AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Douglas DC-9-32, N3329L
Louisville, Kentucky
September 8, 1970

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20591
REPORT NUMBER: NTSB-AAR-71-15
ERRATUM

Page 5 of the subject report has been revised to reflect additional technical information concerning ground operation of the elevators. Please substitute the attached pages 5 and 6 for those now appearing in the report.

September 15, 1971

REPORT NUMBER: NTSB-AAR-71-12
The elevators are operated aerodynamically by the tabs which are controlled by a cable system from the control column. The geared tab on each elevator is linked mechanically to the stabilizer so that as the elevator moves, the geared tab moves in the same direction as the control tab to provide additional aerodynamic control surface. (See Attachment 1.)

The elevators are hinged to brackets attached to the horizontal stabilizer rear spar. Elevator travel is approximately 27° trailing edge up (TEU) and 16-1/2° trailing edge down (TED) from the neutral position. The elevators are interconnected by a torque tube so they can operate in unison. Both elevators are aerodynamically balanced and mass balance weights are installed in the leading edge to minimize flutter. The mass balance causes the elevator to be in the approximate 27° TEU position when no aerodynamic load is applied and the gust locks are disengaged.

If the control column is pulled aft from this static position, the elevator remains fixed as the tab moves from full trailing edge up to full trailing edge down. If the control column is pushed forward from the static position, the control tab remains fixed as the elevator moves from the full trailing edge-up position to a trailing edge-down position.

When the control column is moved forward or aft in flight, the cable system and mechanical linkage cause the elevator tabs to move up or down and, during flight, aerodynamic forces on the displaced tabs drive the elevators. As the position of the elevators changes in relation to the horizontal stabilizer, mechanical linkage moves the geared tabs so as to provide additional aerodynamic boost to assist in moving the elevators.

The TWA EC-8 Flight Operation Manual required pilots to test the flight controls to the full limits of their travel prior to takeoff. Movement of the controls was to be accomplished slowly and smoothly to avoid damage to boosted controls (rudder and ailerons). The CVR transcript indicated that the flight controls were checked while the crew was taxiing to the runway.

1.7 Meteorological Information

The weather reported just prior to the accident at 1451:00 was 3,000 feet scattered, estimated 15,000 feet broken, visibility 13 miles, temperature 69° F., dew point 53° F., wind from 150° at 8 knots, and the altimeter setting 30.08. The weather taken just after the accident was the same except that the wind had shifted to 180° and its speed had increased 1 knot.

The accident occurred in bright daylight.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

Not applicable.

1.9 Communications

The communications between TWA Flight 863 and the FAA facilities were routine.
The last communication received from TIA Flight 863 was the word "Right-o" in response to a thank you from departure control, just after the start of the takeoff roll.

1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities

JFK Airport had been undergoing an expansion and modernization program including the relocation of the outer and inner taxiways and ramp expansion. This work required the removal of old paved surfaces and resulted in taxiway and runway contamination.

Introduction of the new large jet aircraft with more than twice the thrust of previous jet (transport) aircraft, caused considerable erosion along most taxiways and runways. According to New York Port Authority personnel, the products of this erosion, pieces of asphaltic material, rocks, etc., were being blown onto taxiways, ramps, and runways, making it difficult to keep these areas clean.

1.11 Flight Recorders

(a) Flight Data Recorder

The aircraft was equipped with a Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., UDC Division, FDR Model F-542B, S/N 3985, located on the right upper side of the rear pressure bulkhead. The recorder was recovered shortly after the accident and, upon disassembly, it was found that the recording medium was not damaged.

Examination of the data graph prepared from the flight data recorder readout indicated that the aircraft accelerated in a normal manner during the first 15 seconds, reaching about 91 knots, at which time the aircraft rotated noseup. Shortly thereafter, the airspeed and altitude traces became aberrant and continued so throughout the recorded time history. About 14 seconds after the indications of rotation, the acceleration trace (g), moved in a positive direction, to a maximum of +1.5 g in about 5½ seconds, then reversed and reached a value of +0.5 g in about 4 seconds. The trace remained below the +1.0 g until electrical power was lost at impact. The heading remained close to the runway heading of 130° until the last 15 seconds of flight when it fluctuated between headings of 070° and 150°.

(b) Cockpit Voice Recorder

The aircraft was equipped with a United Control Voice Recorder, Model V-557, S/N 1917, located on the right upper side of the rear pressure bulkhead.

Pretakeoff conversation indicated that the engine startup, flight control check, stabilizer check, and flap settings were accomplished in
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Adopted: November 17, 1971

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D. C. 20591
REPORT NUMBER: NTSB-AAR-71-15

Bureau of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C., 20591

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20591

Delta Air Lines Flight 439, a Douglas DC-9, N3329L, touched down 156 feet short of Runway 29 at Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky, September 8, 1970, at 2114, e.d.t., while making a visual landing approach. In the area of the initial impact, the ground sloped upward toward the runway threshold at a 5 percent gradient. After initial impact, the aircraft slid 73 feet on the ground, became airborne, and again touched down, this time on the runway, and the aircraft slid an additional 4,457 feet before it came to rest. The aircraft was damaged substantially, and the fuselage had fractured and buckled in the area between fuselage stations 737 and 794.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's misjudgment of altitude due to the absence of sufficient lights in the approach area, misleading information produced by deceptive slope, and that the pilot did not position the aircraft on the ILS glide slope while he was establishing the final approach profile.

Aircraft accident - short of runway - night visual approach - ground sloped upward - misjudgment of altitudes - absence of sufficient lights - misleading information - deceptive slope terrain - instrument references - final approach profile

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## DELTA AIR LINES, INC.
DOUGLAS DC 9-32, N3329L
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
SEPTEMBER 8, 1970

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20591
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Adopted: November 17, 1971

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.
DOUGLAS DC-9-32, N3329L
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
SEPTEMBER 8, 1970

SYNOPSIS

At approximately 2114 eastern daylight time September 8, 1970, Delta Air Lines Flight 439, a Douglas Model DC-9-32, N3329L, touched down 156 feet short of Runway 29 at Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky, during a night landing visual approach. In the area of initial contact, the ground sloped upward toward the runway threshold at a measured 2°44' or an approximate 5 percent gradient.

The aircraft made firm contact on the main gear, rolled 73 feet in the direction of the runway threshold and then became airborne. It touched down a second time on the runway, 262 feet beyond the runway threshold. From the point of second touchdown, ground marks continued approximately 4,457 feet to where the aircraft came to rest. The aircraft was substantially damaged by the initial ground contact but there was no fire.

The 89 passengers and five crewmembers on board deplaned safely; however, one stewardess and 14 passengers received minor injuries.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's misjudgment of altitude due to the absence of sufficient lights in the approach area, misleading information produced by deceptive sloping terrain, and that the pilot did not position the aircraft on the ILS glide slope while he was establishing the final approach profile.

INVESTIGATION

Delta Air Lines Flight 439 was a scheduled domestic flight from Chicago, Illinois (O'Hare Field), to Atlanta, Georgia, with intermediate stops at Louisville and Lexington, Kentucky.

Flight 439 of September 8, 1970, departed Chicago at 2031 eastern daylight time en route to Louisville, Kentucky, on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan.

At 2101, 1 Louisville Approach Control established radar contact with Flight 439. Vectors and altitude information were given the crew until the flight was turned to a heading that would intercept the inbound ILS 2 localizer course to Runway 29 at Standiford Field. The flight was subsequently cleared for an ILS approach. (Attachment 1.)

Landing weight had been computed to be 92,000 pounds, which established an approach reference airspeed of 123 knots. Flaps had been extended to 50°. The captain stated that the approach appeared normal in all respects, and that the last time he observed the airspeed indication it was 130 to 132 knots. He believed that the aircraft did not flare properly for landing, which resulted in hard landing and a bounce.

1Unless otherwise noted, all times used herein are eastern daylight, based on the 24-hour clock.
2Instrument Landing System.
The first officer thought that the approach had been normal in all respects, and that an airspeed of 130 knots had been maintained. All instrument indications were normal as he checked them when the aircraft was about 2,500 feet from the end of the runway.

A witness who saw and heard the aircraft as it passed over a toll road, approximately 1,000 feet from the approach end of Runway 29, thought the aircraft was low. He stated "I have seen many airplanes come in low before landing on the runway. Usually the airplanes that come in low increase the engine power as they pass over the toll road, but this airplane didn't do that."

Runway 29 at Standiford Field is 7,200 feet long, 150 feet wide. The airport elevation is 497 feet and the elevation at the approach end of Runway 29 is 479 feet. At the time of the accident, approach lighting was not installed. The threshold is marked with standard green lights. When Flight 439 made the approach which terminated in the accident, the high-intensity runway lights were set at step 3, medium bright, and the reported flight visibility was 7 miles. Runway 29 did not have a prepared underrun/overrun area. The ground leading to the threshold slopes upward 2° 44', a gradient of approximately 5 percent.

Flight 439 made initial ground contact on this incline 156 feet short of the threshold of the runway, rolled forward 73 feet, and became airborne. The aircraft then contacted the runway 262 feet beyond the threshold and continued to roll/skid on the runway before it came to rest 4.457 feet beyond the threshold. (See Attachment 2.)

There were 89 passengers and a crew of five on board. One stewardess and 14 passengers received minor injuries from the hard landing. However, all deplaned safely.

The aircraft was damaged substantially, but there was no fire.

Wreckage examination showed that the fuselage had fractured and buckled in the area between fuselage stations 737 and 794. The fracture path was almost identical on each side of the fuselage.

The seat track on the right side of the cabin separated at row 32 and the left track separated at row 31.

There was no visible damage to the landing gear components or to any support or mounting structure.

The left main landing gear tires revealed flat spots on both tires. Holes in these areas penetrated through the tire tread and casing.

The tail cone rested on the runway. The underside of the cone had been worn flat, and heat discoloration was visible on the sides.

There was no separation of seat belts or seat belt attachments.

The following components were removed from N3329L for testing:

- Speed command of attitude and thrust computer
- Speed command of attitude and thrust indicator
- Altimeters -- two
- Vertical speed indicators -- two
- Air data computer
- Anti-skid control box
- Anti-skid wheel speed transducers -- two

Functional testing of these components was conducted in accordance with the specific overhaul requirements. These tests revealed that the components were operational within the requirements and/or limitations set forth by the manufacturer.

The captain's airspeed indicator was checked at indicated speeds of 123 knots and 128 knots, and was within the prescribed tolerance.

The aircraft pitot and static systems were checked with a field test unit. This check did not reveal any systems discrepancies.

The aircraft had been maintained in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration and company procedures. A special airframe inspection for turbulence encounters or for hard or overweight landings had never been required.

The Douglas Aircraft Company computed the loads and forces necessary to cause fuselage separation at stations 737 to 794, as well as the
effect of touching down on an inclined plane of 2°44'. In part, the Douglas report states:

"In this analysis, an airplane sink speed of 8.5 feet per second was assumed. It should be noted that the effect of an airplane landing on a 2°44' incline at 120 knots with zero sink speed is equivalent to landing at approximately 10 feet per second. This situation is accounted for in the analysis. The total effective sink speed felt by the airplane would therefore be 18.5 feet per second in this case . . . ."

"We conclude from the foregoing that the primary cause of the damage to the Delta airplane was the increase in effective sink speed caused by landing on the incline discussed herein. Under the same circumstances, if the airplane had landed on the runway, it is not likely that damage would have occurred."

Both the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder were recovered.

The readout of the cockpit voice recording did not yield any information that was pertinent to the cause of this accident. Upon playback of the original tape, it was discovered that there was an extraordinary amount of background noise on the cockpit area microphone (CAM) channel which served to mask out any intracockpit conversation which may have transpired during the approach and landing.

The flight data recorder foil medium was undamaged. All parameters were active and clearly discernible. The trip and date/reference binary trace was missing. This trace is normally located near the bottom edge of the foil medium and provides the base for all vertical measurements.

The readout was accomplished by substituting an artificial reference line for the missing reference line, based on the standard position of 0.115 inch above the bottom edge of the recording medium. The tape was read out beginning approximately 3 minutes prior to the point where all parameter traces became aberrant and continued to the end of the recorded traces, comprising a total readout time of approximately 4 minutes. The altitude depicted on the flight data recorder graph was corrected to mean sea level altitude using the reported altimeter setting of 29.90 inches of mercury. No other corrections were made to any parameter. (See Attachment 3.)

The altitude shown at the point where all recorder traces became aberrant is 300 feet mean sea level. The actual altitude at point of impact is 472 feet mean sea level.

Standiford Field is located 5 miles south of Louisville, Kentucky, a sprawling city with an irregular complex of lights. The approach course to Runway 29 is over a varied distribution of lights and, after it crosses the four-lane highway, the upward sloping area preceding the threshold is devoid of lights.

At the time of the accident, the Standiford Field weather was reported at 3,000 feet scattered clouds, 10,000 feet scattered clouds, estimated ceiling 25,000 feet broken clouds, visibility 7 miles, wind 310° at 8 knots.

Navigation and approach aids available at Standiford Field included both radar service and an instrument landing system. No equipment malfunctions during the approach or in the preceding 30 days were reported.

A flight check of the ILS and navigation aids indicated that the systems were operating satisfactorily subsequent to the accident.

The crew members of Flight 439 were certified for the operation involved. (See Appendix B for details.)

The captain had been flying into Louisville for 8 years. The first officer had been flying into Louisville since May 1969.

During an approach, the path described by the main landing gear differs from that described by the pilot's eye level, because the pilot is located above and ahead of the main landing gear. The path described by the landing gear ultimately terminates in the touchdown point, whereas the path described by the eye level of the pilot intersects the runway in what is known as the aiming point. The pilot judges his position above or below the glidepath by reference to the horizon and the aiming point at the runway threshold. As the aircraft approaches the threshold, the pitch attitude of the aircraft is changed and a new aiming point on the runway is used.
This aiming point is always some distance down the runway from the touchdown point.

In a 1950 study which concerned visual judgment during the landing approach, Dr. Calvert of the Royal Aircraft Establishment reported:

"The brain interprets the two-dimensional perspective image in the retina, selecting the possible meaning it may have in light of all other data available to it. If the wrong meaning is attached to the visual scene, then so-called illusions occur. The most important features of the visual field are: the plane of the ground and objects of known size on the surface."

In subsequent studies he concluded that a method of determining the descent flightpath of jet aircraft during the approach was essential, even in good visual conditions, if landing approaches were to be conducted safely. Other studies confirmed his opinions, and led to the development of the visual approach slope indicator that is now installed at air carrier airports on runways not served by an ILS.

Because the vertical situation is difficult to assess accurately, the pilot usually tries to check his judgment of it in every way he can. One way of checking this at low altitudes is to estimate the height of textural features such as trees, houses, roads, and to a lesser extent, the size and spacing of approach lights, where they are installed. Then, by means of past experience, the pilot sets this height against estimated range from touchdown. The accident probability rate increases if the terrain has a pronounced slope, or if there is some other peculiarity which gives a false impression of the real position of the horizon.

Between the Standiford ILS outer marker and the runway, residential and commercial light complexes provide a height stimuli. A four-lane highway transverses the inbound course, 1,000 feet from the threshold on Runway 29. There were no fixed ground lights between the highway and the runway threshold lights, and height stimuli must be transferred to the runway and the threshold lighting complex. Directly over the four-lane highway centerline, ILS (2.99°) glide slope projection provides approximately 130 feet clearance above ground level.

**ANALYSIS**

There were no aircraft system or component malfunctions.

The aircraft had not been previously subjected to excessive airframe load conditions that would have induced a premature fuselage fracture.

No extenuating circumstances, such as turbulence, restriction to visibility, or in-flight emergency, were present which otherwise might have contributed to the cause of the accident. Accordingly, the Safety Board focused its attention on the circumstances and conditions relative to the final approach path.

Referring to the flight data recorder graph, the actual pattern of each parameter trace and the values ascribed to the trace were reviewed. Indicated airspeed values from the data graph were converted to true airspeed values from which ground speed calculations were made. The touchdown is presumed to have occurred at flight data recorder time of 3:00 minutes. This is evidenced by the presence of a discontinuity or gap of about 6.6 seconds in the data recorder time trace. The altitude trace indicated that touchdown occurred at an elevation of 300 feet mean sea level. This was found to be in error, as the elevation at ground contact was 472 feet. However, with respect to the altitude trace, experience has shown that any calibration error in the recorder will be constant throughout the altitude profile, and the profile itself will not be altered by an adjustment to a known altitude at a particular point in the altitude trace. Consequently, when the 172-foot altitude correction is made to the point of impact, an altitude profile of considerable accuracy can be plotted backward from that point along the approach path of the aircraft. This plot was made, and it indicates that the aircraft was constantly below the ILS glide slope throughout the final approach. This below-glidepath indication is supported by the witnesses' observation, and by the fact that the altitude trace shows a uniform
descent rate with no indication of a "duck under" maneuver. If the aircraft had been stabilized on the approach, as the flight data recorder information indicates, and the aircraft had been on the glide slope, the wheel-path would have been approximately 50 feet above the runway threshold instead of below it.

From the foregoing, the Safety Board believes that the pilot did not use the ILS glide slope, but relied upon visual ground reference to maneuver the aircraft during the approach for landing. With respect to the use of the ILS glide slope, Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations provides: "A turbine-powered airplane or a large airplane approaching to land on a runway being served by an ILS, shall, if the airplane is ILS equipped, fly that airplane at an altitude at or above the glide slope between the outer marker (or the point of interception with the glide slope, if compliance with the applicable distance from clouds criteria requires interception closer in) and the middle marker..." This procedure was adopted after it was clear from past experience that a need existed for high-performance aircraft to establish a constant final approach flight condition. The approximate 3° glide slope establishes this constant approach flight condition and assists the crew in maintaining the proper approach profile.

Pilots through training and experience develop a visual frame of reference which allows them to conduct safe conventional approaches to flat terrain. Many successful approaches are made by effectively maintaining a visual null (no change to the subject angle). Pilots may "fly the null" so consistently that when deceptive conditions are introduced (such as irregular light patterns, up slope lights, and other topographical features) their approach paths may result in flight at lower altitudes, and touchdowns short of the runway. These conditions and features were found to be present along the final approach path of Flight 439 to Standiford Field.

On the basis of this investigation, the Safety Board concludes that the cause of this accident is related to the crew's operational technique, the absence of adequate lighting in the approach zone, and the sloping terrain.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's misjudgment of altitude due to the absence of sufficient lights in the approach area, misleading information produced by deceptive sloping terrain, and that the pilot did not position the aircraft on the ILS glide slope while he was establishing the final approach profile.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The Director of Airports at Louisville, Kentucky, stated that an abbreviated approach lighting system was programmed for the approach end of Runway 29 at Standiford Field. This installation was expected to be completed by January 1971.

The installation of the approach lighting system for Runway 29 was included in the Federal Aviation Administration's 1969 fiscal year projects and budget requirements. On January 21, 1971, the FAA did complete and commission for use a medium-intensity approach lighting system which included runway alignment indicator lights.

This action corrects the "Black Hole" effect preceding the threshold.

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS
Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER
Member

/s/ ISABEL A. BURGESS
Member

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:

/s/ JOHN H. REED
Chairman

/s/ OSCAR M. LAUREL
Member

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INVESTIGATION AND HEARING

1. Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board received notification of the accident at 2200 c.d.t., on September 8, 1970. The Investigator in Charge was dispatched immediately to the scene from the Chicago Field Office, with technical assistance from Fort Worth, Texas, and Washington, D. C. Working groups were established for operations, witnesses, air traffic control, structures and systems. Parties to the investigation were Delta Air Lines, the Federal Aviation Administration, Air Line Pilots Association, and Douglas Aircraft Company. The on-scene investigation, which was accomplished at Louisville, Kentucky, was completed September 16, 1970.

2. Hearing

A public hearing was not held in connection with the investigation of this accident.

3. Preliminary Report

A preliminary report was not issued in connection with this accident.
CREW INFORMATION

Captain Jerry K. Reed, aged 30, held an airline transport pilot certificate and was type-rated in the Douglas DC-9. At the time of the accident, he had accumulated a total of 5,600 flying hours, of which 1,663 hours were in the DC-9, and 401 hours were flown as a DC-9 captain. When the accident occurred, he had been on duty 1 hour and 45 minutes, approximately 45 minutes of which was flying time. He held a first-class medical certificate dated May 18, 1970, with no limitations.

First Officer Robert A. Cartmill, aged 33, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for aircraft single- and multiengine land, instrument, and rotorcraft. At the time of the accident, he had accumulated a total of 3,485 flying hours of which, 638 hours were in the DC-9. He held a first-class medical certificate dated August 19, 1970, without limitations.
APPENDIX C

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

N3329L, a Douglas DC-9-32, serial No. 47108, was manufactured by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, January 22, 1968.

The total recorded aircraft flight time was 7,601.2 hours; 914.8 hours were recorded since the last major aircraft inspection. The flight time since the last letter check was 186 hours.

The aircraft was powered with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7 engines. The No. 1 engine (left), serial No. 657026, was manufactured on September 18, 1967, and had been in operation 7,419.9 hours since new. The No. 2 engine (right), serial No. 657049, was manufactured on October 13, 1967, and had accumulated 6,543.9 hours since new.
LOUISVILLE, KY.
STANDFORD
ILS Rwy 29
NDB (ADF) Rwy 29
LOC 109.1 ILS
N 36° 50' 00" MSL 37° 33' 360"
3520 3202 1100

APR 24 70

STANDFORD Tower 120.3 122.7 G
Approach 124.3
Ground 121.7

LOUISVILLE APPROACH CHART

290° 109.1 ILS

MARTINSBURG
HARRISONVILLE IHS
NABB VOR

HOLSCAW
35.9 SD-21

MYSTIC
108.2 MYS

RESTRICTED AREA
4.3704 A B

TAC-FR LOU
(114.8)

NORTH 10 NM
2200 (1621')

PULL UP to 2500 feet on 260° to intercept and proceed outbound on LOU VOR R-279 to LYFORD INT (240 DME or MYS VOR R-022), hold WEST on LOU VOR R-279, RIGHT turn or as directed.

STRAIGHT - IN LANDING RWY 29

MIN 660 (381')
1000' (521')

3/4
3/4
1
1
1/4

MIN 829 (350')
829 (350')
860 (381')
1000' (521')
1100' (653')
1160' (653')

350'
350'
381'
521'
653'
653'

LOM GS 700 (299')
LOM GS 201 (1535')

253° 120° 120°
290° 109.1 ILS

CHANGES Clearance delivery frequency.
SEQUENTIAL FRAMES OF OVERSIZED DOCUMENT

REQUIRES 2 FRAMES PAGE # 18
A Thru B
LEGEND

1. TOUCHDOWN POINTS OF THE LEFT AND RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES 156 FEET BEFORE THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD.

2. TRACKS OF THE LEFT AND RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES END 85 FEET BEFORE THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD.

3. INDICATIONS OF REAR FUSELAGE CONTACT ON THE RUNWAY 262 FEET FROM THE THRESHOLD.

4. INDICATIONS OF THE LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES SKIDDING ON THE RUNWAY SURFACE 385 FEET FROM THE THRESHOLD AND 8 FEET TO THE LEFT OF THE RUNWAY CENTERLINE.

5. INDICATIONS THAT THE LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES HAD BLOWN-OUT 1,488 FEET FROM THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD AND 16 FEET TO THE LEFT OF THE RUNWAY CENTERLINE.

6. STOPPING POINT OF THE AIRCRAFT ON THE RUNWAY 4,457 FEET FROM THE THRESHOLD.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D.C.

PLAN AND PROFILE VIEW OF RUNWAY 29