UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. ********************************************************** IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF * AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT 1420, * Docket Number McDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-82, N215AA * SA-519 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, JUNE 1, 1999 * ********************************************************** Arkansas Excelsior Hotel Bill Clinton Ballroom Three Statehouse Plaza Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Wednesday, January 26, 2000 9:00 a.m. Board of Inquiry HONORABLE JIM HALL, Chairman Board of Inquiry THOMAS HAUETER, Deputy Director Office of Aviation Safety JOHN CLARK, Deputy Director Office of Research and Engineering BARRY SWEEDLER, Director Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments BEN BERMAN, Hearing Officer Office of Aviation Safety Technical Panel GREGORY SALOTTOLO GREGORY FEITH EVAN BYRNE MARK GEORGE CHARLES PEREIRA LAWRENCE ROMAN DAVID TEW DONALD EICK Public Information Officer PAUL SCHLAMM Office of Public Affairs Washington, D.C. Parties to the Hearing LYLE STREETER, Air Safety Investigator Accident Investigation Division, AAI-100 Federal Aviation Administration RONALD J. HINDERBERGER, Director Airplane Safety Boeing Commercial Airplane Group ROBERT W. BAKER, Vice Chairman American Airlines, Inc. CAPTAIN CHRIS D. ZWINGLE Special Assistant to Chairman National Safety and Training Committee Allied Pilots Association KATHY LORD-JONES National Safety Coordinator Association of Professional Flight Attendants ROBERT KUESSNER National Weather Service DEBORAH H. SCHWARTZ, A.A.E. Airport Manager Little Rock National Airport J.T. CANTRELL, Training Chief Little Rock Fire Department I N D E X WITNESS: Operations Michael H. Origel First Officer on Flight 1420 Interview by Dave Tew Afternoon Session William Trott Flight Dispatcher for American Airlines Interview by Donald Eick Captain Eric Lewis MD-80 Fleet Manager for American Airlines Interview by Dave Tew Dexter Taylor AAL MD-80 Airplane Program Manager Federal Aviation Administration Interview by Dave Tew Corky Valentine FAA Principal Operations Inspector for American Airlines Interview by Dave Tew P R O C E E D I N G S 9:30 a.m. CHAIRMAN HALL: We will convene this public hearing of the National Transportation Safety Board. It's being held in connection with the Investigation of Aircraft Accident Involving American Airlines Flight 1420, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, Registration N215AA. The accident occurred in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1st, 1999. Good morning and welcome. I am Jim Hall, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board and Chairman of this Board of Inquiry. Today, we are opening a public hearing concerning the accident that occurred on June 1st, 1999, at Little Rock, Arkansas, involving American Airlines Flight 1420. This hearing is being held for the purpose of supplementing the facts, conditions and circumstances discovered during the on-scene investigation. This process will assist the Safety Board in determining the probable cause of the accident and in making recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future. Public hearings, such as this one, are exercises in accountability, accountability on the part of the Safety Board, that it is conducting thorough and fair investigations, accountability on the part of the Federal Aviation Administration, that it is adequately regulating the industry, accountability on the part of the airline, that it is operating safely, accountability on the part of manufacturers as to the design and performance of their products, and accountability on the part of the workforce, pilots and machinists and flight attendants, that they are performing up to the standards of professionalism expected of them. These proceedings tend to become highly technical affairs, but they are essential in seeking to reassure the public that everything is being done to ensure the safety of the airline industry and the safety of flight. This inquiry is not being held to determine the rights or liability of private parties, and matters dealing with such rights or liability will be excluded from these proceedings. The Safety Board has collected a substantial amount of information over the past seven months, and during the course of this hearing, we will collect additional information that will assist the Board in its examination of safety issues arising from this accident. Specifically, we will concentrate on the following issues: flight crew decision-making, availability and dissemination of weather data, aircraft performance, passenger safety and emergency response, runway overrun protection, American Airlines' operational practices and procedures, and American Airlines' internal and FAA oversight. Let me emphasize that these issues are important and have serious implications for the safety of air travel. Eleven lives were lost in this accident, and a 134 passengers and crew members survived, their lives forever impacted by this tragedy. The Safety Board has had the unfortunate task of investigating several of the world's fatal commercial aviation accidents where fatigue was an issue. In two such accidents, an American International Airways DC-8, on August 18th, 1993, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and, most recently, the Korean Air Boeing 747-300 in Guam, fatigue was determined to have been a significant factor in the cause of the accident. Fatigue and its effects on flight crew performance has been and continue to be a growing concern for the aviation community worldwide. Although the Safety Board has expressed -- has addressed the issue of flight crew duty time regulations in previous accident investigations, we must also look beyond the scheduling issues of our pilots and also consider the issue of fatigue as it relates to duty time of flight attendants as well, and, so, while we continue to investigate the specific causes of the American Airlines Flight 1420 tragedy, it is my intention in this hearing to look at the larger picture and explore more precisely the dimensions of the fatigue problem, possible anomalies with the low-level wind shear alert system, various efforts underway to correct these issues, other important safety items, and what is being done to prevent future occurrences. The Safety Board has investigated several accidents involving American Airlines in recent years. During this hearing, I intend to thoroughly explore the possibility of systematic problems within the airline, the efforts American has made to examine its own systems and procedures, and, perhaps most important, what the airline is doing about its problems. Further, the other issues that will be discussed in this hearing all have been identified at one time or another as significant factors in aviation incidents or accidents. Thus, because these issues continue to be identified, it is apparent that the actions that have been taken to eliminate or reduce or prevent the recurrence have not been as successful as we had hoped. Every accident also can teach us something new about these pre-existing safety concerns. If we can learn more about safety issues, if we can draw attention to the serious problems that for whatever reason are lingering in the aviation industry, and if we can get someone to take action, then this hearing will have been worthwhile. Now, at this point, let me welcome the news media, but let me explain to the news media that this hearing is a professional hearing, and interviews with individuals need to take place outside this board room. So, I'd like to be sure that our press officers are sure that this is not used as a set, that the proceedings -- this room is for the hearings and proceedings. Any interviews that need to be conducted need to be moved outside, but we very much appreciate your attendance. Thank you. At this point, I would like to introduce the other members of the Board of Inquiry. To my -- joining us, to my left at this time, is Mr. Greg Feith, who is our Investigator-in-Charge. Mr. Feith is occupying a seat on the Board of Inquiry and replacing Mr. Thomas Haueter, who is the Deputy Director of the Office of Aviation Safety. We hope Mr. Haueter will be able to join us later today, and when he does, he will be seated to my left. To my right is Mr. John Clark, who is the Deputy Director of the Office of Research and Engineering. To his right is Mr. Barry Sweedler, the Director of the Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments. The other member of the Board of Inquiry to my far left is Mr. Ben Berman, the Chief of the Major Investigation Division, the Office of Aviation Safety, who also serves as the hearing officer for these proceedings. The Board of Inquiry will be assisted by a technical panel, consisting of Mr. Greg Feith, who is the Investigator-in-Charge, Mr. David Tew, who is the Operational Factors Investigator, Mr. Don Eick, the Meteorology Investigator, Mr. Evan Byrne, the Human Performance Investigator, Mr. Charlie Pereira, the Aircraft Performance Investigator, Mr. Larry Roman, the Airport Crash-Fire- Rescue Investigators, and Mr. Mark George, the Survival Factors Investigator. All of those individuals are still not here, but the individuals that are important to this morning's panel are in place, and I'm hoping the others will be joining us from Washington this afternoon. In addition, I'd like to acknowledge the presence of Board Members John Hammerschmidt, John Golia, and George Black, who are present for these proceedings, and the former Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, who is from Arkansas, Jim Burnette. Mr. Pat Caraseo and Mr. Paul Schlamm from the Safety Board's Public Affairs Office are here to assist members of the news media. I've only got about half of my news media operation here in place. The media does a good job, but if you have any problems with the media, let me or let them know. They're here to -- to report on these proceedings, and I expect them, as we expect all of our observers, to do so in a responsible fashion. In addition, we have the Mayor of Little Rock that is with us this morning, Mayor Daley, and Donna Madison representing Senator Lincoln, and Barrett Allman, representing Congressman Snyder. My principal assistant, Deb Smith, is on her way from Washington. Behind me is Jamie Perecola, who is my traveling assistant, who will be assisting me in her absence until -- in Deb Smith's absence. Excuse me. Lee Jones here is here from our Office of Government Affairs. Sharon Bryson, Eric Grossauf and Brian Fifick, about half of them are here from our Office of Family Affairs, are here to assist the families. I hope to have a full complement later today. Carolyn Dargan and Candy Bing who are over to my left are the individuals who have been responsible for setting up all these proceedings. We had a hearing last week in New Orleans on a serious bus accident down there, and I appreciate their efforts in getting both of these hearings set up. You may certainly contact either of them for assistance regarding copies of exhibits or other matters. Also observing today's proceedings are representatives from independent safety boards representing Canada, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. Let me continue. Neither I nor any Safety Board personnel will attempt during this hearing to analyze the testimony received nor will any attempt be made at this time to determine the probable cause of this accident. Such analyses and cause determinations will be made by the full Safety Board after consideration of all the evidence gathered during our investigation. The final report on the accident involving Flight 1420, which will reflect the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause determinations, will be considered for adoption by the full Board at a public meeting at the Safety Board's headquarters in Washington, D.C., to be held at a later date. The Safety Board's rules provide for the designation of parties to a public hearing. In accordance with these rules, those persons, governmental agencies, companies and associations whose participation in the hearing is deemed necessary in the public interest and whose special knowledge will contribute to the development of pertinent evidence, are designated as parties. The parties assisting the Safety Board in this hearing have been designated in accordance with these rules. The parties are seated at tables right in front of the dais, and as I call the name of the party, I would like to ask the designated spokesperson to please give his or her name, title and affiliation for the record, and I would appreciate it if you could briefly recognize the other individuals that are seated at your table. We will begin with the Federal Aviation Administration. MR. STREETER: Mr. Chairman, my name is Lyle Streeter. I am the Manager of the Accident Investigation Division at the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Accident Investigation. With me here is Mr. Tony James, the FAA's Investigator- in-Charge for our purposes on this accident, Mr. Mark Baylen from our counsel's office, Mr. Corky Valentine, who will be a witness here later on and is the Principal Operations Inspector for American Airlines, and Mr. Wayne Williams, the Manager of the American Airlines Certificate Management Office. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you, and welcome. The Boeing Commercial Airplane Group? MR. HINDERBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Ron Hinderberger. I'm the Director of Airplane Safety for Boeing, and with me today, I have William Steelhammer, who's our Lead Investigator and Party Coordinator for this investigation, Captain Tom Melody, our Chief Pilot of Flight Operations, Derrick Troy and C.J. Turner, Aerodynamics Engineers, and Mr. Scott Seabloom, our outside counsel. CHAIRMAN HALL: Okay. Thank you. American Airlines, Incorporated? MR. BAKER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Robert W. Baker. I am Vice Chairman of AMR Corporation and American Airlines and the company spokesman. Seated to my right is Mr. Bob Kraft from the firm of Holland and Knight. Next to Mr. Kraft, Ms. Krista Hinkley from our Risk Management Group. Next in counter-clockwise fashion around the table, Mr. Kurt Lewis, a manager in our Flight Safety Organization. Next, Captain Eric Lewis, the Fleet Manager of the MD- 80 Operations at American Airlines. Bill Brown is next from the firm of Holland and Knight, and Mr. Tommy McFall, our Managing Director of Safety. Thank you. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you, and welcome. The Allied Pilots Association? CAPTAIN ZWINGLE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Board. My name is Captain Chris Zwingle. I am the party spokesman and party coordinator. At the table with me, to my right, Captain John Vanderventer, Check Airman on the MD-80, First Officer Gary Chestnut from the DFDR Group, Captain John Jeffries from the CVR Group, First Officer Don Pitts, Chairman of the National Safety Committee, and Mr. Ray Duke, counsel. Seated also at the APFA table, members of the Association, Captain Kevin Elmore from the National Safety Committee, First Officer Tim Minor of the Meteorology Committee. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you, and welcome. The Association of Professional Flight Attendants? MS. LORD-JONES: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Board. My name is Kathy Lord-Jones. I'm the National Safety Coordinator for the Association of Professional Flight Attendants. CHAIRMAN HALL: Kathy, if you could still just pull that over a little bit? Thank you very much. MS. LORD-JONES: Seated at the table with me is Mr. Lonnie Glover, Qualified Flight Attendant and Member of the Accident Investigation Team, Debbie Rowland and Emily Carter. CHAIRMAN HALL: Okay. The National Weather Service? MR. KUESSNER: Good morning, sir. My name is Robert Kuessner. I am the spokesman for the National Weather Service. My title is Forensic Services Manager, Office of Meteorology, Weather Service Headquarters. Sitting with me at the table, starting across from me and running clockwise, Mr. Reinhard Dombrowsky, who is Chief, Surface Observations Branch. Next to him is Mr. Judson Ladd, who is Program Manager of our Southern Region. Next to him, Mr. George Wilka, who is the Science Operations Officer at the Weather Forecast Office at Little Rock, and next to him is Mr. Pat Slattery, who is our Public Affairs Officer, Central Region. Thank you. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you, and welcome. The Little Rock National or International Airport? MS. SCHWARTZ: National, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN HALL: Just like Chattanooga. MS. SCHWARTZ: Mr. Chairman, my name is Deborah Schwartz. I'm Airport Manager and spokesperson for Little Rock National Airport. To my right is Bill Flowers, Deputy Airport Manager at Little Rock National Airport, and behind me is Little Rock Municipal Airport Commission counsel Mark Stodala. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you, and welcome. And the Little Rock Fire Department? MR. CANTRELL: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is J.T. Cantrell. I'm Training Division Chief for Little Rock Fire Department. Clockwise from my left, Mr. Bill Mann, one of our city attorneys, Mayor James Daley. On the opposite side of the table, Chief W.A. Davis, who was Acting Fire Chief the night of the incident, District Chief Larry Tyner, who was the Operations Officer and Site Commander at the incident. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you very much. That completes the introductions. I want to thank all of the parties, both that participated in the on-scene portion of this investigation and those who are participating in this hearing, for your assistance and cooperation. The parties are an integral part of our investigation, and we appreciate very much your participation. On January 11th, 2000, the Board of Inquiry held a pre- hearing conference in Washington, D.C. It was attended by the Safety Board's Technical Panel and representatives of the parties to this hearing. During the conference, the areas of inquiry and the scope of issues to be explored at this hearing were delineated, and the selection of the witnesses to testify on those issues was finalized. We plan to call 21 witnesses during the course of this hearing. Let me note that some of the parties to the investigation recently asked the Board to call the air traffic controller who was on duty in the Little Rock Control Tower as a witness. Serious consideration was given to this request. However, we were informed that the controller is under medical care, and it was his doctor's judgment that he should not testify. Therefore, through the end of this hearing, I will entertain written suggestions from the parties for questions to be asked of the controller. Based on these suggestions, the Safety Board's Air Traffic Control Group chairman or this Board of Inquiry may conduct an additional interview of the controller, if necessary. Copies of the witness list developed at the pre-hearing conference are available at the Media Table. There are numerous exhibits that will be used in this proceeding. Copies of the exhibits are available at the Media Table for review. The Safety Board has provided a complete set of exhibits to Kinko's at 1121 South Spring Street, Little Rock, Arkansas. That telephone number is area code 501 372-0775. Copies of the exhibits can be obtained on request and at the individual's own expense. Please see Mrs. Dargan or Mrs. Bing or any member of the Board if you need additional information or that address. Also, the hearing exhibits may be found on the National Transportation Safety Board's Web Page. That is found at www.ntsb.gov. I repeat www.ntsb.gov. The first witness this morning will be the Investigator-in- Charge of the accident investigation, who will summarize certain facts about the accident and the investigative activities that have taken place to date. The remaining witnesses will be questioned first by the Board's Technical Panel, then by the designated spokesperson for each party to the hearing, followed by questions from the Board of Inquiry. As Chairman of the Board of Inquiry, I will be responsible for the conduct of this hearing. I will make all rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and all such rulings will be final. The record of the investigation, including the transcript of the hearing and all exhibits entered into the record, will become part of the Safety Board's public docket on this accident and will be available for inspection at the Board's Washington office. Anyone willing to purchase the transcript, including parties to the investigation, should contact the court reporter directly. In closing, let me say that as I observed in my opening statement, this is an important hearing. I met this morning prior to this hearing with the individuals who are here representing -- the families representing the victims of this crash and the survivors and their families. They are all observers of these proceedings, and we welcome them. I would like and respect to them and to this investigation that this room, the decorum in this room at all times be appropriate to this hearing. If there are private conversations or other business that needs to be tended to, please take that outside this room. This room will be for the purpose of this hearing. We have a large audience. This will be a very long hearing. We intend to be sure, and it may take us into Saturday, but we're going to be sure that we hear from all of these witnesses, that everyone that has a question has the opportunity from these parties, our Technical Panel, the Board of Inquiry, has the appropriate time to ask questions. That may require these proceedings to run late some evenings. I will try to get, you know, the feel of the various party tables and others in terms of our hours and breaks as we go along, but I just want to again stress if at any time on the break, any of you all have questions about how the National Transportation Safety Board conducts its business or any questions about these proceedings, myself and all the Board representatives are paid for by your tax dollars, and we will be glad to try to respond to you any questions about these proceedings and what is being done because the bottom line of this investigation, it's a function by your American Government to try to find out the facts of this tragedy, working together with the various parties, to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent a similar tragedy such as this from occurring again. Mr. Berman, have all the exhibits been entered in the public docket? MR. BERMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN HALL: Then, Mr. Berman, please proceed to call the first witness. MR. BERMAN: I call Mr. Gregory Feith, Senior Air Safety Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board, and please proceed, Mr. Feith. MR. FEITH: Good morning. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your introductory remarks. On June 1, 1999, at 2350 Central Daylight Time, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, operated by American Airlines, Incorporated, as American Airlines Flight 1420, a regularly- scheduled passenger flight from Dallas, Texas, overran the runway, Runway 4 Right, and collided with a localizer antenna and approach light stanchion at the Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Safety Board was notified of the accident on June 2, about 1:15 Eastern Daylight Time. I was assigned as the investigator-in-charge of this accident. At 0430, the go team assembled at Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C., and departed via the Federal Aviation Administration's Gulfstream 4 Jet for Little Rock. The team arrived on scene at approximately 7:00 that morning. The Board member on duty at the time of the accident was George Black, and he accompanied the team to Little Rock. The investigative team consisted of various specialists from the Safety Board's headquarters. The specialty areas were: Aircraft Operations, Human Performance, Aircraft Structures, Aircraft Systems, Power Plants, Survival Factors, Air Traffic Control, Meteorology, Airport Search-Fire-Rescue, Aircraft Performance. Specialists were also assigned to conduct the read-out of the digital flight data recorder and transcribe the cockpit voice recorder in the Safety Board's laboratories in Washington, D.C. The following organizations were given party status for the on-scene portion of the investigation and provided technical assistance to the Safety Board: the FAA, American Airlines, Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Airplane Group, Pratt and Whitney Engines, the Allied Pilots Association, the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the National Weather Service, the Little Rock National Airport, and the Little Rock Fire Department. For a history of flight. The accident occurred on the first day of a scheduled three-day sequence for this crew. According to company records, the captain reported for the initial segment at 10:38 Central Time, and the first officer reported at 10:18. The flight segments commenced at 11:43 from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport and proceeded to Salt Lake City International Airport and then on to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. The final flight segment of the day was the flight to Little Rock. Flight 1420 was scheduled to depart DFW at 8:28 p.m. However, the airplane that was planned for the flight to Little Rock was delayed in-bound to DFW because of adverse weather in the area. According to the American Airlines dispatcher of Flight 1420, using that original airplane, had it been -- that was originally scheduled for the flight, would have caused the flight crew to exceed the contractual crew duty day limit of 14 hours. As a result, the accident airplane, November 215 Alpha Alpha, was substituted so that Flight 1420 could be conducted. Prior to departure from DFW, the flight crew received paperwork for the flight that included weather information advising the crew of a line of thunderstorms along the planned route of flight. At 2240, and these are in 24-hour clock times which would be 10:40, Flight 1420 departed DFW after two hours and 12 minutes of delay. About 14 minutes after departure, the dispatcher sent an ACARS message to the flight crew advising them of both the in-route weather and the weather in the Little Rock area. The dispatcher's message indicated that the deteriorating weather conditions may be a factor during the arrival at Little Rock, and that "I suggest expediting your arrival in order to beat the thunderstorms to Little Rock, if possible". The flight crew acknowledged receipt of the message. At 2334:09, the CVR recorded the controller informing the crew of Flight 1420, "We have a thunderstorm just northwest of the airport moving through the area now ... wind is two eight zero at two eight gusts four four ..." The first officer responded, "Yeah. We can see the lightening ..." At 2334:41, the controller notified the crew to expect an instrument landing systems approach to Runway 2-2 Left, and four minutes later, the controller issued a clearance to descend to an altitude of 3,000 feet and asked the crew, "How is the final for 2-2 left looking?" The first officer responded, "Okay. We can see the airport from here ... we can barely make it out, but we should be able to make 2-2 ... that storm is moving this way like your radar says it is -- but a little farther off than you thought." At 2339:44, the controller notified the flight crew of a wind shear alert at the airport and stated, "The center field wind is three four zero at one zero, the north boundary wind is three three zero at two five, the northwest boundary wind is zero one zero at one five." Shortly after receiving this information, the first officer asked to land on Runway 4, and the controller provided a vector for that runway. Between 2341:56 and 2342:25, the flight crew attempted to visually identify the airport. At 2342:26, the controller transmitted to the crew, "... it appears we have a second part of this storm moving through, the winds now three four zero at one six, gusts three four." The first officer acknowledged this transmission. At 2342:39, the CVR recorded the first officer asking the captain, "You wanna accept a short approach ... want to keep it tight?" The captain responded, "Yeah. If you see the runway ... 'cause I don't quite see it." Shortly thereafter, the CVR recorded the crew continuing to discuss the location of the airport, and at 2344:19, the captain said, "... see we're losing it, I don't think we can maintain visual." At 2344:33, the first officer told the controller, "... there's a cloud between us and the airport ... we just lost the field ..." The controller responded and provided vectors to the ILS approach course. At 2346:39, the controller notified the crew of Flight 1420 that they were "... three miles from the outer marker ... cleared for the ILS Runway 4 approach right." The first officer acknowledged that clearance. Approximately 13 seconds later, the controller reported that there was heavy rain falling on the airport, the visibility was less than one mile, and the runway visual range or RVR for Runway 4 Right was 3,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged that transmission. At 2347:08, the controller cleared Flight 1420 to land and reported the wind as "three five zero at three zero with gusts to four five." This was followed less than a minute later with a second wind shear alert from the controller reporting the winds as "... center field wind three five zero at three two, gusts four five, the north boundary wind three one zero at two niner, and northeast boundary wind at three two zero at three two." At 2348:12, the controller reported the Runway 4 Right RVR was 1,600 feet. The first officer acknowledged this transmission. This was the last communication between the controller and Flight 1420. The captain continued the approach to Runway 4 Right, and at 2349:57, the CVR recorded an unidentified crew member saying, "we're off course". Four seconds later, the first officer said, "we're way off." This was followed one second later by the captain who said, "I can't see it", followed at 2350:06 by the captain saying, "Yeah. I got it." At 2350:21, the CVR recorded the sound of the airplane touching down on the runway followed by the first officer saying, "we're down." Two seconds later, the first officer said, "we're sliding". The first recorded sound of the airplane striking the localizer antenna occurred about 22 seconds after the aircraft landed. Mr. Chairman, I would like to show a video animation that depicts the motions of the flight of 1420 during the last minute of flight. The airplane motion is based on the data from the DVDR and has select CVR comments annotated in the upper left-hand corner. So, I would defer to you, if you would like to announce this video, please. CHAIRMAN HALL: We're going to show an animation that will simulate the final seconds of this flight. If there are any family members or victims or survivors of this event that would prefer not to observe this, I would take a moment for them to exit the room. (Pause) MR. FEITH: What you are going to see in this video is the last minute of flight as the airplane is approaching Runway 4 Right. There is a lot of text in the CVR transcript which is not in this video because of the clutter that it would cause, but there are select comments. I will talk through this video, just pointing out some of the highlights. This video has been used by the investigators as a tool for the purpose of accident investigation but should give you some sense of what the airplane motion was during its last minute of flight. So, if you could please roll that tape. (Video shown) MR. FEITH: And so that there is no mis-understanding, this video does not show any weather, given the fact that it was night conditions. So, the animation does not represent any of the environmental conditions that occurred. Its sole purpose is to show the motion of the airplane. We have various control positions. You see the control wheel moving. We also have the spoiler position. We have thrust reverser position as well as engine pressure ratio or EPR, and we also have rudder position. What this is demonstrating is that the airplane as it approached, touched down, and when the aircraft touched down, it had 5,200 feet of a 7,200-foot runway remaining. The aircraft touched down right of the center line with a significant right drift. There was an over-correct to the left, and as the correction took place, the airplane then exited the left side of the runway. From the flight data recorder, we understand that there was no braking action until 11 seconds after touch down when there was approximately 3,000 feet of runway remaining. We also note that the ground spoilers that typically deploy at touch down did not in this case deploy. Thank you. The following are a brief synoptic of some of the facts revealed thus far. The captain was a graduate of the Air Force Academy and Michigan State University. He served seven years as a member of the United States Air Force. He was hired with American Airlines in July 1979, but after one year was furloughed for three and a half years. After recall by American Airlines, he flew all three positions in a Boeing 727 and later became a captain on and a check airman on the MD-80 aircraft. According to American Airlines' employment records, he had accumulated over 10,000 hours as a pilot-in-command and over 5,500 hours as pilot-in-command on the MD-80 aircraft. The captain was promoted to the position of chief pilot in the Chicago base on January 1st, 1999. The first officer, who will be testifying in these hearings today, was a graduate of the University of Southern California and entered the United States Navy in 1988. In 1991, he was released from the Navy due to a reduction-in-force and flew corporate aircraft. In addition to his flying duties, he had been the chief pilot for one company and the Director of Operations for a charter service. The first officer was hired by American Airlines January 4th, 1999. According to American Airlines' employment records, he had accumulated 4,292 hours of total flight time, of which, over 2,800 hours of that time was as pilot-in-command. Since his employment with American, the first officer had accumulated a 182 hours in the MD-80 aircraft, of which, 65 were in the last 30 days prior to the accident. The weather conditions at the airport shortly before the accident were reported as the wind being from 180 degrees at nine knots with a visibility of seven miles, thunderstorms, few clouds at 7,000 feet in cumulonimbus clouds. The ceiling was broken at 10,000 feet. Temperature was 77 degrees Fahrenheit. Dew point was 73. There was an AWOS, which is an Automatic Weather Observation System, report that there was a thunderstorm that began at 23 minutes after the hour. There was frequent lightening in clouds and cloud-to-cloud located from the west through the northwest. Thunderstorms west through northwest, moving northeast. Examination by our Meteorological Group chairman and his group members revealed that from the weather data, the Doppler radar images and surveillance video that we received from the airport, as well as witness statements, indicated that there was intense rainfall on the airport at the time Flight 1420 landed. The intensity of both the rainfall and the gusting wind conditions are factors and may have affected the performance of the airplane during the landing roll and will be discussed by several witnesses during this hearing. The Operations Group examined the flight crew procedures employed during the accident flight in relation to those set forth by American Airlines. In addition to the flight crew's decision -- in addition, the flight crew's decision to land in the severe weather conditions, the non-deployment of the ground spoilers after touch down, the crew's non-use of auto brakes for the landing on a wet runway, and the use of a higher-than-recommended engine pressure ratio or EPR during reverse thrust operation, which may have affected the direction of control of the airplane on the ground, are all being examined and will be discussed by various witnesses in this hearing. The Safety Board also found in the investigation that the post-accident emergency response to the crash site was delayed several minutes because the air traffic controller was not immediately aware that Flight 1420 had crashed. The emergency response was further delayed because the fire equipment initially traveled to the approach end of Runway 4 Right before realizing that the accident site was at the departure end. Additionally, the Safety Board is concerned about the non-frangibility of the approach light stanchions struck by the airplane and how this may have contributed to the survivability of the occupants. Several witnesses will testify regarding these issues later in this public hearing. Some of the post-accident activities that took place. When we were finished on scene on June 10th, there was system and component testing that had taken place over the past six months. Some of these activities, including the component testing, involved the analysis of data that we gathered during the on-scene portion of the investigation. Further, the issues that were cited by the Chairman as well as those described briefly in this statement will be addressed by witnesses in this hearing that were selected based on their expertise, experience and extensive knowledge of the relevant subjects or issues. The team will use the additional information to either clarify factual data that we already have that was previously collected during this investigation or pursue additional issue areas, if so needed. This information will provide the Board a complete factual record from which to make its determination of probable cause and further recommendations. Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take a moment to publicly thank the parties and their team representatives for their continued cooperation. It's been seven months of investigative work, and we've, I think, worked well as a team. I'd also like to thank the City of Little Rock and the National Airport staff. They've been very accommodating for the investigative team as well as the local hotel people and actually the citizens of Little Rock who accommodated us during our on-scene investigation back in June. Also, I want to thank the Red Cross and their volunteers who supported our activities under very difficult and stressful conditions. We were out on scene for several days, and the weather, it was very hot. So, they provided a lot of relief to the investigative staff. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. CHAIRMAN HALL: We will get the table changed out for our first witness, and we'll call the first witness. Mr. Feith, if you'll come back and join us. MR. BERMAN: I call Mr. Michael H. Origel, First Officer on Flight 1420. Whereupon, MICHAEL H. ORIGEL having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and was examined and testified as follows: CHAIRMAN HALL: Welcome, Mr. Origel. We appreciate your attendance this morning. I'll turn it over to the Board of Inquiry -- I'm sorry -- the Technical Panel. INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY BY MR. BERMAN: Q Mr. Origel, would you please state your full name and business address? A Michael Origel, and I'm based currently in Dallas Flight Academy, Dallas, DFW Airport at the American Airlines. Q By whom are you presently employed? A American Airlines. Q What's your present position? A Actually in physical therapy, rehabilitation on my leg. Q And do you -- are you assigned also as a first officer? A Not at this time. Q Not at this time. Would you please briefly describe your duties and responsibilities as a first officer at American Airlines as you held it? A I was a first officer at American Airlines, flying the DC-9. My responsibilities were to assist the captain and to be able to assume command in case the captain was not able to. Q And would you please briefly describe your education and training and experience that you obtained to qualify you for the position as first officer at American Airlines? A I graduated from the University of Southern California, entered the Naval Service, U.S. Navy Reserves, released in '91, reduction-in-forces. I flew privately, flew for a private company, a KingAire E- 90, and then I started a charter operation and flew charter from 1994 to I was hired at American in January 1999. Q Thank you. And, finally, what FAA certificates do you hold? A I have an airline transport pilot certificate with a Learjet type rating and Boeing 737 type rating. Q And your flight experience? A 4,000 hours of flight time. Q Thank you very much. A You're welcome. MR. BERMAN: Please proceed, Mr. Tew. INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL BY MR. TEW: Q Good morning, Mr. Origel. A Good morning. Q I know we've talked several times before, and I, too, appreciate your taking the time to talk with us today. I'd like to ask you some questions to provide us with a brief overview of the accident. I understand that this was the first time that you had flown with Captain Bushman. Were you aware of the fact that he was the chief pilot of the Chicago base when you first checked in with him? A Yes, sir. I had met with Captain Bushman on a prior occasion. As a new hire, we have monthly checks they were supposed to provide on our progress with each of the chief pilots. So, I met with Captain Bushman approximately one month earlier. Q Okay. Did the fact that he was the chief pilot affect your relationship and interaction with him in any way? A I don't believe so. Q Would you have been more comfortable interacting with a regular line check -- airline captain? A I saw Captain Bushman ran a smooth cockpit, very professional and very informal. Q Could you tell us what briefing you received from Captain Bushman prior to the first flight? A In Chicago, after I met with Captain Bushman in the office, I went to the aircraft. When I was performing my pre-flight, he came into the cockpit and gave me a captain's brief on what he expected out of his first officers and what he would like to do in certain cases, in certain procedures. It was a standard American Airlines captain's brief. Q Okay. The day of the accident, could you tell us what legs you flew from Chicago to Dallas? A I flew one leg that day from Salt Lake to Dallas. Q And the captain? A Flew from Chicago to Salt Lake and from Dallas to Little Rock. Q At the time of the departure from Dallas, the flight had been delayed approximately two hours in Dallas. How long had you been on duty at that time? A I believe I checked in at 10:00 that morning in Chicago. Q Were you fatigued or tired at the time of the departure from Dallas? A I would say I was tired but alert. Q Did Captain Bushman mention that he was tired or fatigued at any time? A I didn't speak with Captain Bushman very much on the ground. We checked the weather occasionally together, but I didn't really speak to him very much, and, so, no. Q You have no knowledge of that? A No, sir. Q Okay. Did you receive in-route and Little Rock weather prior to leaving Dallas-Fort Worth? A Yes, sir. As I mentioned, on the ground at Dallas, because the aircraft was delayed, we had time to check the weather and operations. So, we checked it several times. Q Okay. When you got this weather, was there any concern, and was there any discussion between you and the captain concerning this weather? A We did see the weather off to the west, moving to the east, but Little Rock was in VFR conditions, and it looked to be able to remain that way. Q Was there any kind of a briefing concerning the weather at all? A Well, yes, sir. Captain Bushman -- that's basically what we were talking about, the weather. We saw the adverse weather conditions to the west, moving to the east, but it looked like Little Rock was in visual conditions and was supposed to remain that way. The forecast that we saw from the terminal area forecast was that it would remain in VFR conditions. Q Were you aware of the forecast for convective activity at Little Rock at the estimated time of arrival, and the current in-flight weather advisories which were included in the convective segment and severe weather forecasts? A Yes, sir. We -- I saw the terminal area forecast, and it remained -- the forecast did call for shower activities and thunderstorms, but the terminal forecast for Little Rock was VFR. Q So, you weren't -- do -- do you recall the convective segment and the severe weather forecast? There was a severe weather forecast at the time? A Yes, I remember seeing that, yes. Q Okay. Was that discussed? A Yes, sir. On the ground in Dallas. Q While en route to Little Rock, an ACARS message was sent concerning weather to the cockpit. Could you tell us who sent this message, and what did it mean to you? A There was a couple -- CHAIRMAN HALL: Excuse me. Mr. Tew, you might explain to -- for the benefit of the audience what an ACARS message is. MR. TEW: Okay. I was afraid you were going to ask that. I think it's an Air Crew or an Aircraft, I'm not exactly sure which, Aviation Response. It's a -- it's a radio signal that's sent from the company to the -- the aircraft. BY MR. TEW: Q Is that correct, Mr. Origel? A It's -- basically, what it is is a printer, and the dispatcher is able to type or dispatch weather or free-text messages to us via a printer on board the aircraft. It's an airborne communication system. Q Okay. This message you received, -- CHAIRMAN HALL: And this comes from the dispatcher? THE WITNESS: It comes from the dispatcher. It comes from -- we get ATIS from it. We can get our departures from it. We can get several forms of communication from it. CHAIRMAN HALL: Okay. MR. TEW: Yeah. It can provide a number of things. BY MR. TEW: Q I'm particularly interested in the one message that was sent about the in-route weather. I believe you know which one I'm talking about. A The bowling alley message, sir? Q And that was sent by the dispatcher, I believe? A Yes. There was two messages actually. There was a segment before that which is a National Weather Service type of message that gives us data on -- it gives us the rough information sent from the MWS. But the dispatcher was able to very distinctly and descriptively give us an idea of what was going on with the bowling alley message, and it basically described weather to the left and to the right of course, but from our position to the airport was clear from the message. Q Okay. Did you and the captain discuss this message between you? A Yes. I received the -- the ACARS machine's off to my right. So, I received the message, read it and gave it to the captain, and we discussed it, and we concurred. We had the radar on the entire time, and what we saw visually and what we saw from our radar picture was that Little Rock was still clear of weather. Q When the dispatcher sent in this message and suggested expediting your arrival into Little Rock, what did that mean to you and the captain? A Do not expect any delay -- do not accept any delays, basically don't necessarily let ATC vector us any further than we had to to get to Little Rock. Because of the weather that day, a lot of activity, there were a lot of aircraft being vectored around that night. So, I'm assuming that he wanted us to go directly to Little Rock, and that's what we took it as to mean. Q Okay. Was that discussed with the captain, that particular statement? A Yes, sir. Q What did you do to expedite your arrival into Little Rock? A Well, it turns out we didn't have to. We were on a direct course for Little Rock at that point, and we just continued straight ahead from -- to the airport. So, there was no other vectors given that night. There was no delays given, and we were already at our planned mach speed at that point. Q Could you tell us what training on the operation and interpretation of airborne weather radar you have received at American Airlines? A There was classroom discussion on the operation of the radar unit, the basically knobs and switches associated with the radar unit, and then in the aircraft, on initial operating experience, the check airman gave us interpretation of the radar. So, there was two actual -- one classroom and one operational side instruction. Q Okay. So, you get the -- the actual hands-on in the airplane then? A Yes, sir. Q When you received your hands-on, do you recall if you had weather during the flight? A No, sir. I believe both instances was VFR -- Q Okay. A -- conditions. Q What -- how did you discuss it with or how did the check captain discuss it with you then at that point? A The check man, he can simulate the tilt by tilting the radar down and getting ground clutter and explaining what the cells will look like and how to interpret that information. So, he substituted what he had available at the time. Q Were you using the airborne weather radar while you were en route? A In the flight to Little Rock? Q Yes. A Yes, sir. Q Could you tell us what -- what did you see on the radar screen while you were en route? A We concurred with the dispatch messages about the weather to the left, and we could see the weather moving off to the east, and we didn't depict any colored areas, other than green, which indicated cells but light cells. Q Was this airborne weather radar being used during the descent -- A We had -- we had the radar on the entire time. Q Okay. Who was operating it? A Both the captain and I were operating the radar. Q Could you tell us, what did you see on the radar during the descent into Little Rock? A The descent, I remember seeing the activity on the radar, and on the descent, we actually were able to see the city lights of Little Rock. So, it's fair to say the radar was working, but our route from where we were at that point to the airport still looked like we were able to continue the approach without maneuvering or hit -- or going -- we were able to avoid weather at that point. Q Okay. Was there weather depicted on the radar during the descent? A Yes, sir. Q Did you discuss it among yourselves, the two of you? A I don't believe -- I believe we -- we were looking at the radar. We were both manipulating it. I don't remember exactly what we said, but there were several conversations, and after reviewing the cockpit voice recorder, I know we were talking about avoiding weather and making reference to the weather out there in front of us. Q Would you describe what you saw on this airborne weather radar while you were on the approach? A The final approach segment? Q Yes. A I believe my focus from the time we turned final to touch down, I picked up the airport, and my focus was basically on the visual conditions, that I was able to see the airport on the final in- bound, and I don't really recall what the radar was showing at that point. Q Did you receive the ATIS for Little Rock? A Yes, sir. Q When the controller on the ATC transcript -- Page 1, if you need to look. I don't think you need to, but it's there if you wish. When the controller mentioned a thunderstorm moving through the area and later said, "It appears we have the second part of the storm moving through", what did you visually observe of the weather at this time? A We could see the activity, if you will, lightening, off in the distance, and we still had the city lights, but I didn't know what the relative position was, and the radar concurred with our visual picture that we were able to see the field, and the approach still looked -- we were able to make it without -- with being able to avoid the weather. Q So, you were able to see the weather on the radar then? A I believe so, yes. Q Could you describe what that weather looked like? Do you recall? A I believe -- no, I -- I -- in all honesty, I -- all I remember seeing is the weather on the approach. What segment are we talking about specifically? Because there are several segments here. Q This is -- this is when you were in the descent. A Okay. On the descent, the weather was to the left and moved off to the right, and the field from our position looked clear. Q The controller gave two reports of wind shear during the descent and the approach. A Yes, sir. Q What concern was there by you or the captain of the possibility of wind shear during the final approach or during landing? A It gave us a heightened awareness of the possibility of receiving a wind shear warning, but at that point, that was a wind shear alert, and the captain made the adjustment on his final landing speed by increasing the speed to 20 knots, which is procedure. Q Okay. So, then you increased to 20 knots. That's kind of planning for it. Did you brief this at all, the increased awareness or anything like that? A Well, the captain mentioned gear up plus 20, and I concurred. Q What training did you receive at American concerning wind shear and operations into areas of suspected wind shear? A We had classroom discussion and in the simulator on our landings and take-off sessions. We saw the phenomenon of what it can do to our -- the landing and the approach and the fluctuation in air speed and vertical speed. So, there was classroom instruction and simulator instruction. Q Referencing the CVR transcript again, there were two statements in there. One was, "We've got to get over there quick", and there was a second one where the captain said, "I don't like that. That's lightening." What message was trying to be conveyed in the cockpit at this time? A When the captain made the comment about "that's lightening", no pilot likes lightening, and it was off to the distance, and we could see the weather, and it just went to our mindset that we're going to have to land as soon as practical, and if we had a delay or other vectors, we wouldn't be able to continue the approach. Q There was no concern about flying into -- A Excuse me? Q There was no concern about flying into the lightening and the weather there? A We never flew into lightening. We would never fly into a thunderstorm. Q Reference the CVR transcript again, do you feel that the captain had the airport in sight well enough to perform a visual approach? A After reviewing the CVR transcript, I -- there's two points I'd like to make here. The first one is after the incident, what I recall is I had the field from the time we turned base to final and all the way down the runway, and I realize now that the captain may have lost the airport in sight, but I don't remember those comments. Q You were initially planning for an approach to Runway 2- 2 Left? A Correct. Q What was the reason for the change to 4 Right? A The wind shifted, and the winds were favoring 4 Right. Q Okay. When you were descending into Little Rock, they gave you the winds, and -- and the tower reported the high crosswinds relative to the runway which is why you changed runways, you said. A Correct. Q How did you or the captain ensure that you conformed to the crosswind limitations in the manuals? A Well, we know what the crosswind limits are, and we used basically a crosswind reference tool that is very close in proximity to the actual numbers, and, so, from using that rule, we actually calculated the crosswinds. Q How does American train you to determine what the crosswind component would be for a landing? A Well, the crosswind training at American Airlines is via the performance manual. Q Did you reference your manual or did the captain reference his manual or did he ask you to or -- A Not at this point, no, sir. Q Did you brief or plan for the crosswinds, either one of you? A Yes, we did. Once we heard the runway conditions, that restricted our crosswind limit to 20 knots, and we reduced the crosswind limit at that point for us to 20 knots. Q Was there any concern among you in the cockpit concerning these high crosswinds? A I would say we were -- I was alert and concerned, but these are conditions I've encountered before, and I'm sure Captain Bushman has as well. Q Did you voice your concern to the captain? A I don't recall exactly what I said. Q Do you recall what his response was? A No, sir, I don't. Q Regarding the wet runway crosswind limitations and the restricted visibility crosswind limitations, how were they discussed or briefed? A The crosswind limitations for reduced visibility was not discussed, and we were in visual conditions, and I think this might be a prudent point for me to make, a point that I truly recall, and after reading the transcripts and after looking at the data, I realized that it may not seem plausible, but I really recall from the time I took off from Dallas, we took off from Dallas, to the time we were on final, I don't remember ever penetrating a thunderstorm or a cloud or weather. We were in visual -- VMC conditions, not that we had VFR cloud clearances, but we were in visual conditions, and, so, the reduced visibility limits weren't discussed. We could see the runway, and the RVR reports that we received didn't concur with what we were seeing. Q So, what you're saying is that you saw the airport? A Yes, sir, and they didn't apply. Q Because, as you know off the CVR, there were several statements where the captain apparently didn't. What training on these crosswind limits did you receive at American? A There's classroom instruction and then the simulator on landings and take-offs again when we go over the crosswind limits. Q During this approach to 4 Right, what was the crosswind limit for the landing on -- on the runway? A I believe we were using the 20-knot crosswind limit. Q I'm sorry. I didn't hear you. A The 20-knot crosswind limit. Q Would the 1800 RVR have come into effect? A No, sir. We didn't -- we -- I had -- we had visual or I thought we had visual. Q The controller gave you 1600 RVR. Does that -- does that come into effect as far the decision as far as the landing limits with American? A Which limits are you referring to? Q The reduced visibility crosswind limits. A As I mentioned, the data that we were seeing didn't concur with what the controller was giving us, and I don't remember discussing it with the captain, but I don't remember using that -- that limit. Q Okay. He didn't -- did he discuss it with you at all? A No, sir. Q Okay. Was there any other discussion in the cockpit concerning the winds after that first initial time when you added 20 knots? A I don't recall. Q Could you describe the weather conditions as they appeared when you were initially approaching the airport, during the decision to change from Runway 2-2 Left to 4 Right, and while on final approach for us? A The weather conditions? Q Yes. A Rick had mentioned -- Captain Bushman had mentioned that he had the -- the field in sight, I believe, on his side, and we were given the winds, and we decided to request Runway 4 Right. The controller gave us a turn to the downwind for 4 Right, to the right. At that point, we were heading south, and I believe there was weather in front of us, and I mentioned that on -- to the captain, and I think the captain makes reference to it, and there was weather, and it was on the ATC transcript as well, the weather between the airport and us, and we lost visual conditions with the airport at that point. Q Right around the airport, was there any weather that you could see or was it further off or could you describe what you saw there? A We were heading south at this point on the downwind, and we could visually see and the radar concurred with weather in front of us and off to the west, approaching the airport. We -- we weren't pointed in that direction. We couldn't really see anything at that point to the -- to the west. Q How about when you turned back on final, back towards the airport? What were you seeing there? A The -- I had the cloud off to my right or the weather off to my right that I -- that I reported to ATC, and he vectored us right around it. So, we remained in the -- we remained clear of clouds at that point, and then I focused in on the airport as I picked it up, completing the base to final turn. Q Is an approach briefing required for all approaches? A The captain's required to -- the pilot flying is required to give an approach briefing, yes. Q If you wish to reference Exhibit 2K -- A Excuse me. Q -- or 2 Kilo maybe. A Yes, thank you. Q Could you tell us -- A What page, sir? Q I'm sorry? A Okay. I've got it. Yes, sir. Q Could you tell us what the required items on the approach briefing for visual approach would be? A For a visual approach or an ILS, I believe at that point, we briefed the same procedures. We -- we still brought out our approach plate, and we still -- I briefed the applicable points that we would use and need on the approach. So, the briefing is still valid for a visual. Q Okay. In this case, what would that be the required procedure off this list for the approach you were doing? A Well, 4 Right, the facility, the frequency and the final approach course, the airport elevation, the decision missed approach chart -- missed approach procedure. Q Who is responsible for the approach briefing, and when is it done? A Prior to the approach, and the pilot flying is responsible. Q Did Captain Bushman do a briefing for this runway? A He -- no, sir. He -- prior to starting the descent, Captain Bushman and I, we both thought we were landing on Runway 2-2. So, he briefed Runway 2-2. On the descent, when we learned of the headwinds for 4 Right and changed -- requested that runway, we -- I -- excuse me. I briefed 4 Right after I got it out to assist the captain because he was flying the aircraft at that time. Q I understand that Captain Bushman was the flying pilot, and you say he briefed you for Runway 2-2 which you were initially going to, is that correct? A Yes, sir. Q Did he provide a full briefing for that runway or -- A I believe so. I can't remember entirely at that point -- this point. Excuse me. Q Were any additional items covered in the approach briefing at Little Rock, other than the required items? A When he made the brief at 2-2? Is that your reference? Q For 4 Right. I'm sorry. A For 4 -- I did the briefing for 4 Right, and I briefed the pertinent points, and Captain Bushman talked about the 20 knots, and he did increase the vero speed to 20 knots. So, I would say he did include those two items. Q Do you feel that your preparation for the approach to Runway 4 Right was adequate? A Given the information that we had at the time, I believe so. Q Was the preparation for the approach in accordance with American Airlines' procedures? A I believe so. Q Who's responsible for calling for checklists? A The pilot not flying will perform the -- what checklist are you referring to, first? Q The descent before landing. A The descent before landing, the pilot not flying will ensure that both items -- both checklists will be called out. Q Were the descent before landing checklists called for and accomplished? A The descent checklist was accomplished, and the before landing checklist was accomplished, but I don't believe we heard it on the CVR tape, and I can't recall specifically when the completion of the before landing checklist was complete, around the time before you do flaps, and that's what I recall of the last item being checked. Other than the enunciator light, which is a light on the panel, that checklist was being performed in a compressed time, and it was very compacted at that point, and I don't recall making -- I don't recall the statement. I don't remember at that point, but I do remember making the 40 flap call, and that is one of the last items. Q Okay. The CVR recorded you stating "we're getting pretty close to this storm, we'll keep it tight, if we have to", and the captain stating, "we're going right into this". Could you tell us what you were seeing at that point, and what you were doing reference these statements? A Was this on downwind? I believe. Q Yes. A On down -- as I mentioned, there was weather on downwind to the south, and it was -- and if we continued at our -- this approach, on downwind, we would go into the weather at that point. So, we made the comment on Rick made the comment to keep it tight -- I believe he made the comment to call for a base or I made the comment, and we talked to the control tower at that point for a tight turn. Q When the controller advised you that the RVR was not 1600, where were you in relation to the localizer and the outer marker? A When we made that turn, I believe we just passed the marker, and I made the comment "1600", and Rick makes the comment "we're inside the marker". I said, "Good point", and we continued. Q Were you established on the approach? A I believe so. Q What is American's definition of being established on the approach? A I would list the stabilizer approach at a thousand feet, landing configuration, in an on position, to make a landing. Q On the localizer on board with the glide slope? A Yes, sir. On an ILS, yes, sir. Q Was there any discussion in the cockpit about possibly diverting to another airport? A I -- at this point, I don't recall. Prior to departing, we talked about the alternates. Q Was there any discussion in the cockpit about possibly delaying the landing? A At this point, I don't recall. I just remember there was alternates discussed, and we talked about the weather at that point. Q What training or guidance did you receive at American concerning a decision to abandon an approach? A I believe it revolves around the stabilizer approach theory, that on an ILS or VFR visual approach, in the landing configuration, your stabilized sink rate is somewhere between 650 and 800 feet per minute sink rate. You're in the normal position to continue the approach, and if you -- and you're on speed. If your speed fluctuates, if your sink rate is excessive, if your deviation's left or right of course, move you out of a stabilizer approach parameters, then you don't meet the stabilizer approach definition. Therefore, you should go around. Q Who can call for abandoning the approach? A Either pilot. Q Did you call for a go-around at any time? A Yes, sir, I did. Q Did the captain respond to this? A He responded -- I don't remember what he said verbally. Apparently from -- after reviewing the CVR, after I made that comment, it sounds like after reviewing the tape, you can definitely hear the go and the around. It seems like he talked at the same time I did, and I looked over at him, and he was -- he brought the airplane back on course, back on center line. Q So, he didn't respond to you verbally? A Not verbally, but by him bringing the airplane back on course, I believed he -- he heard and responded that way. Q During a previous interview, you stated that both you and the captain knew the runway was wet. What discussion was there between you and the captain concerning the fact that the runway was wet? A Well, that goes back to the time-out limitation on crosswinds, and when the controller made the comment, there's rain on the field, we reduced the -- we had a discussion between ourselves in the cockpit about reducing the crosswind limit from 30 to 20 knots. I actually was confused at one point. I -- I asked -- said 25 because I know on a Cap-2 and Cap-3 approaches, there's different limitations, and Rick was confident it was 20, and that's what it -- Q Did you get the book out? A I -- I did get the book out, but Rick signaled me to put it away. He knew what it was, I believe. That's what I took it to mean. Q Did he get his book out? A No, sir, he did not. Q What special procedures for landing with the wet runway does American have and train on? A Again, on landings, take-offs and landings, we practice wet runway procedures, and we use a maximum reverse EPR of 1.3, unless the number's in the situation. Q Were the wet runway procedures covered in the landing briefing? A No, sir. Q Does American's procedures require wet runway procedures to be included in to a wet -- to a briefing, approach briefing? A I don't recall. They -- I believe it's up to the captain -- the -- it does say on the approach briefing that we can brief additional items. So. Q Had you ever covered -- covered that or seen that covered in a briefing in the short time you were with American? A No, sir. I don't remember. I don't recall. Q Okay. Reference Exhibit 2M and 2N, 2 Mike and 2 November, -- A Yes, sir. Q -- how is the before landing checklist accomplished, and by who? A The before landing checklist is a pilot not flying challenge and response and moving the mechanical checklist toggle associated with that item. The pilot not flying will assure that item has been accomplished, will challenge or respond on its accomplishment and move the toggle. Q So, the pilot not flying does the checklist? A The pilot not flying reads the checklist. Yes, sir. Q Okay. Which items on there would be -- does he respond to the items, too? A The pilot not flying -- no, sir. The pilot not flying will basically challenge and respond himself. Q Are there any items responded to by both pilots? A During the descent checklist, both pilots will concur and confirm the landing altimeters, but they are reset and cross-checked. Q How about the before landing checklist? A I don't believe so. No, sir. Q There's no items on the before landing checklist that are accomplished by -- that are responded to by both pilots? You've got - - I think you have it there in the before landing checklist. A No, sir. Q But the gear? A Excuse me? Q What about the gear? A Well, the captain -- Q Okay. What are American's procedures for the selection of brakes, manual versus auto brakes? A It's the captain's discretion. Q Is there any guidance given by American to help you in your choice? A There is quite a bit of talk on the techniques in the environmental section of the manual, but I believe it's -- it's really up to the captain's discretion on which he chooses. I've interpreted it that way, after reading the manuals. Q According to American's procedures, who is supposed to pull the spoiler lever upward arming the spoilers? A Prior to touch down? Q After the gear is down, you arm the spoilers. Who is supposed to pull the spoiler lever upward arming the spoilers? A What I recall, I believe either pilot can arm the spoilers. Q Is this how you were trained when you went through American? A In all fairness, sir, I've been out of training for one year, and I don't -- I mean it -- I'd been on the line for three months at that point, and I don't recall exactly all the training issues. But I have read, I have tried to recall a lot of this material and training that I received, and I believe in training, the pilot not flying would actually do it, but I'm not a hundred percent certain. Q How's it normally done on the line? Do you recall? A Well, on the line, the captains almost always arm the spoilers because of the proximity of where they are to the captain's seat. Q On the before landing checklist, is spoilers an item that requires a confirmation by two pilots or just -- A No confirmation was required. Q Just -- just the non-flying pilot confirms it himself? A Correct. Q Who armed the spoilers on the accident flight? A I believe after the gear was down, Captain Bushman armed the spoilers. Q Did you call-out that the spoiler lever was armed? A I don't believe so, sir. Q What do you know about the effects of the spoilers not extending on landing? A It does increase your landing roll-out. Q Were these effects discussed or trained at American? A Yes, sir. Q On final approach, were the flaps set at the final flap setting prior to a thousand feet? A I don't believe so. I believe what I -- at that point in time, we were turning base to final. Rick had armed the spoilers. I looked down to confirm the checklist and make sure we were getting everything. I noticed the flaps were at 28, and my thousand-foot call- out, it was -- it all happened at the same time, and I asked Rick if he wanted 40 flaps. Q What's the American's normal procedures for when they should be set? A Established on an IFR or an ILS by a thousand feet. Q Describe any instruction or training at American concerning the definition of a stabilized approach. A Well, I was discussing that earlier, about the concept of final approach segment, landing configuration, sink rate 650 to 800 feet per minute, descent, on speed, and in a normal position to continue the approach to make a landing. Q What were you trying to do when the approach was no longer stabilized? A I can't remember -- can't recall any specific discussions, but on an unstabilized approach, you have to go around. Q Did you feel like the approach was stabilized at all times? A The only time that I felt uncomfortable was when I made the go-around statement, and Captain Bushman brought the aircraft back. Q Was the aircraft continuously on the glide slope and on the localizer? A I believe the glide slope, but not the localizer. We were drifting, and that's where I had one indication that we were drifting off to -- I said we're off, and then I said we're way off, and I made the go-around. Q What did the flight instruments indicate at that time? A That we were drifting to the right. Q About how far? Do you recall? A No, sir. Q Did you inform the captain when you noticed you were drifting to the right or did you say anything to him? A I said, "We're off". Q Reference the CVR transcript, at about 30 seconds before touch down, someone said, "We're off course", and then you said, "We are way off." Describe to us what these statements meant to you. A We were on the final approach segment. We were -- I made -- I believe I made my -- my call-outs. I was monitoring the instruments. I was looking inside and outside. I saw the aircraft drifting right, and as it continued to drift right, I believe one third of the dot's a call-out. If it's -- goes beyond that, I called out "We're off", and we continued, and then I said, "We're way off". Q What were you seeing out the window at that time? A I believe I saw the -- we're on final. The right-hand side runway lights was drifting to my left. Q Can you -- is this the point where you said you said "go around"? A Yes, sir. Q Did you feel any reluctance to speak up during this flight due to the fact you were a new hire who was flying with a chief pilot? A No. I felt pretty comfortable with Captain Bushman at this point, and I was more concerned about the flight, and, so, I basically spoke my mind at that point. Q After touch down, according to American's procedures, what call-outs are made concerning the spoilers and reversers? A There is no call-out regarding the spoilers, and the reversers is -- we're confirming that the thrust reversers are actually working normally. So, we're calling out the blue lights and the amber lights, confirming that the spoiler buckets are unlocked and operating. Q Okay. You said there's no call-out for spoilers. A No, sir. Q How about if they don't extend? A No, sir. No call-out. Q What is -- what's American's procedures to do if the spoilers don't extend? A The captain will manually deploy the spoilers. Q Did you look at the spoiler lever to see if the spoilers had extended automatically? A I -- I've had a lot of time to think about this issue, and, unfortunately, I can't remember exactly what position they were, but in all fairness, when we touched down, and I made that comment "We're sliding", it felt like we were hydroplaning, and I was not in a comfortable position in my seat as I'm sitting here, and I was being thrown around a little bit. So, when I was being tossed around, I did look out the thrust reverser handle and the quadrant. I could see Rick going to reverse thrust, but I don't remember the position of the spoiler handle. Q According to American's procedures, what is the engine pressure ratio or EPR power setting during reverse procedures on the dry runway? A On a dry runway, it's 1.6 with an overshoot to 1.8 back to 1.6, and I -- I kind of misspoke. There is a call-out on the landing roll-out. When you decelerate under a hundred knots, then you call out 80 knots and stow the reversers by 60 knots. So, that is a call- out on landing roll-out. But we never got to that point. Q Thank you. According to American's procedures, what is the engine pressure ratio or EPRs again power setting for a landing on a wet runway? A 1.3. Q Describe your training on this procedure, the wet runway procedure, at American Airlines. A It was again in the simulator, landings and take-offs. We saw the effect of going in the reverse thrust and the possible -- I believe it was the rudder-braking issue came up a few times, and that's what we really discussed, and why the reason of the 1.3 is. But beyond that, I don't remember specifically. Q Okay. I'm going to get into the rudder braking in a second, too. After touch down, what were the EPR indications when the captain first went into reverse? A I remember looking at the indications and call -- I don't know if I made a call-out, but I remember a 1.8 and a 1.6, respectively. Q And you don't remember making a call-out then? A I don't remember making a call-out. Q Is that a required call-out? A No, sir. It's just a habit, what you're looking for. Q How about if it -- it would be a call-out if it exceeds the normal setting? A Excuse me. I don't -- I don't know if it's a call-out. Q Okay. Reference Exhibit 2KK, 2 Kilo Kilo, -- A Excuse me. Thank you. I have it. Q Okay. Do you recall information in the manual that stated that as reverse thrust continues above 1.3 EPR, rudder effectiveness decreases until the rudder provides no control at about 1.6 EPR and 90 knots? A That was discussed in the classroom. Q Did you receive any training on this? A I -- I can't remember receiving any training. Q After the touch down, on the CVR, you said, "We're sliding". A Yes, sir. Q Could you describe to us what you saw and did from the time you started sliding? A We touched down firm and flat, and I remember the nose being cocked off to the left of center line when we touched down, and the sliding comment just refers to what I believed, we were hydroplaning. We didn't have control of the aircraft, directional control of the aircraft, and Captain Bushman went into reverse at that point. Shortly after that, we -- I felt the sensation of being tossed around, if you will, from right to left, and I don't remember exactly the sensations of -- of the G forces and what was actually going on inside the cockpit. I just remember not being able to sit in my seat, and I was shifting. Rick went into thrust reverse, and then, shortly after that, he came out, and for a little bit, I mentioned earlier that I thought he may be thinking about going around to get out of there, but after that, he went back in the thrust reverse, and he was, what I would describe as, manipulating the thrust reversers. Around that time, in earlier interviews, I described this sensation of being controlled from the tail or a tail slap sensation. We continued sliding, and it felt like we went off the left side of the runway or to the left side of the runway, and at about that time, Captain Bushman got control of the airplane or felt he was getting control of the airplane, and then we ran out of runway. Q Did you feel yourself slowing down at all? A No, sir. Q You just mentioned that the captain came out of reverse. Could you describe the captain's actions, including that from the time the airplane began to slide until it went off? A I can't remember it specifically. I just remember distinctly him coming up, going into reverse, coming out of reverse, and I don't think it was simultaneous, and I don't remember exactly, but I just remember the manipulation of the thrust reversers, and then at one point, after this manipulation, he went back into reverse consistently, and then it happened very quickly. It went off the end of the runway at that point. Q Okay. You just said manipulation of the reverse. Are you meaning -- what are you meaning by that? A Well, I -- I just saw his hands around the throttle quadrant, the reverse throttle quadrant, and I don't remember exactly what the motions were, but it wasn't one smooth continuous reverse thrust all the way down the runway. Q What have you been taught at American concerning hydroplaning or skidding, and did you receive any training on this? A I can't remember the training we really received, but I remember discussion about hydroplaning, stay on the antilock brakes, don't pump the brakes, stay on the brakes. Q Now, one question just given to me. Did you feel you were on a visual approach? A At the point that we turned base to final, I thought we had -- I had the airport in sight, and I thought Captain Bushman had it in sight, but we never called for a visual, and we had our instruments tuned. So, it's something that I -- I -- I had visual at the airport. Q Did you use the windshield wipers? A Yes. Captain Bushman called for the wipers, and the rain stopped, and I turned them off. Q What setting did you turn the wipers on? A I -- I don't remember. In fact, I think I turned mine on first, and then I realized he needed his. So, I went to turn his on, and then the rain stopped, and I turned it off. Q Okay. Well, I appreciate your coming here and answering these questions. I know it's a very traumatic event. Thank you, Mr. Origel. MR. TEW: Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you. Before we pursue with the parties, we will take a break of about 15 minutes, and, Mr. Origel, we will continue with the questions from the parties and then this panel as soon as we return, and be sure Mr. Origel can get off the side there where he can take a break as well. THE WITNESS: Thank you. CHAIRMAN HALL: We'll stand in adjournment for 15 minutes. (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) CHAIRMAN HALL: We will reconvene this hearing of the National Transportation Safety Board. We will continue with the questions from the Technical Panel. Let me note that Mr. Haueter has now arrived from Washington, D.C., and taken his position on the Board of Inquiry, and welcome him, and some of our other staff have arrived as well, and Mr. Feith is now back where he appropriately belongs at the Technical table, and I would ask the Technical Panel if there are additional questions of this witness. MR. FEITH: Yes, sir. I have a few follow-up, and I know that Mr. Eick does, too. CHAIRMAN HALL: Okay. Well, please proceed. INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL BY MR. FEITH: Q Thank you, Mr. Origel, for -- for being here today. We appreciate it. I know that this is a difficult situation, and the questioning is sometimes a little bit intense, and recall is difficult. I just have a few follow-up questions to some of the answers that you gave Mr. Tew. In regards to the dispatch message that you received on ACARS referring to the bowling alley, is this a common term or a phrase that -- that is used between flight crews and -- and that of the dispatchers at American? A No, but -- excuse me. What the dispatcher was doing was describing free-text the weather conditions on the prior message, which was the SIGMEC, and the SIGMEC is rather long, and you have to look at way points and VORs to figure out the thunderstorm area, the box, if you will, and through a free-text message, he was able to articulate very clearly what the message prior meant. I wouldn't call it a normal or proper phraseology message, but it's a descriptive message that dispatchers sometimes use as a tool to get their message across to flight crews. Q And just following up on that, that other part, where there was a bit of a sense of urgency to try and expedite your arrival, as far as that's concerned, is it typical of the dispatchers to provide such information to get you on the ground or is that still a decision that's left in the cockpit, I mean, as far as influencing your decision or the captain's decision to continue the -- the approach in this case, given the weather conditions? A The captain has final authority of the aircraft, and any information that's given the captain is for his judgment to use how he wishes, and I believe that the dispatcher was just trying to convey a sense that there was weather off to the west, and as I mentioned, Rick and I believed the message tried to convey do not accept any vectors or unnecessary delays. But it was the captain's decision to continue and to disseminate the information as he -- as he chose. Q But as far as influencing you as a crew, because it's two of you there making a decision to continue the approach, given your status as the first officer, and you said that you were comfortable with the captain, did you feel comfortable given the fact that you were looking out the window, you had acknowledged between the two of you that there was thunderstorms moving across the airport that was reiterated by the controller that the storm had moved over the top of the airport? All of these things, when you look at it with that type of message and the decision to continue, I mean what was it that may have influenced or put you over the edge to continue that approach versus abandoning the approach, given the level of information you had? A Well, that's what's -- it's a good question that I've been thinking about, and it really revolves around the information that we had didn't concur with what we were seeing. In other words, the free-text message, the bowling alley message specifically, described what we were seeing, and the radar was showing the line to the west and to the east, and the airport from our position was clear of thunderstorm activity. The tower made a note in a transmission that weather moving from the airport north to northwest, I believe, and I -- after reviewing the transcripts, but the information we had and the level of activity we were seeing didn't necessarily concur, and as I mentioned in one of the transmissions, the weather seemed to be farther off than what the tower had thought. So, given our past experience, I've been in weather situations that are similar, and I thought it was a situation that was -- needed our attention, to be alert and to be cautious, but I believed it was at that point acceptable to continue the approach. Q What kind of radar do you use in the airplane? Is it color weather radar? A Yes, sir. Q Do you recall what you saw on that radar as far as color bands in determining that the thunderstorm was in the proximity of the airport? A We had -- well, to go back, and basically from right after the accident to this point, I never remember seeing red or high- intensity weather, other than green cells, and none of them over the airport. Q Does American have a policy regarding flight in and around areas of convective activity? A I don't recall the exact policy, but no crew member would ever -- is supposed to go through thunderstorms or microburst activity. You just avoid those. You just avoid that kind of activity. Q But American doesn't have a policy that says if you know that convective activity exists, that you want to stay three-five-10 miles away from that activity? A I don't recall, but convective activity is a rather broad -- we have convective activity quite a bit in the United States, and it's a warning to pilots to be alert, but I don't recall a specific policy describing a parameter to avoid. Q How far would you say you were away from the cell that you saw the lightening in? A I -- I don't want to guess and be inaccurate, but I just remember from our position at the time we saw the weather, I believe Captain Bushman made a PA to the passengers at that point. That's what made -- prompted me to give the tower a call about the lightening, and it was off in the distance, and I'd be very -- I'd just be taking a guess, but I knew it was moving in our direction. Q And I know that you've had the opportunity to talk to Mr. Tew on several occasions with the group, and, so, pardon my -- my redundance if some of this may come up. I'm just trying to establish. We're talking about convective activity. We got a report from the air traffic controller now that there's a heavy rainshower moving across or thunderstorm moving across the airport. A Yes, sir. Q Is that considered convective activity for you? A I would say it's convective activity in the sense that it's -- it's weather. It's -- it's raining, but there's no procedure to -- to leave the -- I mean I don't recall receiving a convective weather report at that point. He said heavy rain on the field, but I don't really recall a procedure or parameters to use in those cases. Q One of the things that I noticed in the transcript that you had already talked to Mr. Tew about this morning, and I think in previous conversations, was the fact that you never lost sight of the air field. However, there is a comment that you made with regard to sighting of the field and the fact that you "had lost sight of the field" when you were reporting to the air traffic controller -- when you were reporting to the air traffic control that, you know, you had lost sight of the airport. What -- what was the reference made as far as that was concerned since you've told us that you never lost sight of it? A Well, there's a couple segments in here, and I believe I mentioned that from the final approach when we turned base to final to touch down, I did not lose sight of the field, of the airport -- of the runway. But prior to that, on the downwind, when we were actually performing a visual approach to Runway 4 Right, we were continuing, and we were about to make the base turn visually, and a cloud moved between the field and us. So, I lost sight at that point, and at several points prior to that, Rick -- when we were approaching the air field, Rick had mentioned he had the city lights and had the field, and then we went over the top, and I -- we lost the field, and we had ground references, but in reference to weather reports, the only time I lost the field or -- excuse me -- the only time that weather was influenced or had me -- was -- I wasn't able to see the field at that point was because of that cloud between us and the field. Excuse me. Q Captain Bushman was flying the ILS on -- on the final approach? A I -- yes, sir. Q And your -- your view was inside the cockpit monitoring glide slope and localizer or outside the cockpit? A I was using -- I was inside and -- and outside. I was cognizant of the weather outside, but I was monitoring inside. Q And I know that you may have answered this question, but you made the comment, "We're way off". What -- what was the reference to? Was that something you saw out the window or something you saw in the cockpit? A I -- I believe it was the ILS HSI, horizontal situation indicator, that I was monitoring at that point, and I looked up, and I did see the runway lights at that point. I don't remember at what point in the approach or what point in the deviation that I made those comments, but it was -- in my mind, as I sit here, it was actually two indications that we were moving off course, the HSI and the runway. Q Did it ever cross your mind at all to intervene when the captain, right after you made that statement, "We're way off", the captain made the statement, "I can't see it"? Were you concerned at any time, and had you thought about intervening? A I -- I didn't hear that comment, "I can't see it", and -- and when Mr. Tew visited me in the hospital, and now that I read the -- these transcripts, there's a lot of comments from the captain that I don't recall. Q With regard to the final segment of flight, where the controller had provided a fair amount of wind information, given the fact that there had been some earlier discussion by you and the captain regarding the crosswind component and how much was acceptable, -- CHAIRMAN HALL: Excuse me. Now, I -- gentlemen back in the corner, we're not going to be doing television interviews during this proceeding in this room. So, you take your equipment and move it out, please, while we wait. I made that announcement. This room is for the purpose of this proceeding. It's not a television studio. (Pause) CHAIRMAN HALL: Proceed. BY MR. FEITH: Q Let me just go back. You had been provided quite a bit of wind information regarding the changing wind conditions and in fact a couple of wind shear alerts -- A Yes, sir. Q -- almost all the way down to touchdown by the controller. A Yes, sir. Q Given the fact that there had been some earlier discussion about the maximum crosswind limits for this particular operation, and the fact that in the procedures as we see them and the limitations that are in the manual that are basically driven by visibility, did -- did you ever think about pulling the manual out to just validate -- A Well, as I mentioned, -- Q -- the -- A -- on the downwind, when the heavy rain comment was made by the controller, I was concerned, and we actually -- the captain and I did discuss, and I had a conversation with him, and I actually did go to the manual in my kit bag to pull up the information, and when I pulled out the manual, Captain Bushman basically gave me the sign that he was confident. I assumed he was confident and knew the answer. I don't know, but he had me put it away. Q I don't want to belabor this, and it's hard because, unfortunately, Captain Bushman isn't -- isn't here to defend that -- that position, but you had enough of a concern to start to pull the manual out. Given the fact that then the RVR that was reported went below 3,000, did that not change your thinking to -- to the idea that we had a lower crosswind limit? A As I sit here right now, I can remember that was an issue in my mind, but after concurring with the captain, he had me put the manual away, he seemed confident and comfortable in the position, and we continued the approach, and -- and as I sit here now, there's a lot of things I would do differently, if the opportunity ever arose again or that situation arose again. Q Well, we hope it doesn't. A Well, the weather conditions I'm talking about. I would never -- Q And just a couple of clarifying points. You had talked about that the captain had briefed for originally landing on Runway 22. Can you tell me typically when that briefing would occur, at least what segment of flight that would have occurred? A It was in the descent -- after the -- we received the ATIS, and we had some idea of what the weather was, what kind of weather the airport was experiencing, we would normally do the brief and the descent. Q Is that more or less than a hundred miles out? A I don't -- it's -- in a comfortable position after you receive the weather. Q And you had answered a question for -- for Mr. Tew about the spoilers and the fact that there isn't really a procedure to monitor whether the spoilers actually deploy or not after touchdown. You're checking thrust reverse unlocked and deployed but not the spoilers. Yet, if, for some reason, you or the captain had to manually deploy those spoilers for whatever reason, how would you come to knowing that that had to be done? A American does train that if the spoilers do not deploy automatically, that the crew members and the captain specifically is supposed to deploy the spoilers, and what it comes down to is just being alert of what's happening in the cockpit. But I don't remember a procedure. Q Okay. Well, who's -- how would you know that that didn't occur? A As -- Q The spoilers deploying automatically. A It's just being aware of what's happening in your aircraft, and I don't remember -- like I said, I don't remember a procedure, and that's one of the things that really does bother me about this flight, that if I missed that, but I -- I can't remember exactly what happened to them. Q Did you at any time -- I know that the captain was actually on the controls. Did you at any time look over? You said that you saw the captain's hand on the reverse -- the levers themselves and across the pedestal. Did you happen to notice if the handle had moved to a deployed position? A I looked over there, and I don't remember seeing them in a stowed position. When he was reversing the engines, the spoiler would be back, and his arm would be in a way that would block my view. So, I -- I couldn't see at that point. Q Do you know if the captain had -- could you tell from the movement of the aircraft whether the captain was using asymmetrical thrusts? You said that he had pulled the 1.6 and 1.8, respectively, on -- on the reverse thrust operation, if I heard you correctly. Was that -- do you know if that was intentional or was he just pulling to get both of them into reverse? A I -- when we landed, I did say "We're sliding" and said it felt like we were hydroplaning, and I'd only be speculating on what he was doing, but I assumed that it was an adverse situation, that he thought it was going into an emergency situation, and he needed more reverse. Q After the airplane was on the ground, you said "We're down, we're sliding". There is an unidentified person, either you or the captain, we couldn't really discern when we were listening to the -- to the tape, but someone said, "On the brakes", followed by an expletive, and then someone unidentified said, "Other one, other one, other one". Can you tell us in that sequence what was transpiring, and who may have made those comments? A I remember the captain making the brake comment, and I believe I mentioned that to Mr. Tew, but it was a surprise to me to see those comments so clearly and hear them on the -- on the CVR, "the other one, the other one, the other one", because they are clearly there, and I don't remember saying them or hearing them. Q Did you get on the brakes? A Yes, sir. Q Okay. When you got on the brakes, could you tell -- I mean were you standing on the brakes? Could you tell if the rudder pedals were deflected when you got on the brakes? A Yes. I -- I put all -- all the pressure I could on the brakes, and I don't remember displacement. I don't remember -- I'm not saying they weren't. I just don't remember the displacement. Q Do you recall having -- feeling any type of fight where you may have been pushing, where your left foot was exerting more force than your right, but you felt that you were pushing against the captain? A In all fairness, when he said brakes, and I saw the situation, I stood on those brakes as hard as I could. Q Okay. Going back real quick, what time did you get up that morning? Do you recall? A I -- I don't really recall. I've been asked that question, and I believe it was around 7 or 8, which would have been normal for Chicago. Q Okay. Thank you, Mr. Origel. Appreciate it. A You're welcome. CHAIRMAN HALL: Mr. Eick, I believe you have a couple of questions? MR. EICK: Yes, I do. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. BY MR. EICK: Q Mr. Origel, I'd like to ask you some questions in regards to your pre-flight planning and briefing in Dallas-Fort Worth before the departure. Can you tell me what type of products and what briefing you and the captain participated in before departure? A Yes, sir. We had a two-hour delay in Dallas. So, after checking our gate, we realized the delay. We went to the Operations area, and American provides computer banks for the flight crews to check weather and other information pertinent to flight. There's also a WSI, it's a pictorial and gives us a graphic illustration of the weather, and we checked both systems. We checked it right after we got down to Operations, and then as it became closer to flight time, we checked it again. As far as the pre-flight's concerned, when I went upstairs, the aircraft had arrived or they had switched an aircraft for us. I did an exterior pre-flight, did the -- I was in the middle of doing the cockpit pre-flight. Captain Bushman walked in with the required paperwork and the pictorial for us to look at. Q Did the WSI radar depict the severe thunderstorm watch or convective SIGMEC? A I don't remember a severe watch, a box, if you will, depicted on the WSI, but it did indicate the cells, and I could see the weather to the west and to the east of Little Rock. Q Do you remember the movement of the cells or the line of activity that was depicted? A I believe it was an extensive line north to south, to the west, but I don't remember the exact dimensions. Q In reference to the weather document or flight departure papers the captain brought into the cockpit, are those the same that are in Exhibit 2E? A May I look? Q Yes, and specifically on -- starting on Page 24, Exhibit 2E, Page 24, where we have the weather document, beginning at the Little Rock Terminal Forecast. Page 24? A Yes, sir. I'm looking at the documentation. There's several pages, and -- I believe so. Q Can you -- can you read me the terminal forecast for Little Rock, beginning at -- from 4Z? A For Little Rock from 4Z? "June 1st, 2330 Zulu, 02" -- Q You can start on the line from 4Z, if you'd like to, to get right to the time of the estimated time of arrival. A The copy isn't very clear, but -- CHAIRMAN HALL: Yes, Inspector? Let's get your microphone on, Mr. Baker. Yes, Mr. Baker, American Airlines is recognized. MR. BAKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to point out for the record that this particular exhibit was not specified for this witness, and he has not been prepared on it. CHAIRMAN HALL: Is that correct, Mr. Feith? Mr. Berman? MR. BERMAN: Our information is that he was advised to prepare for the entire two series of -- of exhibits which would include this one. MR. BAKER: That's not so indicated on our latest witness list, dated 1/18. MR. EICK: Well, the question basically revolves around the forecast that he recalls -- CHAIRMAN HALL: Well, wait a minute. I want to find out whether it's on the list or not. It's on the 1/25 list. Did you not receive the 1/25 list? MR. BAKER: Well, we have a 1/18 that says 2 Series. Is that the entire -- MR. BERMAN: Yes. I apologize if that wasn't clear to -- to American Airlines. The 2 Series indicates all -- all of the ones beginning with 2 up through the whole alphabet and triple alphabet. MR. BAKER: Thank you. CHAIRMAN HALL: Okay. And I'll point out that this information for this hearing is in volumes. So, there's a considerable amount of material in the 2 Series that might be referred to. Please proceed, Mr. Eick. BY MR. EICK: Q So, on the 4Z, what was the forecast for Little Rock Airport? A As I mentioned, the copy's very unclear. You can take a look at this. From -- I see Little Rock Airport, and 2-3-0-Z, 0-2-0-2-4, wind 1-8-0 gusts 15, up to 25 knots, six statute miles, scattered 3,000, broken 8,000, temporary, and that's basically all I can read. It's not very clear. CHAIRMAN HALL: Mr. Eick, if you have it, and you -- there are things you want read, you read them. MR. EICK: All right. BY MR. EICK: Q The forecast from 04Z, "winds 230 degrees at 12, gusting to 20 knots, visibility better than six miles, scattered clouds at 15, overcast at 3,500, temporarily between 04 and 08Z, winds variable at 25 knots, gusting to 40 knots, three statute miles and thunderstorm, light rain, mist, ceiling broken at 1,500 feet, in cumulonimbus clouds". Is that the forecast that you were basing your flight on? A I don't recall, sir. I don't. Q Okay. A I remember looking at the weather, looking at the WSI. We received the airport information, the terminal information. The airport was reporting VFR, I remember that, and we were dispatched. Q In your pre-flight planning package here, we have the TAF, the convective SIGMECs, the weather watch, American Airlines SIGMEC. Did you discuss this with the captain in the cockpit? A The captain brought the information. He said he was -- there was a concern about weather. I mentioned it to Mr. Tew. We did have two alternates, Nashville, I believe, and back to Dallas, and we did talk about the weather. We did look at the WSI, the pictorial. It was off to the west, and the weather was discussed. But we were still able to dispatch, and we did discuss it. Q All right. Were you -- did you receive any updated convective SIGMECs en route? A Yes, sir. Via the ACARS, there was a SIGMEC that was issued by the controller, and then shortly after that, we received the - - the free-text message. Q Do you remember what that convective SIGMEC referred to -- A It referred to -- Q -- or what it discussed? A It referred to a box of weather activity off to the west of Arkansas, and -- and I don't remember more than that at this point. Q Okay. You mentioned earlier that you had received some training in meteorology with American Airlines. Do you remember how many hours? One? Three? 10 hours? A I don't recall. Ground school was, I believe, a mixture of three weeks of ground school and simulator training. Q Not three weeks of pure meteorology? A No, sir. But it was definitely a topic, and I don't remember exactly how many hours. Q Did any of that training include any discussion on thunderstorms and thunderstorm dynamics, gust fronts, lines of severe thunderstorms, etc.? A As I sit here today, I -- I can't remember specifically, but I'm sure it did. Q Did the training discussed with your airborne radar about beam width, wave length -- do you know what the airborne weather radar wave length and beam width are -- A No, sir. Q -- on the airplane? A Do not. Q And do you -- you don't recall if that was in any of the training? A I don't recall. Q En route, you mentioned that the lightening and referring to it off the side of the airplane. Do you remember the frequency or type of lightening? Was it in cloud? Cloud-to-cloud? A It was -- it was cloud-to-cloud, and we did see the lightening, and we -- Captain Bushman made the PA to the passengers, and we did discuss it. Q He made the comment to the passengers why? Because of the frequency or the amount of illumination? A I think he just wanted to calm the passengers down, that he was aware of -- of the weather, and -- and what was going on outside on the left-hand side of the aircraft. Q With regards to the -- what you saw on your radar, you said that you only saw green returns? A Yes, sir. Q Did that match what you had seen in the WSI weather briefing or in reference to weather watches, the convective SIGMEC of a line of severe thunderstorms? A The WSI and the radar picture matched to the extent that they both showed the line of weather off to the west and to the east. The WSI is a black and white print-out, and it doesn't -- it's hard to see the intensity, if you will, without the color. But there are ways that you can read the WSI and extract the -- the information. As far as the correlation between the information we received at that point, we were more concerned with the weather activity we were seeing and instead of the information that we already gathered. Q One last question for you. As you were in the terminal area, and you were being provided the low-level wind shear alerts, you -- you made a comment about you disregarded them because they were alerts and not warnings? A It's not a disregard of the -- of the wind shear, but procedurally, a wind shear alert gives a crew that there's a possibility of encountering a wind shear on final, and the crew is -- Captain Bushman did, from what I understand -- that's why I interpreted it, when he used VERAP+20, he had that extra margin of safety on the final approach. But I don't remember or recall any procedure saying that a wind shear warning or alert is a discontinuation of an approach criteria. Q Did you have any discussion with the captain about initially we were planning on this southerly wind, landing to the south, and now thunderstorms are being reported in the vicinity, and now we have a northwest wind? Did you discuss what was causing that change in the wind? A The actual discussion of cause, no. Q Did it come to your attention or did you start to think of anything related to a gust front impacting the airport? A No, sir. Q All right. That's all the questions I have. Thank you very much. CHAIRMAN HALL: Very well. We'll move now to the tables for questioning. Per the Board's procedures, American Airlines will be given the opportunity to question last. We will begin with the Federal Aviation Administration and move across the tables from my right to the left, and then we will stagger after that who begins, so everyone has an opportunity to question first or in various sequence. If you'd please identify yourself, the Federal Aviation Administration table is recognized for questioning. MR. STREETER: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Lyle Streeter from the FAA. INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING BY MR. STREETER: Q Mr. Origel, could you please go to the cockpit voice recorder exhibit, which I believe is 12, the transcript? And if you would, sir, go to Page 40, and that's the page numbers marked down in the lower right corner. Now, it states elsewhere in here that you did get to listen to the CVR, is that correct? A Yes, sir. Q Okay. You talked earlier about the go-around statement. A Yes. Q Okay. There is an entry at 1149:58 which is unclear. A Correct. Q Is -- is that where the go-around statement occurred? A Yes, sir. Upon my review with Captain Mark Sisel and -- and another captain that was in the review with us, we both concurred that we can hear the "go" very clearly, and the rest of the go-around statement, it seems like there was communication from both Rick and I at the same time. Q Okay. I want to -- I want to ask one further question on that, but it'll require a change of page. While we're still on this page, if you'd look down to -- two lines down there, 1150:02, where it attributes to the captain the "I can't see it" statement, and I believe you stated you did not recall hearing that statement, is that correct? A No, sir, I do not. Q Okay. After that, it attributes to you a statement of "got it". A Correct. Q Did you make that statement? A Yes, sir. Q Do you recall what it was you saw or heard that -- and what did you intend by the "got it" statement? A Does he have control of the aircraft? Does he -- when -- when I'm looking over at him, after I make the go-around statement, and there's no go-around being executed, I looked over at him, and he's bringing the airplane back on course, and I just made the statement "you got it". Q Okay, sir. Now, in the same document, up to, I believe it is, Page 3, and this is the page, I think, that has the information that -- that you provided after your review of the tape. A Yes, sir. Q Going again to the go-around statement, where it only attributes -- you stated very clearly you heard the word "go". Do you have the page there now? A Yes, sir. Q Okay. There are two asterisks there. Do you recall -- does that indicate that there were two words that you think were stated after "go"? A It seems like, as I mentioned, I made -- I clearly remember, and I remember talking to Captain Dave Tew about this in the hospital, before anybody had heard the CVR, that I did make a go-around statement. So, I remember that very clearly. Upon listening to the CVR, it seems as though there's a statement that's talked over by the captain at that point. So, -- and it's unintelligible. You can't understand what is being said. Q Okay. Understood. Thank you, sir. Now, going back to the bowling alley message on ACARS, -- A Yes, sir. Q -- did you perceive that message as anybody pressuring you to -- to rush the trip or do anything unusual? A No, sir. I just looked at it as being very informative, of being able to concisely give us a pictorial of what the previous message was indicating. Q Okay. Did the -- did the captain say or do anything to indicate to you in any way that he perceived that as applying pressure to -- A I don't recall that being discussed. No, sir. Q I believe you had mentioned that at -- somebody asked you earlier about your -- whether you were tired or not at DFW. Let's go a little further. On the DFW-Little Rock leg, did you feel tired or fatigued in any way? A I don't recall. It was -- it was a short but busy flight, and the first officer's position in the DC-9 is busy. So, I remember being busy with the work, if you will, but I don't remember actually talking about being tired or -- or being distracted. Q Okay. During -- during that leg of the flight, do you recall the captain making any statement or taking any action or doing anything that led you to believe he was fatigued or tired? A During the flight, no, but during -- upon review of the CVR, I can hear a few things that indicate that. A yawn at one point, I believe. Q Okay. A yawn. Any actions or anything that caused you concern about whether he was fatigued? A At the time, I didn't remember that yawn or any comments. Q Okay. How about upon review? I think you mentioned you heard the yawn on review of the CVR. Is there anything else on the CVR that might have caused you concern about the captain being fatigued? A No, because after that point, things started happening pretty quickly, and we seemed to be both working pretty well and pretty alert. Q That's all the questions I have, sir. Thank you. CHAIRMAN HALL: The Boeing Commercial Airplane Group is recognized. MR. HINDERBERGER: Mr. Chairman, Ron Hinderberger from Boeing. Boeing has no questions. CHAIRMAN HALL: Thank you. The Allied Pilots Association is recognized. MR. ZWINGLE: Mr. Chairman, First Officer Origel is represented by the APA, Allied Pilots Association. With the concurrence of American Airlines, we request that we question the witness last. MR. BAKER: We concur. CHAIRMAN HALL: That's fine. The Association of Professional Flight Attendants? MS. LORD-JONES: Kathy Lord-Jones, Association of Professional Flight Attendants, and we have no questions. CHAIRMAN HALL: The National Weather Service? MR. KUESSNER: Yes. Bob Kuessner, National Weather Service. I do have several questions. BY MR. KUESSNER: Q I'd like you to -- to refer you back to Exhibit Number 2E, specifically Page 28, and I'm hoping, based on our experience with the TAF, that this will be more legible. Right across the top where it says, "Convective SIGMEC, 11C", -- A Yes, sir. Q -- I believe you -- you had indicated receiving that convective SIGMEC earlier in your testimony. Is this the one that you recall before you departed? A As I mentioned, it was part of our dispatch release. There was quite a bit of information, and I don't remember specifically, as I sit here today, looking at this, if it was in the dispatch release. Q Now, in -- in the -- in the line there, where it starts, "From", can you read that, "From 20 east northeast"? A Yes. Q So forth. A Yes. Q Just looking at that line, those are VORs, are they not, -- A Correct. Q -- that bound the area of the convective SIGMEC? A Yes, sir. Q And based on that, would you say that it included Little Rock and a substantial portion of Arkansas to the north-northwest and west? A Without the VORs in front of me right now and sitting here, I -- I remember that that was one of our concerns in looking at the WSI that showed that convective activity to the northwest. So, I remember the pictorial more than I do the text. Q Okay. Now, on the second line, where it starts out with "area", what does S-E-V-T-S mean to you? A Severe thunderstorms. Q And it would be moving then from 300 at 20 knots? A Correct. Tops of 4-5-0. Q So, assuming that Little Rock was already in this area with time, this is saying that with time, the area would be moving towards the southeast, and Little Rock would be further embedded in the area? A Yes, sir. Q Is there any reference to hail and wind gusts in that forecast? A Yes, sir. Hail of two inch, wind gusts to 70 knots possible. Q And you said that you received an update to this SIGMEC while you were in flight? A Correct, sir. Q Thank you very much. That's all I have. CHAIRMAN HALL: The Little Rock National Airport? MS. SCHWARTZ: Little Rock National Airport has no questions, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN HALL: The Little Rock Fire Department? MR. CANTRELL: Little Rock Fire Department has no questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN HALL: Okay. We'll return then to the Allied Pilots Association. The agreement would be that you want to go last. We'll have American Airlines next then. MR. BAKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. BY MR. BAKER: Q Good morning, Mr. Origel. A Good morning. Q When one thinks of a bowling alley, one gets a picture of a long, narrow affair. Either from the ACARS message or your radar displays, can you give us some sense of -- of the size of this bowling alley affair? A From the -- Q From your point of view. A From the flight deck, the weather that we were depicting and seeing visually at that point in the flight, as I mentioned, it was clear in front of us, and I -- I took it to mean that the bowling alley was a very large lane. So, it was a wide area. I don't know exactly the mileage. I think Mr. Trott would be better than I. Q Thank you. Did the tower controller ever give you a report on the runway conditions in terms of contamination or braking action? A I don't recall, sir, no. Q And, finally, did the tower controller ever withdraw the clearance to land? A No, sir. Q Thank you. We have no other questions. CHAIRMAN HALL: Allied Pilots Association? MR. ZWINGLE: With our deepest appreciation to the witness, we have no questions. CHAIRMAN HALL: Very well. We'll move to the Board of Inquiry and Mr. Sweedler. MR. SWEEDLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY BY MR. SWEEDLER: Q Good afternoon, Mr. Origel. I just have a couple of questions. CHAIRMAN HALL: Is your microphone on, Mr. Sweedler? If it is, I'm not hearing it. MR. SWEEDLER: Yes. INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY BY MR. SWEEDLER: Q I just have a couple of questions. I was curious as to the decision when you decided to switch runways to 4 R, I believe. The length of 4 R is 7,200 feet, and I was wondering if any consideration was given to using 4 Left which was an extra thousand plus feet. A Yes, sir. But it was NOTAM'd closed. Q Oh, okay. Thank you. One area that hasn't been discussed that I'd like to cover with you a little bit is could you just give us an idea of what occurred after the aircraft came to a stop? A As we hit -- let me back up. As we went off the end of the runway, I could see the runway lights coming up, and I knew we were going off the end of the runway, and I thought that -- I couldn't see anything in front of us, and all I thought was the gear would collapse, and we would continue to slide, and it's got to be okay, and then all of a sudden, I felt the impact, a left -- to my left side. I put my hands up because I saw Captain Bushman put his hands up off my -- in my peripheral vision, and all I remember is the explosion, if you will, of glass and debris from the left side. The airplane came to rest. Captain Bushman's seat was cocked to the left, and there was a hole in the left-hand side of the aircraft, and I couldn't see Captain Bushman. I called for him a couple times and -- and got no response. As the -- as I'm sitting in my seat, still strapped in, I felt this odd sensation, this odd pain, and it started to become excruciating, and as I sat there, I knew I had to get out. I couldn't see anything. It was completely dark in the cockpit. So, I unbuckled my seat. I stepped up on my right foot, and it was no problem, and I put my hand on the console. As I put my weight on my left foot, I collapsed behind the console, and I couldn't move, and I heard the passengers, and, so, I knew tower had -- was monitoring us, and I felt confident that they would call for the crash crew. My briefcase was just behind me, and it contained my Flight Manual, Part 1, my cell phone and other things. So, I -- the first thing I did, thinking of my family, I called my wife and just said you might get a call. So, I'm okay. Then I called the company to make sure that they were well aware of we had a problem, and the company was aware at that point, and then I saw passengers outside the aircraft. Quite a bit of time elapsed before fire crews arrived on the scene, and I don't have an exact time. I just remember the Little Rock, Arkansas, Fire -- and I do thank the Fire Department. I believe Robb was his name who helped me out and comforted me while -- they couldn't get me out because of the fire in the back of the aircraft, and I heard that. So, I -- I basically had to sit there until they were able to get the fire under control, and I was in pain, but I was okay, and I just wanted to make sure everybody was okay, and I could see the passengers, and I had the opportunity to thank the passengers who did help in the evacuation of the aircraft. I'm very appreciative of that. And the fire crews arrived and got me out, and then I went to the hospital, and that's basically it. Q Good. Thank you very much. I'm sorry I had to put you through that, but I appreciate that. Thank you, sir. A You're welcome. MR. SWEEDLER: That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN HALL: Mr. Berman? BY MR. BERMAN: Q Mr. Origel, thinking back to your -- your flying experience, both at American Airlines and the flying you did before that, have you ever had occasion on a previous flight to challenge a captain to go around? A From my civilian flying to American Airlines, I -- I was always a captain. When I was an instructor, I got my rating and became a flight instructor, I was hired on by a company to fly a KingAire and manage the department, and they sent me to school, and I was a captain there. The Learjet, I went right to the left seat in that, and I don't really have much experience as a second-in-command. Q Okay. Have you ever been challenged to -- to make the go-around? A In a simulator but not in life. Q Okay. Please tell me -- thinking back to what your -- what your understanding was at the time of your approach, what -- what was your understanding about the position of the thunderstorm cell that was nearest you, and what was its movement? A During the approach, we were descending. I remember I had a good picture of the aircraft and the runway. What I mean by that is I kind of had it in my mind, situational awareness, if you will, of where we were and where the aircraft was going and where the runway was, and I knew that the weather was off to the west, but because I could see the runway, I felt confident that we were in the clear. Q Hm-hmm. Do you recall thinking whether or not that that -- that cell or precipitation area that showed on your radar would have been approaching the Little Rock Airport or would you have thought it was leaving? A I -- I don't remember at this point. I think at that point, my visual cues was giving me more information than what I would see on my radar. Q Hm-hmm. What -- what direction do thunderstorms usually move from and to in the Central United States? A Northeast, I would say. Q They -- A In my experience. Q -- move from southwest to northeast? A Yes. Well, yes, sir. Q Hm-hmm. A In all fairness to that question, I -- I've seen thunderstorms move in all different types of directions. Weather doesn't -- weather has a mind of its own. Q Okay. I know you said that you didn't give explicit thought to the idea of a gust front during this approach, but are you familiar with what a gust front is in relation to a thunderstorm? A I've heard the term, but I've never experienced it, and I don't -- I've seen visual cue -- I mean classroom instruction on it, and -- but I don't remember ever experiencing it. Q Did American Airlines train you on -- on the -- the outflow of -- of air out of a thunderstorm, out of a downdraft from a thunderstorm? A In new hire class, we all monitored videos regarding some of these phenomenon. Q Was there any reason to believe that a gusty wind that would come up from the northwest could be from another -- a different atmospheric phenomenon? A I -- I can't answer that question. Q I guess my -- my bottom line question is in this area. If you're -- if you're concerned as you obviously were in this -- in this approach with -- with the proximity of a thunderstorm to the airport you're -- you're trying to land at, and if you're trying to make the -- the -- the most efficient arrival at the runway that you can possibly get, which I think is also clear from your testimony, if you're making an approach, and you haven't landed yet, and you find that the winds are gusting 44 knots out of the northwest, have you reached the airport first or has the thunderstorm reached the airport first? A If I may, let me ask that question like this. I was the first officer on board that flight, and my responsibility at that point was to advise the c