NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

PUBLIC HEARING IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
KOREAN AIR
FLIGHT 801, B-747-300
AGANA, GUAM
AUGUST 6, 1997

Hawaii Convention Center
Ballroom A, B and C
1833 Kalakaua Avenue
Honolulu, Hawaii 96815
Tuesday, March 24, 1998
9:00 a.m.

Chairman, Board of Inquiry
THE HONORABLE ROBERT T. FRANCIS

Board of Inquiry

Technical Panel

Public Information Officer

General Counsel

Parties to the Hearing

A G E N D A

AGENDA ITEM:

Opening Statement by the Chairman, Board of Inquiry: Robert T. Francis

Introduction of the Board of Inquiry

Introduction of the Parties to the Hearing

Introduction of the Technical Panel

Description of the Investigation by the Investigator-in-Charge

Calling of Witnesses, Witnesses Sworn and Qualified by the Hearing Officer,
and Witness Questioning

Afternoon Session
Continuation of Witness Questioning

Adjournment

P R O C E E D I N G S

9:00 a.m.

Opening Statement

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Good morning, everyone.

I'm Bob Francis. I'm vice chairman of the NTSB, and I'm chairing this hearing.

As you know, this is a hearing -- public hearing which is part of our process on an aircraft accident on August 6th, 1997, in Agana, Guam involving Korean Air Flight 801.

The purpose of the hearing is to supplement the factual record of this accident investigation for the NTSB. We thus have the NTSB witnesses, we have party witnesses, and we have some outside witnesses. All of these people have technical expertise to be able to bring to the factual portion of this investigation.

This hearing will not deal, I repeat, will not deal with any analysis of what happened nor will it deal with any causal issues. This is a factual hearing not dealing with analysis or cause.

There are five issues about which we'll be talking here today. The first is controlled-flight-into-terrain accidents and efforts on the part of the aviation community to deal with the controlled-flight-into-terrain accidents.

The second is operation of navigational devices at the Guam airport.

The third is Minimum Safe Altitude Warning systems and practices related to this system at Guam and nationwide.

Fourth, rescue and recovery operations.

And fifth, governmental oversight of foreign air carriers operating into the United States.

Before I proceed further I'd like to introduce three people who are here. First is the congressman from Guam, Congressman Underwood, who is sitting over here at our observer table. Second, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, John Hammerschmidt, and third, a colleague and member also, George Black. They're all sitting over here.

I'd like to take a minute and talk about controlled-flight-into-terrain. Controlled-flight-into-terrain or CFIT as it is called in the industry is the major killer of people on a worldwide basis in commercial aviation. This has been the case for some time, and there are no indications statistically that it is not continuing to be the case. It's an enormously, enormously important issue for those of us who are involved in the aviation safety business to be dealing with, and it's something that I personallyspend a great deal of my time working on and something that the industry I think is more and more focusing on as one of the real places where we can make gains in safety.

So, we'll be talking here about a number of issues that relate to controlled-flight-into-terrain. These include issues that can be dealt with by airlines, by air traffic control authorities, by equipment manufacturers. There are -- the entire community can be involved in this.

And I'd like to mention that the Flight Safety Foundation and a large portion of the international community have over the past five years or so been doing some very good work in this area. There's an educational package that's come out that's being distributed worldwide to airlines which is the kind of work that hopefully will be done by the community internationally and voluntarily to try to deal with this issue. But it's the kind of thing that -- that allows us to make gains in an area -- this particular area that's so important.

So, I think that -- that we should be focusing on this. We will be focusing on air traffic control, we will be focusing on training, we will be focusing on airline cultures, we will be focusing onnew technology which will hopefully let us deal with this issue. But I personally think that this is enormously important, and -- and I'm delighted that we're going to be spending so much time on it.

Let me conclude by one note here. We've had some confusion I think in communications in terms of dealing with the families and some of the people who were -- were survivors of the aircraft, and I think that we're going to make an effort to -- to do a better job with this communication. I'm going to meet with the families after -- after this meeting, and we will be giving them information on how they can communicate with us more directly because we have had some problems in the past and -- and I'm sorry that that was the case.

Let me now introduce Ron Schleede, who is the hearing officer, and he will introduce a number of the people who are going to be key to this hearing.

Introduction of the Board of Inquiry

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

My name is Ron Schleede. I'm a deputy director, Office of Aviation Safety for International Affairs.

The Board of Inquiry up here, I have with meMr. Monty Montgomery, chief of our Information Technology Division, Office of Research and Engineering.

To my far right, that's Mr. Pat Cariseo, safety specialist in the Office of Safety Recommendations.

To his left is Mr. Ben Berman, chief, Operational Factors Division.

There's other NTSB staff here today sitting in that location and this location. First, we have John Clark, deputy director of Office of Aviation Safety for Investigations and Technical Matters.

We have three public affairs officers here. Mr. Paul Schlamm, Keith Holloway, and Ted Lopatkiewicz.

The report-writer for this case, Mr. Gerard Stichen.

Behind us we have Ms. Denise Daniels, special counsel to the vice chairman; Ms. Maria Sturniolo, confidential assistant to the vice chairman; and David Bass, chief counsel -- or deputy chief counsel for the NTSB.

From our Office of Government Affairs we have Ms. Betty Scott. From the Office of Family Affairs, Elizabeth Cotham and Matt Furman. We also have Ms. Alice Park with us today from the NTSB Office ofResearch and Engineering. She is providing interpreting services for us.

For administrative matters and logistics regarding this hearing, we have three people seated over here to the left, Ms. Carolyn Dargan, Candi Wiseman, and Ann -- I forget the last name. Sorry, Ann.

All these people are available to assist during any part of the hearing. If you have questions please approach one of them.

Introduction of the Parties to the Hearing

MR. SCHLEEDE: I'd like now to switch to the people in front of us and ask the party spokesman, as I call each party, to identify their -- their name and their title, beginning with the Federal Aviation Administration.

MR. DONNER: Yeah, Mr. Chairman, my name is Bud Donner. I'm the manager of the Accident Investigation Division, Federal Aviation Administration.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you.

Boeing Commercial Airplane Company?

MR. DARCY: The name is Kevin Darcy, and I'm chief investigator, Air Safety Investigation.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you.

Korean Air Company, Limited?

CAPTAIN KIM: Sang Rok Kim, deputy director, Safety and Security Department.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you, Captain Kim.

National Air Traffic Controllers Association?

MR. MOTE: Good morning, Mr. Schleede and Mr. Chairman. My name is Charles R. Mote. I'm a senior safety investigator with NATCA and air traffic control specialist.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Barton ATC International?

MR. E. MONTGOMERY: Good morning. My name is Ed Montgomery. I'm the president of Barton ATC.

MR. SCHLEEDE: And the Government of Guam?

MR. DERVISH: Good morning. My name is Ron Dervish. I'm the deputy chief of police, Guam Police Department and spokesman for the Government of Guam.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you, Mr. Dervish.

And now I'd like to turn to the Civil Aviation Bureau of Korea spokesman, please. Please state your name and title.

MR. LEE: (responds in Korean)

MR. SCHLEEDE: And also at that table is Mr. Ham, who is the designated accredited representative for the Government of -- of Korea during the on-scene investigation.

I'd like to mention that the KCAB is representing the Government of Korea as part of this investigation in accordance with the provisions of the convention on International Civil Aviation and Annex 13 to that convention. Annex 13 provides certain rights and obligations on the state of registry of an airline when it crashes in another country. This investigation has been conducted in full compliance with the spirit of cooperation intended by Annex 13. I want to thank publicly our colleagues from the KCAB for their assistance in this investigation.

Introduction of the Technical Panel

MR. SCHLEEDE: The Board of Inquiry will be assisted by a Technical Panel of specialists from the NTSB, led by Mr. Greg Feith, the investigator-in-charge. I'd like Mr. Feith to now introduce the Technical Panel.

MR. FEITH: Thank you, Mr. Schleede.

With us at the Technical Panel is Mr. Charles Pereira. He is an aircraft performance specialist in the Office of Research and Engineering. He did the aircraft performance study for this accident.

Sitting to his left is Mr. Scott Dunham. He is a air traffic control specialist in the Office of Aviation Safety.

Sitting next to Mr. Dunham is Mr. Richard Wentworth. He is a national resource specialist for air traffic control in the Office of Aviation Safety, both of whom have done extensive work on this investigation.

At our back table sitting directly behind me is Mr. Paul Misencik, Captain Misencik. He was the operations group chairman for this investigation.

Sitting to his left is Mr. Malcolm Brenner --Dr. Malcolm Brenner, who did the human performance aspect of the investigation in conjunction with the operations group.

Sitting next to Dr. Brenner is Mr. Greg Phillips. He did the aircraft systems portion of the investigation and also did the aircraft structures. Our aircraft structures specialist is not present today, and so, Greg will discuss any structural questions if they do arise.

And then sitting next to Mr. Phillips is Mr. Gary Hammack, and he will be addressing the crash/fire or search/fire/rescue aspects of this investigation.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Let me introduce one other extraordinarily important person here, Teddy Brown, who makes certain that we can all communicate one with another in this room. He works for us with the NTSB inWashington.

Now I'd ask Greg Feith, the investigator-in-charge, he's got a prepared statement to come as -- as the first witness.

Description of the Investigation by Mr. Feith

MR. FEITH: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Board of Inquiry, colleagues on the Technical Panel, parties, ladies and gentlemen.

On August 6th, 1997, about 01:42 Guam time a Korean-registered Boeing 747-300 operated by Korean Air Company, Limited as Korean Air Flight 801 crashed about three nautical miles southwest of the Guam International Airport in Agana, Guam while executing the ILS approach or Instrument Landing Systems approach to runway 6-left.

The Safety Board was notified of this accident on August 5th about 12 noon Eastern Daylight time. I was assigned as the investigator-in-charge. The go-team assembled at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland and departed later that evening via United States Air Force C141 transport aircraft to Fairchild Air Force Base in Washington state. The trip to Guam was subsequently completed on a KC 135R, and the team arrived in Guam about 8:30 in the morning Guam time on August 7th.

The Board member on duty at the time was George Black, and he accompanied the team to the crash site.

The investigative team consisted of various specialists from the Safety Board's headquarters, the south central region, and southwestern regional offices. The specialty areas were aircraft operations, human performance, aircraft systems, structures, power plants, maintenance records, air traffic control, survival factors, aircraft performance, meteorology, and search/fire/rescue. There were also specialists assigned to conduct the read-out of the flight data recorder and to transcribe the cockpit voice recorder in the Safety Board's laboratory in Washington, D.C.

With regard to the CVR, the initial CVR --transcript was produced in English by the initial group members that convened in Washington. The CVR group then later reconvened and produced a more --

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Greg -- Greg, what we're doing in simultaneous interpretation here so you're going to have to go a little slower --

MR. FEITH: Okay.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: -- those ladies back there are going to be in trouble.

MR. FEITH: Okay. The initial CVR transcriptwas produced in English by the group. However, the CVR then reconvened and produced a more detailed and -- and detailed transcript in both English and Korean languages.

The following organizations were given party status and provided technical assistance to the Board: the Federal Aviation Administration; Korean Air Company, Limited; Boeing Commercial Airplane Company; Pratt-Whitney Engines; the National Air Traffic Controllers Association; the United States Navy; and emergency response personnel from Guam.

In addition, Mr. Ham of the Korean Civil Aviation Bureau was designated as the accredited representative and the leader of the Korean delegation in accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Further, two air safety investigators from the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigations, or BASI as they're more commonly known, participated in the investigation as technical observers.

Now, to give you a brief history of flight. Korean Air Flight 801 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight that departed Kimpo Airport in Seoul, Korea at 21:53 or approximately 9:53 in the evening. The -- the flight itself proceeded uneventfully enroute to Guam. An audio examination of the CVR revealed that the captain was what we call the flying pilot and that the first officer was performing the radio communications and those duties required of the non-flying pilot at the time of the accident.

At 01:03 the first officer contacted the Guam Air Traffic Control Center and Radar Approach Control, or more commonly known as CERAP, and stated that they were at flight level 410 or 41,000 feet over Nimitz Intersection, which is a reference point -- a navigation reference point located about 240 nautical miles northwest of the VOR -- Nimitz VOR which is in close proximity to Guam International Airport.

About 01:11:51 the CVR recorded the captain briefing the other flight crew members about the approach to Guam. The captain stated in part, quote, "I will give you a short briefing. Since the visibility is six miles, when we are in visual approach, as I said before, set the VOR on number two and maintain the VOR for the top of descent. In the case of a go-around, since it is VFR while staying visual and turning to the right request a radar vector. Since the localizer glide slope is out, the minimum descent altitude is 560 feet and the height above touchdown is 304 feet."

At the conclusion of this briefing, a short time later at 01:22, the Guam CERAP controller informed Flight 801 that the Automatic Terminal Information Service or ATIS report, which is a prerecorded report of the weather conditions at Guam were as follows: that the current weather was uniform and that the current altimeter setting was 29.86.

The first officer acknowledged the transmission and said, "Checking uniform." However, he did not acknowledge the altimeter setting.

About two minutes later Flight 801 began deviating around cumulo-nimbus clouds that were scattered along their route of flight. About six minutes later the first officer reported to the Guam CERAP controller that they had cleared the weather and requested radar vectors to runway 6-left.

At -- at 01:31 the CERAP controller provided radar vectors to Flight 801, and approximately seven minutes later the controller transmitted, quote, "Korean Air 801 turn left heading 090. Join the localizer." The first officer acknowledged this transmission.

About eight minutes later the CERAP controller transmitted, quote, "Korean Air 801 cleared for the ILS runway 6-left. Glide slope unusable." Thefirst officer responded, "Korean 801, roger. Cleared ILS runway 6-left." However, the first officer did not acknowledge the glide slope was unusable.

Shortly after being cleared for the ILS approach, the CVR recorded the flight engineer saying, quote, "Is the glide slope working?" to which the captain responded, "Yes, yes. It's working."

At 01:39:58 the CVR recorded an unidentified flight crew member say, "Check the glide slope if working," followed by "Why is it working?"

The first officer responded, quote, "Not usable."

About 23 seconds later, the CVR recorded an unidentified flight crew member say, "Glide slope is incorrect."

At 01:40 the first officer stated that they were approaching an altitude of 1400 feet. The captain responded, quote, "Since today's glide slope condition is not good we need to maintain 1440. Please set it."

Approximately 20 later -- 20 seconds later, the sound of the altitude alert, which is an alert in the cockpit with a predetermined altitude set in, was recorded on the CVR.

At 01:41 and 14 seconds, the controller cleared Flight 801 to land on runway 6-left. The firstofficer acknowledged the clearance and the crew began to reconfigure the airplane for landing.

About 01:41 and 42 seconds the CVR recorded the ground proximity warning announcing 1000 feet and the captain beginning a checklist item saying, "No flags, gear, flaps."

About four seconds later the captain said, "Isn't glide slope working?" There was no response to this statement by the captain.

The crew continued to complete the landing checklist items, and at 01:42 the CVR recorded the ground proximity warning system announcing, quote, "Minimums" followed by "sink rate." This announcement was followed shortly thereafter by the first officer saying, quote, "Sink rate okay," and the flight engineer announcing, "200 feet."

At 01:42:19 the first officer said, quote, "Let's make a missed approach," and the flight engineer said, quote, "Not in sight, missed approach."

These two comments were followed immediately thereafter by both the first officer and the flight engineer saying, quote, "Go around."

Approximately one second later the CVR recorded the sound of the auto-pilot disconnect chime and the altitude announcements on the GPWS or GroundProximity Warning System.

The sound of the airplane impacting the ground were recorded by the CVR at 01:42 and 26 seconds.

The published -- excuse me. The published approach procedure for the ILS to runway 6-left with the glide slope inoperative depicts a series of step-down altitudes that the pilot is required to maintain during the execution of the approach. What you will see is the step-down altitudes which will ensure sufficient terrain and obstacle clearance.

(Slide)

MR. FEITH: Unfortunately, I don't have a pointer, but if you'll look at --

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: In this box right here is a profile view of the approach where this being 2600 feet will be the initial intercept altitude. There is a step-down to an altitude of 2000 feet with another step-down to 1440 feet and then a final step-down to the minimum descent altitude of 560 feet.

These step-down altitudes ensure that the pilot will maintain an obstacle and terrain clearance during this portion of the approach.

(Slide)

MR. FEITH: The lowest altitude for the first segment is 2000 feet until 1.6 nautical miles, so the aircraft would be at 2000 feet until this point right here. This would be followed by a step-down to 1440 feet until crossing the VOR.

(Slide)

MR. FEITH: And then stepping down to the final MDA of 560 feet.

If visual contact with the airport does not occur within the 2.8 miles after crossing the VOR or visual contact cannot be made, the pilot must execute a missed approach.

According to the data recorded by the flight data recorder Flight 801 began to descend from 2600 feet when the airplane was about five miles from the VOR or about 8.5 miles from the airport. The flight data recorder and radar data indicated that Flight 801 had been descending at a rate of approximately 950 feet per minute and continued at this rate through the intermediate altitudes of 2000 and 1440 feet. The airplane struck the rising mountainous terrain about one-tenth of a mile west of the VOR.

And at this time, Mr. Chairman, I think that because this is a bit complicated we do have a video depiction which will show both a plan view and aprofile view of the aircraft as it traversed the terrain, and this information is based on the flight data recorder and radar data that was collected during the course of the on-scene investigation, and I'd like to show that now.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: That's very helpful. Let's do that.

(Mr. Feith narrates the scenes from the video.)

MR. FEITH: What we're going to see -- and this video is approximately 10 minutes long. The first part of the video itself will be a -- a still or just a picture of the terrain in the area of Agana Airport in Guam. And then you will see a profile plan. And what you have is the terrain looking down on Guam. Here is Agana, Guam International Airport, runway 6, the coastline.

This is the middle marker, which is one of the navigational aids that is part of the Instrument Landing System Approach.

This is the VOR that we've been referencing. It sits up on Nimitz Hill, and it is also an integral part of the Instrument Approach Landing System approach for this runway. And then the outer marker, which is also another navigational point for the ILS approach.

Flake Intersection is a navigational reference point at which the airplane will initially intercept the localizer, which in this case because the glide slope portion which provides the pilot with a vertical guidance to the runway was out of service, the only navigational aid associated with the ILS on this particular night was the localizer which provides lateral guidance to the pilots. So, the lateral guidance would keep it within this -- these two lines -- this band to the runway.

In the profile you see depicted here the step-down altitudes as they are depicted on the approach procedure for this runway. And again, this is a terrain profile. You have nautical miles across the bottom to the airport. You have altitude in feet above sea level, not above the ground.

And you will see in this animation the airplane as it begins its trek into the localizer flight path and then proceeds towards the airport. At the same time, you will see what it is doing in the vertical and you will watch the airplane as it comes through the various altitudes on its flight profile all the way to the impact point.

All of this information was derived from radar data that was accumulated and the flight datarecorder data from the aircraft. So, what you're seeing is the actual profile of what the airplane did prior to the accident.

The CVR text will be depicted right in the middle, and what we've done so that you can read it because it starts to scroll pretty quickly is that you'll see this played in half-speed so it will not be real time so that you can read the CVR data. We then played -- replayed the -- the animation again at regular speed or full speed so that you will be able to see it in real time. But you will have had an idea of what was transpiring in the cockpit with the flight crew during the -- during the flight path demonstration.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Could -- could we stop for just a second? We're going to show this animation, and -- and I would just say to those here, particularly family members, this is not -- this -- this shows the -- the actual flight of the aircraft. It's possible that -- that you could find this disturbing, and if you would like we'll leave a second here if you'd like to go out of the room while we do this.

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. FEITH: You'll see the airplane enteringthe picture. And again, this is looking down on the airplane as the airplane is beginning its intercept of the localizer. It'll join the localizer and then begin a trek towards the airport. At the same time the airplane has entered the picture up here in the left corner and is tracking along this altitude line of 2600 feet. And as you can see from the note that they will remain at 2600 feet or should remain at 2600 feet until passing the Flake intersection, this point right here. And you will see where they intercept, which is just inside of Flake.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: Now, again, because of -- excuse me. Because of the information that would be necessary such as you see here for this demonstration, terrain information is not typically depicted on approach plates. So, this information has been derived off of topographic maps and is in pretty much of a -- a direct relationship to the flight path and its relative position to the airport. But again, we're talking in an expanded vertical scale so that you can see the actual movement of the aircraft.

And as you can see right here, the airplane has passed Flake intersection in both views and will then begin the descent because they've now been clearedfor the ILS approach.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: One of the things that we found during the course of the investigation was that although the weather conditions were reported as VFR or visual there were some areas of thunderstorm build-up around the airport area and included a thunderstorm build-up off the approach-end of the runway, which the aircraft did in fact fly into because on the CVR we do hear the sound of the windshield wipers on the aircraft being turned on. And so, we know that the aircraft had flown into a rain event. And I will talk briefly about that later on.

But you see the -- the airplane will now begin a descent. These are intermediate altitudes of 2000 feet, 1440 feet, and then on down to 560 feet once the high terrain is cleared, and that would be the altitude that the aircraft would remain at until the pilots had a visual cue on the airport and then would make a normal landing.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: Again, they referenced a 1440. The airplane is on its way down.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: Another integral part of thisapproach is the VOR, and the reason it is critical is because the captain would typically fly with his navigation instruments set for the localizer. So he would be tracking the lateral guidance while the first officer would typically be monitoring the distance-measuring equipment on board that reads off the mileage from the station digitally. And so, he would be monitoring the digital countdown because you're counting down from seven nautical miles at Flake intersection to zero at the VOR. Then you would --once passing the VOR would begin your count back up to 2.8 to the runway.

As you see, as the airplane continues its trek now over land the airplane has gone through the 2000-foot altitude and continues on a steady state descent down to 1440.

Typically, the airplane would fly -- now, this MSAW alert that you just saw flash right here, this is the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning system that the FAA has. It is a system that works in conjunction with the radar at this airport and other airports around the nation, United States.

And what we have demonstrated here is that if the system, which we will talk about and we will have witnesses addressing later on, had been working as itwas intended, the controllers would have had a Minimum Safe Altitude Warning alert right here when the airplane exceeded this 2000-foot step-down at the 1700-foot level. However, because the system did not work as designed the controllers did not receive the MSAW alert and that information was not forwarded to the crew while they were doing the approach.

As you see, the airplane continues in a steady state descent as it's approaching the outer marker. And again, it has gone through the intermediate altitude of 1440 feet.

The crew is going through checklist items. The first officer, which is the Cam-2 position, does not see the -- what we believe is the runway, says "not in sight." They're continuing their checklist items.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: You can see that the GPS is starting to call the sink rate and the minimums. However, the first officer says that the sink rate is okay.

There's the 200-foot call. They don't see the airport. They're in the process of going around.

Disconnect. That is the countdown between the airplane and -- and ground. And the airplane impacts the hill in the vicinity of the VOR.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: And as you will see now, the --the real time animation will run at a quite a bit faster speed.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: Okay. Again, you have the airplane entering the picture, both at altitude and then over the water as it intercepts the localizer.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: Had the glide slope portion of the ILS been working -- the glide slope projects an invisible radio beam at about a three degree angle projected upward, which once the airplane intercepts that glide slope electronically, the flight crew then would follow its instruments. As long as the airplane was on the glide slope it would bring it down to the runway at a -- at a -- approximately three-degree angle, which would clear all of this terrain.

But because the glide slope was inoperative, there is a different set of minimums, altitudes that the -- the flight crew must follow, a different set of procedures, which is this step-down so that they can systematically fly over this area of high terrain. But it is critical that these navigational aids be used as a gauge when crossing this area of high terrain duringthe course of the approach.

And as I had briefly spoke in the earlier part of my statement, there was a -- a discussion amongst the flight crew members about the glide slope. Although the glide slope had been NOTAM'd, and that is Notice to Air Men. It's a piece of information put out by the FAA that the glide slope was out of service. There was still some question by the flight crew as they were proceeding on the approach about the operational status of the glide slope. And because of that, that is one of the issues that the Safety Board Operations and Human Performance group has looked into with regard to why the crew would have been questioning that given the fact that it was in fact inoperative.

And you see the MSAW alert flashing. This would be typically where we would have expected the controller to have received the MSAW alert that the airplane had gone through this 2000-foot altitude which it should have been at, and they would have then provided a low altitude warning alert to the crew.

(Pause)

MR. FEITH: A couple other notes about this particular area. In talking to pilots that fly into this area quite a bit, especially at night, this is what we call a -- a black hole. That is, the terrainaround here is such that there are no lights as you would typically see looking out the window here in Honolulu with all the lights of the building. To contrast that, there are very few if any lights in this area and you cannot really distinguish the terrain from the black of night, so it looks like a black hole.

All of these things are considerations that the Human Factors and Operations group had to look at during the course of their investigation, and that is just parts of their investigative process with -- with regard to the crew and the operation of this airplane.

(End of video)

MR. FEITH: Hopefully you have a little better idea now of what the aircraft was doing. You do have some sense of what the flight crew was doing at various times during the course of the approach.

The investigation is a very complex process. There are a lot of aspects that need to be looked at. And while this public hearing tends to focus on five of the issues that the chairman has discussed, I'd just like to give you a little bit of information on some of the other things that -- that we are looking at and some information that we've revealed thus far during the course of the investigation.

To begin, the captain had been a pilot in theKorean Air Force prior to his employment with Korean Air in November 1987. During his tenure with the airline he flew the Boeing 727 and the Boeing 747. He had accumulated about 9000 hours of total flight time with 3000 hours in the Boeing 747 and about 1700 as a captain in the 747.

According to company records the captain had operated a Boeing 727 into Guam for approximately one year back in 1993. There were no other records of him flying into Guam until he received video familiarization for operations into Guam and a line experience trip or a line trip into Guam which occurred on July 4th, 1997. This operation was conducted in a Boeing 747. It was done at night in VFR conditions.

The first officer was also a pilot in the Korean Air Force prior to his employment with Korean Air in 1994. He had accumulated about 4000 hours of total time and about 1500 hours as a first officer in the 747. The first officer received his familiarization training for operations into Guam on July 8th, 1997, and had previously operated into Guam in the 747 back in 1995.

The flight engineer had been a navigator in the Korean Air Force prior to his employment with Korean Air in May of 1979. He had flown as an engineeron the Boeing 727, the Air Bus A300, and the Boeing 747. He had approximately 13,000 hours of total flying time, of which 11,000 was over a period as a civilian flight engineer.

Several issues that we have looked at as the investigative team include the development of the -- an issue that was developed during the course of the investigation evolved from the operational status, as I mentioned, of the glide slope portion of the Instrument Landing System. On August 6th the glide slope portion of the ILS was out of service and only the localizer was available. Because of the comments that the crew had made regarding the operational status as you saw during the course of the animation, the discussion that they had regarding the operational status of the glide slope, we became concerned what may have caused them to have this discussion.

One of the aspects that we're looking at is what we call spurious signals or radio signals that may have influenced the navigation equipment on the airplane. That is an aspect that our aircraft systems group is currently looking into.

The investigative team also examined the weather conditions as I had said earlier. At the time of the accident the reported conditions at the airportwere generally good with light winds from the east. Visibility was about seven miles in a rain shower, and there were broken clouds. However, based on data that we were able to obtain from Doppler radar, from satellite imaging, and from witnesses, we found that there was a thunderstorm on the approach end of the airport at the time that the airplane -- that Flight 801 had been traversing through and that this thunderstorm was of -- was capable of producing heavy rain and gusty winds and reduced visibility. We are also looking at that and -- from an aspect of what that may have done to influence the crew in their decision-making.

The en route and approach radar positions at Guam are typically performed by one controller using two independent radar systems. And as I had mentioned earlier, that's what we characterize or call the CERAP. Both systems are equipped -- that is, the radar systems are equipped with a Minimum Safe Altitude Warning system, as I pointed out, with the alert that you saw in the demonstration and that when the airplane exceeded the minimum altitudes or a predetermined altitude the controller would typically get this warning.

We want to know why the system was notworking as it was intended. That is one of the focal points of this investigation. And we will have witnesses that will be testifying to this issue later on in the hearing.

The Safety Board also found during the investigation that the post-accident emergency response to the accident site was delayed several minutes because the air traffic -- because the air traffic controller was not immediately aware that Flight 801 had crashed off the airport.

In addition, emergency response vehicles were delayed in arriving on the scene because access to the accident site was initially stopped by a fenced gate around the property where the airplane had crashed and then further hampered by a narrow paved road which was blocked by some emergency vehicles that were disabled thus preventing the fire trucks from getting close --into close proximity to the accident site itself.

Again, we will have witnesses that will be talking to these issues later on in this hearing.

In addition to this, the Safety Board will also be examining several other issues, including the crew's training at Korean Airlines, crew resource management or how the crew works together, and instrument approach procedures and charting. Is therea way to look at these approach procedures that the crew must follow during periods of -- of bad weather or reduced visibility that will give them better information so that we will not have what the chairman has talked about, and that is controlled-flight-into-terrain type accidents.

Although the Safety Board investigative team completed the on-site wreckage examination August 28th, 1997, several other investigative activities have either been completed or are ongoing. These in --activities involve the examination and tear-down of various electronic components, as I referenced earlier, the navigation equipment. These activities involve the study of aircraft performance, the follow-up on the MSAW system, and of course, the detection of spurious signals in the area around Guam.

In addition to the investigative activities, a meeting was convened in Guam back in January of 1998 and was attended by all of the parties. The purpose of this meeting was to review the progress of the investigation thus far, to review all of the reports that have been produced by the National Transportation Safety Board group chairman thus far, and then to determine future work items that are necessary as far as the investigation process is concerned. Since thismeeting, all of the parties and the KCAB have reviewed the factual reports and their comments have either been addressed or incorporated into the respective reports.

The issues stated by the chairman in his opening remarks and those described briefly in this statement will be addressed by witnesses that were selected based on their expertise, their extensive knowledge, or -- excuse me, or their experience as they relate to the subjects and the issues. Their testimony will provide additional factual information which the Safety Board will use in its analysis of this accident and its determination of the probable cause.

And before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take a moment to publicly thank some people and some organizations. First, Mr. Ham and the Korean delegation for their continuing support and assistance in the investigative process. It's been a -- a very difficult situation, especially because of the distance that we need to communicate, but we've been able to coordinate our activities and our efforts, and it's worked out thus far.

I'd also like to thank my colleagues here at the Board, the investigators that worked very diligently under very stressful conditions to get the work done in very short order given the fact that,unfortunately, we've had numerous accidents of recent late and we were all pulling double duty.

I'd also like to thank the U.S. Air Force for giving us transport to the accident site and the Navy for their cooperation and the logistical support while we were at the accident site.

And I'd also like to thank the officials and the citizens of Guam who extended the team while we were on-scene for almost a month for their generosity and their hospitality. We were -- we were treated very well there, and people pitched in and volunteered a lot of service to us and we do appreciate them.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. The -- the record of investigation is contained in the documents in our public docket, and the court reporter has been provided a list of such materials.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Thank you, Mr. Feith.

We will now go ahead and call our first witness, who is Mr. Kurt Mayo, approach controller, FAA, Guam CERAP.

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

TESTIMONY OF
KURT MAYO
APPROACH CONTROLLER
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
GUAM CERAP

MR. SCHLEEDE: Mr. Mayo, please state your full name and business address for our record.

THE WITNESS: My name is Kurt Mayo. My business address is Guam CERAP, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, Building 18011.

MR. SCHLEEDE: And by whom are you employed?

THE WITNESS: I work for the Federal Aviation Administration.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Okay. And what is your position at the --

THE WITNESS: I'm an air -- I'm an air traffic control specialist.

MR. SCHLEEDE: And how long have you worked as air traffic specialist?

THE WITNESS: 19 and a half years.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Could you provide us a brief summary of your training and experience that qualifies you for your present position?

THE WITNESS: I started my career as an air traffic controller in 1978 with the United States Navy. I was assigned to the Naval Air Station, Cubie Point in the Philippines where I was qualified as a full performance level controller in the radar approach control as well as the control tower. I was also qualified as the facility watch supervisor. I worked there for three and a half years.

I began my career with the Federal Aviation Administration as an air traffic controller in 1982. I was assigned to the Los Angeles Terminal Radar Approach Control where I was a full performance level controller. I worked for the Los Angeles TRACON from May 1982 until February 1994, at which time we relocated our office to San Diego, California to the Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control.

I worked in the Southern California TRACON from February 1994 until September 1995 in the Los Angeles area as a full performance level air traffic controller.

In September 1995 I transferred to the Guam Center Radar Approach Control where I currently work as a full performance level controller until this day.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you very much, Mr. Mayo. Mr. Wentworth will proceed with the questioning.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you, Mr. Schleede.

Good morning, Mr. Mayo. Thank you forcoming.

THE WITNESS: Good morning.

MR. WENTWORTH: Mr. Mayo, are you currently certified -- medically certified as a controller?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I am.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Do you have any waivers or limitations?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I do not.

MR. WENTWORTH: And when was your last medical?

THE WITNESS: In December of 1997.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you.

Okay. Teddy, 3D, please?

And would you go to 3D also, Mr. Mayo, please?

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: And this is a layout of the radar approach control.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: Mr. Mayo, if you'd just look at the very top of the view there. Would you please show us where you were operating and would you explain the radar systems that you had to -- to work with there?

THE WITNESS: I was working at the R4position here in front of the long-range radar scope. Directly to my right is the ASR radar scope, approximately one foot to my right. To my left is the D3 position where I have the teletype printer, flight progress strips, and this is the position where I normally answer land-line calls.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay, sir. And where -- was the other associate at that particular time you were on duty? Was he out of the room?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. He was.

MR. WENTWORTH: And how would you have been expected to reach him if you needed him?

THE WITNESS: I would call him on the intercom telephone.

MR. WENTWORTH: And where was that located?

THE WITNESS: Here on the supervisor's desk behind me approximately eight feet.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Did you receive or take any telephone calls while you were on duty prior to the accident?

THE WITNESS: You're referring to non-business-related calls?

MR. WENTWORTH: Yes, that's correct.

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Or anything to do with thephone on the supervisor's desk which would have taken you away from the operation?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I do not recall receiving any phone calls from the telephone on the supervisor's desk.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you.

Thank you, Teddy.

Now, when you came on duty could you tell us what was not functional while you were working?

THE WITNESS: The primary radar on the long-range radar system was out of service, and the glide slope portion of the ILS was out of service.

MR. WENTWORTH: And the impact of not having the primary, did that have anything to do with your being able to depict weather?

THE WITNESS: Yes, there was no weather depicted on the long-range radar system.

MR. WENTWORTH: However, it would have been depicted on the ASR 8?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, which I normally set at a 60-mile range and the long-range radar set for a 250-mile range.

MR. WENTWORTH: Was a staffing complement of two controllers on duty that morning? To your knowledge, was that a standard staffing level?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It was.

MR. WENTWORTH: Now, based on your knowledge of the weather that prevailed throughout the area that morning, is that -- were those weather conditions pretty standard or -- for that time of the season or that time of the year?

THE WITNESS: Yes. During that time of the year we have frequent rain showers in the area ranging from light rain showers to heavy thunderstorms.

MR. WENTWORTH: And based on the fact that the glide slope was out of service you advised the crew that it was unusable. Is this terms relevant to air traffic control phraseology?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I used the phrase exactly out of our handbook. "Glide path or glide slope unusable."

MR. WENTWORTH: In your view, did the crew acknowledge the fact that it was unusable?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The pilot acknowledged my clearance by the use of the word "Roger" in addition to a partial read back of the clearance.

MR. WENTWORTH: To your knowledge, is there any requirement for you to receive every word of a clearance that you issued to a flight crew?

THE WITNESS: I must ensure that the pilot acknowledges my clearance and the pilot make acknowledge of the clearance by use of terms such as "Roger," "Wilco," "Affirmative," or other words or phrases.

MR. WENTWORTH: But if he does not parrot it back to you, in other words, speak every particular phrase that you issued and does in fact give a -- a reply with a "Roger" or the aircraft call sign or something of that nature, does that indeed constitute acknowledgement?

THE WITNESS: The word "Roger" it -- in and of itself according to our handbook means that the pilot received and understood my last clearance in its entirety.

MR. WENTWORTH: Mr. Mayo, prior to this accident did you or your colleague receive any pilot reports of any NAV/AID difficulties or outages?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. We did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: To your knowledge, did any other aircraft execute the ILS to runway 6-left and safely land?

THE WITNESS: I do not recall at this time aircraft executing an ILS prior to the Korean Airlines. The most -- closest previous arrival was 35 minutesearlier, and the aircraft executed visual approach.

MR. WENTWORTH: Now, you relieved a colleague at that position. If he had received a report of difficulties with that particular approach would he have been required to advise you of such?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. He would have been.

MR. WENTWORTH: And I take it that he did not?

THE WITNESS: No, I did not receive any briefing to that effect.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you. Are any of the NAV/AIDs that serve the Guam International Airport monitored by your facility?

THE WITNESS: In our radar room we only monitor the VOR or the VORTAC.

MR. WENTWORTH: And if an alarm occurs is there a way in which you would receive it?

THE WITNESS: The monitor provides an oral and a visual alert. Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: And during the period that you were on duty did you receive any such alarms?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Moving to the approach clearance that was issued to Korean Air 801, is there specific information which must be issued to the crewwhen he's cleared for a specific instrument approach procedure such as the ILS?

THE WITNESS: Generally speaking, the elements of the clearance are aircraft call sign, aircraft position, perhaps a vector, an altitude to maintain -- until established on the final approach course, and then any appropriate remarks -- including the approach clearance.

MR. WENTWORTH: And would you explain for us on the long-range radar are any of the elements of the ILS to runway 6-left at Guam depicted, such as the outer marker or the extended center line for the runway?

THE WITNESS: We have a map that we can display on the long-range radar. At the time it was not displayed on the long-range radar.

MR. WENTWORTH: Would it have been displayed on the ASR 8?

THE WITNESS: Yes, it was.

MR. WENTWORTH: It was, sir?

THE WITNESS: Yes, it was, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Can you tell me what the purpose or rather how the extended center line is depicted, first of all?

THE WITNESS: The extended runway center lineor the final approach course is an extension of the runway out to approximately 12 miles from the airport depicted by dashed lines in one-mile increments.

MR. WENTWORTH: Now, based on the clearance that was issued to Korean Air 801, it's noted that they were not issued an altitude to maintain. Can you tell us why that might have occurred?

THE WITNESS: I observed the aircraft established on a segment of the approach at the assigned altitude and I thought it would have been redundant.

MR. WENTWORTH: We also noted that the crew was not given their position relative to the outer marker. Can you tell us why that occurred?

THE WITNESS: No sure -- no, sir. I should have given them their position.

MR. WENTWORTH: At what point did you transition from the long-range radar to the ASR 8 in determining the position of Korean Air 801?

THE WITNESS: Well, I was continually scanning back and forth between the two radar systems. When I issued the vector for the intercept I'm certain I was looking at the short-range radar, the ASR 8, and when I switched frequencies to the Agana Tower I'm certain I was observing the aircraft on the ASR 8.

MR. WENTWORTH: At the time that you issued the approach clearance to the crew of Korean Air 801, were there any weathers of area being depicted on the terminal radar system?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There was.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you describe for us your observations?

THE WITNESS: There was an area of weather approximately from three to six miles on final -- on the approach course.

MR. WENTWORTH: That was along the approach course, sir?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It was on the approach course.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did you have any idea of what the intensity level might have been?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not. I had not received any information of any significant weather in the area.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did you advise the crew of Korean Air 801 about your observations of this weather?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did you advise the local controller at Agana Tower about the weather?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Is there any requirement for you to have done so?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There is.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you tell us why that did not occur?

THE WITNESS: I assume that the flight crew was using their cockpit radar as they had twice previously asked for deviations around weather while I was working with them. And their cockpit radar is more accurate and more precise than the radar that I have.

And the tower, I -- I failed to inform them --

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: All right. Mr. Mayo, when was your last observation of the target in the data block of Korean 801 on radar? When did that occur?

THE WITNESS: The last time I remember observing the data block was when I switched them to the tower. I'm certain that I scanned back to the data block at some time later. But I don't recall precisely when that might have been.

MR. WENTWORTH: When you advised the crew to go to the tower, did you look at the data block at that particular time? Is that what I understood?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I did.

MR. WENTWORTH: What was the altitude of the aircraft at that time? Do you recall?

THE WITNESS: To my best memory, 2200 feet.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: Did you observe the data block on radar go into coast at any point?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: Prior to being advised by the local controller that he was no longer in contact with the flight, did you continue to monitor the aircraft's progress to the airport in any manner?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I -- I scanned my radar scopes and I'm sure that I saw the data block at different occasions during the approach. I continued to provide radar monitoring.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Richard, we're -- we're having a little trouble with the interpretation here, so if we can just slow it down a little bit just so that they can keep up, and -- and Mr. Mayo, if you could as well. It's -- it's kind of tough for those folks.

MR. WENTWORTH: Sure. I understand. Thank you.

After being told by the local controller thatthe aircraft was down, why did you believe you needed to have a confirmation from another airborne aircraft if you monitored the progress of the aircraft?

THE WITNESS: Would you please restate that?

MR. WENTWORTH: After being advised by the local controller that he was no longer in contact with Korean Air 801, why did you believe you needed a confirmation from another airborne aircraft, specifically Ryan 789?

THE WITNESS: I was fairly certain in my mind that the aircraft had crashed, but I thought it would be best and -- to get a confirmation visually, and Ryan was in a perfect position to observe the area.

MR. WENTWORTH: So, at what point did you initiate either a crash response or get your associate in the control room? What -- what -- at what point did that occur?

THE WITNESS: When the pilot of the Ryan aircraft advised me that he saw a fire on the hillside I was certain. At that time I contacted my co-worker who began making the appropriate phone calls.

MR. WENTWORTH: Well, if you felt that the aircraft had crashed before getting the confirmation, would it have been incumbent upon you to initiate some type of crash response?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It may have been. I just wanted to be -- I wanted to be 100 percent sure.

MR. WENTWORTH: I'd like you to refer to Exhibit 3G, please, Mr. Mayo.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: If you would look at the --this is the facility accident incident notification record that was developed by the CERAP for which you work. And if you'll notice the second block there, it says, "Government of Guam off-base crash." Do you have specific procedures for a crash that occurs off Guam International Airport?

THE WITNESS: Yes, we do.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you explain what those would be?

THE WITNESS: We have a checklist book at the supervisor's desk that gives us a list of what parties to call.

MR. WENTWORTH: And what -- I noticed on the next line there it says, "U.S. Coast Guard Search and Rescue." Is the response to them initiated concurrent with an off-airport crash?

THE WITNESS: The Coast Guard is always notified.

(Pause)

THE WITNESS: They assist in on-shore as well as off-shore.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did you make any of these notifications on the sheet?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I was working the radar, and my co-worker made the calls.

MR. WENTWORTH: You will notice the times that are listed on the sheet. There is a listing for the facility manager, Mr. Cornelison, and it shows a time of 16:02. Do your procedures require that he be the first person notified in the event of an accident?

THE WITNESS: First, we should notify the Coast Guard or the search-and-rescue parties.

MR. WENTWORTH: Mr. Mayo, did you observe any visual MSAW alerts for Korean Air 801?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Based on the record we know that one was indeed developed. If you had observed it, where would it have been displayed as it would have been generated by the Micro-EARTS radar -- automation?

MR. WENTWORTH: Only on the long-range radar system, and the letters MSAW would flash in the lower portion of the data block as well as being displayed in the alert tab list. The call sign would be -- the call sign would be displayed in the alert tab list on thescope.

MR. WENTWORTH: And where was that particular list located on your radar scope?

THE WITNESS: The alert tab list was located at the upper and center portion of my scope.

MR. WENTWORTH: To your knowledge, sir, is there an MSAW speaker in the control room?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There is.

MR. WENTWORTH: And can you tell me where that's located?

THE WITNESS: To the right of the R4 position approximately 10 to 15 feet above one of the radar scopes. It's clearly audible throughout the room from that position.

MR. WENTWORTH: Prior to be notified by the tower that he was no longer in contact with Korean Air 801 did you hear any oral MSAW alerts?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Prior to the day of this accident were you aware that the alert system, the MSAW was virtually non-existent?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I was not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Prior to the day of this accident were you aware that you would not receive an oral MSAW alert from the Micro-EARTS system?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I was not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Do you provide approach control services to other airports?

THE WITNESS: Yes, we do.

MR. WENTWORTH: Other than Guam International?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. We do.

MR. WENTWORTH: For instance, which airports, sir?

THE WITNESS: Anderson Air Force Base, which is located on the island of Guam; Rhode International Airport; Tinion and Saipan International Airport.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you tell me what a safety alert is, Mr. Mayo?

THE WITNESS: A safety alert is an --advisory to an aircraft to alert them of a situation which may be unsafe.

MR. WENTWORTH: In what response -- in what -- in what level of hierarchy of -- in your job does that particular function fall?

THE WITNESS: It along with separation is a first priority.

MR. WENTWORTH: Do you consider issuing --excuse me, sir. Do you consider MSAW in itself, this particular function, as a safety feature?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I do.

MR. WENTWORTH: In your view as a controller, do you believe that MSAW provides protection for you in doing your job?

THE WITNESS: Protection for me?

MR. WENTWORTH: For yourself.

THE WITNESS: It assists me in doing my job.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you amplify how it would assist you?

THE WITNESS: It alerts me to situations which may be unsafe so that I can alert the crew members or the controller who's in control of the aircraft.

MR. WENTWORTH: To your knowledge, is MSAW now working at Guam?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It is.

MR. WENTWORTH: I don't believe I have any further questions. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: All right. We'll now go to the party questioning of Mr. Mayo, and we'll start with the Korean accredited representative. It'll take us a second here so all of us can get our headsets on.

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: You all right, Mr. Mayo? You okay?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: All right. Korean CAB?

MR. LEE: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. Mr. Kurt Mayo, thank you very much.

(The following is a verbatim transcript of the English translation of Mr. Lee's questions posed in Korean and Mr. Mayo's responses in English.)

MR. LEE: Are there seven positions at the Guam Control Tower, including CERAP coordinator approach control, oceanic, and domestic?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. There are six.

MR. LEE: If that is the case, then when approach clearance was issued for KAL 801, were you, Kurt Mayo, there on your own, by yourself?

THE WITNESS: There were two persons on duty.

MR. LEE: Okay. Then, you two started to work together. However, the other controller was on duty only an hour then went on break. Is that what happened?

THE WITNESS: I'm not certain of the amount of time that he worked prior to his break.

MR. LEE: Regarding the breaks at your control center, is there any formalized way of taking duties on a shift basis, such as a staggering fashion,or is it that you can take a break at any time of your choosing?

THE WITNESS: The breaks are based on the traffic load, the number of persons assigned to the shift, and it's normally controlled by the supervisors or the controller-in-charge.

MR. LEE: When the approach clearance was issued for KAL 801, were both radars used, one for en route and the other for approach control?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I was scanning back and forth between both radar scopes, the long-range and the short-range.

MR. LEE: When approach clearance was issued, I understand there were eight aircraft which received approach clearance. Of the eight, how many were given clearance using the en route radar and how many using the approach control?

(End of translation)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Could we -- excuse me. Could we stop for a minute, please? We've got two things. Number one, the court reporter is having a problem here, and let's get that clarified because that's the official record. So, what -- what do we need to do here, Carolyn?

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Please be back -- it's now 10:30 -- at 10:45. We'll make it a 15-minute break.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: We'll resume the -- the KCAB, still questioning Mr. Mayo. And go ahead, gentleman.

(The following is a verbatim transcription of the English translation of Mr. Lee's questions posed in Korean and Mr. Mayo's responses in English.)

MR. LEE: On the previous occasion in connection with your working system at your control tower following the accident, the work system that you had set up might have been changed. If the -- if that was the case, if there were any changes, can you tell us what actions you take following the accident?

THE WITNESS: The MSAW system was changed.

MR. LEE: FAA Order 7110.65K. According to the regulation of said FAA Order there are such provisions. Let me read. "If -- is this -- if altitude heading or other items are read -- are read back by the pilot ensure the read-back is correct. If incorrect or incomplete make corrections as appropriate."

However, with respect to the accident aircraft, Korean Air Aircraft, when you were issuingapproach clearance you -- Korean Air 801 -- Korean 801 cleared for ILS runway 6-left approach, glide slope unusable. When you said that the -- the Korean Air pilot read back just simply, quote, "Korean 801, roger. Cleared for ILS runway 6-left," quote. As the result, the glide scope -- "glide slope unusable" section was not read back. Did you notice that and correct that?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I noticed that. I only need to correct the read-back if the pilot's read-back was incorrect. Nothing that he read in his read-back was incorrect. And the use of the term "Roger" in and of itself is sufficient. The word "Roger" according to the pilot controller glossary in our handbook means that the pilot has received and understands my last clearance in its entirety.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: And I would say again Mr. Mayo has already been asked this question and answered it to Mr. Wentworth.

MR. LEE: Okay. Let me then move on to one more question.

FAA Order 7110.65K 5-1-17, radar service termination. According to the said regulation radar service termination should be notified to the accident aircraft. That is my understanding. Did you actually do that to the accident aircraft?

THE WITNESS: Would you please restate the question?

MR. LEE: FAA Order -- according to FAA Order 7110.65K, air traffic control paragraph 51-13, radar service termination. According to the provisions of the regulation, CERAP power controller should notify radar service termination to the accident aircraft. And what I asked you just now is that whether you performed that obligation.

THE WITNESS: The section also reads that radar service is automatically terminated and the pilot not -- need -- need not be advised when the aircraft lands. Radar service is automatically terminated and the pilot need not be advised when the aircraft lands.

MR. LEE: Just bear with me. Let me have time to just ask two more questions.

Agana Tower D-BRITE increment was established as of January 1997. Were you aware of that?

THE WITNESS: I am aware that the Agana Tower has a D-BRITE.

MR. LEE: And then let me ask you the final question. At the time of the accident 15:32 hours there was official weather advisory. With respect to this official weather advisory measurement, did you receive any notification from the Agana Control Tower?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. LEE: Okay. Then let me follow up on that question to ask you whether you received any such weather advisory notification from any other organizations, including the Weather Bureau?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. LEE: At the CERAP are there any -- any receiving increment to receive meteorological information?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There -- there is. There's a teletype printer and also a weather television monitor.

MR. LEE: FAA Order 7110.65K 4-7-8, weather information regulation. According to the provisions set forth in this particular regulation, the controller -- when there is official weather or meteorological advisory either the controller is supposed to issue instrument landing clearance or issue notification based on that. At that time did you notify the pilot of the accident aircraft, Korean Air aircraft such notice?

THE WITNESS: -- the questions.

MR. LEE: The controller, when he receives or recognize a special weather advisory prior to issuing instrument landing clearance, he should notify thepilot of the special weather advisory status or information or to include such information within such instrument landing clearance. That is the regulation. Did you ever notify the Korean Air pilot of any such special weather advisory information?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not. I was not aware of any special weather or significant weather in the area.

MR. LEE: Thank you very much. That's all.

(End of translation)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Thank you.

Boeing Company?

MR. DARCY: Thank you, Mr. -- excuse me, Mr. Chairman. We don't have any questions for the witness.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Thank you.

Barton ATC?

MR. E. MONTGOMERY: No, Mr. Chairman. No questions.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Korean Air?

CAPTAIN KIM: No questions.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: NATCA?

MR. MOTE: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mayo, in your almost 20 years experience as an air traffic controller in the Navy, Los Angeles approach, and now Guam CERAP, has it been a fairlycommon experience --

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Excuse me. Slower, please. Controllers -- we understand the controller's business is to speak fast, but here you've got to sort of work in reverse.

MR. MOTE: Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In your experience, is it a common daily occurrence for flight crews to read back clearances and acknowledge clearances, particularly with respect to approach clearances with terms such as "roger" and perhaps with partial acknowledgement of elements of that clearance?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It is.

MR. MOTE: Thank you. And also, in your experience as a controller, do you operate with the daily anticipation -- in other words, is it your expectation that flight crews that are coming into your air space will comply with the FARs by familiarizing themselves with NOTAMs and equipment outages affecting their flight? Do you operate with that expectation?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I do.

MR. MOTE: And based on the answer to that --

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Slowly. Slowly.

MR. MOTE: Sorry.

And based on that answer, given the fact that you expect the crews to be familiar with outages and other things affecting the condition of that flight and given the fact that you ensured that the flight crew had or was receiving the ATIS uniform in effect at the time, which broadcast the glide slope outage, and given the fact that you issued the handbook phraseology "glide slope unusable" in the approach clearance, was there any doubt in your mind that this crew should have been aware that the glide slope was not in service at the time the approach clearance was issued?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. There was not.

MR. MOTE: Okay. Thank you.

That's all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Government of Guam?

MR. DERVISH: No questions, sir.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: FAA?

MR. DONNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mayo, just two short questions. What would you characterize your workload as at the time of the accident?

THE WITNESS: Light to moderate.

MR. DONNER: And the complexity of the situation at that time?

THE WITNESS: I'd characterize the complexity as routine.

MR. DONNER: Thank you very much. Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: All right. Thank you. That completes the parties.

Mr. Feith, you got anything further?

MR. FEITH: I just have a couple of questions, sir.

Mr. Mayo, with regard to the MSAW, have you received any formal training on the MSAW in your position?

THE WITNESS: I've received courses and I feel that I've been well-trained in MSAW. I know what it is, I know how to use it.

MR. FEITH: Can you just characterize for me the type of training that you would have received? Was it videos? Was it hands-on? Was it book work?

THE WITNESS: Written courses as well as videos.

MR. FEITH: How long a training period is that? A day? A month? A year? How much training?

THE WITNESS: Each session may last for 30 to 60 minutes.

MR. FEITH: And with regards to recurrenttraining, do you receive recurrent training?

THE WITNESS: Yes, we do.

MR. FEITH: Prior to the accident had you received training on MSAW?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I had.

MR. FEITH: And subsequent to the accident have you received training on MSAW?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I have not.

MR. FEITH: I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Pat?

MR. CARISEO: No questions, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: I -- I'd -- I'd like to clarify one thing here. And this is something that's come up as -- during your testimony. This is the question of the difference between out of service and unusable, if there is a difference, in terms of the glide slope. When one reads the NOTAM, and you may not be the -- the person to answer this question, but the NOTAM says out of service. You said when you gave the clearance to the -- to the aircraft unusable. Is there, to your knowledge, a difference in these or is that effectively the same thing?

THE WITNESS: It's effectively the same thing.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: All right. Thank you. We appreciate your being here with us, and I understand you have to leave so that you will not be subject to perhaps coming back. We -- we do appreciate your coming and being with us.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: The next witness is Mr. Marty Theobald, local controller, Barton ATC.

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

TESTIMONY OF
MARTY THEOBALD
LOCAL CONTROLLER
BARTON ATC INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AGANA CONTRACT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Mr. Wentworth?

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Oh, I'm sorry.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Mr. Theobald, please state your full name and business address for our record.

THE WITNESS: Marty Theobald. 202 --correction. 2024 Piper Avenue, Pocatello, Idaho.

MR. SCHLEEDE: And what is your present position? Work position?

THE WITNESS: I'm an air traffic control specialist for Barton ATC International, Incorporated, and I'm currently in training at that location.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Could you move just a little closer to the microphone, please?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Could you give us a brief description of your education and training and experience that -- qualifies you for your present position?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I began my air traffic control experience with the United States Navy in 1983. I completed the air traffic control basic course in October of that year.

I was subsequently stationed in -- at an approach control facility in Texas. I was qualified as a ground controller and a flight data controller in the tower there as well as full facility rated in the radar facility.

I transferred from there in April of '89 and arrived in May in Guam at Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam. Subsequently, complete facility rated there both route -- and tower and radar. I also servedapproximately six months as the radar branch manager there.

April of '92 I was reassigned to the air traffic control facility officer as an administrative assistant until my separation from Navy in October of '92.

I was hired by Barton Air Traffic Control, Incorporated -- I'm sorry. Barton Air Traffic Control International, Incorporated in May of '95 as an air traffic control specialist in Guam International Control Tower, which was the former NAS Agana Tower.

January of this year we had a opening at another facility and I requested a transfer. And I did transfer in February, and I'm in training now.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you very much. Mr. Wentworth will proceed.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you, Mr. Schleede.

Mr. Theobald, you said that currently you're in Pocatello, Idaho?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: When did you transfer from Guam?

THE WITNESS: In February of this year.

MR. WENTWORTH: Was this at your request?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It was.

MR. WENTWORTH: Are you medically --certified as a controller, sir?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I am.

MR. WENTWORTH: Do you have any waivers or limitations?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: And when was your last physical, please?

THE WITNESS: October of last year, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: And at the time that you were working in the tower on the night of this -- accident you were a fully certified controller at that time?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I was.

MR. WENTWORTH: To your knowledge, is it standard procedure to work that particular shift by yourself?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It is.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you explain what the procedures would have been for taking a break to go to the bathroom or something like that?

THE WITNESS: You would normally wait until the traffic permits. You would coordinate with Guam CERAP that you would be out of the tower momentarily. You would also coordinate with airport authority's ramp control to let them know you would be out of the towershould an aircraft call on either ground or tower frequency. And you would take a hand-held with you when you went down to the facilities.

MR. WENTWORTH: Having seen this coordination take place, is it fair to say that you remained in the tower while you were on duty prior to the time of the accident?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. WENTWORTH: Teddy, can you put up 3E for us, please?

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: Mr. Theobald, this is a layout of the control tower. Can you tell us where you were primarily located during the course of the shift?

THE WITNESS: Primarily in this location, sir. In front of the local control position.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay, sir. And to orient us of the view of the tower cab in relation to the runways, could you tell us where those would generally be?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The runways would be located on this side.

MR. WENTWORTH: So your scan would be from your left to your right?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The approach end ofrunway 6 would be this direction.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. And from the tower cab, where is the crash/fire/rescue station located?

THE WITNESS: Sir, it would be located on this portion over in here.

MR. WENTWORTH: Off to the right.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Off to the right in the local control position.

MR. WENTWORTH: Now, would you point out for us the D-BRITE radar displays?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There's one located here and there's one located here as well.

MR. WENTWORTH: Would you point out where the crash/fire/rescue phone is?

THE WITNESS: The crash phone would be located right here, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Could you show us where the monitor panel for the ILS six-left is?

THE WITNESS: Be located right here.

MR. WENTWORTH: And where do you receive your weather? 1">

THE WITNESS: Comes in via a printer located right here, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Right --

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. It would be righthere.

MR. WENTWORTH: And then the ATIS recording station is just above that, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That would be ATIS.

MR. WENTWORTH: And where is the phone for the search and rescue?

THE WITNESS: We have a line that is located over in this that is a coordination line with the Coast Guard.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you.

Thank you, Teddy.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: Can we bring up the lights? Thank you.

Would you pull out Exhibit 3H, hotel, please?

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: My correction, Marty. That's 3 foxtrot.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry?

MR. WENTWORTH: 3 foxtrot. 3F.

THE WITNESS: Foxtrot?

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Sir, on page -- the first page here we see two ATIS messages.

THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm sorry. I can't hearyou, sir. I can't hear you.

MR. WENTWORTH: On the first page there are two ATIS -- there's two messages here, weather sequences which appear to be marked U and V.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The U and the V would be the letter for the phonetic alphabet of that ATIS broadcast.

MR. WENTWORTH: So, were those annotations made by you?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That is my writing.

MR. WENTWORTH: If you'd look on the last page we have the sequence from the National Weather Service, and it would appear there's a mark on about the fourth one down. That particular sequence seems to be the same as the ATIS broadcast Uniform that you developed.

And then at the next mark further down at 02:04 if you see that, Marty, on that last page?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: It appears that that sequence is the same as ATIS broadcast Victor.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Now, it appears here in looking at the last page there are two specials, one issued at 01:32, 01:47, 0 -- the hourly at 01:50, andthen a -- an additional three specials there.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you tell us why these particular broadcasts or this weather was not disseminated by you as the local controller?

THE WITNESS: Sir, the special observation with the time of 01:32, I was in the process of recording that broadcast when CERAP called me with an in-bound which stopped me in the middle of that -- that recording. I went back to the recording and was in the process of checking it for correctness when the Korean Air aircraft checked in with me.

The ones beyond that were during the period when I was attempting to locate the aircraft and I was performing higher priority duties than the weather at that point.

MR. WENTWORTH: Are you certified to determine the prevailing visibility?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I am.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: And in Guam in particular on -- on this accident?

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry?

MR. WENTWORTH: At Guam in particular during the time of this accident?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I was.

MR. WENTWORTH: At what point does the tower assume responsibility for determining prevailing visibility?

THE WITNESS: If the visibility drops below five miles, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: With the hourly weather sequence we see the visibility being reported as three statuate miles. And then it reduces down to one, back up to two, and then back to four. Did you make any of these determinations of prevailing visibility?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. At that point I was involved in coordination reference the air -- accident aircraft and was searching for the aircraft as well.

MR. WENTWORTH: So, these would have been visibility at the surface as determined by the weather -- National Weather Service?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Those would be their determinations on visibility, sir.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: And if you'd look on page two of these sequences.

THE WITNESS: F2?

MR. WENTWORTH: F2, yes. That's correct, Marty.

There is a time of receiving 15:25 and then atime apparently of the sequence 15:32. There appears to be a disparity there. Can you explain what was occurring?

THE WITNESS: I believe that that time in the -- the receiving time there is a time that's set in the system itself, the actual printer in the tower cab. It appears to be that the -- the clock on that was not correct.

MR. WENTWORTH: Is there a way that you had to set that or check that?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. We're not allowed to set any equipment or make any adjustments to any equipment in the control tower.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Thank you.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: Go to 3 X-ray, page 12.

(Pause)

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I have that.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. This is the maintenance log for the glide slope at Guam. In the upper right-hand corner it's marked June 1997. However, in the middle of the page it's carried on to July of 1997. Do you see that?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I do.

MR. WENTWORTH: I'd like to direct yourattention to the July entry of the 7th where it says that the glide slope is out of service, to replace the building coordination with ATCT, and then in parens (Marty), and then the MCC and in parens, (TC). The "Marty" that's being referred to on this particular log, was that you?

THE WITNESS: I would have -- correction. It appears to be, yes, sir. I'm the only Marty that works in the control tower.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay, sir. So then you did have knowledge that the glide slope was out of service?

THE WITNESS: Not at that point, sir. I was on vacation then in the United States mainland on 7 July.

MR. WENTWORTH: So, then somebody had to be mistaken when they put your name down here, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It appears that way.

MR. WENTWORTH: All right. Does the tower issue NOTAMs?

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry?

MR. WENTWORTH: Does the tower issue NOTAMs?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. We do not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Do you know who does?

THE WITNESS: I believe it would be GuamAirport Authority or the FAA Airways Facilities people or Maintenance Coordination Center in Honolulu.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. You pointed out for us earlier the monitor panel for the ILS to runway 6-left.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: In the event of a failure of either the glide slope or the localizer -- that is the two components that you would monitor, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Would you receive any type of an alert?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There would be a visual actual change from one color light to another as well as an audible tone.

MR. WENTWORTH: Now, did you receive any type of audible alerts or visual alerts for the glide slope or the localizer that morning?

THE WITNESS: When I arrived to work to the best of my knowledge the glide slope was already in a failed position. A red light in the localizer was in the green, which would be the operational position.

MR. WENTWORTH: However, you were aware at that particular point the glide slope was indeed out of service, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I was.

MR. WENTWORTH: During the time that you were on shift did you receive any reports from pilots of any problems with NAV/AIDs that serve the airport?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: When Korean Air 801 was in-bound to the airport did you observe the flight?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I never did see the aircraft.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did you know why you were not able to see the airplane?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did there become a point at which you believed you should have been able to see the airplane?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: And can you tell us when that was?

THE WITNESS: It would have been approximately three to four minutes after I cleared the aircraft to land.

(Pause)

MR. WENTWORTH: If you would, Marty, go to 3 India, page 13.

(Pause)

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: -- to the left on the page, paragraph 3-10-7. Landing clearance without visual --

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. What -- what paragraph, sir?

MR. WENTWORTH: 3-10-7 on page 13.

(Pause)

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. You see that to the left?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Landing clearance without visual observation?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: We note that in the transcript that the flight was not told that they were not in sight. Can you tell us why they were not advised of this?

THE WITNESS: As this states, when an arriving aircraft reports a position where he should be seen but has not been visually observed, and I don't believe he was in a position where I should have visually seen him when he checked in with me.

MR. WENTWORTH: And based on what, sir?

THE WITNESS: The distance of the aircraft from the airport on the initial call from CERAP withthe in-bound and his position distance from the airport being to the west to 12 miles.

MR. WENTWORTH: You heard the earlier testimony of Mr. Mayo that there was weather along the final approach course between the flight and the airport?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I have.

MR. WENTWORTH: Had you known that weather was out there would you have done anything differently?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I would have.

MR. WENTWORTH: Could you amplify?

THE WITNESS: I would have immediately on initial contact with the aircraft I would have read him the weather observation that I was attempting to record at the time. And I -- if I had known that cell was there I would have issued that information to the aircraft as well to be sure that he had the information.

MR. WENTWORTH: And another point that I'd like to make, when you said that the monitor panel had a red light for the glide slope, what was being shown on the localizer? What did you receive on that?

THE WITNESS: On the status panel, sir?

MR. WENTWORTH: Yes, sir. On the status panel.

THE WITNESS: Yes, the glide slope was in the red, which would be the alarm position, and the localizer was in the green, which would be the go indicator, operational.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you. At what point did you become concerned about Korean Air 801?

THE WITNESS: As I said before, approximately three to four minutes after I issued him his landing clearance he was not visible and not over the approach into the runway.

MR. WENTWORTH: And so, then what did you do?

THE WITNESS: I commenced a communication search for the aircraft.

MR. WENTWORTH: Which included calling the ramp?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It did.

MR. WENTWORTH: From the tower cab how far are the runway out in front of you?

THE WITNESS: Approximately one-quarter mile, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you normally hear aircraft landing in the -- and taking off?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. You can.

MR. WENTWORTH: After you called the CERAP and was told by them that the aircraft was no longer onradar, why did you call Anderson Air Force Base?

THE WITNESS: To ascertain whether or not the aircraft had possibly landed there, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Have you ever had a commercial air carrier land at Anderson inadvertently?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. It has not happened to me personally.

MR. WENTWORTH: Has it ever happened to your knowledge?

THE WITNESS: When I got to Guam it was one of the things in my training that they cautioned me on, that it had happened prior.

MR. WENTWORTH: Do you know whether this occurred during the day or -- or during -- at night?

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure if that was a day -- during the day or at night.

MR. WENTWORTH: In your view, was there a reluctance on your part to initiate a crash response?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. Not once I had some actual evidence and -- and a position and a location to send someone to.

MR. WENTWORTH: So you felt like you had to have a location before you could send vehicles out to nowhere?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: I see. And you pointed out for us earlier there's a crash -- a search-and-rescue phone on the tower cab. Did you use that in any manner?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I did not.

MR. WENTWORTH: And why not?

THE WITNESS: We don't have an established procedure for using that for search-and-rescue type information. That's normally a line that's used for coordination between the Coast Guard and us, normally in-bound calls to the tower.

MR. WENTWORTH: And that's how you've seen it used?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: For an off-airport crash, do you still retain responsibility to initiate the crash/fire/rescue response?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I would make the notification as soon as I become aware of it to ramp control, which would then make the notifications to the appropriate Government of Guam agencies.

MR. WENTWORTH: And now I'd like you to go to 3H, please, Marty. This is the facility accident incident notification record.

(Pause)

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I don't have that.

(Pause)

THE WITNESS: Thank you. Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: At the first entry there at the top of the page it shows a time, and would you tell us what time that is?

THE WITNESS: 15:58 --

MR. WENTWORTH: And then there's initials. Who is that -- those initials?

THE WITNESS: Those are my initials behind that.

MR. WENTWORTH: T.O. is your initials?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Those are my operating initials.

MR. WENTWORTH: And the recipient was Juan --does it appear?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: So, is this handwriting yours?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That is.

MR. WENTWORTH: And when this entry was made, from where did you derive the time?

THE WITNESS: From my directory digital clocks in the tower on the local control position.

MR. WENTWORTH: Was it marked or annotatedconcurrent with the time you made the call?

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry?

MR. WENTWORTH: Was it marked concurrent with the time that you made the call?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: You showed us earlier that from the tower you were able to see the crash/fire/rescue -- the crash/fire station?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: After you made the notification did you see any of those trucks leave?

THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge.

MR. WENTWORTH: During the duration of the time you were in tower?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Do you know whether they have a requirement to leave the station for off-airport crash?

THE WITNESS: That would be based on the Airport Authority's releasing them, to my knowledge.

MR. WENTWORTH: Mr. Theobald, what -- what is a safety alert?

THE WITNESS: A safety alert would be a -- an alert that you would issue to an aircraft if you were aware that he is too close to terrain, obstructions, oranother aircraft.

MR. WENTWORTH: Have you received any formal training on MSAW?

THE WITNESS: During wash -- which portion of my career, sir?

MR. WENTWORTH: While you've been with Barton.

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: During what portion have you received training?

THE WITNESS: When I was an approach controller in -- when I was stationed in Texas we had an MSAW system there and I had some training there for it, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: So you basically know what it is?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I understand what the system is.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Had you been told by the CERAP controller to issue a safety alert to Korean Air 801, what would you have done?

THE WITNESS: I would have issued the low altitude alert, check your altitude immediately, to the aircraft.

MR. WENTWORTH: I believe I have no furtherquestions. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: KCBA -- does KCAB?

(The following is a verbatim transcript of the English translation of Mr. Lee's questions posed in Korean and Mr. Theobald's responses in English.)

MR. LEE: You have pretty much covered all the questions that we originally intended to, so let me just touch up on several simple issues.

(Disruption in recording)

THE WITNESS: -- pilot report or notification from the FAA -- personnel -- was not operational.

MR. LEE: Let me just confirm one more thing. On January 16, 1997, at Agana Tower there were two D-BRITEs installed at the Agana Control Tower. Up until -- up to the moment of accident, for about six months, for 24 hours around the clock the two D-BRITEs were turned on. Did you ever actually use the increment -- D-BRITE increment? If you ever did, then please let me know, particularly with respect to the accident? Have you ever utilized D-BRITE system in connection with this accident?

THE WITNESS: No -- no, I did not use --utilize that system as it is not a certified system and it is not an operational piece of equipment.

(End of translation)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Barton ATC?

MR. E. MONTGOMERY: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Government of Guam?

MR. DERVISH: Yes, sir. I just have a couple questions. And the first one's by way of clarification. I'm sorry I missed your answer, Marty.

At 01:58 you notified who?

THE WITNESS: Ramp Control, I'm sorry.

MR. DERVISH: Is there a notification list that you have for notification or do you just call Ramp Control?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. We do have a notification list. That would be the exhibit that I was looking at at the time, 3 Hotel.

MR. DERVISH: And who else did you notify?

THE WITNESS: My next call was to the facility and the air traffic manager, and then we commenced with the -- I commenced with my portion of this as I was able to with other things that were going on with coordination.

MR. DERVISH: So you -- you did contact 911 and those --

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry?

MR. DERVISH: Who contacted 911?

THE WITNESS: It was not I. I don't know.

MR. DERVISH: And just by way of clarification again, and I might have missed it, did you say the clock might have been wrong in the tower? Or did I miss that?

THE WITNESS: That would be the printout clock for the weather --

MR. DERVISH: Oh.

THE WITNESS: -- received time.

MR. DERVISH: Okay. But you have a clock there that would have the accurate times for these notifications?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. DERVISH: Okay. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: NATCA?

MR. MOTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You stated in your answers to Mr. Wentworth a few moments ago that had the approach controller advised you of weather off -- on the final with regard to Korean Air you would advised the pilot of the -- of the special ATIS observation that you had, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. MOTE: The special weather at 01:32 --let me refer, by the way, to Exhibit 3 Foxtrot or the 01:32 special observation page, that form.

(Pause)

THE WITNESS: Which page?

MR. MOTE: It's page F4.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. MOTE: Do you see the approximately four lines down -- five lines down from the top, the special Guam observation, 01:32?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. MOTE: There are rain showers or showers depicted on that special weather observation. Do you see that?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I do.

MR. MOTE: I'm curious to know why you would advise the flight crew of showers on the final if the approach controller told you that but why you would not advise them when you have a hard copy showing showers in the vicinity of the airport. What -- what's the difference?

THE WITNESS: The showers that are located here are not on the final approach course, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: So, you're -- so you're specifically relating it to the final, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. What I -- the reasonI would have passed that information would have been the ceiling information.

MR. MOTE: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Korean Air?

(The following is a verbatim transcript of the English translation of Captain Kim's questions posed in Korean and Mr. Theobald's responses in English.)

CAPTAIN KIM: Yes, let me ask one question. I'm with the Korean Airlines.

Of the questions that are asked by ATC chairman special weather conditions, why it was not notified to the aircraft -- pilot, the witness said the reason was called --

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: I think we've got a problem -- hang on just a second.

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Go ahead.

CAPTAIN KIM: Among the questions asked by the chairman, the special weather conditions advisory which is not notified of the pilot and the -- why such notification was not done. The witness answer was that it was because of radar recording matters. Was it also -- would it be interpreted as -- would it be reasonableto interpret your answer as the -- the tasks that you were performing -- you alone were performing were too demanding on any one person?

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I understand the question as it was stated.

CAPTAIN KIM: Okay. Then, my assistant will ask the question in English.

FIRST OFFICER CHUNG: You -- one of your answers implied that the -- the reason the special observation was not transmitted to the pilot was because you were interrupted in the process, and we're asking if that -- if your answer implies in any way that at particular times during your shift your tasks might be too much for one person. Is that question clear, sir?

THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. And the answer would be no, I don't believe it's too -- too much for one person.

FIRST OFFICER CHUNG: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Do you have another question?

CAPTAIN KIM: No. Thank you very much.

(End of translation)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Boeing Company?

MR. DARCY: Thank you, sir. We have noquestions.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: FAA?

MR. DONNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have no questions.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Greg?

MR. FEITH: I just have one question regarding the weather, and that is in reading the transcript when Ryan was turning onto the localizer coming in-bound and was asked whether they had seen 801 and they were describing or in the process of looking for the aircraft, they stated that they went -- they just went IMC. And they -- they lost the airport. Did you do anything to get them to provide you a prep of some sort or any update to the weather given the fact that they just went IMC, which apparently wasn't the same condition at the airport? Was there any attempt to update the weather out there that you could provide to following aircraft?

THE WITNESS: I wasn't aware that they went IMC. They were not on my frequency when they were searching for the aircraft.

MR. FEITH: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Pat?

MR. CARISEO: No question.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Ben?

MR. BERMAN: Mr. Theobald, you testified that you didn't make the crash call until you knew a position and location for the crash to send the units to. From whom did you ascertain the position and location and how did that go?

THE WITNESS: That was information that was passed to me by Guam CERAP from Ryan 789.

MR. BERMAN: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Monty?

MR. M. MONTGOMERY: Thank you -- thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have one question.

In your tour of duty there at Guam, Mr. Theobald, have you ever received an MSAW alert of any kind?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I've never worked in that tower when there was a functional MSAW capability in that control tower.

MR. M. MONTGOMERY: Did you ever get a call from approach control with such a message?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

MR. M. MONTGOMERY: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Were you aware that the MSAW was not functional in the approach control?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. I was not.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: And could you -- could you just clarify for us a little bit the status of the D-BRITE in your -- in your facility?

THE WITNESS: The D-BRITE was an uncommissioned, unserviceable, non-certified piece of equipment at the time.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: So you basically were not using it at all for your ATC duties?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Thank you very much.

THE WITNESS: You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: That's good. Appreciate it.

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: Mr. Theobald, the same thing applies to you. You're -- you're released now. I understand you want to leave as well.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: All right. Our next witness will be Ms. Sherrie Ewert, air traffic manager, Barton ATC.

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

TESTIMONY OF
SHERRIE EWERT
AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER
BARTON ATC INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AGANA CONTRACT TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER

MR. SCHLEEDE: Ms. Ewert, please state your full name and business address for the record.

THE WITNESS: My name is Sherrie Lynn Ewert. My business address is 1775 Adamborough Boulevard, Tgin, Guam.

MR. SCHLEEDE: And what is your present occupation?

THE WITNESS: Air traffic manager, Agana, Guam, and air traffic control specialist.

MR. SCHLEEDE: And how long have you held that position?

THE WITNESS: I've been a manager for approximately two years and I've been a specialist with Agana FCT for almost three years.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Would you give us a brief description of your education, training, and experience that brings you to your present position?

THE WITNESS: I went to Navy Air Traffic Control School, a school, from June of '76 to October '76. And then October '79 through November '79 I wentto Navy Radar Air Traffic Control Facility school. June '86 to July '86 I went to Navy Facility Management Terminal En Route Procedure school.

I've been stationed at Naval Air Station Fallon; Naval Air Station Siganella, Sicily; again at Naval Air Station Fallon; Naval Air Station Agana, Guam; and then Agana FCT.

And I've been qualifications in flight planning, flight data, clearance delivery, tower visibility, ground control, local control, tower supervisor, radar final control, IFR data, desert data, IFR coordinator, arrival control, approach control, desert control, radar supervisor, facility watch supervisor, on-the-job training instructor, team leader, flight planning chief, tower chief, radar chief, training and standardization, ATCS examiner, control tower examiner, operations duty officer, command training team, facilitator, CPR instructor, air field driving instructor, carrier air group in-briefer, controller-in-charge, air traffic manager.

MR. SCHLEEDE: Thank you very much. Mr. Wentworth will proceed. Please pause between some of the sentences so that the interpreters can keep up.

MR. WENTWORTH: Thank you. Good morning, Ms. Ewert.

THE WITNESS: Good morning.

MR. WENTWORTH: Based on your qualifications -- I heard you say both manager and controller, so you work as a controller at Guam International in addition to being manager of the facility?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: You maintain currency work on a daily basis?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: So you're considered a full performance level controller also?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Would you provide for us an overview of your training program and how it's administered?

THE WITNESS: We have a person come into the facility and they have to complete all the courses and take graded tests prior to getting on position. They do on-the-job training. At the completion or what we hope to be the completion FAA will send over a CTO examiner. They'll be observed and then certified by the FAA.

We continue periodic training, proficiency training as part of the program, which will includerefresher training, supplemental training that might come along.

MR. WENTWORTH: Are emergencies and procedures for those emergencies covered as part of your remedial or supplemental training?

THE WITNESS: It's covered under the refresher training.

MR. WENTWORTH: Under refresher. Can you tell me what the average experience or level of experience within the tower is?

THE WITNESS: Approximately 15 years average experience.

MR. WENTWORTH: And out of the -- what --what is the full staffing complement of the tower, please?

THE WITNESS: The full staffing now?

MR. WENTWORTH: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Seven.

MR. WENTWORTH: And out of that complement, how many have previous experience at Guam International or Agana when it was under the Navy?

THE WITNESS: The number of people that are there now?

MR. WENTWORTH: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Two.

MR. WENTWORTH: And -- but yet, at the time of the accident Mr. Theobald had previous experience at that facility?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay.

THE WITNESS: That would have made it three at the time.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did the staffing or the midnight shift on August 6th, did it conform to the contractual requirements of Barton ATC, the FAA, or both?

THE WITNESS: Both.

MR. WENTWORTH: Both. As a contract facility, to what standards do you provide service to what level?

THE WITNESS: We provide 'em in accordance with FAA and company policy.

MR. WENTWORTH: So, those regulations that are applicable to the FAA controllers also applicable to -- to you?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: As a VFR facility, how is D-BRITE radar display used?

THE WITNESS: How is it normally used out of the --

MR. WENTWORTH: Yes. How is it used --

THE WITNESS: -- tower?

MR. WENTWORTH: -- not at the tower itself, but how would it be used?

THE WITNESS: It would be used as an aid to the -- the VFR tower controller. A term that's commonly used is an extension of the eye so you can get a geographical idea of where, like, the aircraft might be.

MR. WENTWORTH: But you do not separate aircraft through the use of the D-BRITE, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: We still don't separate with them the D-BRITE. We -- it would still just be used as an advisory.

MR. WENTWORTH: The two displays that we've been talking about that are currently in the tower, are they commissioned today as we speak?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: If the system is not commissioned, why does the facility log the system in and out of service? I -- I know I had to conduct a review of your facility logs. I noticed that.

THE WITNESS: We log them in the facility to help the FAA AF maintain a history of the status of theequipment.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you provide us a history during your tenure at least of -- of the D-BRITE, please?

THE WITNESS: At the time that my company started working in the tower, there was a Navy brands in the tower, which is similar to the D-BRITE system. In October of '95 the Navy brands and all associated equipment was removed.

In January of '96 a remote display was installed. That is a display that is displayed up to the Anderson Air Force Control Tower.

In October of '96 there was a group of gentlemen that came out to do an overview for revamping of the control tower. I was told at that time that the D-BRITE system was going to be installed in Guam and that they even knew at that time already where they were going to be getting a system from.

In -- in February of '97 the D-BRITE system was transferred to the FAA.

In between November of '97 and January of '98 digital maps were delivered and it's installed at Agana FTC.

In December of '97 some testing and more software was installed.

In December of '97 the Agana FCT or traffic control personnel received training on the D-BRITE.

And at present FAA AF is continuing to evaluate and optimize the system. The D-BRITE is currently not commissioned or certified.

MR. WENTWORTH: In your view as a manager, does this seem to be an -- extraordinarily long time in getting the system commissioned?

THE WITNESS: Well, this is the first time that I've been a manager and been associated with the FAA, and it's -- it's been an educational time for me to learn how things work.

The duration, I'm not really sure on that. I don't -- I don't have experience with them within this system to say how long it's been.

MR. WENTWORTH: Have you been told when the system is expected to be commissioned?

THE WITNESS: The latest word I have is the end of March, April time frame of this year.

MR. WENTWORTH: Of '98?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. Have you started training your people on the system at this point?

THE WITNESS: We've already received our training and we've already taken our test and we'vealready received the results back from the test.

MR. WENTWORTH: Has -- have you learned what the status of the D-BRITE was on the morning of the accident?

THE WITNESS: It was not a usable piece of equipment.

MR. WENTWORTH: Okay. When this new system, this D-BRITE system is commissioned, will it have MSAW capability?

THE WITNESS: Would you please ask that question again?

MR. WENTWORTH: When the -- when the D-BRITE system is indeed commissioned, will it have MSAW capability? That is, the ability to provide both oral and visual alerts to the controller?

THE WITNESS: My understanding is it will not.

MR. WENTWORTH: Will the components that would allow these warnings to be issued, will they be present in the system?

THE WITNESS: My understanding is they will.

MR. WENTWORTH: But in essence, inhibited?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Now, is that just the oral or the visual portion?

THE WITNESS: I'm not --

MR. WENTWORTH: Or in total?

THE WITNESS: I'm -- I don't remember about the visual, but I -- the oral is what I remember for sure as being inhibited. I don't recall if the visual will be there or not.

MR. WENTWORTH: As the manager, do you believe that you should have that capability to receive both oral and visual?

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I missed the first part of your question.

MR. WENTWORTH: As the manager of the facility, do you believe that you should have the capability of receiving both oral and visual MSAW alerts?

THE WITNESS: My understanding is that FAA policy is that we will not receive oral.

MR. WENTWORTH: Earlier from Mr. Theobald we heard about the search-and-rescue line in the tower cab. And did Barton ATC or the Navy or if you can identify who requested that it be installed?

THE WITNESS: Barton did not request it. We had a similar line that was a Navy line when the Navy was there. That line was removed. I believe the line now is -- was installed by Guam Airport Authority, butI don't know as to what discussion or, you know, how that line came about, who decided to put the line in. I don't have that information.

MR. WENTWORTH: Therefore, you as a facility have no procedures for its use, formal procedures?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: With what frequency at the facility do power outages occur?

THE WITNESS: They happen quite often. Power outages or power hits. It's very common.

MR. WENTWORTH: And when you lose commercial power, what happens? Do you have back-up capability?

THE WITNESS: We have several different backup capabilities. Different components that we have has battery pack. We have a UPS system connected to several items in the tower. And the whole tower is on a generator back-up that is automatic. As soon as it -- we lose power that starts up.

MR. WENTWORTH: Within the facility who checks the tower clocks, the digital clocks?

THE WITNESS: The FAA AF.

MR. WENTWORTH: And how often is that conducted?

THE WITNESS: My understanding is it's done weekly.

MR. WENTWORTH: Is there a log to that effect?

THE WITNESS: Ask me that again?

MR. WENTWORTH: Is there a log kept to that effect that -- that -- that the check is made?

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

MR. WENTWORTH: Do you know from where the time source is derived?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: Can you tell me what that is?

THE WITNESS: It would either be from WWVH in Hawaii or the GPS clock from Guam Center.

MR. WENTWORTH: Who owns the equipment in the tower cab?

THE WITNESS: The FAA.

MR. WENTWORTH: And they're responsible for making sure that it operates correctly?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

MR. WENTWORTH: About what time were you notified of this accident? Do you recall?

THE WITNESS: Ask me that again?

MR. WENTWORTH: About what time were you notified of the accident?

THE WITNESS: Approximately 2:00 in the morning.

MR. WENTWORTH: And who were you notified by?

THE WITNESS: Mr. Theobald.

MR. WENTWORTH: And approximately how long did it take you to get to the facility?

THE WITNESS: Approximately 25 minutes.

MR. WENTWORTH: And what was going on at the tower cab when you arrived?

THE WITNESS: Mr. Theobald was busy working traffic. I can't recall exactly what type of traffic, but I know he was active at the time.

MR. WENTWORTH: Did you assist with any of the notifications?

THE WITNESS: I called -- yes, I verified that some people had been notified. I called CERAP to see if there was anything that they needed me to do, and then I went on from there and notified my company.

MR. WENTWORTH: Have any changes to procedures been made or are anticipated?

THE WITNESS: We've made an additional to our tape. When we change our tapes in the morning we do tape checks. With that we've added where we would tell the time that it is when we do it. That is with the crash phone, and that's at the request of the ramp control supervisor and airport rescue and fire-fighting -- fire chief to help them until they can come up withfurther procedures for times.

MR. WENTWORTH: Is there any procedure for the controller to call an entity other than the Airport Authority or the crash/fire/rescue station on the airport in the event of an off-base or off-airport accident?

THE WITNESS: No, sir. The procedure is the same.

MR. WENTWORTH: I have no further questions. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FRANCIS: KCAB?

MR. LEE: Thank you, Chairman.

(The following is a verbatim transcript of the English translation of Mr. Lee's questions posed in Korean and Ms. Ewert's responses in English.)

MR. LEE: Let me just ascertain two things. As of now do you -- staff size at your control center, Agana Control Tower -- to think it's appropriate staff size the contract between FAA and the Barton Company. If we have a chance to review the contract, would we be able to find out the staff size of the controller?

THE WITNESS: I -- that question. Can you please restate it?

MR. LEE: Yes, with respect to the operation of the control tower at the Guam Airport, I believethere is a contract with the FAA. What I'm wondering is the way there the size of the controller staff is also included under the provisions of the contract.

THE WITNESS: My understanding that it is.

MR. LEE: My understanding is that judging by reading of the report, it says that the s