On December 22, 1999, at 1006 Eastern Standard Time, a Cessna 182P, N1545M, was substantially damaged during a forced landing immediately after takeoff from Carl R. Keller Field (PCW), Port Clinton, Ohio. The certificated private pilot was seriously injured, and visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. No flight plan had been filed for the flight, between Port Clinton and Put-in-Bay Airport (OH30), Put-in-Bay, Ohio. The personal flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. Use your browsers 'back' function to return to synopsisReturn to Query Page
In a statement given to Ohio State Police, the pilot reported that he conducted a "routine preflight." After starting the engine, "everything was in the green. I taxied down and departed Runway 27, and just about off the numbers, the engine quit. The prop was windmilling. Just no sound."
The pilot also stated that, at the time of the engine failure, the airplane was 300 to 400 feet off the ground. The pilot made a left turn, and glided the airplane with the flaps up. He made another left turn, "and had to get the plane down." He selected 40-degrees of flaps and tried to make another left turn, but the airplane impacted the terrain.
In an interview with the Safety Board Investigator, the pilot further stated that the airplane had flown almost daily, and had been used almost exclusively in a commuter role, from the pilot's island home to his workplace on the mainland, about 22 miles away. Four days before the accident, he had taken an introductory instrument lesson in the airplane, which included recoveries from unusual attitudes. The accident flight was the first flight after the training.
The pilot also said that the engine run-up was normal, and that he had a good rpm drop when he checked the carburetor heat. For takeoff, the carburetor heat was in the off position, and full power was utilized. The takeoff was normal until the engine failure occurred, when it seemed "like someone had pulled the mixture to the off position." The pilot thought he may have been airborne for about 30 seconds, and said that he had no choice but to hit trees during the descent. The pilot said he probably stayed aloft as long as he did was because the airplane had a STOL kit installed on it. He also noted that he was wearing a noise-attenuating headset.
According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Inspector, the airplane impacted the terrain next to a north-south taxiway that led to the approach end of Runway 27. There were four propeller strikes in the frozen ground, and both propeller blades were bent backwards at the hub, in the shape of a ram's horn. Both propeller blades also exhibited leading edge nicks and chordwise scratching, and one blade had a leading edge gouge that matched a strike on a nearby rock.
Engine cylinder compression and crankshaft continuity were confirmed. Three of the 12 spark plugs were black, with heavy soot, while 9 spark plugs were light gray in color. The engine mixture control was full forward, the throttle was 1 inch from full forward, and the carburetor heat control was in the full-in, "cold" position. There was no obstruction of the exhaust pipe.
The fuel selector lever was on "both". The left fuel tank indicator indicated 1/2 tank of fuel, while the right tank indicator indicated zero fuel; however, the airplane had come to rest with the left wing down.
During an additional inspection 6 days after the accident, the FAA Inspector found: "The fuel sump filter assembly had minor amounts of foreign matter on screen. Fuel drained from filter had minor amounts of ice crystals floating in fuel."
Temperature at the time of the accident was about 18 degrees Fahrenheit.
The engine logbook revealed that at the time of the accident, the engine had about 140 hours since major overhaul.
During an interview for a 1998 accident investigation, the head of engine teardowns for Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) stated that TCM did not have an instruction about carburetor icing, but that the one promulgated by Textron-Lycoming would apply to TCM engines, as well. That instruction included the following statement:
"Take-offs and full throttle operation should be made with carburetor heat in the full cold position. The possibility of throttle icing at wide throttle openings is very remote, so remote in fact, that it can be disregarded."