HISTORY OF FLIGHT Use your browsers 'back' function to return to synopsisReturn to Query Page
On October 27, 2006, at 1216 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N969ES, registered to a private owner, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, collided with trees while maneuvering in the vicinity of Statesville Regional Airport, Statesville, North Carolina. The pilot had been cleared by air traffic control (ATC) for an instrument landing system approach (ILS) to runway 28. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight plan (IFR) was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The private pilot and one passenger received serious injuries. Two passengers were fatally injured. The flight originated from North Palm Beach County General Aviation Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida, on October 27, 2006, at 0900. The flight was en route to a visual flight rules (VFR) airfield, located at Lake Norman Airpark, Mooresville, North Carolina. The pilot diverted to Statesville, North Carolina, due to weather.
Review of transcripts revealed the pilot contacted Charlotte Approach control at 1134 and requested the weather at Charlotte. The controller advised the pilot the weather was 600 broken,1200 overcast, visibility one and half miles. The pilot asked the controller what the weather was at his destination airport. The controller informed the pilot the weather at Concord Airport ten to 15 miles from his destination was 200 overcast, 2 miles visibility, and mist. The pilot asked the controller to change his destination to Statesville. The controller approved the request, and provided the pilot with radar vectors to Statesville. The controller informed the pilot he was number 4 for the approach, and advised the pilot the displaced threshold to runway 28 was 2,000 feet. In addition, the controller informed the pilot that the airplane ahead of him reported breaking out of the clouds 50 feet above minimums. The pilot acknowledged the transmission. At 1203, the controller informed the pilot he was 7 miles from Pegte intersection, maintain 3,000 feet until established on the final approach course, and the pilot was cleared for the ILS runway 28 approach. The pilot acknowledged the clearance at 1206, and there were no further recorded transmissions with the pilot.
The pilot stated he received a full weather briefing from St. Petersburg, Florida, Lockheed-Martin Automated Flight Service Station for a weather briefing for the IFR flight to Mooresville, North Carolina. The weather was forecasted to be VFR upon his arrival. The ceiling was forecasted to be between 2,500 to 3,000 feet with rain showers and was not forecasted to decrease until between 1430 to 1500. The pilot stated he did not get any en-route weather updates. Before departing the pilot briefed the passengers on the emergency exits, use of restraint systems, and the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS); however the pilot did not remove the safety pin on the CAPS before departing or during the flight. Upon arrival in the Charlotte area , the pilot stated he was handed off by ATC to Charlotte approach control, and he was instructed to descend. During the descent the pilot realized the weather at his destination airport may not be VFR. He requested permission from the controller to divert to Statesville. The controller approved his request and provided radar vectors to the ILS runway 28 final approach course. The pilot stated he was flying the airplane with the autopilot, and performed the before landing checks. The pilot extended the flaps to 50 percent and ultimately to 100 percent. The pilot stated he was not cleared by the controller for a circling approach or issued alternate missed approach procedures. The pilot remembered descending below the clouds on the approach, but could not remember any other events associated with the accident.
Witness stated the airplane was observed on approach for runway 28 at Statesville Regional Airport. The airplane came out of the clouds in the vicinity of taxiway D and continued over the runway to taxiway F. An increase in engine power was heard and the airplane started a right turn and entered the clouds. The airplane was heard north of the airport and was observed again on the south side of the runway traveling from southeast to the northwest located just below the clouds, and crossed runway 28. The airplane entered the clouds and came out of the clouds north of Aviation Drive. The witnesses observed the airplane make a sharp bank to the right estimated at a 45-degree angle of bank followed by a 45-degree left bank. The nose of the airplane was observed to pitch down and the airplane collided with trees and the ground.
Review of information on file with the FAA Airman's Certification Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed the pilot was issued a private pilot certificate on June 20, 2003, with ratings for airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane. The pilot held a third class medical certificate issued on December 1, 2005, with the restriction "must have available glasses for near vision."
The pilot attended Cirrus SR22 flight training contracted out to Wings Aloft by Cirrus Design from September 4, 2001, through September 7, 2001. The pilot received 7 hours of ground school and 8.7 hours of dual instruction. The curriculum called for 5 hours of ground school and 7.75 hours of dual instruction including 1.5 hours for the final flight evaluation. The pilot did not receive a final evaluation flight and was not awarded a completion certificate. The instructor pilot noted in his daily notes on September 8, 2006, "the pilot did not fly consistently to the performance standards. The pilot was behind the airplane and general finesse was lacking." The pilot's insurance company did not require a factory sign off. The pilots stated he received additional flight instruction after returning home from his flight instructor who attended the SR22 training with him.
Review of the pilot's logbook revealed he has 717 total hours not including 3 hour and 16 minutes on the accident flight. The pilot has recorded 501 total flight hours in the SR22 of which 14 hours has been flown in the last 90 days and 5 hours has been flown in the last 30 days. The pilots last flight review and instrument proficiency check was conducted on June 25, 2005. The pilot's last recorded instrument flight was on June 26, 2006, and he has accumulated 51 hours of actual instrument flight time. The pilot has logged 92 hours of simulated instrument flight time. The pilot's last recorded flight was on October 18, 2006, in a Piper PA31. The pilot's last recorded flight in the SR22 before the accident flight was on October 4, 2006. The pilot's last recorded instrument approaches before the accident was on May 1, 2006, with a certified flight instructor.
Further review of the pilot's logbook revealed in the previous 12-month period before the accident, the pilot had logged 8.0 hours of actual instrument flight time, and 3.8 hours of simulated instrument flight time. The simulated instrument flight time included 1.8 hours with an instructor, and 2.0 hours of simulated instrument flight time as PIC, however, no safety pilot was noted in the remarks section of the logbook. In addition, the pilot had logged 7 instrument approaches. Six approaches were logged during 1.8 hours of simulated instrument flight with a flight instructor. The remaining approach did not indicate in the logbook if the pilot flew in instrument or simulated flight conditions. In addition, the logbook did not reflect the type of approach that was flown. Logbook entries revealed the pilot flew 3 solo instrument approaches. One approach was flown on July 2, 2003, January 25, 2005, and the last approach was flown on June 2, 2006. None of the flights indicated if the flights were flown in instrument or simulated instrument flight conditions, and the type of approach flown was not identified.
Review of the Cirrus Design records revealed the pilot purchased the airplane from Cirrus Design on September 4, 2001.The last recorded annual inspection was conducted on July 14, 2006, at Hobbs time 577.4. The Hobbs time at the crash site was 598.3 hours. The airplane has flown 20.9 hours since the annual inspection. The altimeter, static pressure system, and transponder tests were completed on June 8, 2005. Examination of the gyro instruments revealed no anomalies. The airplane was topped off with 42.7 gallons of 100 low lead fuel at Landmark Aviation, North Palm Beach County General Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida, on October 27, 2006.
Review of the approach chart for the "ILS or LOC/DME RWY 28 Statesville Regional Airport (SVH)" revealed the minimums for the approach is decision height 1,166 feet, and 3/4 mile visibility. The airport elevation is 968 feet and the touchdown elevation is 966 feet. The weather at the time of the accident was 300 feet overcast with a visibility of 1 1/2 mile. The missed approach procedure requires the pilot to climb to 1,700 feet, followed by a climbing left turn to 3,400 feet on a heading of 080-degrees until intercepting the Charlotte 024 radial to PEGTE intersection and the Statesville 12.2 DME and hold. The minimums for the circling approach is decision height 1,420 feet and 1 mile visibility.
The NWS Surface Analysis Chart at 1100 depicted the general synoptic conditions prior to the accident. The chart depicted a low-pressure system with a central sea level pressure of 998-hectopascal (hPa) over the Arkansas and Tennessee border, with an occluded front extending south-southeast through Tennessee to Mississippi, where the triple point was located. A cold front extended to the south-southwest from this point across Mississippi, eastern Louisiana, into the Gulf of Mexico. A warm front extended from the triple point, eastward across Mississippi, southern Alabama and Georgia, and then northeastward along the South Carolina coast. The accident site was located north of the warm front, and ahead or to the east of the occluded front in the cool air mass sector.
The regional NWS Surface Analysis Chart at 1100 depicted a warm front along the Georgia, and Carolina coasts. The station models across eastern Georgia, South Carolina, and western and central North Carolina, and eastern Tennessee indicated continuous light to moderate rain, fog, and overcast skies. The closest station model from Charlotte, North Carolina, to the south of the accident site indicated a wind from the east at 5 knots, continuous rain, overcast sky cover, temperature of 52-degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point temperature of 50 degrees F.
The NWS regional radar mosaic chart at 1212 depicted a large area of echoes associated with rain showers extending over Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, eastern Tennessee, and Kentucky.
The accident occurred at the Statesville Regional Airport (KSVH), at an elevation of 968 feet msl, located 9 miles north-northwest of Lake Norman Airpark. The airport was equipped with an Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS-3) and reported the following conditions surrounding the time of the accident:
KSVH 1201, automated observation was, wind from 040 degrees at 3 knots, visibility 1 1/4 miles in light rain, ceiling overcast at 300 feet, temperature and dew point 46-degrees F, and altimeter 30.01 inches of Mercury (Hg).
The Piedmont Triad International Airport, Greensboro, North Carolina, located 53 miles south west of Statesville wind profile indicated light surface winds, with winds from the south-southwest slowly veering to the west through 500-hPa with wind speeds increasing to 35 knots. The maximum wind was identified at below the tropopause at 43,750 feet with wind from 265 degrees at 117 knots. No strong vertical wind shears were identified below 18,000 feet. The sounding data supported low stratiform clouds. No strong vertical wind shears were identified in the sounding.
The Geostationary Operations Environmental Satellite number 12 (GOES-12) data was obtained from the NOAA's Comprehensive Large Array-data Stewart System (CLASS) and displayed on the National Transportation Safety Board's Man-computer Interactive Data Access System (McIDAS) workstation. The GOES-12 infrared and visible satellite imagery depicted an extensive area of stratiform clouds extending over the region. No cumulonimbus clouds or thunderstorms were identified in the vicinity of the accident site.
The closest NWS Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) was Roanoke, Virginia. The 1214 base reflectivity image depicted echoes ranging from 5 to 30 dbz or light intensity echoes extending over the region, with echoes of 5 to 10 dbz over the accident site.
The following pilot reports (PIREPs) were recorded over North Carolina surrounding the time of the accident. The reports are in standard format, but in narrative form, versus standard code and abbreviations. The reports are as follows:
Raleigh-Durham (RDU) routine pilot report (UA); Over - 35 miles southwest of RDU; Time - 0953; Flight level - 11,000 feet; Type aircraft - Boeing 737 airliner (B737); Weather - moderate rain; Turbulence - negative (smooth); Remarks - instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
Greensboro (GSO) routine pilot report (UA); Over - 1 mile northeast of GSO; Time - 1201; Flight level - 400 feet; Type aircraft - British Aerospace (H25B) business jet; Remarks - cloud bases at 400 feet.
Raleigh-Durham (RDU) routine pilot report (UA); Over - Sand Hills (SDZ); Time - 1301; Flight level - 5,000 feet; Type aircraft - Cirrus (SR22) high performance single engine airplane; Temperature - 9 degrees C; Wind - 193 degrees at 17 knots; Icing - negative; Remarks - instrument meteorological conditions with a smooth ride.
Charlotte (CLT) routine pilot report (UA); Over - route between CLT to Knoxville, TN (TYS); Time - 1352; Flight level - 22,000 feet; type aircraft - Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ2) multiengine commuter aircraft; Icing - negative; Remarks - instrument meteorological conditions encountered the entire trip.
All the pilot reports were from pilots operating on IFR flight plans and indicated icing conditions above 13,000 feet, extensive cloud layers, with IMC conditions.
The NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC) located in Kansas City, Missouri, issues the area forecasts at regular intervals and issues specials reports as necessary usually in the form of an AIRMET. The synoptic section of the forecast indicated that a strong low-pressure system was moving northeastward and was expected to be in central Kentucky by 2300. A warm front extended across southern Georgia was expected to lift northeastward into southern North Carolina and extreme northern South Carolina by 2300.
The forecast for the North Carolina Piedmont was for broken clouds at 5,000 feet msl, overcast at 10,000 feet, with tops to 25,000 feet, with occasional light rain developing. From 2300, overcast at 2,500 feet with visibility 3 to 5 miles in light rain and mist. From 1300, overcast clouds at 1,500 feet, visibility 3 to 5 miles in light to moderate rain and mist, with widely embedded thunderstorms developing with cumulonimbus cloud tops to 40,000 feet.
The NWS had a full series of Airman's Meteorological Information (AIRMETs) issued at 0945 and current until 1600 for the region for IFR, mountain obscuration, turbulence, and icing conditions, and the accident site was located within the borders of these advisories.
AIRMET Sierra update 2 issued at 0945for IFR and mountain obscuration conditions, valid until 1600. Occasional ceilings below 1,000 feet and/or visibility below 3 miles in precipitation and mist, conditions. Mountains occasional obscured by clouds, precipitation, and mist, with conditions continuing beyond 2000 through 2200.
The closest Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) to the accident site was from Hickory Regional Airport (KHKY) located approximately 20 miles west of the accident site. However, no forecast was current when the pilot of N969ES obtained his preflight weather briefing. The forecast current at the time of the accident was issued at 1116 and was the fourth amendment from the initial 0749 issued forecast
The forecast for KHKY indicated from 1100, winds calm, visibility 2 miles in light rain and mist, ceiling broken at 900 feet, overcast at 2,800 feet, temporary conditions between 1100 and 1300 of visibility 3 miles in light rain and mist, scattered clouds at 800 feet, ceiling overcast at 2,500 feet. From 1300 through 2000, winds from 070 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 2 miles in moderate rain and mist, ceiling overcast at 400 feet.
The next closest TAF location was for Charlotte/Douglas International Airport (KCLT) located approximately 30 miles south of the accident site. The forecast available to the pilot of N969ES at the time of his filing his IFR flight plan was issued at 0127 and was for the following conditions:
From 1200, winds 070-degrees at 6 knots, visibility 5 statute miles, light rain and mist, ceiling overcast at 1,000 feet.
The next scheduled forecast was issued at 0713, with little change:
From 1100, winds 050-degrees at 5 knots, visibility better than 6 statue miles, in light rain, ceiling overcast at 2,500 feet.
From 1300, winds 060-degrees at 6 knots, visibility 5 statue miles, in light rain and mist, ceiling overcast at 1,200 feet.
A series of amendments were issued. The forecast at 0909 was:
From 1100, winds 050-degrees at 5 knots, visibility 5 statue miles, in light rain and mist, ceiling overcast at 1,200 feet.
From 1500, winds 070-degrees at 8 knots, visibility 2 statue miles, in moderate rain and mist, ceiling overcast at 400 feet.
The forecast at 1026 was:
From 1200, winds 070-degrees at 8 knots, visibility 2 statue miles, in moderate rain and mist, ceiling overcast at 400 feet.
The forecast at 1131 and current at the time of the accident was:
Issued at 1131, from 1200, winds 100-degrees at 5 knots, visibility 11/2 miles, in light rain and mist, ceiling overcast at 400 feet. Temporarily between 1200 to 1600, visibility 2 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 700 feet.
The pilot of N969ES filed an instrument flight plan and then obtained an abbreviated weather briefing from the St. Petersburg Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) between 0649 and 0659. The pilot did not list an alternate airport.
The briefer used the Charlotte/Douglas International Airport (KCLT) terminal forecast (issued at 0127), which expected MVFR conditions until 1200, then IFR conditions with visibility 2 miles in moderate rain, with ceilings overcast at 500 feet. The pilot acknowledged the briefer and indicated "we should be down by noon, if nothing goes wrong and we should be good".
There were no reports of the pilot of N969ES getting any updates from the FAA's enroute flight advisory service (EFAS).
The main wreckage of the airplane was located in a wooded area adjacent to Statesville Regional Airport, Statesville, North Carolina, north of Aviation Drive in a ravine on an embankment. Examination of the crash site revealed the airplane collided with 75 foot tree tops in a nose down, left wing low attitude. The airplane continued through the trees on a heading of 116-degrees magnetic, and came to rest on a heading of 174-degrees magnetic at an elevation of 908 feet. The crash debris line was 166 feet long.
The upper and lower engine cowling separated from the airframe. The engine separated from the firewall and was located to the right in front of the right wing. The right aft engine mount leg and the left forward and aft engine mount legs were separated. The forward right engine mount assembly separated from the forward isolation mount. All engine accessories remained attached to the engine except for the oil cooler and the stand by generator. The nose landing gear wheel was separated from the nose gear assembly.
The propeller assembly remained attached to the propeller crankshaft flange. The propeller spinner was crushed and the propeller bulkhead was damaged. Rotational scratching was present on the spinner. All propeller blades remained attached to their propeller hubs. One propeller blade was bent forward at mid span and twisted. The outboard 2-inches of the propeller tip was curled forward toward the cambered side. Chord wise scratching was present on the cambered side of the propeller blade with 45-degree scratches. The outboard 10-inches of the propeller blade leading edge was polished. Another propeller blade outboard 10-inches of the propeller blade was twisted. The outboard 3-inches of the propeller blade had separated and was not located. Chord wise scarring was present on the trailing edge of the cambered side of the propeller blade, and 45-degree scratching was present at mid span on the propeller blade. The remaining propeller blade outboard 4-inches of the propeller blade tip was separated and twisting was present at the separation. Chord wise scarring and 45 degree scratching was present on the cambered side of the propeller blade.
The cabin area was intact from the firewall extending aft to the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) compartment. The windshield was broken out of the fuselage, the rear baggage compartment window, and right side window was broken. The left side cabin window was not damaged. The left baggage compartment door was locked. The cabin roof was cracked and compressed inward and outward on the right side of the fuselage. The right "a" pillar was separated. Both cabin doors were separated. Scaring was present on the right side of the cabin roof aft of the right cabin door extending rearward to the CAPS compartment. The CAPS strap covers were debonded from the left and right side of the fuselage.
The CAPS safety pin was located under the right front seat and the system had not been activated. Cirrus personnel cut the CAPS cable at the fuselage station bulkhead at the aft baggage compartment. Examination of the CAPS cover revealed no impact marks. The parachute enclosure was separated from CAPS bulkhead. The CAPS pick up collar was separated from the launch tube. The CAPS rocket motor flangeable mounting screws were severed. The CAPS rocket motor was displaced in the launch tube.
The aileron and roll trim system cable continuity was confirmed throughout the cabin floor aft to the rudder interconnect, and along the fuselage longerons to the kick out pulleys to the left and right aileron activation pulleys. The elevator cable continuity was confirmed from the control yoke to a pulley selector on the elevator torque tube, to a single cable to the forward pulley gang, through the elevator pulley gang to the elevator empennage bell crank. The rudder pedal cable continuity was confirmed from the rudder pedal torque tube to the forward pulley gang, to a single cable system routed under the cabin floor to the rudder interconnect, through the elevator pulley gang to the rudder bell crank. The rudder activation pulley push pull rod was attached to the rudder bell crank and rudder.
The right wing was attached to the fuselage at the spar tunnel. The spar was fractured on its face from the right tip inboard 13 feet. The upper and lower right wing skins were debonded, fractured and separated. The right wing tip remained attached to a five-foot section of the right upper and lower wing skin. The flap was separated from all three-hinge points and was buckled downward at the mid hinge point. The flap actuator was extended 1-inch which indicates 100 percent flap extension. The flap switch in the cockpit indicated zero. The right aileron remained attached at the outboard and inboard hinge points. The right flap actuation arm was disengaged from the right actuation pulley. The right main fuel tank was ruptured and the fuel cap was intact with a tight seal. The right collector tank was ruptured. The right main landing gear remained attached to the wing.
The empennage was separated from the fuselage aft of the CAPS compartment. The horizontal stabilizer was fractured from the fuselage at the bond line. The right elevator separated at the outboard hinge point and the counter balance weight was attached. The left elevator remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer and the counter balance weight was attached. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the top of the rudder was bent to the right.
The left wing was attached to the fuselage at the spar tunnel. The spar was fractured on its face from the left tip inboard 4½ feet. The outboard 4 feet of the upper and lower wing skins were debonded, fractured, and separated. The left wing tip was separated and was located in a tree near the initial impact point. The leading edge of the left wing was damaged 2 feet outboard of the wing root and at the wing cuff. The flap was damaged at the midspan attachment point and remained attached at all hinge points. The left aileron was separated and the aileron actuation arm remained attached to the aileron. The left main fuel tank was ruptured and the fuel cap was intact with a tight seal. The left collector tank was ruptured. The left main landing gear remained attached to the wing.
Examination of the engine revealed the left and right engine exhaust tubes were damaged. The starter was damaged, and the starter adapter was intact and the mount was not damaged. The alternator was attached to the engine and damaged. The rear auxiliary generator was separated and damaged. The oil sump was damaged and leaking oil. The oil filter was removed, cut open, and no foreign objects were present. All cylinders were intact. Cylinders No. 1, No. 3, No. 5, and No. 4 received fin damage. The magnetos, fuel manifold valve, fuel injection lines, and fuel nozzles were intact and not damaged. The ignition harness was damaged.
The upper spark plugs were removed. The electrodes were "normal" when compared to the Champion Aviation Check-A- Plug Chart. Thumb compression and suction was obtained on all cylinders when the propeller flange was rotated by hand, and valve and gear train continuity was confirmed. The magneto to engine timing was checked and verified at 22 degrees before top dead center. The magnetos were turned by hand, spark was obtained at all ignition towers, and the impulse coupling snapped. The safety wire and lead seal was intact on the fuel manifold. The fuel manifold was removed, disassembled, and examined. The fuel manifold valve screen was free of debris, and fuel was present. The fuel manifold diaphragm and spring were intact and not damaged. The engine driven fuel pump was damaged, and fuel was present in the fuel to the fuel control body unit. The fuel pump drive coupling was intact, and the fuel pump drive shaft rotated freely by hand. The propeller governor was removed and was not damaged. The propeller governor drive shaft rotated freely. The propeller governor mounting gasket screen was removed and no debris was present. The fuel control throttle plate shaft was damaged. The throttle plate moved freely by hand and fuel was present in all fuel lines. The fuel injector nozzles were removed and were free of contaminants.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The pilot and one passenger were transported to Baptist Hospital in Winston Salem, North Carolina, with serious injuries. No toxicology testing was ordered by the North Carolina Highway Patrol on the pilot. A subpoena was issued on November 30, 2006, by the NTSB to Wake Forrest University Baptist Medical Center, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for any and all blood and urine samples taken from the pilot. The Forensic Toxicology Research Section, Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma performed testing on the specimens received from Wake Forrest University Baptist Medical Center. Carbon monoxide, cyanide, and ethanol testing was not performed. The results were negative for basic, acidic, and neutral drugs.
The Piedmont Pathology Association, Medical Examiner, Hickory, North Carolina, issued a certificate of death on the two passengers on October 27, 2006. The cause of death was "multiple trauma." No toxicological samples were requested.
The FAA conducted a flight check of the Statesville Regional Airport ILS runway 28 on October 28, 2006, and the instrument landing system was found within tolerance.
Review of the Cirrus Design, Normal Checklist states on page N9, "BALKED LANDING/GO AROUND" requires the pilot to set the flaps at 50 percent, airspeed between 75 to 80 KIAS until clear of obstacles, and then raise the flaps to 0 percent. The flaps at the crash site were at 100 percent.
Review of the Cirrus Pilot Operating Handbook, Section V, Stall Speeds, page 5-16, figure 5-7 indicates at an operating weight of 3,400 pounds, flaps down; the airplane will stall at 59 KIAS or KCAS.
The pilot's logbook was released to the custody of the registered owners attorney on November 7, 2006. The airplane logbooks were released to the custody of the registered owners attorney on November 15, 2006. The airplane and gyro instruments retained by the NTSB were released to Atlanta Air Recovery on January 7, 2007.
"THIS NARRATIVE WAS MODIFIED ON 2/16/2007"