Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to provide preliminary information on the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's) investigation of Potomac Electric Power Company's (PEPCO's) pipeline accident near the Chalk Point Power Generating Station.

NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress to investigate transportation accidents, determine probable cause and make safety recommendations to prevent their recurrence. Although we are best known for our aviation accident investigations, such the crash of TWA Flight 800, we investigate accidents in all modes of transportation. The Safety Board has neither regulatory authority nor grant funds.

On Friday evening about 6:02 p.m., April 7, 2000, ST Services confirmed that fuel oil was leaking from a PEPCO pipeline at a location approximately ¼ mile south of the Chalk Point Power Generating Station, near Aquasco, Maryland. At this location, the pipeline is on PEPCO property, passing through a marsh that is adjacent to Swanson Creek. The leaking fuel oil spread from the marsh into Swanson Creek and then eventually into the Patuxent River.

The pipeline is normally used to transport #6 fuel oil from the ST Services Terminal at Piney Point, Maryland to the Chalk Point Power Generating Station. Fuel oil is delivered to the ST Services Terminal by marine transportation and then transported approximately 52 miles by pipeline to the Chalk Point station. However, on April 6th and 7th ST Services was flushing the pipeline with a mixture of #2 and #6 fuel oil between Chalk Point and Ryceville to clean and prepare the pipeline for an internal inspection.

The first indication of an abnormal condition was observed by ST Services on Friday about 2:30 p.m. when the flow of mixed fuel oil from Chalk Point to Ryceville stopped and suction problems developed at the Chalk Point pump about the same time. ST Services personnel believed, at that time, that these conditions indicated an operating problem or valve misalignment instead of a potential leak. Therefore they continued to operate the pipeline for approximately 1 hour at a reduced rate while evaluating storage tank volumes. About 3:34 p.m. the ST Services assistant terminal manager ordered the pipeline shut down when he could not account for over 3,000 barrels of product. PEPCO records show that at 4:20 p.m., ST Services advised that they could not account for 2000 barrels of product from the pipeline.

After the pipeline was shut down, product inventories were calculated and action was taken to initiate an aerial inspection of the pipeline. At 6:02 p.m., the aerial inspection identified a leak near the Chalk Point station. The ST Services assistant terminal manager then initiated an emergency response plan by contacting PEPCO and an oil spill clean-up contractor.

Although the Safety Board's investigation of this accident is on-going, we believe that ST Services was responsible for daily operation activities of the pipeline and routine maintenance. PEPCO made decisions on major maintenance activities for the pipeline, considering input from ST Services.

The pipeline is constructed of 12-inch diameter steel with a 0.203 inch nominal wall thickness. It was constructed between 1972 and 1973. Based on interviews conducted after the accident, the Maximum Operating Pressure for this pipeline is 550 psi and it was typically operated at 350 psi. On the day of the accident, the operating pressure fluctuated between 280 and 240 psi.

Our preliminary investigation indicates that at 6:50 p.m. PEPCO notified the National Response Center (NRC) that it had a leak of 2,000 gallons of fuel oil from its pipeline near Chalk Point Generating Station and that Swanson Creek was affected. The NRC then notified the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Maryland Department of Environment, and the Virginia Office of Emergency Services. The Safety Board understands that EPA and PEPCO then contacted the Prince George's County Fire Department and advised that the spill was estimated to be 2,000 gallons. However, after arriving on scene about 8:30 p.m., the Prince Georges County Fire Department learned that the spill was at least 3,000 barrels (126,000 gallons).

About 3:41 a.m., the next morning, the NRC notified the NTSB about the PEPCO pipeline leak and reported it to be 2,000 gallons. Although NTSB staff made several telephone calls to PEPCO to determine details of the pipeline spill, NTSB was not informed that the size of the leak was greater than 2,000 gallons until about 9:30 a.m. on April 8th. At this time, PEPCO advised the NTSB duty officer that the spill was about 125,000 gallons. NTSB then initiated an accident investigation and launched a team to the accident site. The Safety Board's investigation of the accident notification and response is continuing.

When the failed section of pipe was excavated, a vertical crack was found in a buckle at a bend in the pipe, which was later determined in NTSB's laboratory to be approximately 6 ½ inches long and approximately 3/8 inch wide. This bend was apparently made during the original construction of the pipeline in 1972-73 and is commonly referred to as a wrinkle bend.

PEPCO had contracted for an internal inspection of the pipeline in 1997. The inspection report indicated a "T-piece" (a welded pipeline fitting) at the approximate location of the wrinkle bend failure. However, there was no fitting at this location. After the 1997 internal inspection, repairs were made to sections of the pipeline with identified corrosion problems. On April 6th and 7th, 2000, the pipe was being cleaned with a cleaning scraper to prepare the pipeline for another internal inspection.

During normal operations, the pipeline computer system calculates product flow data that can provide information to identify a pipeline operation problem, such as a leak. However, when the pipeline is being cleaned or flushed this monitoring system cannot be used due to the way the pipeline is designed. The NTSB is investigating ST Services procedures for monitoring pipeline operations under normal conditions and when the pipeline is being cleaned or flushed for internal inspections (pigging operations).

Although NTSB's investigation of this accident is ongoing, pipeline integrity has been of concern to NTSB for many years and the Safety Board has scheduled a Pipeline Safety Hearing for November 15 and 16, 2000. The hearing will be held in the NTSB Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. Details of the hearing will be found on the Board's web page in the near future at www.ntsb.gov.

The Pipeline Safety Hearing will provide a forum to examine technologies available to assess the integrity of pipelines, such as the use of internal inspection tools, and the capability of pipeline operating systems to identify leaks and to prompt timely responses. The hearing will also seek to determine the status of ongoing research in these areas.

This hearing was prompted by the Safety Board's past investigations of numerous pipeline accidents in which pipe with time-related defects failed, and the Safety Board's current investigations of six pipeline accidents that have occurred in 1999 and 2000, which include potential pipeline integrity issues. Five of those six accidents may involve failure to promptly recognize pipeline ruptures and then initiate timely action to reduce the consequences of the spill.

Many of the hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines in our country are 30 to 50 years old. Although age alone does not indicate that a pipeline may be unsafe, determining the integrity of pipelines becomes increasingly important as our pipeline systems age.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to try to answer any questions that you may have.