Testimony of Danielle E. Roeber
Alcohol Safety and Occupant Protection Coordinator
National Transportation Safety Board
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Law
Commonwealth of Virginia
Regarding Impaired Driving Legislation
February 8, 2004
Good afternoon Chairman Albo and members of the subcommittee on Criminal Law. It is my pleasure to be here in Richmond, Virginia and talk about the National Transportation Safety Board's recommendations for addressing hard core drinking drivers.
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress to investigate transportation accidents, determine their probable cause, and made recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The recommendations that arise from our investigations and safety studies are our most important product. The Safety Board has neither regulatory authority nor grant funds. However, in our 37-year history, organizations and government bodies have adopted more than 80 percent of our recommendations.
The Alcohol-Highway Safety Problem
The Safety Board has recognized for many years that traffic crashes are this nation's most serious transportation safety problem. More than 90 percent of all transportation related deaths each year result from highway crashes. About 41 percent of highway deaths nationwide, and in Virginia, are alcohol-related. Unfortunately, since 1999, the number of alcohol-related fatalities has risen across the nation and in Virginia, in 2002, reaching 17,419 nationally and 371 locally.
The emotional toll on families is staggering, but impaired driving also has a financial impact. With the lifetime cost to society for each fatality at approximately $977,000, alcohol-related crashes cost society more than $17 billion. While the affected individual covers some of these costs, overall, those not directly involved in crashes pay for nearly three-quarters of all crash costs, primarily through insurance premiums, taxes, and travel delay. Clearly, much needs to be done to reduce this ongoing tragedy.
The Hard Core Drinking Driver
The Safety Board is particularly concerned about hard core drinking drivers, known to be involved in about 48 percent of alcohol-related fatalities. The Board defines hard core drinking drivers as individuals who drive with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.15 percent or greater, or who are arrested for or convicted of driving while intoxicated within 10 years of a prior driving while impaired (DWI) conviction. From 1983 through 1998, at least 137,338 people died in crashes involving hard core drinking drivers.
Most experts agree that impaired drivers persist in their behavior because these drivers believe that they will not be caught and/or convicted. That perception is based on reality. On average, drinking drivers make 1,000 drinking driving trips before being arrested.
In 1984, the Safety Board completed a safety study that included recommendations to reduce the problem of repeat offenders. Since the Board issued those recommendations, States have made efforts to address the alcohol-related highway safety problem, and considerable progress has been made in detecting, arresting, and adjudicating drinking drivers. However, the measures taken and the degree of implementation have not been uniform, and alcohol-related crashes continue to claim too many lives.
In light of the thousands of deaths still resulting from these crashes, the Safety Board again focused on impaired driving. In 2000, the Board issued a report that examined a variety of countermeasures for hard core drinking driving. The Board identified which countermeasures have been effective in the specific States that have utilized them and recommended a model program (attached) to reduce hard core drinking driving. The problem of hard core drinking drivers is complex. No single countermeasure appears to be sufficient to address this issue because these offenders require different approaches. We need a comprehensive system of prevention, apprehension, sanction, and treatment to reduce the crashes, injuries, and fatalities caused by these drivers.
Today, I want to discuss several key issues pertaining to impaired driving. First, to make decisions, policy makers need accurate and reliable data to define the problem, and our DWI control system needs test results to identify problem-drinking drivers. Second, drivers with a high BAC pose a much greater risk than other impaired drivers and merit a significant intervention the very first time they are identified. Third, States should authorize administrative license revocation (ALR) that lasts for sufficient length of time to ensure that hard core drinking drivers are not driving vehicles while awaiting trial. Fourth, States should authorize administrative application of vehicle sanctions. Finally, underage alcohol consumption remains a problem, and States need to implement a comprehensive Age 21 program.
BAC Testing (HB 127 and HB 1131)
Substantial commitments of financial and human resources are made annually in every State to implement or expand DWI countermeasures. Obtaining support, particularly at the local level, for DWI countermeasures is dependent upon demonstrating that DWI violations are a serious local problem. Complete and accurate information on the involvement of alcohol in fatal highway crashes is essential for acquiring such support. To allocate resources for, and to evaluate the effectiveness of, DWI laws and programs, each State must know both the level of, and the annual changes in, alcohol involvement in highway crashes. Such knowledge also is a critical prerequisite to the planning and implementation of effective countermeasures. The Safety Board recognized the value of testing drivers involved in fatal crashes nearly 20 years ago, when it recommended that Virginia and the other States require alcohol testing of all drivers involved in fatal highway crashes.
The national proportion of drivers involved in fatal crashes who are tested for alcohol has only increased from about 41 percent in 1982 to about 50 percent in 2002. In addition, results were not obtained for all drivers who were tested. At almost 45 percent, Virginia actually tested a greater percentage of drivers in 1982 than the national average. Unfortunately, Virginia has regressed, testing only about 21 percent of drivers involved in fatal crashes in 2002. Therefore, it is entirely likely that more people are killed from alcohol-related crashes than estimated. The scope of the problem may well be larger than we all think.
Repeat offenders, those familiar with the system, whether previously convicted or diverted, are more likely to refuse a test than first offenders. By refusing the test, a repeat offender essentially opts himself out of the system. The lack of a valid test result robs the State of a valuable piece of information in identifying those most in need of a significant intervention and substantially weakens the system for preventing alcohol-related fatalities. Sanctions for refusal need to be increased, and police need authority to demand a test.
The Safety Board supports House Bills 127 and 1131 because they both propose measures to ensure BAC test results are obtained. The Board would prefer, however, that the provisions of House Bill 127 would be applied administratively rather than by the courts. In addition, the provisions of House Bill 1131 should apply to convicted DWI offenders, not just individuals charged with driving on a suspended license.
Drivers with High Blood Alcohol Content (HB 667 and HB 1138)
Drivers with a high BAC, 0.15 percent or greater, require strong intervention similar to that ordinarily prescribed for repeat offenders. Those who reach this high BAC level have consumed large amounts of alcohol, much more than is considered to be social or responsible drinking. Research has found that drivers with a high BAC are at a substantially greater risk of being involved in a fatal crash. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has estimated that the relative fatality risk for drivers in single-vehicle crashes with a high BAC is 385 times that of a zero-BAC driver and for male drivers the risk is 607 times that of a sober driver.
One Virginia crash illustrates the risks created by high BAC drivers. On September 22, 1998, Phillip Coakley crashed his BMW into a mother and daughter walking in a Virginia Beach neighborhood. Both mother and daughter were injured; the daughter was propelled into the air for more than 20 feet before landing. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Coakley had a BAC of 0.16 percent.
At least 30 States have laws providing for an "extreme" or "aggravated" DWI offense; 11 States define the extreme DWI offense as the drivers having a BAC of 0.15 percent. House Bills 667 and 1138 address high BAC drivers by moving Virginia's high BAC level from 0.20 percent to 0.15 percent.
Administrative License Revocation (HB 591, HB 779, and HB 1136)
Even when drivers are arrested for DWI, the case crawls through the judicial system while the driver is still on the streets and highways. A typical impaired driving case takes an average of 90-120 days to complete. During that time, the driver retains his or her license. Frequently the offender, even before being tried for the first offense, is arrested again for DWI. For example, the police made the ninth DWI arrest of one Portsmouth while he was free on bond and awaiting sentencing for his seventh DWI conviction.
Administrative License Revocation (ALR) gives a law enforcement officer the authority, on behalf of the State-licensing agency, to confiscate the license of any driver who either fails or refuses to take a chemical breath test. To be truly effective, the officer must be able to confiscate the license on the spot. Once a driver's license has been confiscated, the driver is issued a temporary license that is valid for a short, specified period of time. During that time he or she may seek an administrative hearing -- a process that is independent of any criminal proceedings. That hearing addresses a single issue: Did the driver fail or refuse to take a breath test? If the answer is yes, the license is revoked.
A 1999 study conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration revealed that ALR is very effective at reducing repeat impaired driving behavior and saving lives. The study estimated that in 1997, the application of ALR saved 1,359 people. In addition, researchers have found that ALR delays or deters repeat offenses even after the license suspension period has ended.
A U.S. Department of Justice study also demonstrates that States with an ALR law have reduced recidivism rates among drinking driving offenders. The most startling effect was found in North Dakota. The rate of recidivism declined by nearly 40 percent, suggesting the potential for long-term behavior modification. This study is consistent with others, which indicate that, even though some drivers will continue to drive after revocation, they tend to drive less frequently and more cautiously. Most important, however, is the fact that most drivers subsequently adhere to the law and do not drive at all.
The concern that the loss of driving privileges, especially in rural areas, would result in the loss of a job, prompted studies in New Mexico, Mississippi, and Delaware to determine whether the concern is justified. In all three States, the problem was minimal. For example, in Delaware, a rural State with little public transit, only 1.2 percent of those whose licenses were revoked lost their jobs, a group that included two school bus drivers.
Although Virginia does have an administrative process for taking a driver's license, the suspension period lasts only 7 days. House Bills 591, 779, and 1136 improve Virginia's ALR system by extending the suspension period, particularly for repeat offenders.
Vehicle Sanctions (HB 990, HB 1091, HB 1130, HB 1221, and HB 1259)
License sanctions are useful measures for preventing DWI violations. Hard core drinking drivers, however, frequently continue to drive while their licenses are suspended or revoked. In a recent survey, 65 percent of suspended drivers and 71 percent of revoked drivers in California admitted to driving during their disqualification.
A Safety Board analysis of 1998 FARS data showed that, if involved in a fatal crash, drivers with suspended or revoked licenses and a prior DWI conviction are 4.43 times more likely to be drinking at the time of the crash than drivers with a valid license and no prior DWI conviction. One California study found that California drivers with suspended or revoked licenses have 3.7 times the fatal crash rate of the average driver, and a second study determined that the relative risk of a fatal crash is substantially higher than average among drivers suspended or revoked for DWI offenses. States must create a system to intervene effectively with DWI offenders the very first time they are arrested.
Therefore, the Safety Board recommends the use of vehicle sanctions such as license plate impoundment, vehicle immobilization, vehicle impoundment, vehicle forfeiture, and ignition interlock. Vehicle sanctions substantially decrease the opportunity for hard core drinking drivers to operate vehicles illegally. In its 2000 safety study, the Board noted the following results of existing vehicle sanction programs:
The Safety Board also proposes that vehicle sanctions, except for vehicle forfeiture, be applied administratively. Like ALR, vehicle sanctions can reduce or eliminate the opportunity for DWI offenders to drive impaired or transfer vehicle ownership before the lengthy trial process concludes. In addition, studies have revealed that judges often avoid imposing available vehicle sanctions. Authorizing the police officer to implement vehicle sanctions at the time of arrest will increase the likelihood that these effective sanctions will be used.
The Safety Board acknowledges that Virginia allows administrative impoundment or immobilization for offenders who drive while their licenses have been suspended for a DWI offense. House Bill 1221 increases the length of the impoundment or immobilization. This bill also authorizes impoundment for second or subsequent DWI convictions. The Board supports House Bill 1221, but the Board encourages Virginia to consider additional measures that will strengthen its impoundment and immobilization law, such as authorizing impoundment or immobilization at the time of and for the very first DWI arrest.
House Bills 990 and 1259 propose a viable vehicle sanction by requiring special license plates for convicted DWI offenders. The Safety Board generally supports any measure that will help separate an offender from his or her vehicle. Virginia does not have vehicle forfeiture, making House Bills 1091 and 1130 critical to Virginia's DWI countermeasure system. The Board supports these bills.
The Youth Alcohol-Highway Safety Problem and Underage Consumption (HB 668)
Motor vehicle crashes are the number one cause of death for persons age 15 through 20. During the 1980s, the nation saw a reduction in alcohol-related fatal crashes, directly attributable to raising the legal minimum age for the sale of alcohol to age 21. It is estimated that minimum drinking age laws, imperfect as they are, have prevented nearly 21,000 fatalities since 1975. However, the fact that a minor, who cannot legally purchase alcohol, has a positive BAC demonstrates that underage drinking and driving remains a problem.
Self-reported monthly alcohol use by high school seniors has increased from 48.6 percent in 1993 to 50 percent in 2000. Binge drinking has increased from 27.5 percent to 30 percent. In 2001, 3 percent of the teen drivers involved in property-damage-only crashes had been drinking, 5 percent of those involved in injury crashes had been drinking, and 23 percent of those involved in fatal crashes had been drinking. Teen drivers with a BAC between 0.05 and 0.10 percent are far more likely to be killed in single vehicle crashes than sober drivers or older drivers with similar BAC levels. More than 60 percent of youth alcohol-related crash fatalities occur in rural areas. Clearly, these young people have access to alcohol. Because underage drinking and driving remains a problem, Virginia needs comprehensive Age 21 laws.
Closing loopholes that allow minors to purchase, possess, or consume alcohol can further decrease the tragic highway problem. In 1993, the Safety Board recommended that States adopt a comprehensive system of laws that prohibits the attempt to purchase, purchase, possession, consumption, age misrepresentation, and use of false identification by minors, as well as the sale of alcohol to minors.
Virginia has several elements of the comprehensive Age 21 program. Although Virginia must still enact legislation to prohibit age misrepresentation by minors, House Bill 668 will prohibit consumption. The Safety Board supports this bill.
Conclusion
Based on the last five years of alcohol-related fatalities, it seems clear that the DWI control system in Virginia is not working to the degree needed to reduce these preventable tragedies. The Safety Board urges you to take action on these life-saving measures this year.
Thank you for allowing the Safety Board to testify about legislation that you can enact to save lives on streets and highways in Virginia. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
HARD CORE DRINKING DRIVER MODEL PROGRAM
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