On November 12, 2001, at approximately 9:16 a.m., American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus A-300-600R, crashed into a neighborhood in Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after taking off from Kennedy International Airport. The plane was on a scheduled flight to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. As depicted on [SLIDE 3], the vertical stabilizer and rudder were found in Jamaica Bay, about one mile from the main wreckage. The engines struck the ground several blocks north of the main wreckage and then the main wreckage impacted at the intersection of Newport and 131st Street, Belle Harbor, New York. All 260 persons aboard the plane died, as did 5 residents of Belle Harbor. I will be stepping through a timeline of events from takeoff until aircraft impact with the ground shortly.

Safety Board investigators from our Northeast Regional Office arrived shortly after the accident to coordinate NTSB activity with local authorities and secure perishable evidence. Later that day, a full team of 40 NTSB investigators and support staff arrived at the accident sight and began work in a dozen different specialties. Board Member George Black, former Chairman Marion Blakey, public relations personnel, and NTSB Transportation Disaster Assistance representatives accompanied the investigators. Other investigators simultaneously began background work on the accident back here in Washington. Because the aircraft involved in the accident was designed and built by Airbus, headquartered in France, and certified by the French government, the Bureau Enquetes Accidents (BEA), [Bureau D'enquetes et D'Analyses Pour La Securite de L'Aviation Civile] provided a French Accredited Representative and investigators to assist the investigation.

The Safety Board spent about one week at the accident site documenting the wreckage in situ. [SLIDE 7] depicts the accident site about two days after the accident. During this week, the engines were removed for future teardown examinations in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and the majority of the vertical stabilizer and rudder assemblies were recovered from the water under the final flightpath of Flight 587. These components were removed to an unused hangar at Floyd Bennet Field, close to the impact site, for initial visual examination. In addition, an NTSB aircraft performance engineer was dispatched to Toulouse, France to begin working with Airbus engineers on aerodynamic loads calculations.

To date, investigation activity has also been accomplished in Stade, Germany, where the vertical stabilizer was built, the NASA Langley, Hampton, Virginia, facility for composite material examination, the NASA Ames, Mountain View, California facility, home of the most sophisticated motion simulator in the world, Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico, the Ford Motor Company CAT scan facility in Detroit, Michigan, and the US Army Aberdeen Proving Ground CAT scan facility in Maryland.

Accident Sequence

Based on radar and flight data recorder (FDR) data, flight 587 took off approximately 101 seconds behind Japan Airlines flight 47, a Boeing 747. The FDR indicates that flight 587 encountered two wake vortices generated by JAL flight 47. The second wake encounter occurs about 10 seconds before the end of the FDR data. Following the second wake encounter, the aircraft responded to flight control inputs. Both wake encounters averaged about 0.1 G lateral (side to side) movement. During the last 8 seconds of FDR data, the plane experienced three stronger lateral movements, two to the right, and then one to the left. These lateral force excursions were consistent with rudder movements. The left pointing horizontal arrows on this slide show where the accident aircraft encountered the two wake vortexes. The right pointing arrows show the direction of travel of the vortices as they are carried by the wind. The vertical arrows show where the JAL 747 was by the time of the vortex encounters.

We can see the wake encounters on the vertical acceleration traces of the FDR [SLIDE 9]. Here is the first wake encounter. Here is the second wake encounter,[SLIDE 10] and here, on the rudder position trace [SLIDE 11], is where we believe the vertical stabilizer broke away from the airplane. Currently, it appears that the rudder was still attached at the time of the vertical stabilizer separation.

We now have three visual presentations to show you.

The presentations that follow depict the accident somewhat graphically, but not exceedingly so. If any family members wish to not see this material, we will pause for a moment to allow them to relocate.

A construction crew working at JFK with a video camera filmed the departures of both JAL flight 47 and American Airlines Flight 587. We can look at that video now.

[VIDEO]

Security cameras from the Metropolitan Tri-borough Bridge and Tunnel Authority at the Marine Parkway Bridge also recorded most of the accident sequence itself. This tape includes two simultaneous video clips of the accident airplane in the far distance. The clips have been time correlated by using surveying techniques and correlating position with radar data. The left clip shows the airplane flying through the frame from left to right. The right clip showed the airplane on a somewhat parabolic descent from left to right. Shortly thereafter, smoke was observed rising from the ground. We will show this video twice, once with a white circle around the very small image of the airplane, and again without the white circle. Based upon our correlation, we believe that the vertical stabilizer separated while the airplane is in view in the left clip. However, careful examination of the video in our laboratory revealed no images of an object or objects falling off the airplane. In the right clip, you will note a lighter color smear or smudge develop. The staff believes that this could be misting fuel, smoke, or even flame that spread from the airplane after the engines broke away from the wing. Again, we could find no images of anything falling off the aircraft.

[TOLL BOOTH VIDEOS]

Last, a video animation of the accident take off and loss of control about a minute and a half later, was completed by the Safety Board, and we will show it in a minute. The animation is based upon information derived from the flight data recorder.

Now, I need to brief you a bit on what you are going to see. [SLIDE 12] You will first note that we are superimposing selected wording from the CVR transcript and other items over the image of the airplane. These words only appear for a few seconds and will not impede the view of the airplane. A little lower, on the instrument panel portion of the animation you will see the time, altitude, and airspeed. The round object is an attitude indicator that will show you the pitch angle and how much the airplane is banked. To its right is the airplane's control wheel. Next to it is a vertical accelerometer that will tell you how heavy in the seat the pilots feel. A sliding triangle on the rudder pedal indicator tells you how much the rudder pedals are deflected, and the rudder surface indicator, along with the tail section depiction tells you how much the rudder itself is deflected. The red lines on the tail section depiction show the rudder limiter limits. You will see these red lines come closer together as the airspeed increases. Last, you will note a lateral acceleration indicator that indicates the amount of side-to-side forces that exist at any given moment.

We will first run the full animation in real time from taxi to the end. Keep in mind that the entire flight was only about a minute and a half long, and some events occur very rapidly, especially near the end of the animation. Also, the FDR quit working before the crash. The animation will stop at that point but the CVR text will continue to scroll. Then we will then run the final segment at ½ speed so you can better see the relative motion of the airplane and controls. And finally, we will run the final segment again in real time.

[ANIMATION]

I would now like to summarize the accident sequence of events, using a map of the New York area.

I would now like to describe some of the investigative activity that has been accomplished that will not be subjects of this public hearing. These subjects, for the most part, are no longer active areas of investigation because the staff believes that they are not associated with the reason this tragedy occurred. I must reemphasize however, that this public hearing is not the end of this investigation. Any area of inquiry can be reopened with sufficient reason, and we simply are not finished with our inquiries in several other areas.

Sabotage

Numerous criminal investigation agencies, led by the FBI, were immediately involved with the NTSB in careful examination of the recovered wreckage onscene. There was no evidence of high speed object impacts, supersonic gas washing, microparticle pitting, or explosive residue on any aircraft components, that would have been indicative of an onboard explosion. The Board also discovered no unusual indications on the flight data recorder or the cockpit voice recorder that would indicate foul play. And last, the sequence of events itself, as previously described, is not consistent with foul play.

Interviews with those associated with the ground operation of the flight were conducted. Passenger background checks were accomplished by the FBI and police. And, the efficiency of airport security measures was also examined by law enforcement authorities. In short, no evidence of sabotage was discovered by the Board or by law enforcement.

Weather at the time of the accident

At 0925 a.m., a special weather observation was taken that revealed the winds were out of 270 degrees at 8 knots velocity. The visibility 10 miles. A few clouds were present at 4,800 feet, and the temperature was about 42 degrees Fahrenheit . There was no indication of adverse weather.

Air traffic control activities

All air traffic control directions and clearances given to American Airlines Flight 587, and spacing between the flight and the preceding Japan Airlines Boeing 747 were in accordance with current FAA regulations and guidelines. The wake vortex encounter experienced by Flight 587 is a topic of this hearing.

The aircraft's engines

Teardowns of both engines and the auxiliary power unit at the American Airlines maintenance facility revealed no indications on either engine or the APU of uncontained failure, case rupture, in-flight fire, or preimpact malfunction.

In addition, the flight data recorder engine parameters revealed no anomalies. The staff therefore believes that the engines did not contribute to the cause of this accident.

Bogus or unauthorized aircraft parts

In late February of this year, investigators became aware of a group of apparently bogus aircraft components that were allegedly being shipped to the United States from Italy. However, no bogus parts were discovered to be associated with Flight 587.

Eyewitnesses

The Board has received about 350 accounts from eyewitnesses, either through direct interviews or through written statements. A summary of those statements has been previously been made public and the witness reports are available in the public docket.

A large number of witnesses reported seeing fire, either on the fuselage, at the engines, or at the wings. Some reported an explosion. Some saw no fire. Some saw the airplane wobbling, dipping or moving side to side. Many saw something separate.

Investigators believe that observations of fire and smoke are normal in an inflight event such as this. Flames, smoke, and misting fuel often occur as aircraft engines rip off the wing during situations such as this. In similar events in the past, the disruption of airflow into the engines also often cause loud bangs and large flames known collectively as compressor surges. In short, many of the statements we have received are quite consistent with the sequence of events that occurred.

Aircraft systems

To date, investigators have found no indications of any rudder system anomalies, but investigation in this area continues.

Aircraft structures

Structures investigators continue to look for preexisting damage on the vertical stabilizer. However, it must be noted that even if preexisting damage did exist on the accident airplane's vertical stabilizer, the stabilizer structure remained intact until the loads it sustained were very high.

The external aerodynamic loads and the internal loads calculations for the vertical stabilizer are a topic of this public hearing, but it should be noted that, the extensive loads calculations accomplished by Airbus and independently by the Safety Board revealed that the aerodynamic and internal loads that the vertical stabilizer experienced were significantly above the ultimate loads required by the French and American certification standards. In fact, the sustained loads were near the structural test loads demonstrated during the certification process.

Flight 587 maintenance records

All periodic maintenance examinations of the accident aircraft were on time and in accordance with current FAA guidelines. The last visual inspection of the vertical stabilizer and rudder was conducted on December 9, 1999 during a heavy maintenance check. Nothing unusual was noted during the visual inspection.

A review of the aircraft's maintenance log shows that on the morning of the accident, a pitch trim control and the yaw damper would not engage during a pre-flight check. The computer controlling those components was re-set by a mechanic, which resolved the problem. There were no open maintenance items regarding the vertical stabilizer and rudder system when the aircraft took off.

Flight Data Recorder problems

The analysis of the flight data recorder, a vital tool in accident investigation, was much more difficult than it needed to be, because signals for some FDR parameters on the accident aircraft were electronically "filtered" before they reached the flight recorder. As a result, the readings on the recorder show what the gauges were telling the pilots, not necessarily what was actually occurring on a real-time basis to the aircraft. In 1994, the Safety Board recommended to the FAA that such filtering systems be removed from information sent to flight data recorders, and yet in 2001 this investigation was hampered by totally unacceptable filtering of FDR data. In addition, the sample rates of data are not adequate. Staff and the Board are addressing these issues separate from this hearing.

NTSB recommendations

The Board has issued two recommendations to the FAA so far during this investigation. These two were considered so important that we could not wait until the conclusion of the investigation.

The two safety recommendations address the fact that many pilot training programs do not include information about the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes. Significantly, full rudder inputs even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed, may result in structural loads that exceed certification requirements. However, pilots may have the impression that the rudder limiter systems which limit rudder travel as airspeed increases to prevent a single full rudder input from overloading the structure, also prevent cyclic full rudder deflections from damaging the structure. This is not true. The structural certification requirements for transport-category airplanes do not take such maneuvers into account; therefore, such cyclic rudder inputs, even when a rudder limiter is in effect, can produce loads higher than those required for certification and that may exceed the structural capabilities of the aircraft.

Staff is continuing to evaluate whether the pilots caused the rudder to move or determine if a rudder system anomaly could have contributed to the movement. Regardless, staff believes that the rudder movement resulted in most, if not all, of the loads imposed on the vertical stabilizer.

Because of the lack of understanding of the certification requirements of the vertical stabilizer, the Board asked the FAA to require the manufacturers and operators to ensure that pilot training programs: (1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer; (2) explain that a full or nearly full rudder deflection in one direction followed by a full or nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction can result in potentially dangerous loads on the vertical stabilizer, and (3) explain that, on some aircraft, as speed increases, the maximum available rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light pedal forces and small pedal deflections.

Madam Chairman, this concludes my opening statement.