Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to represent the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) before you today on the subject of railroad track safety.

In 1999, the railroad industry transported more than $35 billion in freight, and more than 1.43 trillion revenue ton miles. These figures rise each year, which places greater demand on track performance. Railroad cars weighing over 150 tons are now common on our railroads. An increase in traffic, however, brings an increase in accidents.

According to data published by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), in 1996, there were 2,443 train accidents, with 905 of those accidents track related. In 1999, there were 2,768 train accidents, with 995 of those accidents track related. It was fortunate that the number of fatalities in that time period went from 26 in 1996 to 9 in 1999. With the continuing increase in railroad traffic, however, the railroad industry must remain vigilant.

The NTSB has been investigating railroad accidents since 1967, and as a result of those investigations, we have issued 1,930 safety recommendations that we believe would prevent a recurrence of similar railroad accidents. Of those 1,930 recommendations, at least 131 were related to railroad track.

Some on-going Safety Board railroad investigations in which track is an issue of concern include:

• Arlington, Texas - On December 20, 1998, an Amtrak train en route from Chicago, Illinois, to San Antonio, Texas, derailed six cars and all three locomotives within the city limits of Arlington, Texas. Total damages as a result of the accident were estimated at $1.4 million. Issues being looked into include procedures for maintaining track with known stability problems, procedures for responding to train crews' reports of track problems, and procedures for changing track classification.
• Carbondale, Kansas - On March 27, 2000, an Amtrak train traveling from Chicago, Illinois, to Los Angeles, California, derailed 15 cars in Carbondale, Kansas. Total damages as a result of this accident were $1.5 million. Issues being looked into include the quality control and oversight of ultrasonic testing of rail, and the quality of rail used on this section of track.
• Eunice, Louisiana - On May 27, 2000, a Union Pacific Railroad freight train carrying hazardous materials derailed 30 cars near Eunice, Louisiana. Of the 30 derailed cars, 15 contained hazardous materials. The cost of this accident exceeded $35.3 million. Issues being looked into include inspection of jointed track, and oversight of track inspection.

The most recent accident we are investigating in which the track is an issue occurred on March 17, 2001, near Nodaway, Iowa. At approximately 11:40 p.m. central standard time, an Amtrak train en route from Chicago to Oakland, California, derailed on the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway's track. At the time of the derailment the train was being operated at a recorded speed of 52 miles per hour. The engineer indicated that he was operating under clear signal indication when he felt his train "tug" in resistance and subsequently initiated an emergency brake application. Shortly after, he realized that his train had derailed. The train was carrying 241 passengers and a crew of 15 at the time of the accident, which resulted in one passenger fatality and over 90 injuries.

As a result of the derailment, 1,677 feet of the main track were destroyed. This accounted for about $250,000 in track damage.

The track was owned, inspected, maintained, and operated by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF). The single main track had a maximum allowable operating speed of 60 miles per hour for freight trains, and 79 miles per hour for passenger trains, designating it as Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Class 4 track.

The rail through the accident site was 132-pound continuous welded rail, except for a jointed section at the point of derailment. At the point of derailment, a 14 ft. 11½ inch "plug" rail was installed to repair a fracture that had been detected by ultrasonic inspection on February 13, 2001. According to BNSF, because the track carries high tonnage and passenger service, for the past 14 years the track was inspected daily, and ultrasonic rail testing was conducted every 30 days.

The replacement "plug" rail came from the BNSF Springfield, Missouri, rail complex. The replacement rail from this facility was not ultrasonically tested for internal defects, but was visually inspected for excessive wear and surface damage. The rail from the accident site will be examined in our Washington, D. C., laboratory. We will keep the Committee advised of developments regarding this accident, and we will offer Committee Members or staff the opportunity to see the rail if they wish to.

Mr. Chairman, in July 1997, the Federal Railroad Administration published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to revise track safety standards. In our September 1997 rulemaking comments, we commended FRA on its efforts, and stated that we believed that changes to the track safety standards would provide more effective track safety criteria and eliminate the possibility of abuse in the regulations if the FRA elaborated and clarified terms and limits pertaining to track inspection, maintenance, repairs, and requalification of track inspectors in the track safety standards.

The FRA incorporated many Safety Board concerns into their final rule, which went into effect in September 1998, including those dealing with:

• gage restraint measurement systems;
• excepted track regulations;
• continuous welded rail;
• flattened rail;
• rail conditions that prevent ultrasonic inspection; and
• visual inspections.

We were disappointed, however, that the rule did not mandate the use of advanced track inspection technology, such as the track geometry car.

Automated track geometry measurement systems were addressed by the NTSB in safety recommendations issued in 1985. Those recommendations were:

R-85-010

Develop and implement a national track inspection program which requires railroad companies to use automated track geometry measurement systems in an on-going, systemic program of inspection of all routes emphasizing initially routes regularly traveled by train carrying either hazardous materials or passengers.

R-85-011

Increase the use of automated track geometry inspections in its evaluations of railroad track systems and integrate the results of automated track geometry programs, emphasizing initially routes regularly traveled by trains carrying either hazardous materials or passengers.

Because the FRA did not agree with the Board's recommendations, on June 11, 1986, they were classified "Closed-Unacceptable Action."

We believe data identified by a track geometry car would enable a track inspector to more effectively identify track anomalies; monitor those track segments bordering on potential defects; and monitor the results of track work performed.

Following the Eunice, Louisiana, derailment, Union Pacific advised Safety Board staff that the track at the scene was inspected daily. However, a post-accident inspection by the Safety Board's investigative team revealed numerous track defects - including 403 cracked and broken splice bars. In addition, numerous tie defects were also observed so that the track speed had to be reduced from 40 miles per hour to 10 miles per hour. Track safety standards require that if a splice bar is found to be cracked or broken between the middle two bolt-holes, it must be replaced. Union Pacific has since implemented a more stringent inspection program for jointed track.

The most strenuous track safety standards will not increase safety if corrective action is not taken when defects are noted. FRA data shows that in 1999 there were 51,918 inspections performed with 183,863 defects recorded. This data is impressive, but we would like to be assured that remedial action has been taken on the recorded defects.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement, and I would be happy to respond to whatever questions you may have.