard time, United Parcel Service Company (UPS) flight 1307, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, landed at its destination airport, Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after a cargo smoke indication in the cockpit. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer evacuated the airplane after landing. The flight crewmembers sustained minor injuries, and the airplane and most of the cargo were destroyed by fire after landing. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Night visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require that fire suppression systems be installed in the cargo compartments of all cargo airplanes operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Philadelphia, PA, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA06MA022
Accident Reports: In-Flight Cargo Fire, United Parcel Service Company Flight 1307, McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP
Report #: AAR-07-07
Accident Date: 2/7/2006
Issue Date: 12/17/2007
Date Closed: 4/27/2011
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Hazmat

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 4/27/2011
Response: The FAA indicated that the benefits of Halon compartment fire suppression systems, or alternative systems, do not justify the cost of installing such systems in the main deck cargo compartments of cargo aircraft of any weight category. The NTSB is disappointed that, although the FAA requires passenger aircraft to have fire suppression systems installed in their cargo compartments, it has not instituted a similar requirement for cargo airplanes. Because the FAA has indicated that it has completed its actions in response to this recommendation, however, Safety Recommendation A-07-99 is classified CLOSED – UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/6/2010
Response: CC# 201000359: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The FAA arranged for a cost-benefit analysis for the installation of on-board fire detection and extinguishment systems in all-cargo airplanes. In April 2009, we published results of the analysis in report DOT/FAAIAR-09/17, A Cost-Benefit Analysis for the Installation of Fire Suppression Systems in Cargo Compartments of Cargo Airplanes (enclosure 2). The results show that benefits of Halon (a bromotrifluorocarbon fire suppressant manufactured by DuPont) compartment flooding fire suppression systems, or alternative compartment flooding systems likely to be developed for below-floor cargo compartments, do not justify the cost for the main deck cargo compartments of cargo aircraft of any weight category. After careful consideration of this analysis, we have decided not to pursue additional rulemaking at this time. However, the FAA continues to support efforts to improve fire protection on all-cargo airplanes. For example, we continue to work with industry and other government agencies in evaluating the use of new, non-Halon fire extinguishing agents; directed fire suppression systems that apply agent to individual cargo containers or specific cargo compartment zones; new fire inerting systems utilizing nitrogen or water mist; and advanced cargo containers that incorporate smoke detection, fire containment, and fire suppression systems. Should research produce a viable option, we will consider further action.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/4/2009
Response: The FAA stated that it would review the guidance on Class E cargo-compartment fire protection and operators’ procedures for cargo-compartment fire containment to determine the effectiveness of the fire protection systems. The FAA will also review the service history of Class E cargo compartments and evaluate requiring the installation of fire suppression systems in Class E compartments. The Safety Board recognizes that the actions described are the first steps that the FAA needs to take to implement the recommended regulatory change. Pending the establishment of a requirement that all cargo compartments of all cargo aircraft be equipped with fire suppression systems, Safety Recommendation A-97-99 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/8/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 9/18/2008 12:11:57 PM MC# 2080573: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator: We understand this recommendation refers to installation of fire suppression systems in previously approved Class E cargo compartments. We will review the guidance on Class E cargo compartment fire protection and operators’ cargo compartment fire containment procedures to determine the effectiveness of the fire protection relative to compartments which require fire suppression systems. In addition, we will review the service history of Class E cargo compartments and evaluate the safety benefits, costs, and operational impact of requiring the installation of fire suppression systems. I will provide a status update by January 2009. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA’s progress on this safety recommendation.