On November 4, 2009, approximately 1400 Central Standard Time, a twin-engine Hawker Beechcraft, 95-B55 Baron, N725GS, was substantially damaged during a forced landing following the loss of power from the right engine, shortly after takeoff. The private rated pilot, sole occupant, received serious injuries during the forced landing. The airplane was registered and operated by a private individual. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a flight plan was not filed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 flight. The flight was originating from the Brenham Municipal Airport (11R) at the time of the accident. Use your browsers 'back' function to return to synopsisReturn to Query Page
In an interview with the pilot, he stated that on a previous flight with the airplane, the exhaust gas temperature’s (EGT) red light would illuminate or flicker-on, while in cruise flight. The pilot then brought the airplane to the maintenance shop at 11R to determine and repair the problem. The accident occurred on the first flight after being released by the maintenance shop.
The pilot reported that he did an extended run-up prior to departure, and everything appeared normal. However, shortly after take-off, just as the airplane was going airborne, he noticed the right engine’s EGT light illuminate and fuel flow decrease to about 11 gallons-per-hour (gph). The airplane then started to yaw to the right. Unable to maintain altitude and airspeed while attempting to return to the airport, the pilot elected to conduct a forced landing in a field. The pilot commented that he “did not want to complicate matters by trying to raise the landing gear, or feather the prop.”
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, who responded to the site, reported that the airplane had plenty of fuel, and that it appeared consistent with 100LL aviation grade fuel. Additionally, the inspector noted that the airplane sustained heavy impact damage to the fuselage and wings. The airplane was then transported to a private hangar located at 11R. Prior to the airplane’s removal, an estimated 8-10 gallons of fuel from the left-wing fuel tank and about 52 gallons from the right-wing fuel tanks were drained from the airplane.
An examination of the aircraft wreckage was conducted by the NTSB Investigator-in-Charge (IIC), along with technical representatives from the airframe and engine manufacturers, at 11R on November 12-13, 2009.
The airplane was sitting on its belly on a flatbed trailer; its landing gear had been torn off during the forced landing. The landing gear selector was found in the down (extended) position. The retraction gearbox bellcrank and landing gear push rods positions were consistent with the gear down position. The bottom part of the fuselage was buckled, including the front nose section of the airframe. Both left and right wings, including flaps, were either buckled or distorted. Additionally, a section of the left horizontal stab’s leading edge displayed impact damage consistent with an object. The flaps appeared in the retracted (up) position and neither propeller was feathered. The left crossfeed fuel-line was compromised during the accident, allowing fuel to drain from the left side fuel tanks. Control continuity was established to each of the flight control surfaces. The fuel line strainers and engine “finger” screens were in good condition and free of any contamination. Shop air was blown into the lines to test the fuel lines and selectors from the engine (left and right sides) to the fuel tanks and the fuel tank vent lines. The fuel selectors were found in the OFF position. The fuel selectors were then actuated from OFF to ON and to the CROSSFEED positions; each position had “positive” detent engagement and appeared to functional normally. The actual positions of the fuel selectors were not documented at the accident site, prior to the airplane’s removal.
A review of the airplane’s maintenance records revealed that on June 10, 2009, the right aft fuel cell was replaced, along with maintenance work on the right tip tank fuel pump and switch. Log book entries on September 3 and October 2, 2009, disclosed that the right forward fuel cell was replaced; the fuel divider diaphragms on both engines were replaced and both fuel screens were cleaned. Additional items included: changing engine oil and filter, right-side alternator belt, and the right-side propeller accumulator. A fuel receipt dated October 2, 2009, revealed the airplane was filled with 40 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel at 11R.
The visual examination of both engines, revealed no apparent pre-impact abnormalities.
The right and left engines were then removed from the airframe and sent to Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) engine test facility, in Mobile, Alabama. On December 1-2, 2009, the engines were examined under the supervision of the FAA, technical representatives from (TCM), and the Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC).
In order to run each engine, several components on both engines were either replaced or removed. Those items mainly consisted of the engine mounts, induction balance tube, and oil pressure screen and sumps. Each engine, separately, was cycled through the engine test cell. Prior to starting the run, the engines were fitted with a test propeller. Each engine was started and then run for several minutes at various power (idle to full) settings. During the tests, both left and right engines were able to produce rated horsepower, without hesitation or interruption.
A reason for the loss of engine power was not found.
A review of the airplane’s Pilots Operating Handbook (POH) emergency procedures section; Engine failure after lift-off and in-flight reads, in part;
1. Landing Gear and Flaps – Up
2. Throttle (inoperative engine) – Closed
3. Propeller (inoperative engine) – Feather
4. Power (operative engine) – As Required
5. Airspeed – Maintain speed at engine failure (100 knots, Max), until obstacles are cleared
Note: The most important aspect of engine failure is the necessity to maintain lateral and directional control. If airspeed is below 78 knots, reduce power on the operative engine as required to maintain control.
At the time this report was submitted, the pilot had not returned a completed NTSB Form 6120.1, (The Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report), as requested.