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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-07-061
Details
Synopsis: On December 8, 2005, about 1914 central standard time, Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 1248, a Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN, ran off the departure end of runway 31C after landing at Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois. The airplane rolled through a blast fence, an airport perimeter fence, and onto an adjacent roadway, where it struck an automobile before coming to a stop. A child in the automobile was killed, one automobile occupant received serious injuries, and three other automobile occupants received minor injuries. Eighteen of the 103 airplane occupants (98 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and 2 pilots) received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, Baltimore, Maryland, about 1758 eastern standard time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety margin of 15 percent.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Open - Unacceptable Response
Mode: Aviation
Location: Chicago, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: Yes
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA06MA009
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun and Collision Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 Boeing 737-74H, N471WN
Report #: AAR-07-06
Accident Date: 12/8/2005
Issue Date: 10/16/2007
Date Closed:
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Open - Unacceptable Response)
Keyword(s): Flightcrew

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/4/2015
Response: From CC# 201500140: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) draft Advisory Circulars (AC) 25-X, “Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways,” and AC 25-X, “Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance Assessments,” which were posted for comment on the FAA’s website on January 21, 2015. Both of these draft ACs provide guidance and standardized methods that data providers, such as type certificate (TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and airplane operators can use when developing performance data for transport category airplanes for operations on contaminated runways. The AC also promotes the use of consistent terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel. However, the NTSB is disappointed that the FAA does not plan to undertake rulemaking to require turbojet operators to use a standardized methodology and FAA-approved data to perform takeoff and landing distance assessments for operations on wet or contaminated runways. Although many manufacturers, operators, and airports have elected to incorporate elements of the TALPA ARC recommendations that will improve industry operations and safety, the ACs provide guidance material only. Since the planned AC content is neither mandatory nor regulatory, the recommended data to support takeoff and landing distance assessments may or may not be developed. If the data are developed and optional assessments are performed, operators remain free to choose the performance data basis, the means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions, and the added safety margin, if any. The FAA has no plan to approve existing or future performance data developed by TC holders to support takeoff and landing distance assessments or the accompanying calculation methods that may inadvertently or purposely deviate from the TALPA ARC recommendations. As a result, it is likely that many components of the FAA’s AC guidance will be ignored by segments of the intended audience, even if it is consistent with the TALPA ARC’s vision. In addition, both ACs are aimed at transport category airplanes, but the guidance should, at a minimum, extend to all turbojet airplane operations. Among the NTSB safety recommendations addressing landing distance assessments are: A-07-57 Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Urgent) A-07-59 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to provide clear guidance and training to pilots and dispatchers regarding company policy on surface condition and braking action reports and the assumptions affecting landing distance/stopping margin calculations, to include use of airplane ground deceleration devices, wind conditions and limits, air distance, and safety margins. A-07-61 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. A-08-41 As part of the Takeoff/Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee, address the need for initial training on the rationale for and criticality of conducting landing distance assessments before landing on contaminated runways. One technical problem that should be addressed within the ACs is their reliance, in part, on the wheel braking coefficient model codified in Section 25.109(c) for wet runway stopping performance calculations. However, the Section 25.109(c) model has never been validated by flight test data. To its credit, the FAA has recognized that the wheel braking coefficient model in Section 25.109(c) might be insufficiently conservative, as evidenced by the recent FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) tasked to provide recommendations regarding new or updated standards for airplane performance and handling qualities. Under the subject area of Takeoff and Landing Performance, subtask (b) addresses wet runway stopping performance: b. Wet runway stopping performance. Recent landing overruns on wet runways have raised questions regarding current wet runway stopping performance requirements and methods. Analyses indicate that the braking coefficient of friction in each case was significantly lower than expected for a wet runway (i.e., lower than the level specified in FAA regulations). Consideration should also be given to the scheduling of landing performance on wet porous friction course and grooved runway surfaces. Recommendations may include the need for additional data gathering, analysis, and possible rulemaking. [emphasis added]

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 2/10/2015
Response: We are aware that, as a result of the Southwest Airlines flight 1248 accident, you developed and issued Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06012, “Landing Performance Assessments at Time of Arrival (Turbojets).” Although the SAFO contains good guidance on assessing landing distances, our experience is that, because operators are not required to implement SAFO recommendations, critical parts of the guidance are often ignored. We believe that few operators have requested the optional OpSpec/MSpec that is based on the SAFO. We issued Safety Recommendation A-07-61 because your issuance of SAFO 06012 was an interim response, and we believed that a more complete analysis was needed for a permanent solution. We are aware that you referred this work to the TALPA ARC, which made a number of recommendations in mid-2009 regarding assessing landing distances. In the 5 1/2 years since then, you have not acted on the TALPA ARC’s recommendations, and your current letter states that you are not considering rulemaking related to them, nor otherwise regulating performance data. Rather, you plan to address those recommendations through other means, including changes to SAFO 06012. We do not believe that non-regulatory guidance is effective; therefore, we do not consider such action to be an acceptable response. We are currently arranging a staff-level briefing on the details of how you will implement the TALPA ARC recommendations through non-regulatory means. Pending your taking actions that address Safety Recommendation A-07-61, it remains classified OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 10/28/2014
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: In its December I 6, 2013, letter, the Board recognized that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will be addressing the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) recommendations through non-regulatory means as an interim response. Currently, certain aircraft manufacturers offer products that calculate and convey airplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. For example, Airbus offers the Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) to help prevent runway overruns. Airbus decided not to keep its patented ROPS as a product differentiator and plans to release it to competing aircraft builders. Other manufacturers are developing programs that would report braking action to the air carriers' dispatch centers. One airline utilizes Aviation Safety Technologie's (AST's) SafeLand software system, which monitors and measures aircraft systems in real time to display three dimensional aircraft simulation from landing to ground movements. This information is then sent to home base via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System. The AST's algorithm can deliver normalized braking reports as well as runway braking and cornering coefficients. This information will then be shared with aircraft crew members prior to their arrival and can be used to determine real -time braking performance. The FAA encourages the use of such programs and products on a voluntary basis, and we are no longer considering rulemaking related to TALPA or regulating performance data. The FAA does not see a need to conduct a research project on their feasibility because these systems are becoming commercially available. However, as a result of the TALPA ARC recommendations, many document changes will be forth coming, including changes to much of the information currently contained in Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 060 12, with an expected target completion elate of October 2016. We plan to incorporate information contained in SAFO 060 12 into the following documents: • Advisory Circulars; • Aeronautical Information Manual; • Notices to Airmen; • Air Traffic Control guidance and manuals; and • Airport guidance and manuals. In addition to the creation of documents and document changes, we are developing the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM) tool. The RCAM takes a known assessment criteria provided from the airport and provides the pilot with a downgrade assessment criterion. This downgrade assessment criterion is based on the reported runway conditions, such as the reported runway friction expressed in mu (m) values and reported braking action. This information will provide the pilot with an expected braking ability to slow or stop the airplane during the landing roll. The RCAM is still under final development and the procedures required to use this matrix have not yet been addressed. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an update by January 31, 2016.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/16/2013
Response: In its September 6, 2013, letter, the FAA discussed that one of the non-regulatory approaches it was considering was revising Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06012, “Landing Performance Assessments at Time of Arrival (Turbojets).” Although the SAFO contains good guidance on performing landing distance assessments, our experience is that, because operators are not required to implement the SAFO recommendations, critical parts of the guidance are often ignored. We believe that few operators have requested the optional OpSpec/MSpec that is based on the SAFO, and we ask, therefore, that the FAA provide information on the number of operators who are using that voluntary OpSpec/MSpec. In the meantime, pending implementation of the recommended requirement, Safety Recommendation A-07-61 remains classified OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 9/6/2013
Response: -From Michael P. Huerta, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) received the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) recommendations for landing performance assessments in April 2009 and for contaminated runway takeoff performance in July 2009. The TALPA ARC recommended comprehensive changes to aircraft certification rules in parts 23, 25, and 26; operating rules in parts 1, 91, 121, 125, and 135; airport rules in part 139; as well as FAA internal air traffic control procedures and orders. Rulemaking activity related to these ARC recommendations has been delayed to allocate resources to rulemaking projects mandated under the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of2010 (Public Law 111 -216) and the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of2012 (Public Law 112-95). However, the FAA is developing a comprehensive program to support implementation of the TALPA ARC recommendations through appropriate non-regulatory activity. After extensive testing, which continued into the winter season of 20 1 0 and 2011, the FAA is working to review and analyze the data related to the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. This matrix provides a common language for all users of runway surface condition information and is the cornerstone to most of the TALPA ARC recommendations. The matrix is the first necessary step in development of associated rule and policy changes. Completing this matrix and revising Safety Alert for Operators 06012, Landing Performance Assessments at Time of Arrival (Turbojets), would be part of our comprehensive program. Approval of this program is anticipated in the near future. Specific content of this program is not available because final approval is not yet complete. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an update by June 2014.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 12/7/2011
Response: The NTSB reiterated safety recommendation A-07-61 with the 12/7/2011 issuance of recommendations A-11-92 through A-11-95, which were issued in response to the 12/22/2009 incident where American Airlines flight 331, a B-737-800, ran off the departure end of runway 12 after landing at Norman Manlet Intational Airport in Kingston, Jamaica. From the 12/7/2011 greensheet: Following its investigation of the runway overrun accident involving Southwest Airlines flight 1248, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-07-61 on October 2, 2007. In its most recent response (dated August 23, 2010) concerning this recommendation, the FAA stated that it was evaluating recommendations provided by the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) and intended to initiate rulemaking in 2011. The FAA also stated that, in the interim, it was validating the accuracy and usability of the ARC-developed runway surface condition reporting matrix, which forms the foundation for many of the TALPA recommendations, and continuing to encourage operators to incorporate the safety elements contained in Safety Alert for Operators 0601216 pending the completion of the rulemaking process. The FAA stated that it would provide an updated response by January 2011. Safety Recommendation A-07-61 is classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” Although the FAA published SAFO 06012 with the intent of pursuing rulemaking that addresses landing distance assessments, in the interim, operators are still not required to comply with its recommendations and currently many operators do not.17 During post-accident interviews, the American Airlines 737-800 aircrew program manager stated that he was not familiar with the operational aspects of SAFO 06012, and an American Airlines ground instructor stated that the airline did not provide instructors and check airmen with SAFO information that would benefit pilots' decision-making when considering overrun prevention. The NTSB is concerned that, because of operational and conditional variations that may include a tailwind landing upon arrival at the destination, it is possible for an airplane to use more of the landing runway than predicted during preflight (dispatch) calculations and for pilots to continue to overrun runways while landing. As the FAA concluded in SAFO 06012, operator compliance with preflight landing distance planning requirements alone “does not ensure that the airplane can safely land within the distance available on the runway in the conditions that exist at the time of arrival, particularly if the runway, runway surface condition, meteorological conditions, airplane configuration, airplane weight, or use of airplane ground deceleration devices is different than that used in the preflight calculation.” The FAA continues to rely on operators’ voluntary compliance with SAFO 06012 but, as demonstrated by statements provided by American Airlines personnel, the SAFO is not being consistently disseminated or implemented. The NTSB concludes that, until rulemaking requiring the performance of arrival landing distance assessments is complete, the FAA needs to ensure that operators distribute the information in SAFO 06012 to the necessary personnel. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require POIs to ensure that the information contained in SAFO 06012 is disseminated to Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K instructors, check airmen, and aircrew program designees and they make pilots aware of this guidance during recurrent training. The NTSB did not receive an update in January 2011 on the status of the rulemaking as stated in the FAA’s August 2010 response concerning Safety Recommendation A-07-61. If implemented as recommended, this rulemaking would require Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K flight crews to perform arrival landing distance assessments for the specific runway of intended landing, including operations conducted in tailwind conditions. More than 4 years after this recommendation was issued, the continued lack of this requirement greatly reduces the likelihood that flight crews will make fully informed decisions about the performance capabilities of their aircraft prior to landing, particularly on wet or contaminated runways, and, under such circumstances, increases the risk of a runway overrun. Therefore, the NTSB reiterates Safety Recommendation A-07-61 and reclassifies it OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/31/2011
Response: The FAA indicated that it is currently evaluating the recommendations n1ade by the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessn1ent (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). The NTSB notes that the FAA is also working with 10 airports and 2 air carriers to validate the accuracy and usability of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the TALPA ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. The FAA's efforts to address Safety Recommendations A-07-61, A-07-63, and A-08-41 are responsive; however, the NTSB encourages the FAA to initiate and complete rulemaking in a timely manner in response to the ARC's recon11nendations. In addition, the NTSB requests that the FAA document the specific actions taken to address Safety Recon1mendations A-07-58 through -60 and -64. Pending our receipt and review of this information, and the FAA's prompt action to address these recommendations, Safety Recon1n1endations A-07-58 through -61, -63, -64, and A-08-41 remain classified OPEN – ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/23/2010
Response: MC# 201000343: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration received the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee's (ARC) recommendations for landing performance assessment in April 2009 and for contaminated runway takeoff performance in July 2009. The FAA is evaluating the ARC recommendations and intends to initiate rulemaking in 2011. In the interim, the FAA in cooperation with ten airports and two air carriers is in the process of validating the accuracy and usability of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. This matrix forms the cornerstone to many of the recommendations put forth by the TALPA. The FAA also continues to encourage operators to incorporate the safety elements contained in Safety Alert for Operators 06012 pending the completion of the rulemaking process. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an updated response by January 2011.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/27/2008
Response: [The Safety Board addressed this recommendation in its June 27, 2008, letter to the FAA issuing recommendations as a result of the February 18, 2007, runway overrun of Delta Connection flight 6448] At the time of the accident, Shuttle America did not require landing distance assessments based on conditions at the time of arrival. Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO)5 06012, "Landing Performance Assessments at the Time of Arrival (Turbojets)," which the FAA issued about 6 months before the accident, had urgently recommended that operators of turbojet airplanes develop procedures for flight crews to assess landing performance based on the actual conditions at the time of arrival, which might differ from the presumed conditions at the time of dispatch, and that an additional safety margin of at least 15 percent be added to actual landing distances. The aircraft performance study included a landing performance data calculation that most closely matched the landing distance assessment that the flight crewmembers might have accomplished if Shuttle America had incorporated procedures that were consistent with SAFO 06012. This calculation was based on the reported winds, a braking action report of fair, and the accident airplane’s flaps 5 configuration. The calculation assumed a touchdown point of 1,400 feet, the use of maximum reverse thrust until 60 knots, and full wheel braking and included an additional 15-percent stopping distance margin. The landing performance calculation showed that, on the basis of the conditions that had been reported to the flight crew at the time, the airplane could have landed with a factored touchdown point of 1,610 feet and come to a safe stop on the runway with a ground roll distance of 3,262 feet, for a total distance of 4,872 feet. However, the airplane’s actual touchdown point and the flight crew’s use of reverse thrust and braking were not in accordance with the assumptions used in the landing performance calculation. Before the issuance of SAFO 06012, the FAA had planned to issue Operations Specification (OpSpec) N 8400.C082 to all 14 CFR Part 91 subpart K, 121, 125, and 135 turbojet operators in response to Safety Recommendation A-06-16 (urgent), the intent of which was to ensure adequate safety margins for landings on contaminated runways.6 The FAA had intended for operators to comply with the OpSpec by October 2006 but instead encountered industry opposition to the OpSpec. Consequently, in August 2006, the FAA decided not to issue the mandatory OpSpec but rather to pursue formal rulemaking and issue the voluntary SAFO in the interim. In its final report on the Southwest Airlines flight 1248 accident,7 the Safety Board concluded, "although landing distance assessments incorporating a landing distance safety margin are not required by regulation, they are critical to safe operation of transport-category airplanes on contaminated runways." As a result, on October 4 and 16, 2007, the Board issued Safety Recommendations A-07-57 (urgent) and -61, respectively, to further address the need for landing distance assessments. Safety Recommendation A-07-57 asked the FAA to immediately require all Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing that are based on existing performance data and actual conditions and incorporate a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. This recommendation, which superseded Safety Recommendation A-06-16, was classified "Open--Unacceptable Response" on October 4, 2007, because it maintained the previous classification of Safety Recommendation A-06-16 and the FAA had not yet required landing distance assessments that incorporated a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. Safety Recommendation A-07-61 asked the FAA to require all Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing that are based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, and a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available and that include a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. The Safety Board recognized that the standardized methodology recommended in Safety Recommendation A-07-61 would take time to develop and, thus, issued Safety Recommendation A-07-57 to ensure that landing distance assessments with at least a 15-percent safety margin were being performed in the interim. In its December 17, 2007, response to Safety Recommendation A-07-57, the FAA reported that, on the basis of its survey of Part 121 operators, 92 percent of U.S. air carrier passengers were being transported by carriers that had adopted SAFO 06012 in full or in part. However, the FAA did not indicate the percentage of Part 121 carriers that had fully adopted the SAFO or those parts of the SAFO that had not been adopted by other Part 121 carriers. The Safety Board is especially concerned that among those parts of the SAFO that have not yet been adopted is the minimum 15-percent landing distance safety margin. Also, the FAA did not provide any information regarding whether SAFO 06012 had been adopted in full or in part by Part 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators. In addition, the FAA did not describe the actions that it would take to encourage those operators that have not complied with the SAFO (such as Shuttle America) to do so. Because all Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators have not fully complied with SAFO 06012 and rulemaking that requires arrival landing distance assessments with a 15-percent minimum safety margin has not been implemented, Safety Recommendation A-07-57 remains classified "Open--Unacceptable Response." In its January 8, 2008, response to Safety Recommendation A-07-61, the FAA stated that, in December 2007, it had announced the formation of an aviation rulemaking committee to review regulations affecting certification and operation of airplanes and airports for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways. The Safety Board recognizes that aviation rulemaking committees are part of the rulemaking process, but these committees have historically taken a long time to complete their work, and the FAA has not always acted in a timely manner after it receives recommendations from the committees. Pending the prompt completion of the aviation rulemaking committee’s work and the FAA’s timely action in response to the committee’s recommendations, Safety Recommendation A-07-61 is classified "Open--Acceptable Response." The Board continues to urge the FAA to act expeditiously on Safety Recommendations A-07-57 and -61 because landing distance assessments are critical to safe landing operations on contaminated runways.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/13/2008
Response: On December 6, 2007, the FAA issued a notice announcing the formation of an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) to review regulations affecting certification and operation of airplanes and airports for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways. The following items are among those for which the FAA has tasked the ARC to provide advice and recommendations: ·Establishment of airplane certification and operational requirements (including training) for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways ·Establishment of landing distance assessment requirements, including minimum landing distance safety margins, to be performed at the time of arrival ·Establishment of standards for runway surface condition reporting and minimum surface conditions for continued operations Formation of the ARC with the specific tasks described is a responsive first step. Pending the FAA’s taking the recommended actions, Safety Recommendations A-07-59, -62, and -63 are classified Open Acceptable Response. Safety Recommendation A-07-61 is addressed and classified as OPEN -- ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE in the Safety Board’s report on the runway overrun accident involving Shuttle America flight 6448, which was presented at a public Board Meeting on April 15, 2008.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 1/8/2008
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 1/14/2008 3:39:36 PM MC# 2080007: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, FAA, 1/8/08 Since the Southwest 1248 accident the Federal Aviation Administration has taken several actions to address the safety issues that are the focus of these recommendations, including the development of proposed Operations Specification C082, and the issuance of Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06012, which address landing distance computation with a 15 percent safety margin. A survey of part 121 operators, the results of which have been briefed to the Board's staff, indicates that 92 percent of U.S. airline passengers are now being carried by air carriers in full or partial compliance with the practices recommended in SAFO 06012. On November 6, 2007, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 91-79, Runway Overrun Prevention (copy enclosed). This AC provides ways for pilots and operators of turbine-powered airplanes to identify, understand, and mitigate risks associated with runway overruns during the landing phase of flight. It also provides operators with detailed information that may be used to develop company standard operating procedures to mitigate those risks. The broader mandate that the Board is now recommending will require rulemaking. On December 6,2007, the FAA issued a notice announcing the formation of an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) to review regulations affecting certification and operation of airplanes and airports for airplane takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways (72 FR 68763) (copy enclosed). The ARC will provide advice and recommendations to: ·Establish airplane certification and operational requirements (including training) for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways; ·Establish landing distance assessment requirements, including minimum landing distance safety margins, to be performed at the time of arrival; and ·Establish standards for runway surface condition reporting and minimum surface conditions for continued operations. While this rulemaking effort progresses, we will continue to work with the air carriers and industry to gain the widest possible compliance with the elements of SAFO 06012.