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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-07-057
Details
Synopsis: On December 8, 2005, about 1914 central standard time, Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 1248, a Boeing 737-74H, N471WN, ran off the departure end of runway 31C after landing at Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois.1 The airplane rolled through a blast fence, an airport perimeter fence, and onto an adjacent roadway, where it struck an automobile before coming to a stop. A child in the automobile was killed, one automobile occupant received serious injuries, and three other automobile occupants received minor injuries. Eighteen of the 103 airplane occupants (98 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and 2 pilots) received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), Baltimore, Maryland, about 1758 eastern standard time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Urgent) (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-06-016)
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Chicago, IL, United States
Is Reiterated: Yes
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA06MA009
Accident Reports: Runway Overrun and Collision Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 Boeing 737-74H, N471WN
Report #: AAR-07-06
Accident Date: 12/8/2005
Issue Date: 10/4/2007
Date Closed: 1/31/2011
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Keyword(s):

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 3/4/2015
Response: From CC# 201500140: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) draft Advisory Circulars (AC) 25-X, “Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways,” and AC 25-X, “Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance Assessments,” which were posted for comment on the FAA’s website on January 21, 2015. Both of these draft ACs provide guidance and standardized methods that data providers, such as type certificate (TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and airplane operators can use when developing performance data for transport category airplanes for operations on contaminated runways. The AC also promotes the use of consistent terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel. However, the NTSB is disappointed that the FAA does not plan to undertake rulemaking to require turbojet operators to use a standardized methodology and FAA-approved data to perform takeoff and landing distance assessments for operations on wet or contaminated runways. Although many manufacturers, operators, and airports have elected to incorporate elements of the TALPA ARC recommendations that will improve industry operations and safety, the ACs provide guidance material only. Since the planned AC content is neither mandatory nor regulatory, the recommended data to support takeoff and landing distance assessments may or may not be developed. If the data are developed and optional assessments are performed, operators remain free to choose the performance data basis, the means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions, and the added safety margin, if any. The FAA has no plan to approve existing or future performance data developed by TC holders to support takeoff and landing distance assessments or the accompanying calculation methods that may inadvertently or purposely deviate from the TALPA ARC recommendations. As a result, it is likely that many components of the FAA’s AC guidance will be ignored by segments of the intended audience, even if it is consistent with the TALPA ARC’s vision. In addition, both ACs are aimed at transport category airplanes, but the guidance should, at a minimum, extend to all turbojet airplane operations. Among the NTSB safety recommendations addressing landing distance assessments are: A-07-57 Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Urgent) A-07-59 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to provide clear guidance and training to pilots and dispatchers regarding company policy on surface condition and braking action reports and the assumptions affecting landing distance/stopping margin calculations, to include use of airplane ground deceleration devices, wind conditions and limits, air distance, and safety margins. A-07-61 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. A-08-41 As part of the Takeoff/Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee, address the need for initial training on the rationale for and criticality of conducting landing distance assessments before landing on contaminated runways. One technical problem that should be addressed within the ACs is their reliance, in part, on the wheel braking coefficient model codified in Section 25.109(c) for wet runway stopping performance calculations. However, the Section 25.109(c) model has never been validated by flight test data. To its credit, the FAA has recognized that the wheel braking coefficient model in Section 25.109(c) might be insufficiently conservative, as evidenced by the recent FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) tasked to provide recommendations regarding new or updated standards for airplane performance and handling qualities. Under the subject area of Takeoff and Landing Performance, subtask (b) addresses wet runway stopping performance: b. Wet runway stopping performance. Recent landing overruns on wet runways have raised questions regarding current wet runway stopping performance requirements and methods. Analyses indicate that the braking coefficient of friction in each case was significantly lower than expected for a wet runway (i.e., lower than the level specified in FAA regulations). Consideration should also be given to the scheduling of landing performance on wet porous friction course and grooved runway surfaces. Recommendations may include the need for additional data gathering, analysis, and possible rulemaking. [emphasis added]

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 1/31/2011
Response: The NTSB addressed this urgent safety recommendation in its June 27, 2008, letter to the FAA issuing safety recommendations as a result of our investigation of the February 18, 2007, runway overrun of Shuttle America, Inc" doing business as Delta Connection flight 6448. The NTSB noted that, at the time of the accident, Shuttle America did not require landing distance assessments based on conditions at the time of arrival, despite the issuance of Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06012 by the FAA 6 months before the accident. Currently, the NTSB is investigating a July 31,2008, accident in which an East Coast Jets Hawker Beechcraft HS-125 airplane crashed while attempting to go-around after landing on a wet ungrooved runway at Owatonna Degner Regional Airport, Owatonna, Minnesota. The investigation to date has revealed that East Coast Jets did not require its pilots to perform landing distance assessments based on conditions actually existing at the time of arrival. The FAA indicated that it continues to encourage operators to incorporate the safety elements contained in SAPO 06012 as an interim solution until rulemaking is complete. The FAA previously reported that 92 percent of Part 121 carriers had adopted the guidance contained in the SAPO; however, the FAA did not indicate the percentage of Part 121 carriers that had fully adopted the SAFO or which parts of the SAFO had not been adopted by the remaining Part 121 carriers. The NTSB informed the FAA that it was especially concerned that among those parts of the SAPO that have not yet been adopted was the minimum IS-percent landing distance safety margin. The NTSB also pointed out that the FAA had not provided any information regarding whether SAFO 06012 had been adopted in full or in part by Part 135 or Part 91 subpart K operators, nor did it describe the actions it would take to encourage those operators that had not complied with the SAPO (such as those en1ployed by Shuttle America and East Coast Jets) to do so. To date, not all Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators have fully con1plied with SAFO 06012, and rulemaking that requires arrival landing distance assessments with a 15-percent minimum safety margin has not been implemented. The NTSB remains concerned that accidents continue to occur in which pilots have not conducted arrival landing distance assessments, which would have provided them with crucial information about the expected landing performance upon arrival and would have either prevented or significantly reduced the severity of the accidents. The NTSB points out that this urgent safety recommendation was issued as an interim solution because we recognized that the standardized methodology recommended in Safety Recommendation A-07-61 would take time to develop; however, to date, the FAA's actions have not been responsive. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-07-57 is classified CLOSED – UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 8/23/2010
Response: MC# 201000343 - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration received the Take Off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee's (ARC) recommendations for landing performance assessment in April 2009 and for contaminated runway takeoff performance in July 2009. The FAA is evaluating the ARC recommendations and intends to initiate rulemaking in 2011. In the interim, the FAA in cooperation with ten airports and two air carriers is in the process of validating the accuracy and usability of the Runway Surface Condition Reporting Matrix that was developed by the ARC for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. This matrix forms the cornerstone to many of the recommendations put forth by the TALPA. The FAA also continues to encourage operators to incorporate the safety elements contained in Safety Alert for Operators 06012 pending the completion of the rulemaking process. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on these safety recommendations and provide an updated response by January 2011.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/27/2008
Response: [The Safety Board addressed this recommendation in its June 27, 2008, letter to the FAA issuing recommendations as a result of the February 18, 2007, runway overrun of Delta Connection flight 6448] At the time of the accident, Shuttle America did not require landing distance assessments based on conditions at the time of arrival. Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO)5 06012, "Landing Performance Assessments at the Time of Arrival (Turbojets)," which the FAA issued about 6 months before the accident, had urgently recommended that operators of turbojet airplanes develop procedures for flight crews to assess landing performance based on the actual conditions at the time of arrival, which might differ from the presumed conditions at the time of dispatch, and that an additional safety margin of at least 15 percent be added to actual landing distances. The aircraft performance study included a landing performance data calculation that most closely matched the landing distance assessment that the flight crewmembers might have accomplished if Shuttle America had incorporated procedures that were consistent with SAFO 06012. This calculation was based on the reported winds, a braking action report of fair, and the accident airplane’s flaps 5 configuration. The calculation assumed a touchdown point of 1,400 feet, the use of maximum reverse thrust until 60 knots, and full wheel braking and included an additional 15-percent stopping distance margin. The landing performance calculation showed that, on the basis of the conditions that had been reported to the flight crew at the time, the airplane could have landed with a factored touchdown point of 1,610 feet and come to a safe stop on the runway with a ground roll distance of 3,262 feet, for a total distance of 4,872 feet. However, the airplane’s actual touchdown point and the flight crew’s use of reverse thrust and braking were not in accordance with the assumptions used in the landing performance calculation. Before the issuance of SAFO 06012, the FAA had planned to issue Operations Specification (OpSpec) N 8400.C082 to all 14 CFR Part 91 subpart K, 121, 125, and 135 turbojet operators in response to Safety Recommendation A-06-16 (urgent), the intent of which was to ensure adequate safety margins for landings on contaminated runways.6 The FAA had intended for operators to comply with the OpSpec by October 2006 but instead encountered industry opposition to the OpSpec. Consequently, in August 2006, the FAA decided not to issue the mandatory OpSpec but rather to pursue formal rulemaking and issue the voluntary SAFO in the interim. In its final report on the Southwest Airlines flight 1248 accident,7 the Safety Board concluded, "although landing distance assessments incorporating a landing distance safety margin are not required by regulation, they are critical to safe operation of transport-category airplanes on contaminated runways." As a result, on October 4 and 16, 2007, the Board issued Safety Recommendations A-07-57 (urgent) and -61, respectively, to further address the need for landing distance assessments. Safety Recommendation A-07-57 asked the FAA to immediately require all Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing that are based on existing performance data and actual conditions and incorporate a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. This recommendation, which superseded Safety Recommendation A-06-16, was classified "Open -- Unacceptable Response" on October 4, 2007, because it maintained the previous classification of Safety Recommendation A-06-16 and the FAA had not yet required landing distance assessments that incorporated a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. Safety Recommendation A-07-61 asked the FAA to require all Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing that are based on a standardized methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, and a means of correlating the airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available and that include a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. The Safety Board recognized that the standardized methodology recommended in Safety Recommendation A-07-61 would take time to develop and, thus, issued Safety Recommendation A-07-57 to ensure that landing distance assessments with at least a 15-percent safety margin were being performed in the interim. In its December 17, 2007, response to Safety Recommendation A-07-57, the FAA reported that, on the basis of its survey of Part 121 operators, 92 percent of U.S. air carrier passengers were being transported by carriers that had adopted SAFO 06012 in full or in part. However, the FAA did not indicate the percentage of Part 121 carriers that had fully adopted the SAFO or those parts of the SAFO that had not been adopted by other Part 121 carriers. The Safety Board is especially concerned that among those parts of the SAFO that have not yet been adopted is the minimum 15-percent landing distance safety margin. Also, the FAA did not provide any information regarding whether SAFO 06012 had been adopted in full or in part by Part 135 and Part 91 subpart K operators. In addition, the FAA did not describe the actions that it would take to encourage those operators that have not complied with the SAFO (such as Shuttle America) to do so. Because all Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators have not fully complied with SAFO 06012 and rulemaking that requires arrival landing distance assessments with a 15-percent minimum safety margin has not been implemented, Safety Recommendation A-07-57 remains classified OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. In its January 8, 2008, response to Safety Recommendation A-07-61, the FAA stated that, in December 2007, it had announced the formation of an aviation rulemaking committee to review regulations affecting certification and operation of airplanes and airports for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways. The Safety Board recognizes that aviation rulemaking committees are part of the rulemaking process, but these committees have historically taken a long time to complete their work, and the FAA has not always acted in a timely manner after it receives recommendations from the committees. Pending the prompt completion of the aviation rulemaking committee’s work and the FAA’s timely action in response to the committee’s recommendations, Safety Recommendation A-07-61 is classified "Open--Acceptable Response." The Board continues to urge the FAA to act expeditiously on Safety Recommendations A-07-57 and -61 because landing distance assessments are critical to safe landing operations on contaminated runways.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 6/17/2008
Response: This recommendation was reiterated on the greensheet issuing A-08-40 thru 43 on June 17, 2008. This greensheet discusses an April 12, 2007 accident of a Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19, N8905F, operated as Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, which ran off the departure end of runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan. Landing Distance Assessments CVR and postaccident interview evidence indicated that the pilots’ concerns during the flight appeared to be primarily related to the TVC wind conditions, perhaps because that was the critical factor in the airplane’s delayed dispatch from MSP.2 Although the CVR recorded the captain mentioning the possibility of diverting to Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW), Detroit, Michigan,3 late in the approach (about 1 minute before touchdown), the pilots exhibited limited concern regarding the runway surface condition. About 37 minutes before they landed, the pilots listened to the TVC automated surface observing system (ASOS) broadcast for updated weather information and runway surface condition information. This ASOS information indicated winds out of 040º at 7 knots and visibilities of 1 1/2 miles in light snow. This was the only TVC ASOS broadcast the pilots listened to before their arrival at TVC. However, TVC ground operations personnel provided the pilots with updated weather and runway surface condition information on several occasions as the airplane neared the airport. The TVC airport operations supervisor provided runway surface condition information to the accident pilots both before (“forty plus MU”4 with “thin wet snow over patchy thin ice”) and during the vectoring stages of the approach (for example, “it’s comin’ down pretty good,” “this is fillin’ in pretty quick,” and “it’s fillin’ in real hard”). (Evidence indicates that the runway surface conditions at TVC deteriorated because of increasing snowfall during the last 15 minutes of the accident flight.) Consistent with this information, the CVR recorded the captain commenting that he expected to land on a contaminated runway. For example, the captain stated: “there’s snow removal on the field yet they’re showing forty or better sounds like a contaminated…runway to me” at 0029:10.5; “with contaminant, more than likely” at 0033:50.9; and “snowing hard” at 0034:09.3. (ASOS reports, which the pilots had not obtained, also showed that light snow increased to moderate snow about 0030; then, about 0040, increased to heavy snow with visibility of 1/4 mile.) Pinnacle pilots were required to obtain the most current meteorological and runway surface condition estimates as close to landing as possible and perform landing distance assessments to determine whether adequate runway length was available before beginning an approach to a contaminated runway. This requirement was incorporated into Pinnacle’s Operations Specifications (OpSpecs) in December 2006, consistent with guidance contained in the FAA’s Safety Alert For Operators (SAFO) 06012. However, CVR evidence and postaccident interviews revealed that the pilots did not perform a landing distance assessment. The captain told investigators that he had landed on snowy runways many times, that he believed the runway conditions were okay based on the freshly plowed runway and reported contamination depth, and that a landing distance assessment was not required. The first officer stated that he thought that pilots were required to (and should) check landing distances with a contaminated runway. He said that he believed 4,000 feet was the required landing distance but indicated that they did not check the landing distance charts. The Safety Board concludes that the pilots failed to perform the landing distance assessment that was required by Pinnacle’s OpSpecs; had they done so, using current weather information, the results would have shown that the runway length was inadequate for the contaminated runway conditions described. This accident reinforces the need for pilots to perform landing distance assessments before every landing, taking into account conditions at the time of arrival and adding a safety margin of at least 15 percent to calculated landing distances. Therefore, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation A-07-57.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 12/17/2007
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 1/2/2008 9:24:51 AM MC# 2070769: - From Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator: FAA Comment. Since the Southwest 1248 accident the Federal Aviation Administration has taken several actions to address the safety issue that is the focus of this recommendation, including the development of proposed Operations Specification N 8400.C082, and the issuance of Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06012, which address landing distance computation with a 15 percent safety margin. A survey of part 121 operators, the results of which have been briefed to the Board's staff, indicates that 92 percent of U.S. airline passengers are now being carried by air carriers in full or partial compliance with the practices recommended in SAFO 06012. These actions represent a substantial safety improvement, which was effected far more quickly than would have been possible through the rulemaking process. The broader mandate that the Board is now recommending will require rulemaking. On December 6,2007, the FAA issued a notice announcing the formation of an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) to review regulations affecting certification and operation of airplanes and airports for airplane takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways (72 FR 68763) (copy enclosed). The ARC will provide advice and recommendations to: Establish airplane certification and operational requirements (including training) for takeoff and landing operations on contaminated runways; Establish landing distance assessment requirements, including minimum landing distance safety margins, to be performed at the time of arrival; and Establish standards for runway surface condition reporting and minimum surface conditions for continued operations. Additionally, FAA principal operations inspectors will continue to be tasked to encourage their assigned air carriers to incorporate the elements contained in SAFO 06012. I will keep the Board informed of the FAA's progress on this safety recommendation.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/4/2007
Response: In issuing this recommendation, the Board noted in its letter to the FAA that: As a result of the SWA flight 1248 accident, the Safety Board issued urgent Safety Recommendation A-06-16, which asked the FAA to immediately prohibit all 14 CFR Part 121 operators from using reverse thrust credit in landing performance calculations. The stated intent of this recommendation was to ensure adequate landing safety margins on contaminated runways. In response, in June 2006, the FAA issued an advance notice of its intent to issue mandatory Operations Specification (OpSpec) N 8400.C082, which would have required 14 CFR Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct landing performance assessments (not necessarily a specific calculation) before every arrival based, in part, on planned touchdown point, procedures and data at least as conservative as the manufacturer’s, updated wind and runway conditions, and an additional 15 percent safety margin. However, the FAA subsequently decided not to issue the mandatory OpSpec at that time and, in August 2006, published Safety Alert For Operators (SAFO) 06012 as an interim guidance measure. SAFO 06012 addressed similar issues to the mandatory OpSpec, but operator compliance with the SAFO is, by definition, voluntary. Although the FAA published SAFO 06012 with the intent of pursuing rulemaking in the area of landing distance assessments, in the interim, operators are still not required to comply with its recommendations and, currently, many operators do not. For example, on February 18, 2007, a Shuttle America Embraer ERJ-170 ran off the end of snow-contaminated runway 28 at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, Cleveland, Ohio.6 The investigation to date has revealed that Shuttle America did not require its pilots to perform (and therefore did not incorporate landing distance safety margins into) arrival landing distance assessments. About 2 months later, a Pinnacle Airlines Bombardier Regional Jet CL600-2B19 ran off the end of snow-covered runway 28 at Cherry Capital Airport in Traverse City, Michigan.7 By contrast, the investigation into this accident showed that Pinnacle’s OpSpecs required its pilots to perform arrival landing distance assessments (including a minimum 15 percent safety margin) per SAFO 06012;8 however, the pilots did not perform the required assessment before the accident landing. If an arrival landing distance assessment had been performed, given the existing conditions, Pinnacle’s OpSpecs would have dictated that a diversion was required. The Safety Board is concerned that, because of operational and conditional variations, it is possible for an airplane to use more of the landing runway than preflight (dispatch) calculations predicted and for pilots to continue to run off the end of contaminated runways. The circumstances of the flight 1248 accident (among others) demonstrate that conditions9 can change between dispatch and arrival and that there is a safety benefit to landing distance assessments at both times. The Safety Board notes that the FAA concluded in SAFO 06012 that operator compliance with preflight landing distance planning requirements alone “does not ensure that the airplane can safely land within the distance available on the runway in the conditions that exist at the time of arrival, particularly if the runway, runway surface condition, meteorological conditions, airplane configuration, airplane weight, or use of airplane ground deceleration devices is different than that used in the preflight calculation." In addition, the FAA stated that "a landing distance assessment should be made under the conditions existing at the time of arrival in order to support a determination of whether conditions exist that may affect the safety of the flight and whether operations should be restricted or suspended." Existing FAA regulations do not specify either the type of arrival landing distance assessment that should be performed or specify a safety margin that should be applied. The FAA-advocated minimum safety margin of 15 percent for arrival landing distance assessments published in SAFO 06012 is based on historic links to the FAA-mandated additional 15 percent factor for wet/slippery preflight planning requirements and the 15 percent factor embedded in the European Aviation Safety Agency and Joint Aviation Authorities operational requirements for contaminated runway landing performance. Although during public hearing testimony10 the FAA stated that the 15 percent landing safety margin has not been substantiated by a specific data collection and evaluation effort, the Safety Board is convinced that a defined landing safety margin is necessary for air carrier operations on contaminated runways. The Board was encouraged when the FAA proposed OpSpec N 8400.C082, which would have required operators of transport-category airplanes to incorporate a 15 percent safety margin in arrival landing distance calculations. The proposed 15 percent safety margin identified in FAA OpSpec N 8400.C082 would have satisfied the intent of the Board’s Safety Recommendation A-06-16. However, the FAA subsequently sought voluntary operator implementation of such actions through SAFO 06012; although SAFO 06012 contains similar information to OpSpec N 8400.C082, compliance with the SAFO is not required by the FAA.11 Because the FAA has had adequate time to require landing distance assessments and implement a landing distance safety margin but has not, Safety Recommendation A-06-16 was classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” on May 8, 2007. Because the FAA has not required actions to address urgent Safety Recommendation A-06-16, flight crews of transport-category airplanes may still be permitted to land in wet, slippery, or contaminated runway conditions, without performing arrival landing distance assessments that incorporate adequate safety margins. As another winter season approaches, the urgent need for such margins becomes more critical. The Safety Board concludes that because landing conditions may change during a flight, preflight landing assessments alone may not be sufficient to ensure safe stopping margins at the time of arrival; arrival landing distance assessments would provide pilots with more accurate information regarding the safety of landings under arrival conditions. Further, the Safety Board concludes that although landing distance assessments incorporating a landing distance safety margin are not required by regulation, they are critical to safe operation of transport-category airplanes on contaminated runways. The Board recognizes that development of a standardized methodology for arrival landing distance assessments will take time. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that, until a standardized methodology can be developed, the FAA should immediately require all 14 CFR Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. Because the objectives of this recommendation and Safety Recommendation A-06-16 are identical, the Safety Board classifies A-06-16 Closed Unacceptable Action/Superceded and the superceding safety recommendation will maintain the status of OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date:
Response: At the 1990 Board meeting addressing the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL), the Board voted to place Safety Recommendations A-86-33, A-86-40 and A-86-42 on the Federal MWL under the issue category “Runway Incursions/ Ground Collisions of Aircraft.” On November 8, 2007 at the Board meeting addressing the Federal Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements the category’s name was changed to “Improve Runway Safety.” Since 1990, the Board has voted to include Safety Recommendations A-91-29, A-91-30, A-91-54 through A-91-58, A-91-110 through A-91-115, A-95-86, A-95-92, A-95-93, A-95-97, A-00-66, A-0067, A-00-68, and A-07-57 is this category as well.