NTSB Identification: DCA96MA068
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Scheduled 14 CFR DELTA AIR LINES INC
Saturday, July 06, 1996
Probable Cause Approval Date:
McDonnell Douglas MD-88, registration:
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 2 Serious, 3 Minor, 135 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
During the initial part of its takeoff roll, the airplane experienced an engine failure. Uncontained engine debris from the front compressor front hub (fan hub) of the #1 (left) engine penetrated the left aft fuselage. Two passengers were killed and two others were seriously injured. The takeoff was rejected, and the airplane was stopped on the runway. The fan hub had fractured through a tierod hole and blade slot. Some form of drill breakage or drill breakdown, combined with localized loss of coolant and chip packing, had occurred during the drilling process, creating an altered microstructure and ladder cracking in the fan hub. Drilling damage extended much deeper into hole sidewall material than previously anticipated by P & W. Fatigue cracks initiated from the ladder cracking in the tierod hole and began propagating almost immediately after the hub was put into service in 1990. The crack was large enough to have been detectable during the last fluorescent penetrant inspection at Delta. Delta's nondetection of the crack was caused either by a failure of the cleaning and fluorescent penetrant inspection processing, a failure of the inspector to detect the crack, or some combination of these factors.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this
the fracture of the left engine's front compressor fan hub, which resulted from the failure of Delta Air Lines' fluorescent penetrant inspection process to detect a detectable fatigue crack initiating from an area of altered microstructure that was created during the drilling process by Volvo for Pratt & Whitney and that went undetected at the time of manufacture. Contributing to the accident was the lack of sufficient redundancy in the in-service inspection program. (NTSB Report AAR-98/01)