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Safety Recommendation Details

Safety Recommendation A-04-024
Details
Synopsis: On January 8, 2003, about 0847:28 eastern standard time, Air Midwest (doing business as US Airways Express) flight 5481, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV, crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 18R at Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. The 2 flight crewmembers and 19 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, 1 person on the ground received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 5481 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport, Greer, South Carolina, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure that Raytheon Aircraft Company revises the maintenance procedures for critical flight systems in its Beech 1900, 1900C, and 1900D Airliner Maintenance Manuals to ensure that the procedures can be completely and correctly accomplished.
Original recommendation transmittal letter: PDF
Overall Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Mode: Aviation
Location: Charlotte, NC, United States
Is Reiterated: No
Is Hazmat: No
Is NPRM: No
Accident #: DCA03MA022
Accident Reports: Loss of Pitch Control During Takeoff Air Midwest Flight 5481, Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV
Report #: AAR-04-01
Accident Date: 1/8/2003
Issue Date: 3/5/2004
Date Closed: 8/11/2006
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: FAA (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Keyword(s): Maintenance

Safety Recommendation History
From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 8/11/2006
Response: The Safety Board notes that on March 9, 2005, the FAA informed the Board that Raytheon had updated the Beech 1900 Maintenance Manuals for critical flight systems. Revision highlights for some of the affected aircraft were forwarded to the Board for information. On October 12, 2005, the Board replied that it would appreciate the opportunity to review a selection of the revised maintenance procedures, particularly those procedures that were involved in the Air Midwest accident. In its current letter, the FAA supplied a copy of the revised Beech 1900 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27, revision A38, dated July 31, 2005. The Safety Board has reviewed the information supplied and found that the FAA has taken the recommended action; consequently, Safety Recommendation A-04-24 is classified "Closed-Acceptable Action."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/13/2006
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 3/21/2006 11:22:00 AM MC# 2060148 Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, FAA, 3/13/06 On March 9, 2005, the Federal Aviation Administration informed the Board that Raytheon Aircraft Company had updated the Model 1900 Maintenance Manuals for critical flight systems. The Model 1900D Maintenance Manual A35 revision and the Model 1900/1900C Maintenance Manual B17 revision highlights were forwarded to the Board for information. Highlights of the revisions were: Model 1900D and Model 1900C (UC serials) Aileron Rigging, Model 1900D and Model 1900C (UC serials) Aileron Trim Tab Rigging, Model 1900D and Model 1900/1900C Flap Rigging, Flap System Functional Checks, and Flap System Operational Checks. With these revisions, the Model 1900 Series Chapter 27 Flight Control maintenance procedures have been revised. On October 12, 2005, the Board stated that it would appreciate the opportunity to review a selection of the revised maintenance procedures, particularly those procedures that were involved in the Air Midwest accident. Consequently, I have enclosed a copy of the revised Model 19000 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27, revision A38, dated July 31, 2005, for the Board's information.

From: NTSB
To: FAA
Date: 10/12/2005
Response: The Safety Board notes that on November 30, 2004, Raytheon Aircraft Company updated the Model 1900 Maintenance Manuals for critical flight systems. The Board received a highlight of the changes listing the chapters modified and a short description of the changes from the FAA. The Board would appreciate the opportunity to review a selection of the revised maintenance procedures, particularly those procedures that were involved in the Air Midwest flight 5481 accident. Pending the Board's receipt and review of these revised procedures, Safety Recommendation A-04-24 is classified "Open--Acceptable Response."

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 3/9/2005
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 3/18/2005 11:19:21 AM MC# 2050114 Raytheon Aircraft Company has updated the Model 1900 Maintenance Manuals for critical flight systems. The Model 1900D Maintenance Manual A35 revision and the Model 1900/1900C Maintenance Manual B17 revision highlights are enclosed for the Board's information. Highlights of the revisions are: Model 1900D and Model 1900C (UC serials) Aileron Rigging, Model 1900D and Model 1900C (UC serials) Aileron Trim Tab Rigging, Model 1900D and Model 1900/1900C Flap Rigging, Flap System Functional Checks, and Flap System Operational Checks. With these revisions, the Model 1900 Series Chapter 27 Flight Control maintenance procedures have been revised. I believe that the Federal Aviation Administration has satisfactorily responded to this safety recommendation, and I look forward to your response.

From: FAA
To: NTSB
Date: 6/18/2004
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 6/28/2004 3:14:12 PM MC# 2040357 The FAA agrees with the intent of this safety recommendation and is working with Raytheon Aircraft Company and Raytheon Airline Aviation Services to revise all maintenance manual procedures with a Fault Hazard Analysis of Hazardous or greater. It is anticipated that the revisions will be completed by November 2004. As part of this effort, Raytheon Aircraft Company has provided information on the revisions to be released this calendar year. This information is contained in the enclosure. The FAA will ask Raytheon to provide outlines and estimated dates for further revisions to the maintenance manuals to continue the process already started. These changes will be tasked in order of importance--failures rated catastrophic will be completed first, followed in descending order through the items rated as potentially hazardous in nature.