



AVIATION



HIGHWAY



MARINE



RAILROAD



PIPELINE

July 22, 2025

MIR-25-30

Grounding of Recreational Vessel *6 Saturdays*

On June 19, 2024, about 1517 local time, the recreational vessel *6 Saturdays* grounded near the St. Augustine Inlet entrance, near St. Augustine, Florida (see figure 1 and figure 2).¹ After the grounding, the captain maneuvered the vessel into deeper water, where it partially sank and was later salvaged. The captain and one passenger on board subsequently abandoned the vessel and were rescued by local first responder marine units. There were no injuries, and no pollution was reported. Damage to the vessel was estimated at \$1 million.²



Figure 1. *6 Saturdays* in the boatyard after the grounding, on November 22, 2024.

¹ In this report, all times are eastern daylight time, and all miles are nautical miles (1.15 statute miles).

² Visit [nts.gov](https://www.nts.gov) to find additional information in the [public docket](#) for this NTSB investigation (case no. DCA24FM048). Use the [CAROL Query](#) to search investigations.

Casualty Summary

Casualty type	Grounding/Stranding
Location	St. Augustine Inlet, St. Augustine, Florida 29°54.85' N, 081°17.09' W
Date	June 19, 2024
Time	1517 eastern daylight time (coordinated universal time -4 hrs)
Persons on board	2
Injuries	None
Property damage	\$1 million est.
Environmental damage	None
Weather	Visibility 10 mi, overcast, winds east 18 kts (at Northeast Florida Regional Airport, 4 nm north-northwest of grounding location), seas choppy, air temperature 82°F, water temperature 81°F, sunset 2029
Waterway information	Inlet; flood tide 2.5 ft at 1518 (mean range 4.5 ft), high tide at 1936 (Mayport, Florida, 30 nm north of grounding site)



Figure 2. Area where the *6 Saturdays* grounded, as indicated by a circled X. (Background source: Google Maps)

1 Factual Information

1.1 Background

The *6 Saturdays* was a 55-foot-long, Florida-registered, fiberglass-reinforced plastic recreational vessel built in 2024 and privately owned under a limited liability corporation. The vessel was powered by two 900-hp engines that drove two forward-facing, twin-counter-rotating, azimuthing propellers mounted on a pod underneath the hull. The vessel's propulsion pods were designed so that, if one was displaced, flooding through the associated hull fitting should not occur. The boat had a draft of about 4 feet.

1.2 Event Sequence

On June 19, 2024, about 0840, the *6 Saturdays* departed a marina at Hilton Head, South Carolina, and headed into the North Atlantic Ocean and southbound toward the St. Augustine Inlet. The vessel's destination was Jupiter, Florida. On board was the captain, employed by the vessel owner, and a passenger. The captain intended to enter the Intracoastal Waterway by way of the St. Augustine Inlet and proceed southbound in the Intracoastal Waterway, with the intent to stop the boat and rest once it became dark.

According to the vessel's automatic identification system (AIS) data, at 1459, when it was about 2.5 miles northeast of the St. Augustine Inlet, the *6 Saturdays* began to turn to the southwest from a southerly course toward the inlet at a speed of 26 knots (over ground). Over the next 16 minutes, the vessel changed speed and heading multiple times as it approached the inlet.

About 1515, the *6 Saturdays* transited into an area with charted water depths that ranged from 0 to 5.9 feet. Just after 1517, at a speed of 15 knots, the *6 Saturdays* grounded and came to an abrupt stop about 0.2 miles east of the beach on the shoals at the north side of the inlet. The captain described that it felt like "going over a speed bump too fast."

A St. Johns County marine operations unit was responding to a medical call near the St. Augustine Inlet when one of the first responders witnessed the *6 Saturdays* run aground. He called St. Johns County dispatch and requested a full response to the location of the grounding for a possible rescue of the vessel occupants.

The captain said that, after the vessel grounded, there were 4- to 5-foot swells and an easterly wind that pushed the vessel toward the shore. He also noted that the

stern was submerged in the water, the bow was up, and the boat was taking on water. The *6 Saturdays* had lost propulsion to both pods. He was able to get one propulsion pod running and activated the bow thruster to turn the bow of the *6 Saturdays* into the waves in an attempt to stop the water from washing over the stern. With one propulsion pod, which he described as making a “really loud noise,” available for use, at 1526, the captain got the vessel underway in a northeasterly direction away from the inlet at a speed of about 7 knots.

The St. Johns County marine operations unit first responder saw the *6 Saturdays* move away from the area of the grounding and observed waves coming over the stern of the vessel with its bow “sticking out of the water.”

The captain said that about 2 minutes later, at 1528, the boat’s “water sirens” (bilge level alarms) started going off. He activated the vessel’s four bilge pumps, but the bilge pumps were not able to keep up with the amount of water coming in. About this time, the vessel lost propulsion again. The vessel’s AIS data showed that, about 1543, 1.4 miles east of the inlet, the vessel began to drift west toward the shoreline.

The captain and passenger were waist-deep in water, with the vessel’s stern submerged. The captain assessed that they needed to evacuate the vessel. At 1544, he made a distress call over VHF radio, which the US Coast Guard Sector Jacksonville command center received. Because he could not open the main cabin doors to the aft deck (the primary evacuation route), about 1550, the captain directed the passenger to exit via an overhead hatch at the forward end of the main cabin and, less than a minute later, he exited the vessel via the same overhead hatch. Once outside, they donned lifejackets, and the captain activated both of the vessel’s emergency position indicating radio beacons.

Three St. Johns County marine units and one St. Johns County Sheriff’s Office helicopter responded to the emergency. The helicopter arrived on scene about 1545 (see figure 3). Upon seeing the approaching marine units, the passenger entered the water, followed by the captain shortly after. First responders on a marine unit jet ski picked up the captain and passenger and transferred them to a St. Augustine Fire Department boat, which brought them to shore.



Figure 3. The *6 Saturdays* as viewed from the St. Johns County Sheriff's Office helicopter at 1546. (Source: St. Johns County Sheriff's Office)

The last transmitted AIS position from the *6 Saturdays* was recorded at 1547 about 1.3 miles east from the north entrance to the inlet.

1.3 Additional Information

1.3.1 Damage

After the casualty, the *6 Saturdays* was refloated and towed to a boatyard, where it was later examined for damage. The portside propulsion pod and stabilizer were missing. The starboard-side propulsion pod was missing its forward hub. All propeller blades were bent in the aft direction and were severely damaged. The keel had scratch marks extending on both sides of the hull from the bow to the stern. There were scratch marks through the bottom paint at the aft port quarter of the boat near the port propulsion pod's through-hull fitting. There were no observed holes or cracks in the hull (see figure 4).




Figure 4. Left to right: The aft bottom of the *6 Saturdays*, including the through-hull fitting for the missing port propulsion pod and damage to the propeller blades of the starboard propulsion pod. Scratch mark damage to the keel of the *6 Saturdays*.

1.3.2 Waterway and Environmental Conditions

The location where the *6 Saturdays* grounded was known to have shoaling and sand buildup. The electronic navigation chart for the area had a cautionary note for mariners for St. Augustine Inlet that stated:

The entrance channel is subject to frequent changes in depth and direction because of shifting shoals. Buoys are not charted because of frequent changes in position. Mariners are advised to seek local knowledge (see figure 5).




Figure 5. Electronic navigation chart with the positions and track of the *6 Saturdays* up to the grounding location, and caution area inset. (Background source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration electronic navigation chart US5FL7RG)

In addition, the *US Coast Pilot 4* stated:

Dangerous and shifting shoals extend one mile seaward. A lighted whistle buoy marks the approach, and buoys mark the channel. These aids are not charted since they are frequently moved with changing conditions to mark the best water. Mariners are advised to seek local knowledge prior to entering.

1.3.3 Crew Information

The captain of the *6 Saturdays* had a valid near coastal waters 100-ton Coast Guard merchant mariner credential. He said he had about 20 years' experience in the yachting industry. The captain said he had been through the St. Augustine Inlet "many times" previously. He was, however, not aware of any local navigational cautions or warnings for the area, and he could not recall seeing any navigational aids.

After the grounding, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission levied a civil penalty to the captain of the *6 Saturdays* for "reckless or careless operation of a vessel."

2 Analysis

While approaching the entrance to the St. Augustine Inlet, the recreational vessel *6 Saturdays* grounded in shoal water. The vessel began taking on water, and as the captain moved the vessel to deeper water it took waves over the stern. Although all bilge pumps were started, they could not keep up with the flooding, and the vessel began to sink by the stern. The captain and passenger abandoned the vessel and were rescued by first responders.

The navigation chart for the area where the grounding occurred contained a cautionary note warning of frequent changes in depth due to shifting shoals. Additionally, the *Coast Pilot* warned of dangerous and shifting shoals extending 1 mile seaward. Although the captain of the *6 Saturdays* said he had operated vessels many times through the St. Augustine Inlet, he was unaware of the shoaling and published cautions and warnings. The captain did not navigate the vessel to the lighted whistle buoy off the entrance of the inlet to follow the buoyed channel inward, which would have kept the vessel in safe water. Instead, he proceeded directly through the shoal water at a speed of about 15 knots. The captain's decision to navigate the vessel through shoal water with charted depths that were likely less than the vessel's draft led to the vessel's grounding.

3 Conclusions

3.1 Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the grounding of the recreational vessel *6 Saturdays* was the captain's decision to navigate through an area known to have shoals instead of the buoyed entrance channel marking the safe navigation passage into the St. Augustine Inlet.

Vessel Particulars

Vessel	6 Saturdays
Type	Yacht/Boat (Recreational vessel)
Owner/Operator	Krause Consulting 2C II, LLC (Private)
Flag	United States
Port of registry	Jupiter, Florida
Year built	2024
Official number	1339373 (Hull ID PBT55038E324)
IMO number	N/A
Classification society	N/A
Length (overall)	62.7 ft (19.1 m)
Breadth (max.)	17.2 ft (5.2 m)
Draft (casualty)	4.0 ft (1.2 m)
Tonnage	N/A
Engine power; manufacturer	2 x 900 hp (671 kW); Volvo Penta D13 IPS 1200 diesel engines

NTSB investigators worked closely with our counterparts from **Coast Guard Sector Jacksonville** throughout this investigation.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and events we investigate, and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies and offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for any accident or event investigated by the agency. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person” (Title 49 *Code of Federal Regulations* section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report (Title 49 *United States Code* section 1154(b)).

For more detailed background information on this report, visit the [NTSB Case Analysis and Reporting Online \(CAROL\) website](#) and search for NTSB accident ID DCA24FM048. Recent publications are available in their entirety on the [NTSB website](#). Other information about available publications also may be obtained from the website or by contacting—

National Transportation Safety Board
Records Management Division, CIO-40
490 L’Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594
(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551