Good afternoon Chairman Guns and members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to provide preliminary information on the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of Potomac Electric Power Company's (PEPCO's) pipeline accident near the Chalk Point Power Generating Station.

The Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress to investigate transportation accidents, determine probable cause and make safety recommendations to prevent their recurrence. Although we are best known for our aviation accident investigations, such the crash of TWA Flight 800, we investigate accidents in all modes of transportation. The Safety Board has neither regulatory authority nor grant funds.

On Friday April 7, 2000, about 6:02 p.m., ST Services confirmed that fuel oil was leaking from a PEPCO pipeline at a location approximately ¼ mile south of the Chalk Point Power Generating Station, near Aquasco, Maryland. At this location, the pipeline is on PEPCO property, passing through a marsh that is adjacent to Swanson Creek. The leaking fuel oil spread from the marsh into Swanson Creek and then eventually into the Patuxent River.

The pipeline is normally used to transport #6 fuel oil from the ST Services Terminal at Piney Point, Maryland to the Chalk Point Power Generating Station. Fuel oil is delivered to the ST Services Terminal by marine transportation and then transported approximately 52 miles by pipeline to the Chalk Point station. However, on April 6th and 7th ST Services was flushing the pipeline with a mixture of #2 and #6 fuel oil between Chalk Point and Ryceville to clean and prepare the pipeline for an internal inspection.

The first indication of an abnormal condition was observed by ST Services on Friday about 2:30 p.m. when the flow of mixed fuel oil from Chalk Point to Ryceville stopped and suction problems developed at the Chalk Point pump about the same time. ST Services personnel believed, at that time, that these conditions indicated an operating problem or valve misalignment instead of a potential leak. Therefore they continued to operate the pipeline for approximately 1 hour at a reduced rate while evaluating storage tank volumes. About 3:34 p.m. the ST Services assistant terminal manager ordered the pipeline shut down when he could not account for over 3,000 barrels of product. PEPCO records show that at 4:20 p.m., ST Services advised that it could not account for 2000 barrels of product.

After the pipeline was shut down, product inventories were calculated and action was taken to initiate an aerial inspection of the pipeline. At 6:02 p.m., the aerial inspection identified a leak near the Chalk Point station. The ST Services assistant terminal manager then initiated an emergency response plan by contacting PEPCO and an oil spill clean-up contractor.

Although the Safety Board's investigation of this accident is on-going, we understand that ST Services was responsible for daily operation activities of the pipeline and routine maintenance. PEPCO made decisions on major maintenance activities for the pipeline, based on input it received from ST Services.

The pipeline is constructed of 12-inch diameter steel with a 0.203 inch nominal wall thickness. It was constructed between 1972 and 1973. Based on interviews conducted after the accident, the Maximum Operating Pressure for this pipeline is 550 psi and it was typically operated at 350 psi. On the day of the accident, the operating pressure fluctuated between 280 and 240 psi.

Our preliminary investigation indicates that at 6:50 p.m. PEPCO notified the National Response Center (NRC) that it had a leak of 2,000 gallons of fuel oil from its pipeline near Chalk Point Generating Station and that Swanson Creek was affected. The NRC then notified the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Maryland Department of Environment, and the Virginia Office of Emergency Services. The Safety Board understands that EPA and PEPCO then contacted the Prince George's County Fire Department and advised that the spill was estimated to be 2,000 gallons. However, after arriving on scene about 8:30 p.m., the Prince Georges County Fire Department learned that the spill was at least 3,000 barrels (126,000 gallons).

About 3:41 a.m., the next morning, the NRC notified the Safety Board about the PEPCO pipeline leak and reported it to be 2,000 gallons. Although Safety Board staff made several telephone calls to PEPCO to determine details of the pipeline spill, the Safety Board was not informed that the size of the leak was greater than 2,000 gallons until about 9:30 a.m. on April 8th. At this time, PEPCO advised the Safety Board duty officer that the spill was about 125,000 gallons. The Safety Board then initiated an accident investigation and launched a team to the accident site. The Safety Board's investigation of the accident notification and response is continuing.

When the failed section of pipe was excavated, a vertical crack was found in a buckle at a bend in the pipe, which was later determined in the Safety Board's laboratory to be approximately 6 ½ inches long and approximately 3/8 inch wide. This bend was apparently made during the original construction of the pipeline in 1972-73 and is commonly referred to as a wrinkle bend. A copy of the laboratory's recently released report is attached.

PEPCO had contracted for an internal inspection of the pipeline in 1997. The inspection report indicated a "T-piece" (a welded pipeline fitting) at the approximate location of the wrinkle bend failure. However, there was no fitting at this location. After the 1997 internal inspection, repairs were made to sections of the pipeline with identified corrosion problems. On April 6th and 7th, the pipe was being cleaned with a cleaning scraper to prepare the pipeline for another internal inspection.

During normal operations, the pipeline computer system calculates product flow data that can provide information to identify a pipeline operation problem, such as a leak. However, when the pipeline is being cleaned or flushed this monitoring system cannot be used due to the way the pipeline is designed. The Safety Board is investigating ST Services' procedures for monitoring pipeline operations under normal conditions and when the pipeline is being cleaned or flushed for internal inspections (pigging operations).

Although the Safety Board's investigation of this accident is ongoing, pipeline integrity has been a major concern to the Board for many years. On November 15 and 16, 2000 the Safety Board conducted a Pipeline Safety Hearing that addressed pipeline integrity issues. Details of the hearing, and portions of the testimony delivered, can be found on the Board's web page at www.ntsb.gov.

The hearing provided a forum to examine technologies available to assess the integrity of pipelines, such as the use of internal inspection tools, and the capability of pipeline operating systems to identify leaks and to prompt timely responses. The hearing also addressed the status of ongoing research in these areas.

This hearing was prompted by the Safety Board's past investigations of numerous pipeline accidents in which pipe with time-related defects failed, and the Safety Board's current investigations of six pipeline accidents, including the Chalk Point spill, that have occurred in 1999 and 2000, which include potential pipeline integrity issues. Five of those six accidents may involve failure to promptly recognize pipeline ruptures and then initiate timely action to reduce the consequences of the spill.

Many of the hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines in our country are 30 to 50 years old. Although age alone does not indicate that a pipeline may be unsafe, determining the integrity of pipelines becomes increasingly important as our pipeline systems age.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony to you today. I will be glad to keep you informed of the status of this investigation as it progresses.