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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-07-064
Details
Synopsis: On December 8, 2005, about 1914 central standard time, Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 1248, a Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN, ran off the departure end of runway 31C after landing at Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois. The airplane rolled through a blast fence, an airport perimeter fence, and onto an adjacent roadway, where it struck an automobile before coming to a stop. A child in the automobile was killed, one automobile occupant received serious injuries, and three other automobile occupants received minor injuries. Eighteen of the 103 airplane occupants (98 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and 2 pilots) received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, Baltimore, Maryland, about 1758 eastern standard time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Demonstrate the technical and operational feasibility of outfitting transport-category airplanes with equipment and procedures required to routinely calculate, record, and convey the airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. If feasible, require operators of transport-category airplanes to incorporate use of such equipment and related procedures into their operations. (Safety Recommendation A-07-064 is superseded by Safety Recommendations A-16-023 and A-16-024)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded
Mode: Aviation
Location: Chicago Midway Airport, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA06MA009
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun and Collision Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 Boeing 737-74H, N471WN
Report #: AAR-07-06
Accident Date: 12/8/2005
Issue Date: 10/16/2007
Date Closed: 10/6/2016
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/6/2016
Response: From the NTSB aviation accident report AAR-16-02: Runway Excursion During Landing Boeing MD-88, N909DL New York, New York March 5, 2015, issued on October 6, 2016, notation 8780: On October 16, 2007, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations A-07-63 and -64 as a result of the December 2005 accident involving Southwest Airlines flight 1248 (discussed in section 1.10.2). The safety recommendations asked the FAA to do the following: Establish a minimum standard for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to use in correlating an airplane’s braking ability to braking action reports and runway contaminant type and depth reports for runway surface conditions worse than bare and dry. (A-07-63) Demonstrate the technical and operational feasibility of outfitting transport-category airplanes with equipment and procedures required to routinely calculate, record, and convey the airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. If feasible, require operators of transport-category airplanes to incorporate use of such equipment and related procedures into their operations. (A-07-64) Regarding A-07-63, on October 28, 2014, the FAA stated that, as a result of the TALPA ARC recommendations, many document changes would be forthcoming. For example, the FAA planned to incorporate the information from SAFO 06012, “Landing Performance Assessments at Time of Arrival (Turbojets),” which was issued on August 31, 2006, into several ACs, the Aeronautical Information Manual, NOTAMs, and ATC and airport guidance and manuals by October 2016. In addition, the FAA stated that it was developing the RCAM tool. The FAA indicated that the RCAM “takes a known assessment criteria provided from the airport and provides the pilot with a downgrade assessment criterion,” which would be based on the reported runway conditions, including the reported runway friction (expressed as a Mu value) and the reported braking action. The FAA also indicated that this information would provide a pilot with an expected braking ability to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. On February 10, 2015, the NTSB noted that the development and testing of the RCAM was nearing completion and that, during a December 2014, teleconference, the FAA indicated its intention to mandate the use of the RCAM once completed.68 Safety Recommendation A-07-63 remained classified “Open—Acceptable Response” pending completion of the RCAM and the requirement for its use by all appropriate airports and operators. Regarding A-07-64, on August 29, 2012, the FAA stated that some airplane manufacturers offered products that calculate and convey the braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. The FAA also stated that other manufacturers were developing programs that would report braking action to air carrier dispatch centers to determine real-time braking performance. The FAA planned to encourage the use of such programs and products on a voluntary basis but did not plan to mandate their use. Further, the FAA stated that it no longer planned to conduct a research project to demonstrate the feasibility of these systems because they were “becoming commercially available.” On December 26, 2012, the NTSB replied that it was pleased to learn about industry efforts to develop the recommended system and stated that the FAA should require, if feasible, such commercially available systems. On May 9, 2014, the FAA stated that it encouraged the use of commercially available systems that routinely calculate, record, and convey airplane braking ability but maintained its position not to mandate the use of such systems. On July 24, 2014, the NTSB stated that the commercial systems that were available at that time were not sufficient to satisfy the intent of this recommendation. The NTSB also stated that it had recently learned that the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) was conducting research and development on the recommended systems.70 The CAST project appeared to address the first action specified in Safety Recommendation A-07-64 (demonstrate the feasibility of systems that routinely calculate, record, and convey the airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll).71 The NTSB further stated that the CAST project demonstrates that it is “premature to conclude that these systems are fully developed and available.” In addition, the NTSB expressed its disappointment that the FAA had not previously provided information to the NTSB about the CAST project given that the FAA was an active participant in the CAST. The NTSB also expressed concern that, if the FAA did not act on the second part of Safety Recommendation A-07-64 (to require such systems if feasible), and operators equipped their fleets with the recommended system (once developed) on a voluntary basis, the “greatly improved runway condition data” collected by such systems would be available solely to the operators and not to others that need this information, such as ATC, airport operators, or airplanes operated by other organizations. As a result, Safety Recommendation A-07-64 remained classified “Open—Acceptable Response” pending completion of the CAST project and FAA actions to ensure that the data would be available to organizations outside of air carriers with a safety need for the information. As previously stated, on June 9, 2016, the FAA held an industry-wide rollout for the TALPA program. The NTSB notes that the information provided at the briefing regarding the development and planned use of the RCAM would address the requested action in Safety Recommendation A-07-63. The NTSB also notes that none of the information provided at the briefing addressed the requested action in Safety Recommendation A-07-64. In addition, although the CAST is continuing to conduct research and development on systems in response to Safety Recommendation A-07-64, the NTSB is not aware of any system that has fully demonstrated the technical and operational feasibility of equipping transport-category airplanes with such a system. The implementation and use of the RCAM does not address the requested actions in Safety Recommendation A-07-64. The FAA has sponsored the development and evaluation of these systems over the past several years and provided a briefing to the NTSB on September 6, 2016, about the status of this work. The FAA indicated that this work included research efforts through contracts awarded by its William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey; work conducted at its technical center; and agreements with private companies. The research and development of the recommended systems continues, as shown by the activities of the CAST and the private organizations that have briefed the NTSB about the status of their related projects. For example, the NTSB has learned that one system under development is being designed to calculate the friction coefficient developed by an airplane during a landing and quickly transmit the results of the calculation and other measurements to an on-ground network for processing and distribution to the company’s customers.106 Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA continue to work with industry to develop the technology to outfit transport-category airplanes with equipment and procedures to routinely calculate, record, and convey the airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. Safety Recommendation A-07-64 was issued in part to ensure that the objective calculations of airplane braking ability generated from such equipment (and the related operational procedures) would be conveyed to the flight crews of arriving aircraft and other stakeholders in the National Airspace System (NAS), including airport operators and ATC personnel. Although the FAA has been evaluating and sponsoring the development of these systems, the NTSB remains concerned that, when these systems are fully validated and become commercially available, the information that they provide might be available only to the individual operators that voluntarily equip their fleets with such systems and the organizations that subscribe to the service providing the data instead of all others with a safety need for this information. The NTSB believes that the safety-related information provided by these systems should be in a form that will facilitate timely reporting of the results to all arriving aircraft, among other relevant NAS stakeholders. As a result, the FAA will need to develop policies and procedures for disseminating the information from these systems. Therefore, the NTSB also recommends that, if the systems described in Safety Recommendation A-16-23 are shown to be technically and operationally feasible, the FAA work with operators and the system manufacturers to develop procedures that ensure that airplane-based braking ability results can be readily conveyed to, and easily interpreted by, arriving flight crews, airport operators, ATC personnel, and others with a safety need for this information. The FAA has consistently indicated that it would encourage, but not mandate, the use of airplane-based systems that determine runway surface conditions. However, given the success of CAST in effecting widespread voluntary introduction of safety improvements (including FAA-approved voluntary safety programs such as FOQA and the Aviation Safety Action Program), many operators might voluntarily equip their fleets with these systems if they are shown to be feasible, even without regulatory action by the FAA. Thus, if the FAA takes the actions necessary to satisfy Safety Recommendations A-16-23 and -24, the intent of Safety Recommendation A-07-64 will also be satisfied without the FAA mandating the requested action. As a result, Safety Recommendation A-07-64 is reclassified CLOSED—ACCEPTABLE ACTION/ SUPERSEDED.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/4/2015
Response: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) draft Advisory Circulars (AC) 25-X, “Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways,” and AC 25-X, “Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance Assessments,” which were posted for comment on the FAA’s website on January 21, 2015. Both of these draft ACs provide guidance and standardized methods that data providers, such as type certificate (TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and airplane operators can use when developing performance data for transport category airplanes for operations on contaminated runways. The AC also promotes the use of consistent terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel. The NTSB has investigated several accidents within the last 10 years that involve issues addressed by these ACs. As a result of these investigations, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations A 07 57 through 64, A 08 17, A 08 41 through 43, and A 11 28 and 29.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 7/24/2014
Response: On August 29, 2012, you told us that some aircraft manufacturers currently offered products that calculated airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. These systems reported braking action back to the air carriers’ dispatch centers to determine real-time braking performance. At that time, you said that you planned to encourage the use of such programs and products on a voluntary basis, but you did not plan to mandate their use. Your current letter indicates that your position related to this recommendation has not changed. We issued this recommendation to make higher quality data on runway conditions available to air traffic control, airport operations personnel, and other airplanes using an airport, as well as the particular operator of an airplane. Existing data sources on runway conditions, such as measured mu values (representing the coefficient of friction between a tire and the runway surface) and pilot reports of runway braking action, have demonstrated shortcomings. We believed that data collected from the systems recommended would not be subject to these shortcomings, and would provide organizations and pilots, as well as carriers, a much-improved basis for decisions regarding the need to treat runways during slippery conditions, and the suitability of a particular runway for a landing or takeoff. We recently learned that the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) is currently developing the systems we recommended, demonstrating that it is indeed premature to conclude that these systems are fully developed and available. We support the current work being performed by the CAST, which appears to constitute the action specified in Safety Recommendation A-07-64. As your agency is an active participant in the CAST, and, therefore, in the actions it is taking to address this recommendation, we are disappointed that your letter did not discuss this CAST project. We are concerned that, if you do not require these systems once they have been developed, and operators equip their fleets only on a voluntary basis, the information collected by such systems will be available solely to operators of particular airplanes and not to others who need this information, such as air traffic control, airport operators, or airplanes operated by other organizations. We are also disappointed to learn that, although your Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee submitted its reports 5 years ago, you are not considering any rulemaking related to the committee’s recommendations. We note that you are developing non-regulatory options, including your continued development of the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM), which uses assessment criteria provided from the airport and provides pilots with a downgrade assessment criterion based on the reported runway conditions. We further note that the RCAM will be based on information having shortcomings that have already been identified, such as the reported runway friction expressed in mu values and pilot-reported braking action. It appears that the RCAM will not contain the information that would have been available from the systems whose development was the subject of Safety Recommendation A 07 64. In summary, we do not agree that the commercial products currently available are sufficient to satisfy this recommendation. We believe that, when the CAST completes its related work, the recommended systems will be available, and it is likely that most operators will equip their fleets with these systems. We are concerned that, when this happens, the greatly improved runway condition data will not be available to all organizations and pilots, beyond the carrier itself, who have a need for this information. We request that you tell us how this information will be made available to others if the equipment is installed on a voluntary basis alone. Pending completion of the CAST activities, and your taking actions that ensure the data will be available to organizations outside of the carrier with a need for the information, Safety Recommendation A 07-64 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 5/9/2014
Response: -Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) encourages the use of commercially available systems on a voluntary basis that routinely calculate, record, and convey airplane braking ability required. However, as previously indicated, we do not currently plan to mandate their use. The Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Conm1ittee (ARC) Charter has expired; we are considering neither rulemaking related to TALPA nor regulating performance data. However, we are planning to pursue all non-regulatory options, including the implementation of recommendations that came from this ARC with an expected target completion date of October 2016. Safety Alert for Operators 060 I 2 already includes much of the information that we plan to incorporate in the following documents: • Advisory Circulars; • Aeronautical Information Manual; • Notices to Airmen; • Air Traffic Control guidance and manuals; and • Airport guidance and manuals. In addition to the creation of documents and document changes, we are developing the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) tool. The RCAM takes a known assessment criteria provided from the airport and provides the pilot with a downgrade assessment criterion. This downgrade assessment criteria is based on the reported runway conditions, for example the reported runway friction expressed in MU values, and reported braking action. This information will provide the pilot with an expected braking ability to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. The RCAM is still under final development and the procedures required to use this matrix have not yet been addressed. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation and provide an update by March 2015.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/26/2012
Response: The FAA reported that some aircraft manufacturers offer products that calculate and convey airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll and are developing other programs that would report braking action back to the air carriers’ dispatch centers to determine real-time braking performance. The FAA indicated that, because these systems are becoming commercially available, it no longer plans to conduct a research project on their feasibility. We are pleased to learn that industry has been proactive in its efforts to develop these systems. However, we would be interested in learning more about the procedures that will be used by operators and crews, air traffic control, and airport ground personnel to validate, communicate, and integrate aircraft-based data (for example, with runway surface condition reports) to improve their respective and collective operations. We also ask the FAA to require, if feasible, that the necessary equipment and procedures be adopted by the operators of transport-category airplanes. We believe that a briefing on these topics by FAA staff would be helpful. In addition, the FAA indicated that it is nearing completion of the final draft of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. We encourage the FAA to initiate and complete rulemaking in a timely manner in response to the TALPA ARC’s recommendations. Pending our receipt and review of this information, and the prompt completion of the recommended action, Safety Recommendation A-07-64 remains classified OPEN—ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/29/2012
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Acting Administrator: To address this recommendation, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) researched certain aircraft manufacturers who currently offer products that calculate and convey airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll For example, Airbus currently offers the Runway Overrun Prevention System to help prevent runway overruns. Other manufacturers are developing programs that would report braking action back to the air carriers' dispatch centers to determine real-time braking performance. The FAA plans to encourage the use of such programs and products on a voluntary basis but does not currently plan to mandate their use. We note that the FAA no longer plans to conduct a research project on their feasibility as mentioned in our January 8, 2008, letter, because these systems are becoming commercially available. The Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) recommended comprehensive changes to aircraft certification rules in parts 23, 25, and 26; operating rules in parts 1, 91, 121 , 125, and 135; airport rules in part 139; as well as FAA internal air traffic control procedures and orders. Many of these changes need to be coordinated with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAD), Transport Canada, European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and other foreign regulatory authorities. The FAA received the TALPA ARC recommendations for landing performance assessments in April 2009 and for contaminated runway takeoff performance in July 2009. The FAA is nearing completion of the final draft of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. This matrix provides a common language for all users of runway surface condition information and is the cornerstone to most of the TALPA ARC recommendations. The matrix is the first necessary step in development of associated rule and policy changes. ICAO and EASA were briefed regarding the TALPA ARC recommendations and the matrix process. The rulemaking project has been delayed to allocate resources to rulemaking projects mandated under Public Law 111-216. The FAA is currently developing a plan to pursue all appropriate non-regulatory options in support of TALPA ARC recommendations. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation and provide an update by January 2014.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/31/2011
Response: The FAA indicated that it is currently evaluating the recommendations n1ade by the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessn1ent (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). The NTSB notes that the FAA is also working with 10 airports and 2 air carriers to validate the accuracy and usability of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the TALPA ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. The FAA's efforts to address Safety Recommendations A-07-61, A-07-63, and A-08-41 are responsive; however, the NTSB encourages the FAA to initiate and complete rulemaking in a timely manner in response to the ARC's recon11nendations. In addition, the NTSB requests that the FAA document the specific actions taken to address Safety Recon1mendations A-07-58 through -60 and -64. Pending our receipt and review of this information, and the FAA's prompt action to address these recommendations, Safety Recon1n1endations A-07-58 through -61, -63, -64, and A-08-41 remain classified OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/23/2010
Response: MC# 201000343: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration received the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee's (ARC) recommendations for landing performance assessment in April 2009 and for contaminated runway takeoff performance in July 2009. The FAA is evaluating the ARC recommendations and intends to initiate rulemaking in 2011. In the interim, the FAA in cooperation with ten airports and two air carriers is in the process of validating the accuracy and usability of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. This matrix forms the cornerstone to many of the recommendations put forth by the TALPA. The FAA also continues to encourage operators to incorporate the safety elements contained in Safety Alert for Operators 06012 pending the completion of the rulemaking process. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an updated response by January 2011.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/13/2008
Response: The FAA indicated that it is considering undertaking a research project in response to this recommendation. Pending the FAA’s conducting such a project and instituting a requirement for operators to incorporate the equipment and procedures that result, Safety Recommendation A-07-64 is classified OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/8/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 1/14/2008 3:39:36 PM MC# 2080007: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, FAA, 1/8/08 Since the Southwest 1248 accident the Federal Aviation Administration has taken several actions to address the safety issues that are the focus of these recommendations, including the development of proposed Operations Specification C082, and the issuance of Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06012, which address landing distance computation with a 15 percent safety margin. A survey of part 121 operators, the results of which have been briefed to the Board's staff, indicates that 92 percent of U.S. airline passengers are now being carried by air carriers in full or partial compliance with the practices recommended in SAFO 06012. On November 6, 2007, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 91-79, Runway Overrun Prevention (copy enclosed). This AC provides ways for pilots and operators of turbine-powered airplanes to identify, understand, and mitigate risks associated with runway overruns during the landing phase of flight. It also provides operators with detailed information that may be used to develop company standard operating procedures to mitigate those risks. The broader mandate that the Board is now recommending will require rulemaking. On December 6,2007, the FAA issued a notice announcing the formation of an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) to review regulations affecting certification and operation of airplanes and airports for airplane takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways (72 FR 68763) (copy enclosed). The ARC will provide advice and recommendations to: ·Establish airplane certification and operational requirements (including training) for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways; ·Establish landing distance assessment requirements, including minimum landing distance safety margins, to be performed at the time of arrival; and ·Establish standards for runway surface condition reporting and minimum surface conditions for continued operations. While this rulemaking effort progresses, we will continue to work with the air carriers and industry to gain the widest possible compliance with the elements of SAFO 06012. In addition to these actions, below is the additional work being done for certain specific recommendations: For A-07-64: The FAA agrees that, if feasible and cost effective, an airplane-based means for obtaining information on the runway surface condition, determining the available braking capability, and communicating that information to subsequent landing airplanes could be beneficial for operations in inclement weather. The FAA is considering a research project to examine the operational and technical feasibility of such a system. We will provide a more detailed response on this in 180 days.