Testimony of Kevin E. Quinlan
Chief, Safety Advocacy Division
National Transportation Safety Board
Before the Judiciary Committee
Maryland House of Delegates
on Impaired Driving Legislation
House Bills 124, 125, 126, 417, 525, 545, 644, 661, 821, 1315, 1415
February 21, 2006
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress to investigate transportation accidents, determine their probable cause, and make recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The recommendations that arise from our investigations and safety studies are our most important product. The Safety Board cannot mandate implementation of these recommendations. However, in our 38-year history, organizations and government bodies have adopted more than 80 percent of our recommendations.
The Alcohol-Highway Safety Problem
The Safety Board has recognized for many years that traffic crashes are this nation's most serious transportation safety problem. More than 90 percent of all transportation related deaths each year result from highway crashes. More than 39 percent of highway deaths nationwide are alcohol-related. The nation as a whole has seen a slight decline over the last few years in the number of alcohol-related fatalities, but far too many people are dying from an entirely preventable cause, particularly in Maryland, where 44 percent of highway deaths are alcohol-related and where the number of and percent of alcohol-related fatalities have increased over the last 3 years.
The emotional toll on families is staggering, but impaired driving also has a financial impact. With almost 16,700 people dying in alcohol-related crashes in 2004, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimating the cost of each fatality to be over $977,000, alcohol-related fatal crashes cost society over $16 billion each year. We believe this to be a very conservative estimate. While the affected individual covers some of these costs, overall, those not directly involved in crashes pay for nearly three-quarters of all crash costs, primarily through insurance premiums, government paid health care costs, taxes, and travel delay. Clearly, much needs to be done to reduce this ongoing tragedy.
The Hard Core Drinking Driver
The Safety Board is particularly concerned about hard core drinking drivers, who were involved in more than 54 percent of alcohol-related fatalities in 2004. While it appears that we may be making progress to reduce overall alcohol-impaired driving, the percent of alcohol-related fatalities involving hard core drinking drivers really has not changed over the last 5 years. The Safety Board defines hard core drinking drivers as individuals who drive with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.15 percent or greater, or who are arrested for or convicted of driving while intoxicated within 10 years of a prior driving while impaired (DWI) conviction. From 1983 through 2004, more than 177,000 people died in crashes involving hard core drinking drivers.
The problem of hard core drinking drivers is complex. No single countermeasure appears to be sufficient to address hard core drinking drivers. These offenders require different approaches. We need a comprehensive system of prevention, apprehension, sanction, and treatment to reduce the crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused by these drivers. Experts agree that impaired drivers persist in their behavior because these drivers believe that they will not be caught and/or convicted. That perception is based on reality. An intoxicated person can drive from New York to Los Angeles and halfway back without being arrested.
In 1984, the Safety Board made a series of recommendations to address the problem of repeat offenders. Since those recommendations were issued, all States have made at least some efforts to address the alcohol-related highway safety problem, and considerable progress has been made in detecting, arresting, and adjudicating drinking drivers. However, the measures taken and the degree of implementation of the Safety Board's 1984 recommendations by States and localities have not been uniform, and alcohol-related crashes continue to claim too many lives.
In light of the thousands of deaths still resulting from these crashes, the Safety Board again focused its efforts on hard core drinking drivers in 2000. That report examined a variety of countermeasures to identify which of these actions have been effective in the specific States that have utilized them, and recommended a model program (attached) to reduce hard core drinking driving.
Today, I want to discuss several key issues pertaining to impaired driving that are directly related to the bills being considered. First, I would like to clarify how the drinking driver problem has changed over the last 30 years. Second, I want to address the importance of BAC testing. Then, I will describe articulate the Safety Board's support for legislation that focuses on hard core drinking drivers. Finally, I will explain the benefits of vehicle sanctions.
Hard Core Drinking Driving Bills
BAC Testing (HB 417, HB 644, and HB 661)
Substantial commitments of financial and human resources are made annually in every State to implement or expand DWI countermeasures. Obtaining support, particularly at the local level, for DWI countermeasures is dependent upon demonstrating that DWI violations are a serious local problem. Complete and accurate information on the involvement of alcohol in fatal highway crashes is essential for acquiring such support. To allocate resources for, and to evaluate the effectiveness of, DWI laws and programs, each State mush know both the level of, and the annual changes in, alcohol involvement in highway crashes. Such knowledge also is a critical prerequisite to the planning and implementation of effective countermeasures. The Safety Board recognized the value of testing drivers involved in fatal crashes nearly 20 years ago, when it recommended that Maryland and the other States require alcohol testing of all drivers involved in fatal highway crashes.
The national proportion of drivers involved in fatal crashes who are tested for alcohol has only increased from about 41 percent in 1982 to about 48 percent in 2004. In addition, most of the drivers tested are those killed in the crash, and results were not obtained for all drivers who were tested. In 1982, Maryland tested about 42 percent of drivers involved in fatal crashes. Maryland's testing rate has risen only to about 45.5 percent, lower than the abysmal national average. Therefore, it is entirely likely that more people are killed from alcohol-related crashes than estimated. The scope of the problem may well be larger than what the data tell us.
Repeat offenders, those most familiar with the system, whether previously convicted or diverted, are more likely to refuse a test than first offenders. By refusing the test, a repeat offender essentially opts himself out of the system. The lack of a valid test result robs the State of a valuable piece of information in identifying those most in need of a significant intervention and substantially weakens the system for preventing alcohol-related fatalities. Sanctions for refusal need to be increased, and police need authority to demand a test.
The Safety Board supports House Bills 417, 644, and 661 because they propose measures to ensure BAC test results are obtained. House Bill 417 expands the circumstances when BAC tests must occur to include cases when the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a driver contributed to causing a motor vehicle crash that resulted in the death, or life-threatening injury, of another. This is in line with the Board's 1984 recommendation. Increasing penalties for test refusal when subsequently convicted of DWI will encourage offenders to take the BAC test in all DWI cases and therefore help provide an accurate picture of the DWI problem in Maryland.
Drivers with High Blood Alcohol Content (HB 125 and HB 525)
Drivers with a high BAC, 0.15 percent or greater, require a significant intervention similar to that ordinarily prescribed for repeat offenders. Those who reach this high BAC level have consumed large amounts of alcohol, much more than is considered to be social or responsible drinking. High BAC offenders are also likely to be repeat drinking drivers though they may not have previously been arrested for DWI. Research has found that drivers with a high BAC are at a substantially greater risk of being involved in a fatal crash. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has estimated that the relative fatality risk for drivers in single-vehicle crashes with a high BAC is 385 times that of a zero-BAC driver and for male drivers the risk is 607 times that of a sober driver.
Nationally at least 58 percent of alcohol-positive drivers involved in fatal crashes are high BAC drivers. A high BAC is a very good indicator of an alcohol problem that requires sanction, treatment, and long-term follow-up to prevent subsequent offenses.
At least 38 States and the District of Columbia have recognized that treating all first offenders in a like manner is an out-of-date approach and have established laws providing for an “extreme” or “aggravated” DWI offense. 25 of these States have set the “aggravated” offense level at .15 or .16; Virginia, which had set the high BAC level at .20, lowered its high BAC level to .15 in 2004. In these States, a first offender committing an aggravated alcohol offense can be subject to sanctions similar to those available for repeat offenders.
Delegate Zirkin has introduced 2 bills, HB 125 and HB 525, which mandate ignition interlocks for those offenders registering a high BAC at or above .15 percent. Ignition interlocks are a proven technology that allows the user to maintain employment and attend treatment while providing security to the community that the person is not driving impaired. The Safety Board prefers HB 525, which requires the Motor Vehicle Administration to impose ignition interlocks administratively after test failure, because administrative actions are swift and certain. However, even HB 125, which establishes a court-ordered ignition interlock program after conviction, will modernize Maryland's impaired driving statutes and provide targeted sanctions for a unique part of the impaired driving population.
Repeat Offenders (HB 821 and HB 1415)
The Safety Board defines repeat offenders as individuals who are arrested or convicted of DWI offense within 10 years of a prior DWI arrest or conviction. The Board recommends a longer look-back period because the chance of arresting DWI offenders is so small. One estimate says that DWI offenders are arrested only once for every 700 or more impaired driving trips. A more conservative estimate for low DWI enforcement areas is one arrest for every 2000 impaired driving trips. It is also estimated that a problem drinker will drink to excess (above legal limit) and get behind the wheel about 80 times per year. This means that the likelihood of arrest is very low, thereby making the likelihood of a repeat offense arrest extremely low.
Even when arrested, DWI offenders are not always convicted of DWI violations; their charges may be reduced to a lesser, non-alcohol-related offense, erased, or not used for enhancement after participating in a diversion program, such as probation before judgment (PBJ). Because diversion programs interfere with the State's retention of accurate records for enhancement, a subsequent DWI conviction may not place an individual in the repeat offender category. Yet such behavior, a repeat DWI arrest, supports the conclusion that the individual has an alcohol abuse problem. The American Psychological Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual states that one DWI offense is indicative of a substance problem.
Research indicates that diverted offenders recidivate faster than offenders receiving conviction and traditional sanctions. Research has also shown that offenders can receive multiple diversions despite legislated limits on its use. Ideally, the Safety Board supports eliminating diversion programs like Maryland's PBJ. If Maryland continues its diversion program, the tracking system must be effective and be used by prosecutors and judges to ensure that offenders cannot receive PBJ more than once.
The likelihood of being arrested twice in a five-year period is extremely low. However, it is possible to identify repeat offenders if that period is lengthened to at least 10 years. Currently, 24 States and the District of Columbia have a 10-year or longer look-back period, as recommended by the Safety Board. House Bill 821 extends the look-back period for PBJ to 10 years. The sooner a person is identified as a repeat offender (therefore needing significant sanctions and treatment), the better chance there is to reduce recidivism, crashes, and fatalities. It is this logic that leads the Safety Board to support House Bill 821.
Congress addressed the repeat offender when it passed the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21) and imposed penalties on States that did not implement repeat offender provisions. One provision requires States to impose imprisonment or community service. Community service for DWI offenders was developed in the 1980s as an alternative to jail because of high jail costs and limited available space. Existing research, however, has not identified positive effects of community service on recidivism or crashes. As an alternative, house arrest with electronic monitoring is an effective countermeasure for reducing DWI recidivism. House Bill 1415 appropriately eliminates community service and promotes the use of house arrest with electronic monitoring as an alternative to jail sentences for DWI offenders. House arrest with electronic monitoring should last sufficiently longer than mandatory jail sentences, rather than permitting a day-for-day substitution. Our 2000 report indicated that three months is the minimum effective period for house arrest and a longer period is preferable. The Board asks that you adopt HB 1415.
Vehicle Sanctions (HB 124, HB 125, HB 126, HB 525, HB 545, and HB 1315)
Because hard core drinking drivers have demonstrated an inability to separate their drinking from their driving, measures to separate the offenders from their vehicles are also important. In addition, while license sanctions are useful for preventing DWI violations, hard core drinking drivers frequently continue to drive while their licenses are suspended or revoked. In a recent survey, 65 percent of suspended drivers and 71 percent of revoked drivers in California admitted to driving during their disqualification.
A Safety Board analysis of 1998 FARS data showed that, if involved in a fatal crash, drivers with suspended or revoked licenses and a prior DWI conviction are 4.43 times more likely to be drinking at the time of the crash than drivers with a valid license and no prior DWI conviction. Another California study found that California drivers with suspended or revoked licenses have 3.7 times the fatal crash rate of the average driver, and a second study determined that the relative risk of a fatal crash is substantially higher than average among drivers suspended or revoked for DWI offenses. States must create a system to intervene effectively with DWI offenders the very first time they are arrested.
Therefore, the Safety Board recommends the use of vehicle sanctions such as license plate impoundment, vehicle immobilization, vehicle impoundment, vehicle forfeiture, and ignition interlock. Vehicle sanctions substantially decrease the opportunity for hard core drinking drivers to operate vehicles either while their license is suspended or while they are intoxicated, something, unfortunately, that will likely reoccur unless an offender is assessed and treated for any alcohol abuse problems identified. In its 2000 safety study, the Board noted the following results of existing vehicle sanction programs:
The Safety Board also proposes that vehicle sanctions, except for vehicle forfeiture, be applied administratively. Like administrative license revocation, which Maryland authorizes, vehicle sanctions can reduce or eliminate the opportunity for DWI offenders to drive impaired or transfer vehicle ownership before the lengthy trial process concludes. In addition, studies have revealed that judges often avoid imposing available vehicle sanctions. Authorizing administrative action to implement vehicle sanctions after a DWI arrest will increase the likelihood that these effective sanctions will be used.
Several bills to expand the use of ignition interlocks and to require special license plates for repeat offenders are before the committee today. As noted above, the Safety Board supports HB 125 and 525, which tie ignition interlocks to high BAC offenders. The Board also supports HB 124, HB 126, and HB 545, with a preference for the latter bills, which place responsibility for the ignition interlock program in the administrative agency. HB 1315 requires special license plates for drivers convicted of their second DWI offense. License plate action is effective because it helps police officers to identify vehicles that may be operated by an impaired or suspended driver. Ideally, Maryland should administratively impound license plates or allow special plates to serve as probable cause for a traffic stop where police officers can determine that the driver of a vehicle with special plates is a licensed driver. HB 1315, however, is a step in the right direction, one that the Board generally supports.
Conclusion
Based on the last five years of alcohol-related fatalities, it seems clear that despite the best efforts of many, the DWI control system in Maryland is not working effectively to reduce these preventable tragedies. You have a copy of the Safety Board's list of “Most Wanted” recommendations. You will note that the Board has included adoption of the Model Program measures on the “Most Wanted” list. These measures have been tested in other States and found to reduce fatalities, injuries, crashes, or recidivism. We urge you to take action on these life-saving measures this year.
The impaired driving problem has not gone away or even been substantially reduced in many States. Our citizens need your help and protection. We are joined in the effort to reduce underage alcohol problems and hard core drinking driving by the Century Council, funded by the nation's leading distillers, AAA, and by Mothers Against Drunk Driving.
Thank you for allowing the Safety Board to testify about legislation that you can enact to save lives on streets and highways in Maryland. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
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HARD CORE DRINKING DRIVER MODEL PROGRAM
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