On June 25, 2006, about 1630 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna T210M, N761GW, experienced a loss of engine power and collided with terrain while departing from Hayward Executive Airport, Hayward, California. Aerial Advertising Services was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The commercial pilot, who owned Aerial Advertising Services, was not injured; the airplane sustained substantial damaged. The personal local flight was originating at the time of the accident and was destined for the Livermore Municipal Airport, Livermore, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan had not been filed.

The pilot was involved in another mishap (LAX06LA213) about 4 hours prior to the accident flight, which occurred in the same airplane. The previous accident occurred when the passenger egressed the airplane and was struck by the propeller. The pilot canceled all of Aerial Advertising Service's flight operations for the day, but planned for the airplanes positioned in Hayward (including the accident airplane) to be flown to the operator's home base in Livermore.

During a telephone interview with a National Transportation Safety Board investigator, the pilot stated that following the prior incident, the airplane was inspected for damage. Accompanied by two Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certificated airframe and powerplant (A&P) mechanics, the pilot visually inspected the engine and propeller. All three men came to the agreement that the airplane did not incur any damage and was therefore in an airworthy condition. He noted that during the previous mishap the propeller did not stop and the engine revolutions per minute (rpm) did not lag or slow. Based on this observation and no visible airplane damage, the pilot opted to fly the airplane to Livermore.

The pilot further stated that prior to departure, he completed a thorough engine run, noting no anomalies on the cockpit gauges. After being cleared for takeoff, the pilot began the departure roll on runway 28L. When the airplane reached about 300 feet above ground level (agl) the pilot retracted the landing gear. Simultaneous with the landing gear locking into the up position, the engine experienced a loss of power. The pilot maneuvered the airplane to a golf course adjacent to the end of the runway and prepared for a forced landing. The airplane impacted a berm and subsequently collided with trees.


According to the FAA Airman and Medical records files, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane ratings for single engine land and instrument flight. The pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate on March 20, 2006, with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses.

In a written statement, the pilot reported his flight time as 1,861 hours total flight experience, of which 687 hours were flown in the same make and model as the accident airplane.

The pilot added that he frequently departed from Hayward and has had no prior problems with the airplane operating out of that airport.


The Cessna T210M, serial number 21062255, was manufactured in 1977. According to the recording Hobbs meter in the cockpit, it had accumulated a total time in service of 1102.3 hours. The pilot reported that the most recent annual inspection of the airframe and engine was performed on January 06, 2006, corresponding to 31.5 flight hours prior to the accident. The pilot additionally reported that the Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-520-R engine, serial number 294309-R12, had accumulated a total time of 3190.2 hours, and 374.1 hours since last major overhaul.

The gravity fed fuel system is designed for fuel to flow from both of the integral wing tanks through a fuel line, until reaching two separate reservoir tanks (located under the cockpit area). The fuel continues from the reservoir tanks to a fuel selector value, which the pilot can manipulate via a lever inside the cockpit (the lever is connected to the selector by means of a single shaft). The fuel selector positions are as follows: LEFT ON, OFF, and RIGHT ON; when moving to either tank, the selector passes through the OFF position. The fuel will continue to flow through a strainer to the engine driven fuel pump, bypassing the auxiliary fuel pump (when it is not in operation). The fuel will then be pumped to the air/fuel control-metering unit and directed to the spider valve where it is evenly dispersed into each cylinder through a fuel injection nozzle.

The airplane's two wings tanks held 45 gallons of fuel and the total usable fuel capacity of the airplane was 89 gallons. The pilot noted that prior to departure the airplane contained about 40 gallons of fuel in the left wing tank and 30 gallons of fuel in the right wing tank. He did not have the fuel boost pump on during the takeoff, nor did he have time to activate it after the engine quit.


Following recovery, the airplane was examined under the supervision of a National Transportation Safety Board investigator at the Hayward Airport on July 27, 2006. Present in the investigation were technical representatives from both Cessna Aircraft Company and Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM).

The fuel tanks were breached from damage incurred during the accident; no fuel was present. Investigators established fuel line continuity from the wing root to the firewall by applying air pressure to the left line located in the wing root and positioning the fuel selector to the left fuel tank. Pressurized air, accompanied with trace amounts of fuel, was observed to egress out of the fuel line near the firewall. The same results were observed with the right fuel line. The engine-driven fuel pump was removed and hooked up to an electric drill with an ample supply of water near the input. When energizing the drill, investigators observed it pump the water through the outlet.

The engine was intact with no visible external damage. A teardown examination was performed during which all cylinders, pistons, and accessories were removed and inspected.

Investigators established continuity on the throttle and mixture control cables by manipulating the respective lever inside the cockpit and confirming the control arm travel to each stop. The fuel injector nozzles remained secured in their respective cylinders and were internally clean from contaminates and debris. The upper air deck tubing was clear and mounted securely to the injector nozzles. The fuel screen in the throttle body fuel control unit was found to have debris consistent with that of a rubber substance; the contaminant measured under 0.5 inches long and the width was about 0.1 inches.

Investigators achieved manual rotation of the crankshaft by turning the crankshaft flange. Thumb compression was established in all cylinders. Valve train continuity was observed, with equal lift action at each rocker assembly; oil was found in the rocker box areas on all cylinders. The fuel manifold was removed and disassembled; the diaphragm was intact and the screen was clean of debris.

Removal of the cylinders revealed no evidence of internal stress inside the crankcase. The cylinder combustion chamber had very light combustion deposits, and the intake and exhaust valves were unremarkable; the cylinder wall did not display any scoring or evidence of heat distress. The accompanying piston was intact and moved freely on the securely attached pin. The internal cylinder domes and piston crowns exhibited similar combustion deposits and coloration. A crystallized white residue was noted on the piston faces which looked akin to a snowflake pattern, which a TCM representative said was consistent with aluminum corrosion. The piston rings were intact and moved freely. The valves and guides were examined and no evidence of material transfer was visually apparent. The push rods were removed and found to be intact with no bends.

The crankcase halves were separated revealing the internal components of the engine. The crankshaft and camshaft were intact with no anomalies were noted. The cam follower faces displayed little wear and were all similar in appearance.

The magnetos were removed and examined by investigators. Upon manual rotation a spark was produced at each post; the impulse coupling was heard upon each turn. The spark plugs were examined; no mechanical damage was noted and the electrodes and posts exhibited a light ash gray coloration, with trace amounts of oil on the surface. The TCM representative stated that the combustion signatures on the spark plugs were consistent to normal operation and wear.

No foreign objects were in the oil pans and screens. The induction and exhaustion systems were examined, and no evidence of blockage was found. There was no evidence of exhaust leakage.

The turbocharger remained secured to the engine on its respective mounting pad. Removal and partial disassembly of the turbocharger revealed an oily film on the compressor back plate adjacent the compressor wheel. The shroud of the compressor housing that surrounds the compressor wheel, was clean with no scoring evident on the interior surfaces. Both the compressor and turbine wheels rotated freely.

The turbocharger waste gate controller and valve housing were intact; the butterfly valve was found opened.

The three bladed metal D3A34C402C McCauley propeller was removed from the crankshaft flange. All blades were visually intact with one blade, model number 90DFA-10 (serial number K78667), showing slight deformation consisting of an s-bend. The subject blade was loose in the hub and investigators were able to rotate it about 90 degrees in both directions. Partial disassembly of the propeller revealed that a propeller link (part number A4577) attached to the subject blade was separated. The aft area of the piston was intact with no evidence of scoring of internal contact.

There was no evidence of pre-mishap mechanical malfunctions observed during the examination of the engine and airframe.


Teledyne Continental Motors issued a service bulletin SB96-11 on September 10, 1996, with regards to propeller strikes; a revision, SB96-11A, was issued October 10, 2005. In pertinent part, SB96-11A defines a propeller strike as follows: "Any incident while the engine is operating in which the propeller makes contact with any object that results in a loss of engine RPM. Propeller strikes against the ground of any object, can cause engine and component damage even though the propeller may continue to rotate."

The service bulletin further states that, "Following any propeller strike a complete engine disassembly and inspection is mandatory and must be accomplished prior to further operation." A copy of the above referenced service bulletin is contained in the public docket for this accident.

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