UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x : PUBLIC HEARING IN THE MATTER OF: : : No. DCA COLLISION AND DERAILMENT OF : 99-MR-003 AMTRAK 59, THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, : WITH AN EASTBOUND TRACTOR, : Volume II SEMI-TRAILER AT RAILROAD/HIGHWAY : GRADE CROSSING NEAR BOURBONNAIS, : Day II ILLINOIS ON MARCH 15, 1999 : : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Tuesday, September 14, 1999 The Guildhall The Ambassador West Hotel The Wyndham Grand Hotel Chicago, Illinois The Public Hearing in the above-entitled matter resumed, at the Ambassador West Hotel, The Guildhall, 1300 North State Parkway, Chicago, Illinois, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:00 a.m., before the Board of Inquiry of the National Transportation Safety Board. APPEARANCES: THE BOARD OF INQUIRY: GEORGE W. BLACK, JR., Chairman National Transportation Safety Board JAMES S. DUNN, Hearing Officer ROBERT C. LAUBY, Director Office of Railroad Safety BARRY SWEEDLER, Director Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments CLAUDE HARRIS, Deputy Director Office of Highway Safety APPEARANCES: (Continued) THE TECHNICAL PANEL: TED TURPIN, Operations Specialist Office of Railroad Safety DR. GERALD D. WEEKS, Chief Human Factors Division Office of Railroad Safety RICHARD DOWNS, Survival Factors Specialist, Office of Railroad Safety RUBEN PAYAN, Signal Specialist Office of Railroad Safety BURT SIMON, Human Performance Specialist Office of Highway Safety BYRD RABY, Heavy Vehicle Specialist, Office of Highway Safety THOMAS JACKY, Event Recorder Specialist Office of Research and Engineering MIRIAM KLOEPPEL, Transportation Research Analyst, Office of Research and Engineering PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TERRY WILLIAMS ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT Evelyn Hemingway APPEARANCES: (Continued) PARTIES TO THE HEARING: NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK): LEE W. BULLOCK, President, Amtrak Intercity TRAVIS HINTON, Chief Operating Officer, Amtrak Intercity CHRIS BLACK, Director, Public Affairs T. MICHAEL KERRINE, Associate General Counsel, Tort Litigation GEORGE BINNS, General Manager, Standards and Compliance PETER HALL, Director of Safety, Amtrak Intercity MARK MEANA, Director of Safety, Corporate CLAYTON BROWN, Assistant Vice-President, Corporate Operations CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD: ED HARRIS, Vice-President, Midwest Division JOHN PRENDERGAST, Risk Manager CHARLES WEBSTER, General Counsel, U.S. JOHN SHARKEY, General Manager, Communications and Signals APPEARANCES (Continued) CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD: (Continued) MYLES TOBIN, Vice-President, U.S. Legal Affairs BOB KEENE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION: DAVID BLACKMORE, Deputy Regional Administrator ALLAN HALSTROM, Principal Inspector, Indianapolis JEFF THOMAS, Signal and Train Control Inspector, Chicago ROBERT MYERS, Assistant Grade Crossing and Trespass Manager, Chicago PATTY SMITH, Grade Crossing and Trespass Manager, Chicago FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION: RUDY UMBS, Chief, Safety Design Division ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION: MICHAEL STEAD, Rail Safety Program Administrator JOHN BLAIR, Railroad Safety Specialist STAN MILEWSKI, Railroad Safety Specialist DON RICHARDSON, Railroad Safety Specialist, State Coordinator, Illinois Operation Lifesaver BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS: WILLIAM C. WALPERT, Vice-President JOHN P. TOLMAN, Special Representative, International Division LARRY JAMES, Coordinator, Education and Training Department CARL FIELDS, Safety Task Force TOM O'BRIEN APPEARANCES: (Continued) UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION: THOMAS P. DWYER III, Director MELCO TRANSFER, INC.: MELVIN MARSHALL JUDY MARSHALL BRAD PURCELL, Counsel for Melco Transfer, Inc. C O N T E N T S PAGE Opening Remarks 218 Sworn Testimony of John Sharkey 218 Examination by the Technical Panel 219 Examination by the United Transportation Union 265 Examination by the Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad 266 Examination by the Illinois Commerce Commission 270 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 271 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 275 Sworn Testimony of Mark R. Corbo 296 Examination by the Technical Panel 297 Examination by Melco Transfer, Inc. 323 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 325 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 327 Sworn Testimony of Michael Harshbarger 343 Examination by the Technical Panel 344 Examination by Amtrak 368 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 371 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 372 Further Examination by the Technical Panel 375 Sworn Testimony of Lee Bullock and Mark Meana 378 Examination by the Technical Panel 379 Examination by the Federal Railroad Administration 395 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 396 Examination by the United Transportation Union 398 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 399 C O N T E N T S (Continued) PAGE Sworn Testimony of John Blair 411 Examination by the Technical Panel 412 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 429 Examination by the United Transportation Union 430 Examination by Amtrak 431 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 431 Sworn Testimony of Clayton Brown, Bruce George, and Rudolph Umbs 451 Examination by the Technical Panel 453 Examination by the United Transportation Union 494 Examination by the Illinois Commerce Commission 496 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 501 Adjournment 529 P R O C E E D I N G S CHAIRMAN BLACK: Good morning. The good news is I don't have a long boilerplate the second day. The bad news is I have a long one to read at the end of tomorrow. I think we had a very productive day yesterday. We certainly got into the record some information we did not have before, and I think we got it in a more concise way than it was in some of the previously recorded and transcripted statements. So, are you ready, Mr. Dunn? MR. DUNN: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Proceed. MR. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board calls Mr. John Sharkey. SWORN TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHARKEY MR. DUNN: Mr. Sharkey, for the record, would you state and spell your full name. MR. SHARKEY: John Sharkey; J-o-h-n, S-h-a-r-k-e-y. MR. DUNN: Who are you employed by? MR. SHARKEY: The Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad. MR. DUNN: For how long have you employed by the Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad? MR. SHARKEY: We have just merged on July 1st of this year, but I have been with the railroad, Illinois Central, for 27 years. MR. DUNN: What are your duties and responsibilities? MR. SHARKEY: I am General Manager of Communications and Signals. I direct the activities of the Signal Department at this time and at the time of the accident, I am active in engineering and engineering organizations. I am and charged with procedures; maintenance inspections; tests, compliance with those; and the design of signal systems. MR. DUNN: You were involved in the investigation of the accident at Bourbonnais? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, I was. MR. DUNN: You were a part of the signal crew? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. DUNN: At this time, I will turn the questioning over to our Technical Panel, Mr. Ruben Payan. EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. PAYAN: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Good morning. MR. PAYAN: Let's start off with a little history of the equipment at McKnight Road. Can you provide a history of the active warning devices that have been installed at McKnight Road? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. The original installation of the active warning devices was in December of the 1968 pursuant to an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission to install automatic flashing light signals and short arm gates. The term "short arm gates" was used at that time to differentiate what had been the previous practice of installing long gates which extended completely across a roadway. So, those were installed in 1968. There was a modification to the track circuits in 1987, whereby we changed an overlay type, an audio frequency overlay type circuit from a non-modulated circuit to a modulated circuit in 1987. In September of 1990, we installed 12 inch flashing lights at the location. Previous to that, the state standard was 8 3/8 inch bravos (phonetic). That was part of a state-wide program. Pursuant to a Commerce Commission order, we installed Clovis bravos (phonetic). In January of 1992, we changed the control equipment from a -- there was a constant warning timed device originally installed there. It was a GCP model 400. We changed those to the latest, the GCP Model 3000, in January of 1992 pursuant to a Commerce Commission order. That is the equipment that is there today. There has been some software upgrades in that microprocessor type equipment since its original installation in 1992. So, what we have there today is control circuits of GCP 3000s and flashing light signals and short arm gates. MR. PAYAN: You mentioned several other types of warning devices. Can you describe what other types the Illinois Central/Canadian National uses at their other railroad crossings that are not experimental and that are in actual use? MR. SHARKEY: Are you saying from an historical perspective? MR. PAYAN: Historical and currently being used. MR. SHARKEY: Historically, active warning devices began with what we call an auto flag, commonly referred to as a wig-wag. It was a device with a disk that had a red light in it that swung back and forth. Those began to be installed in the 1890s. The conventional flashing light signals began to be installed back in the early 1900s, 1910. The gates were patented in 1938, so the type of gate mechanisms we have -- the earlier models went back to the late 1930s. The conventional type flashing light signals are what is used at most crossings that are signal track crossings. Flashing light signals with gates are used at crossings where you have multiple main tracks or there is a possibility of a sight obstruction due to a train or a curve or something like this. Flashing light signals are used to warn the motorist, to get the motorist stopped, and the gate is used to supplement that to keep the motorist stopped. MR. PAYAN: Is that a railroad definition or a state law or do you know? MR. SHARKEY: Well, the state law in Illinois provides that flashing light signals for the motorist are analogous to the stop sign -- stop and then proceed if it is safe to do so -- and with gates, it is an absolute stop similar to a stop light. MR. PAYAN: As far as the age of technology, where does the equipment at McKnight Road fall into? MR. SHARKEY: It is the latest in current levels in technology. MR. PAYAN: State of the art? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: You mentioned GCP. Can you explain what that means? MR. SHARKEY: It is a grade crossing predictor. It is what is generically called a constant warning timed device. It is a device that is a microprocessor-based electronic transceiver that is hooked up to the rails at the crossing. It puts a low frequency voltage out on to the track. It puts it out with a constant current transmitter, and it is tuned to a -- perhaps slide one might be appropriate. MR. PAYAN: Are the slides we are using now from the signal factual, from one the attachments? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. (Pause in the proceedings.) MR. PAYAN: Maybe we can come back to that. Can you explain what the process is that is used to determine which crossings will get active warning devices? You mentioned the ICC order in several places. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. The Illinois Commerce Commission is responsible for crossing devices in the State of Illinois in conjunction with the Illinois Department of Transportation. In accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the selection and determination of warning devices is determined by the highway authority with jurisdiction over the road. MR. PAYAN: Does the railroad have a say in this process? MR. SHARKEY: The railroads will participate in meetings at the crossing of diagnostic surveys under Federally funded projects or stipulated agreement meetings or meetings with the Illinois Commerce Commission. MR. PAYAN: Do you know what factors are used to determine which crossings and what equipment will be used? MR. SHARKEY: I believe the warrants would be that on multiple track railroads, for sure, you would have flashing light signals and gates. On single track railroads, it may depend on the speed. Each state has different warrants. In Illinois, right now, the projects are calling for gates. MR. PAYAN: How about warning time? How much warning time is required? How much warning time is provided for an approaching train? MR. SHARKEY: The minimal warning time recognized for any crossing would be 20 seconds minimum warning time. At this particular crossing, we achieved 25 seconds warning time. MR. PAYAN: Is that a railroad standard or ICC requirement to measure it by seconds? MR. SHARKEY: It started out as being an Association of American Railroads recommended practice, and it was adopted into the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices in, I believe, 1978. So, basically the HFWA adopted the railroad signal practices from the Association of American Railroads in 1978, and now, it is considered part of that standard to be 20 seconds minimum. MR. PAYAN: If we could get back now to the operation, could you give us a description of the operation of the warning devices? MR. SHARKEY: What we have here is a stretch of track. In the center here of the slide is McKnight Road. What we are showing is about a nine thousand foot stretch of track to the north left just towards Chicago, Illinois, and south goes down to the right. This is the stretch of traffic in the vicinity, and it is kind of a schematic diagram of the tracks at McKnight Road. We have Saint George Road to the north and Larry Powell Road to the south. If we could come in from this section right here possibly (indicating). What we have is a constant warning timed device at McKnight Road. It is an electronic transmitter, receiver located at the crossing; and it transmits out these signals. Here, it schematically represents a termination shunt that terminates the signal from that transceiver. So, with no train around, there is a voltage from the transmitter impressed on to the track. The microprocessor device, the constant warning timed device, the GCP-3000, looks at that signal on the track, and that is a normal condition with no train around. As the train passes these termination shunts on either side, the voltage that is on the track, due to the train wheels across the track circuit, forms basically a short circuit to the that signal. As the train approaches, there is this voltage level as this train would come in that would decrease linearly towards the crossing. There is a reference level of a hundred when everything is normal. That is what it is calibrated up to be. As the train approaches, that reference level goes down to zero at the crossing when it is linear. So, what that level does is it basically is proportional to the distance the train is away from the crossing. The rate of change of that level is proportional to the velocity of the train. So, by knowing distance and knowing velocity, we know when the train is going to arrive at the crossing. That is the way this device calculates when to activate the warning devices. MR. PAYAN: The voltage on the rail is always on there; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: What happens if it loses power? MR. SHARKEY: Then it will deactivate, which would be the same result as if it detected a train approaching. It is a closed circuit. It is a normally energized circuit that would de-energize in the event of a train. You would get the same indication if there is a malfunction, that same indication as if a train was coming. MR. PAYAN: Can the amount of warning time be affected in any way once a train is approaching? MR. SHARKEY: The devices today are devices of such a nature that the warning time is very consistent. If the train slows down, once it is detected and the unit says the train is going to be at the crossing in 25 seconds, if the train slows down, naturally, the warning time is going to get longer because it has already made its prediction. If the train speeds up, the warning times would get proportionally shorter for the change in speed. So, if there is acceleration or deceleration, warning times may be affected. MR. PAYAN: Can we get into how the gates operate? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: What activates the gate? Can you explain how that works? MR. SHARKEY: If we could back out a little bit. The lower track is the main track, the track that Train 59 was on that night. What we have is a track circuit that goes with our wayside signals, and we have signals about nine thousand feet north of the crossing and another set of signals about six thousand feet south of the crossing. We have a track circuit in there where you can employ that track circuit to as act as a redundant part of the system. What we do is from a circuit at the end, we repeat the information that there is no train on that track back to McKnight Road via an audio frequency overlay circuit. If we could zoom in on that center portion, the lower portion of McKnight Road. So primarily for Track One, the main track, we have the 1XR, which is the crossing relay for the one track; and in this, we have two paths that can hold up or energize this relay -- relay being an electromechanical device. It is part of our logic circuit. So, we have two paths that are holding this up. So, the first thing that happens is a southbound train would deactivate 1 WAR, which is a wrap circuit, that long wrap circuit. This contact would open, but the relay would remain energized through the outputs of our grade crossing predictor. When the grade crossing predictor detects that the train is going to be the prescribed time from the crossing, this contact would open thereby de-energizing the 1XR. That starts off basically -- can you turn that? (Adjustment of Diagram.) MR. SHARKEY: It starts somewhat of the chain reaction. Over here, to the right, over to this lower right portion, here, we have the 1XR on the top line. When that contact opens, it drops the crossing control relay to the main crossing. Basically, we have one relay for Track One and one relay for Track Two, the side track. When that de-energizes, it opens the two relays over here (indicating). In the lower right-hand corner is what is called the XR-GPR. That relay I am referring to, all these relays are normally energized, so if there is an open wire or if anything goes wrong in the circuitry, it will go to its restrictive state and cause the flashers to operate. So, this XR is normally energized. Then the XR one will start dropping or de-energizing so it starts the change. If a wire opened in that circuit, the same thing would happen. So what happens is when a train is detected at the 1-XR, we end up dropping the XR-GPR. With that de-energized, it turns on the lights. So, that is what starts the lights flashing, and at that point, the bell begins to ring. The relay above it, the XRPR, is what we refer to as a slow release relay. When you take the energy off of the coil of the relay, the XRPR remains energized for four seconds, and that is what gives us our gate delay time. So, the lights start flashing first, and then four seconds later, the gates start to descend. I think yesterday we saw some, I guess, some confusion and conflicting talk about gates going down or being down. What I prefer to talk about is the gate starting to descend, and that happens about four seconds after. The minimum prescribed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices is three seconds. MR. PAYAN: Can you explain what an XR-1 monitors and the XPR and an XGR or XRGPR? MR. SHARKEY: The XR would be that the crossing control circuits, when it is energized and the crossing control circuits do not sense an approaching train. The XRPR would be to give our gate delay time, and when that relay de-energizes is when the gates start to descend. The XR-GPR is the relay that would, when it is de-energized, that would light the lights through a flash relay that alternates the lights back and forth. MR. PAYAN: The XR is the one that gets the signal from the controller, from the GCP? MR. SHARKEY: That is the one that is the main relay for sensing an approaching train. MR. PAYAN: Once the XGPR tells the gates to start, can you explain how they are finally put into a horizontal position? MR. SHARKEY: Okay. I believe that would be slide two. What we have here is some cables going from the control house out to the various flashing light signals, and the lower square on the bottom is the actual gate mechanism or the gate motor. How this operates, that XR relay actually keeps the motor control relay in the upper left-hand corner energized. When you de-energize the XR, it de-energizes this motor control relay which turns on the motor, and the motor starts to drive, from the 90 degree position, the gate arm to the horizontal position. Through a series of contacts on the rotating shaft inside the gate mechanism, we get various angular deflexions of the gate arm. When the motor drives the gate down, it starts to accelerate because it is going to accelerate from motor motion and from gravity because the gates are counter-weighted to be heavy to where they will fall; but normally, the gate is held in the up position. There is actually energy on a ratchet and gear train here that is called a hold-clear mechanism. So actually, we hold the gates in the up position and then allow them to descend when we take energy off of the motor control relay. MR. PAYAN: If you lose energy, would that affect the gate? MR. SHARKEY: If we lose energy completely, like if all the cables were severed, the gate would lower by gravity to a horizontal position. MR. PAYAN: So, you drive it down? MR. SHARKEY: We drive it from the 90 degree position to the 50 degree position. Then at that point, one of the contacts opens. Then what we do is the armature of the motor actually acts like a generator at that point, and it is turning and it is causing the electricity to flow through a resistor that is in the gate mechanism that actually acts as a braking motion. Then went it gets down to the final five degree position, there is a contact that opens up or closes, and then we actually put a short circuit across that armature to act like a brake. It is called a dynamic braking at that point, and that is why you see a gate mechanism come down fairly smoothly. Then when it gets down to the last five degrees, it seems to hesitate and then gradually lower down to the horizontal position. MR. PAYAN: Yesterday, we heard Mr. Nieves testify he saw the gate hit or strike the truck. How does that affect the gate operation if it hits something midway down? MR. SHARKEY: Well, below the 50 degree mark, it is going to be trying to go down by gravity at that point. So, it is going to strike it and not try to force its way down. If it is above the 50 degree, then the motor is going to drive and try to continue to push the gate down to at least the 50 degree mark. MR. PAYAN: There is no reset where it will automatically come on if it can't go down? MR. SHARKEY: No. It doesn't hit something and then restore it. It is not like a garage door. MR. PAYAN: It will just continue down? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: I would like to get into a little bit of the maintenance. How often does the Canadian National/Illinois Central inspect its railroad active warning devices? MR. SHARKEY: At least once a month. MR. PAYAN: When was the last inspection at McKnight Road? If you could, tell us what that consisted of. MR. SHARKEY: Let me refer to the Signal Factual Report. The last monthly inspection was on February 24th of 1999 at 1400 hours. The maintainer -- the signal personnel that are responsible for maintaining signals on the territory -- the maintainer would check the housings to make sure they were secure and padlocked; check the wire and cable for mechanical injury; check the signs to make sure they were in good condition and visible. The flashing light signals, he would activate the flashing light signals; look at the light units to make sure all the bulbs operated and that they were visible and properly aligned; that the units were clean. There is no traffic signal interconnected at this crossing, so that is not applicable. If a gate arm or gates are used, check the gate length to make sure it is proper out to the middle of the street; and that there is correct timing, in other words, that three seconds minimum gate delay time. Then he would check the stand-by power. Signal systems are backed up by battery back-up, so that there is a battery on the circuit at all times that is being charged. There would be an operating battery that would operate the grade crossing predictor equipment. Then there would be a light battery that would power the light circuits so if you have a power outage, you have stand-by power. He would check the power. He would check these reference levels on the GCP. In this case, the reference level was 97 on both tracks, and it remains true. That is what he checked. He did replace the flasher relay at that time. It is not noted exactly what the failure was, but he replaced the flasher relay at that time. Maybe there was something he found on his inspection, but it was not anything that was reported to the railroad. MR. PAYAN: Was that the only exception found? MR. SHARKEY: He did repair the belt. Again, he makes a notation that he repaired it. It doesn't say what was what the problem was. MR. PAYAN: He looks at that once a month you said? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: We go to post-accident. Do you recall what time you arrived on the scene on March 15th? MR. SHARKEY: It was a few minutes after midnight on the 16th. MR. PAYAN: Could you describe what you saw when you arrived. MR. SHARKEY: Well, the emergency operation was quiet. I came down Route 50 parallel to the tracks coming from the north. So, there was all of the ambulance activity staged at the Carter Lumber Company. I parked my car down on Route 50 and then walked. I identified myself when I walked in. Then I walked down the back road towards the crossing. The train was stopped on the crossing as we have seen in the exhibits. There were three or four cars on the crossing north. At that time, our maintenance personnel and the field management personnel had just completed a download of the data recorder. We had conversed on car phones while we were en route. I told them I wanted about three or four people to go into the signal house, download the event recorder, look but don't touch anything except for the process of downloading the event recorder, then do that, and lock the house back up. I got there, and they had just completed that and gave me the disk of the recorder print-out. MR. PAYAN: Can you explain what the event recorder print-out indicated? MR. SHARKEY: The event recorder indicated we had 26 seconds warning time on the grade crossing predictor and that the actual events indicated that there was 25 seconds operation between the time the XR de-energized and the time the island circuit was occupied. MR. PAYAN: You said 25 seconds. Is that the time the computer saw the train or the actual flashing of the lights? MR. SHARKEY: That would have been from the time that the XR relay de-energized, saying that the predictor saw the train, until the train occupied the island circuit, which was a short track circuit that extended about 60 feet north of the crossing. There is a positive section of the track circuit transmitter talking to the receiver at that point where it shunts that voltage to absolute zero, and that is called a 90 circuit. At that point, we just had to determine the elapsed time. MR. PAYAN: Can you give us a view of the post-accident testing and the results of that? MR. SHARKEY: Basically, nothing was done until later the next day after NTSB personnel arrived. We went back in and downloaded the event recorder again. Nothing had changed because there had been no subsequent train moves or trains at the crossing. We had considerable damage to one of the signals, so that had to be replaced before we were able to put the circuits back in service. We finally opened up the crossing Wednesday night. We went through our annual and our monthly inspection again as part of our post-accident tests. We checked the predictor. A rail was broken, so at that point, the predictor circuit was de-energized and the gates were down and the flashers were flashing. We also did a relay test. All those relays I referred to were individually tested to make sure they were within specifications. Wiring going to the gates were checked to make sure they had proper insulation and resistance and there wasn't heavily damaged cables. The relays and the cables all checked appropriate. MR. PAYAN: How about the unit itself, the predictor itself? What tests were done on it? MR. SHARKEY: We observed train movements after we put it back in service after train service was restored. Subsequently to that, the manufacturer sent engineers to the site to look at the location. The unit was taken out of service and sent back to the manufacturer's plant where each board was individually tested to see if it was compliant with their test procedures. MR. PAYAN: Were you notified of any exceptions taken? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. PAYAN: You mentioned some damage to the equipment. Can you briefly explain what kind of damage you found or that you witnessed when you arrived? MR. SHARKEY: What we see here is an end view of the west gate looking south. MR. PAYAN: The west gate, is that the first gate or the second gate the trucker would have encountered? MR. SHARKEY: This would have been the first gate the truck came to (indicating). To the south, we see the derailed Amtrak cars. When I arrived on the scene -- you cannot see it in this photo, but up above, up on the mast is where we have the flashing light signal units; there are two units, 12-inch flashing light units facing west, and two flashing light units facing east -- there was only one unit that was still intact. It was the front light, the south light. You can barely see the bottom both of it here. It was in its proper position. The other three flashing light units were broke off at the aluminum elbow that comes out the junction box. When I arrived, two of the lights were hanging by their wires and spinning in the wind. One of the light units was completely missing. It was later found about a hundred feet north of the crossing. The crossbuck sign, the X sign that is on the flashing light signal and gate mast, it has a cast bracket that holds it to the mast, and that cast bracket was broken, and the crossbuck was laying on the ground. The belt can be seen here laying on the ground. Let's see what else is at the top. The counter-weight arm. There is a counter-weight that extends on an arm, and it goes out horizontal when the gate is horizontal. That counter-weight arm was broken off. The counter-weight was laying on the ground just below the signal. It was noted that the counter-weight, except for the casting, the arm with it physically being cracked and broke off, that there was no other damage to counter-weight. I will get back to that in a moment. Further down on it, this is the gate mechanism that has the motor in the center mast, and there is a gate arm that comes out. This is the type of arm. There was a wooden gate arm. It was basically two boards that we refer to as baseboards that tied to a tongue. They bolt together in kind of a "V" shape. The baseboard on the field side -- I will refer to field side versus track side -- the baseboard on the field side was cracked through the first bolt holes which bolts it to the tongue and the field baseboard. The gate tongue, again, was cracked right here (indicating), but nothing had fallen off. What we see are the lights hanging down, and we see the board is broke, but we don't a gate arm laying on the ground. MR. PAYAN: Where is the light normally seated? MR. SHARKEY: There will be a light on the tip. It looks like there is a junction box there that you can barely see. Then there is another junction box. There are three lights on the gate arm. The one at the end of the gate stays on all the time, and the other two flashing units are seated with the flashing light signals up on the mast. There were signs where the -- there is a concrete foundation, and there is a junction box on the base where the mast fits in and then the base bolts to the foundation. There were signs of the base being struck by the rebar. The bolts were, where the base connects to the foundation, the bolts were bent so that when we knew it was time to replace the signal, we actually had to replace the foundation also. So, there was evidence of the whole signal being hit and the impact causing basically a shoving movement in the southwesterly direction. I think everybody was very good. I believe that, you know, it was the base being hit that caused all this fracture to the metal parts on top. That motion from the gate being shoved in a southwesterly direction could also have caused some of this fracture on the gate because if it would be an impact more or less of a whiplash that the tip would want to remain at rest, and it would brake in that same direction. One of things we were concerned about, and that we had testimony yesterday about, was gates possibly bouncing along the truck. We had visually observed the bottom of the gate, and we didn't appear to see any marks where the gate appeared to be bouncing along the rebar. Later in the week, we actually put wooden boards back on the gate and purposely dropped it on to a load of steel that the truck drove, and there were marks. Those similar type of marks were not on the gate that was in service after the accident or at the time of the accident. That pretty well describes the damage to this gate mechanism. It took severe impact at the base. We note that we still have a gate arm here, and I believe that with the base being struck directly below the gate arm, it somewhat indicates that the steel that hit came in on an arc, coming in underneath the gate arm rather than going down. Obviously, it didn't go down through gate arm to get to the base, so it had to go slowly on some arc. That may be able to help determine where the position of the rear of the truck was at the time of the accident. MR. PAYAN: Thank you. Mr. Jacky has some questions for you. MR. JACKY: Thank you. Good morning Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Good morning. MR. JACKY: You mentioned before that the signal at McKnight Road has what you called an event recorder on there. Could you give us a general description of the recorder, what it records, and what it recorded on to? MR. SHARKEY: There are basically two types of devices within this constant warning time cabinet that gives us a recording. There is a keyboard display that is shown in the Signal Factual Report that actually is an LED type of print-out that shows this same information that we see down at the bottom. MR. JACKY: That is Attachment One of the Signal Factual, which is Exhibit 3A just for information. MR. SHARKEY: The information we see down at the bottom, 26, that is the warning time that would be shown on the keyboard display. There is a detected speed, island speed, and an average speed that is also shown on the keyboard display that is represented by the numbers 73, 71 and 68, these numbers down here (indicating). That is also shown on this keyboard display. That is an independent calculation within the unit. That information is fed over to a recorder. This information that we are seeing here is what is captured and recorded. So, we have different -- we have times shown here and different numbers, and what they represent right in here (indicating) is numbers on a recorder interface card that we use to input different relay positions into the recorder card. For instance, number one over here on the left, this line right here (pointing) indicates everything is back to normal. When the one disappears, that is the time that, that wrap circuit de-energized. Let's see; on pin two, it is the Track One GCP sensing the train. So here, we see two -- at that point in time, we see two, three, and four disappearing at the same time, the same seconds. That is basically our One Track constant warning time device, the 1XR, and what I have referred to as the XR disappearing. That is what would start the chain reaction of both the lights turning on, which is noted by this, actually, item ten. MR. JACKY: What would be the first indication to the recorder or to the signal that the train is approaching? MR. SHARKEY: Number one disappearing at 9:16:57. That indicates the clock on the recorder was slow by approximately 29 minutes. So, the times that we see here are really closer to 9:47. When we adjusted the time on the recording device, we found out it was 29 minutes and 18 seconds slow. So, 29 minutes and 18 seconds need to be added to all these times to come up with the actual. MR. JACKY: The elapsed time should be accurate? MR. SHARKEY: The elapsed time is accurate, yes. So at this point, we detect a train. So, at 41, we detect a train. At 45, item eight disappears, and eight happens to be the XRPR, which is the relay that de-energizes, to de-energize the relay in the gate mechanism which starts it now. So, there is a four second interval between when the flashers would start here and when the gate would start to descend. So, the next thing that we see disappear is five, and five is the One Track island circuit. So, that is the circuit that extends about 60 feet north of the crossing. When the train enters that circuit, then the five disappears here so there is, what, 21 seconds elapsed between when the gate starts to descend and the train gets to the island circuit, which is approximately the time of impact. MR. JACKY: How long would it take approximately for the gates to descend, assuming they were not obstructed by any obstacle? MR. SHARKEY: Normally within ten seconds. The reason we do not have a gate down indication on here is that the gate mechanisms are not set up to have that extra contact in them that could be used to record that the gate is down to a certain position. In fact, depending on which scenario you believe, if the gate bounced along the truck, the gate would have never got down. It never would have indicated that because it was obstructed. You know, it would have been prevented from getting down to, say, five degrees or whatever. So, at what point do we determine down is down? What we have to do is rely on the control circuitry and look at different failure mechanisms and probabilities. MR. JACKY: Which leads me to my next question: If there was something in the crossing such as a vehicle or an obstacle that was preventing the gates from coming all the way down, would the event recorder record that? How would that be recorded on the event recorder? MR. SHARKEY: All we know on this event recorder is that the energy was removed off of the control relay and the gate mechanism, which would cause it to start down. If the gate was obstructed, this would not detect it or record it. MR. JACKY: If there were a vehicle across the crossing without touching the gate or having the gates touching the vehicle, but if the vehicle, say, had its tires or something across the track, would that be indicated on the event recorder at all? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. JACKY: You mentioned that in this case for the accident train, the signal provided a 26 second warning time. Could you explain to us on the print-out where that comes from? MR. SHARKEY: The 26 is indicated right here as being the warning time that the predictor sensed its output disappearing to the time it sensed the island circuit disappearing, and that is 26 seconds there. The times along the left between when the XR relay dropped and the island relay dropped was 25 seconds. There could be a slight, because we are going through a chain of three relays energizing, there is a slight time delay in a fraction of a second. What is happening here is that the recording device is truncating the times. If something happened at 25.9, it rounds it down to 25. If something happened at 26.1, it is going to round it down to 26, so that is why we get a second deviation here. MR. JACKY: I think you mentioned previously the signal at McKnight Road is programmed or designed to provide a 25 second warning time; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. JACKY: In the Factual, it mentions there is a 30 second time that was programmed into signal computer. Could you explain the difference there? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. There is an equipment reaction time that is involved. When we designed it, I think we designed that equipment reaction time. It is supposed to take three or four seconds for the equipment to make its prediction. So, what we are saying by setting up our termination shunts at 30 seconds and we are setting up our programming at 30 seconds, it will give us at least 25, which gives us a buffer time above 20 seconds minimum that is prescribed by the MUDC. MR. JACKY: Ultimately, when you determine what warning time you would like to have for that individual signal or grade crossing predictor, how is that physically entered into the signal? MR. SHARKEY: The same keypad display that has the 26 seconds shown on it is used as a keypad, and it is used for programming the device. MR. JACKY: So, the maintenance person would enter in 30 seconds on the keypad? MR. SHARKEY: (Nonverbal response.) MR. JACKY: You also mentioned earlier something about average speeds for the train. Could you indicate to us on the event recorder print-out where that would come into play? MR. SHARKEY: We have the approach speed, the detected speed, island speed, and the average speed. Honestly, there is a three up there, and I think the next witness may be better able to talk to those, but there are three different speeds that the unit records. Two of them are snap shot in time, and one is an integration over time to get the average speed. What we are seeing here is some deceleration. Again, these are electronically derived from the slope of that line that I talked about, that reference point. So, it is not the same as the speed that you are going to see on the event recorder. This is generally used for maintenance. The idea was to be able to tell whether, if we had a shorter warning time or a longer warning time, we would see if it was accelerating train or a decelerating train. Unfortunately, it was never intended to be an accurate speed, but more of an indication of acceleration, deceleration or accident speed. It indicates a deceleration. MR. JACKY: Do you have any knowledge as to exactly how those speeds are calculated within the GCP? MR. SHARKEY: I think I would rather defer to the next witness. MR. JACKY: I asked you before about whether there were any cars or vehicles, if they were in the signal, how that would be handled by the recorder. You have mentioned the damage to the signal itself. If a vehicle were to, say, drive through the actual gate or break the gate, would that be indicated on the event recorder at all, to your knowledge? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. JACKY: Within the Signal Group Factual Report, it indicates that on the day of the accident, there was an incident of false activation. Are you aware of that or the nature of that? MR. SHARKEY: Do you know exactly where? MR. JACKY: Yes. It is on page nine in paragraph number four. The paragraph starts (reading) McKnight Road incident reports were reviewed for 1998 and 1999. MR. SHARKEY: I show that as paragraph three. MR. JACKY: I'm sorry. In yours, it would be paragraph number three? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Tom, what were you looking at? MR. JACKY: It is the, Signal Group Factual, 3A. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I have that here. It is a little thick. MR. JACKY: It is Exhibit 3A, paragraph number four. In the information Ruben has put in front of me, it shows it as being paragraph number three. MR. SHARKEY: Yes, I can explain that. MR. JACKY: Okay. MR. SHARKEY: What we did on Wednesday morning, the 17th, is we, Pat Sullivan (phonetic), of the NTSB and Dave Flower (phonetic) of Amtrak, and I, we went up to our Homewood offices, the railroad, and went to our CNS control center where we dispatch the maintainers out to sites that we receive a malfunction report. I went there the computer's database personally, and I looked at any report that we had about McKnight Road. They are shown in the subsequent pages. After the accident, we called our signal personnel through the CNS control center, so there was an entry in the computer saying that yes, there was an accident, and we called out all this personnel. It was not a malfunction report. It was just the fact we had a work out open on McKnight Road because of the incident. MR. JACKY: What history of false activations, to your knowledge, does the system or the signal system at McKnight Road have? MR. SHARKEY: Again, that is shown in the Signal Factual Report. I guess it says seven, including there was, then six previous, and they were all in the early part of 1998. We had a false activation due to a defective card, and the maintainer cleared it. That was January of 1998. We had a another incident in here that listed McKnight Road, and I included it. In fact, those are my handwritten notations on all these reports as I went through and analyzed the data. There was a report on March 14th of 1998. There was a tracking indication on. Since it stated that there was something found near McKnight Road, I included it. It was not an actual malfunction. On April 23rd of 1998, the west gate was down, and the maintainer replaced the armature brush in the motor of the gate mechanism. So, that was a false activation. May 20th of 1998, we had an alleged false activation. It was not confirmed. When the maintainer arrived, everything was working as intended. Frequently, we get those types of reports if there are switching moves or if somebody doesn't see a train go across a crossing, things like that. On June 10, 1998, there was a false activation. It was will open bond wire that had the island circuit out. That caused the high EC levels. So, that was the false activation. Then July 24th of 1998, we had a tripped circuit breaker. They had confirmed there was a false activation. We would have had the gates down and flashing or the gate down and the lights dark without a train on the crossing. That was a result of the tripped circuit breaker. So, the last malfunction that was reported at that crossing was July 24, 1998. MR. JACKY: Thank you. What programs does the Canadian National/Illinois Central have to do ensure the continued operation of the signal systems on the railroad? What I mean by that is, Are there any efforts by the railroad to go and look at the print-outs from the event recorders and determine that, based on the information that is recorded, the signal is operating properly and giving the requisite warning times? MR. SHARKEY: Well, as part of the of annual inspection and tests which we have to determine that the warning times are proper, that can either be given or done by recorders or it can be done by observation or it can be done through a calculated simulation type mode where you go out there and simulate it between the distances. So, on an annual basis, we have to confirm that. That is a part of the FRA regulations and the 234 rules. On a monthly basis, the maintainers will go on the reserve and fix them. If there are errors at all, if there have any been any problems, they would also show up as an error on this keypad display. As a practice of going through the recordings, they are time consuming, as you can see just going through this one, and generally, it would be done on an exceptional basis. If there was a malfunction reported, somebody would look back to determine it, they could find out from the recorder device. MR. JACKY: If there was a malfunction, if there was an incident reported, would the records from that signal recorder be kept on file? MR. SHARKEY: Not as a matter of record. MR. JACKY: Those are all the questions I have. Mr. Raby has a couple more questions. MR. RABY: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Good morning. MR. RABY: For a little clarification, if you could, please, the island circuit, you stated the island circuit extends some 60 foot north of the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. RABY: For accident reconstruction and things, I need a reference point for the crossing. Is that the edge of the roadway or edge of the timbers, it would be in between the tracks? MR. SHARKEY: Generally, we refer it as clocking the center line of the crossing. MR. RABY: The center line of the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, sir. MR. RABY: This island circuit, what is its function? MR. SHARKEY: It is what we refer to as a positives section of detection. There is a transmitter given the frequency of one hooked up to the wires one side of the track to a receiver hooked up to the wires on the other side of the crossing so that there is approximately 120 foot track circuit that, when it is de-energized, there is no time-out feature, that the gates would remain down. It is also used for resetting some internal calculations on the circuitry inside the flash. MR. RABY: The timing of the signals, I would like to get some clarification on that if I could. The Federal Railroad Administration says the lights or the signals must be activated for a minimum of 20 seconds before what? MR. SHARKEY: The arrival of the training at the crossing. MR. RABY: At what point is at the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: I take it to be the edge of the street. MR. RABY: The edge of the street? So regardless of the speed of the train approaching, the regulations say the warning lights must be on for a period of 20 seconds before the train arrives at the edge of the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: For a normal through train, yes. Under a switching condition, there are alternate means where the train crew -- MR. RABY: With the predictor system, that 20 seconds is to the edge of the crossing for a three train? MR. SHARKEY: For a three train, it would generally be to the edge of the island. MR. RABY: So, the 20 second FRA regulation really don't apply to the island circuit. MR. SHARKEY: I don't quite understand that. MR. RABY: If a switching engine was pulling a grain car out of that siding, when it hits the island circuits, the lights come on? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. RABY; There is no timing sequence involved? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. RABY: They come on, the gates come down? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. If a train stopped just outside the island circuits, the gates would recover. Then if it went to proceed across the crossing, it would be possible for it to get to the crossing in less than 20 seconds depending on the distance, but it would activate the signal at the edge of the island circuit. MR. RABY: That is kind of what I said. The 20 seconds doesn't apply in the island circuit? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. RABY: The timing sequence then outside of the island circuit is programmed into the computer, the predictors? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. RABY: For my understanding, I want a clarification. Then that timing sequence never changes regardless of train speed? MR. SHARKEY: It is designed to provide a relatively uniform warning time. If you have perfect conditions, perfect constant speed of the train, never varying conditions of the electrical circuit, yes, you would have a constant warning time. That is part of a theoretical within a practical. You are going to get some minor variations. MR. RABY: The variations would be result of relays or something like that or some kind of equipment lag? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. What we are talking about is an electrical circuit that uses two rails of the wires. So that would be two wires laying on the ground, and you are going to get variations in moisture content and things like that affect them slightly. We are just talking about in the one or two second range. MR. RABY: I was thinking that only applied to the computation of speed, the calculation of speed that the predictor makes. Once it determines a speed of the train, then it knows where that train started the computation at, the point of the tracks. From then on, it doesn't really pay too much attention to that. If it detects a 79 a mile an hour train, then its only next job is to know when to turn on that 20 second or whatever that timing signal is, 25 seconds, to start it so that the motorist has 26 seconds, 25 seconds before the front of that train reaches the edge of that crossing. MR. SHARKEY: I guess what I was trying to say is that there could be variations that were where it is trying to determine that distance, that can change by atmospheric conditions slightly in the train speed calculations. You know, it is not exact stop watch type of calculation that are used for the traffic signals. The yellow is four seconds, and the green is so many seconds. It is not that precise because it is making a calculation based on the track circuit conditions. MR. RABY: It is still not clear to me. I understand what you said, but it is not clear to me that, that applies the whole time that train is traveling down to that crossing. That would only apply at the beginning when it senses the train and it has to determine the speed and it knows how far up the tracks that its shunt is. So, it already knows that distance down to the crossing. It really only needs to know the speed of the train and the time, and then through computation and calculations, it says I got to turn the switch on in the next second or the next five seconds, or the next timing sequence. Then it starts a timing sequence. Isn't that independent of everything else or is that continually changed? MR. SHARKEY: When you said the shunt, are you talking about the termination shunt that is out there a fixed distance? MR. RABY: 3,400 feet or something. MR. SHARKEY: What it is actually doing is looking at the train shunt and making a calculation as to the distance to the train. It is not timing -- it is not saying the train is doing 79 miles an hour and once it gets past this point, I will count down. It is not making that type of calculation. What it is doing is looking at the distance to the train and the velocity of the train and making that calculation. So, that point can move slightly. It is not making an elapsed time calculation. It is not a five seconds after I sense him go by the termination shunt, I am going to drop the gate because he is going so fast. It is not making that type of calculation. Again, perhaps the next witness from the manufacturer of the equipment might be better able to answer your question. MR. RABY: The gates, on the monthly test, are these gates exercised; meaning are they each individual gate, or together? Are they turned on and looked at and watched, timed to see if they perform within specifications? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. RABY: You mentioned mechanical relays. It looks like you have quite a few mechanical relays. Is that the state of art today in railroad signaling, mechanical relays rather than solid state? MR. SHARKEY: They are both used. It depends on different philosophies of thought. An electromechanical relay gives you very excellent electrical isolation and some immunity from lightning damage and things like that where you can get some isolation. It is kind of a hybrid of electronic outputs and some mechanical relays for isolation. MR. RABY: I do understand sometimes mechanical relays do stick or fail to make contact. I was wondering if the reliability was still there and that you were satisfied, that the railroad is satisfied the mechanical relays have a reliability to satisfy to use the, to continue to use them. MR. SHARKEY: Yes, In fact, I believe it was about 15 years ago, with these same types of relays, the FRA Administration basically relaxed their testing interval because of the high degree of reliability of these types of relay. MR. RABY: Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Sharkey. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Anything on follow-up? (No response). CHAIRMAN BLACK: The United Transportation Union is up. Questions, sir? EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION MR. DWYER: Mr. Sharkey, is there a minimum or a maximum time from the time the light for the gates to come down? Is there a standard for that? MR. SHARKEY: The gate should not start its descent for a minute of three seconds. It can take longer for the gate to start to come down, and the gate must be down five seconds prior to the arrival of the train. So as long as things are working in that range -- that is the operating range. Those are minimums and maximums. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Marshall, MELCO? MR. MARSHALL: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, sir. Amtrak, Mr. Bullock? MR. BULLOCK: We don't have any questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad? EXAMINATION BY THE CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD MR. ED HARRIS: Mr. Sharkey, you went through some of the description of the false activations that occurred earlier in 1998. Can you explain the difference between a false activation and an activation failure? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. A false activation is when the signals are activated without a train approaching. An activation failure is the failure of the signals to activate when a train is approaching. In other words, it doesn't give the 20 second warning or fails to give any warning at all. MR. ED HARRIS: Thank you. When you put up the chart indicating the times of the -- and we are talking basics here -- the circuitry changes and the activation of the lights and activation of the gates, you had mentioned the clock had not been properly set; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: The elapsed times when you did your retest and your team did their activities, the elapsed times remained accurate? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. Maybe I should clarify that what we did to reset the clock and establish what time this recording device determined impact to be or determined that the island circuit was occupied was the morning, the Wednesday morning. This was this would be the 17th. We were out with the signal team, and I used my cell phone to dial in through our switchboard to our National Bureau of Standard time, and with the keypad display, we could see what time the recording device was set to. We held up the phone and listened for the beep and determined we got the standard time, and that is where we determined the 29 minutes and some seconds that the clock was off. Then we recalibrated the unit to that time and changed, basically to be able to add that time on to the recorder time to come up with the 9:47 or the approximate time of 9:47. MR. ED HARRIS: Thanks for that clarification. As you were going through the times, based on Train Number 59's approach to the circuitry, the lights became or started flashing approximately 25 seconds prior to the train getting to the grade crossing; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. ED HARRIS: You also mentioned that four seconds later, after Train 59 hit the circuitry, the gates would have started to come down and your records indicate that as well? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. ED HARRIS: You also mentioned that after that four seconds and the gates began to come down, the gates would have been in the down position approximately nine or ten seconds after that? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: Based on the calculation of the initial 25 second warning or the activation of the lights, the gates would have been down approximately 10 seconds prior to the accident; correct? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. ED HARRIS: Mr. Sharkey, we have looked at the exhibit that indicated the tremendous force in which the rebar hit the signal mast, through which the west gates were attached to. There are two other exhibits on file that indicate some broken gates. Do you recall seeing those exhibits? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: In your opinion, in the regard to which the gates had been broken both on the west and east side of the grade crossing, particularly the east side, that the gates were broken while the trucks was going through the crossing or across the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: That was the appearance of the east gate right here, and there was the appearance it was broken in an easterly direction. MR. ED HARRIS: We heard Mr. Nieves yesterday give testimony that it was his opinion that the truck did, indeed, drive around the gates. Do you recall that? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: The way these gates are broken, is that indicative of the same comment Mr. Nieves made? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. MR. ED HARRIS: I have no further questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: It was getting pretty close to lawyering there. I am not entirely sure I would characterize what Mr. Nieves said the way you did, but the record will speak for itself. The Federal Railroad Administration? MR. BLACKMORE: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Highway Administration? MR. UMBS: No questions, thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Illinois Commerce Commission? EXAMINATION BY THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION MR. STEAD: Mr. Sharkey, you mentioned before that the typical crossing signal system is provided with battery back-up power; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. STEAD: What would happen to the system is if all power was lost, both the primary commercial AC power and the back-up power? MR. SHARKEY: If all was lost, the gates would be not flashing, but the gate arms would lower to the horizontal position. MR. STEAD: They would go down? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. STEAD: One other question: The relay that closes to provide power to the automatic flashing light signals, was that recorded by the event recorder? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. STEAD: What did the recorder show? MR. SHARKEY: It showed that we had the 1XR, the XR, all four of those relays, the three relays, the XR and the XR-GPR, which is the relay, that, when it de-energizes, it puts energy to the lights; that they are released at the same time. MR. STEAD: Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers? EXAMINATION BY THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MR. WALPERT: Mr. Sharkey, you have explained to us the difference between activation failures and false activations, and you have indicated there had been seven previous activation failures prior to the date of the accident; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: No, it is not. MR. WALPERT: What is? MR. SHARKEY: We had seven total work orders in our control center. I think I will have to go through them again, but there were no activation failures. There were a couple of disk errors, at least one. We will go through it again. That is the best way to do it. We had a false activation in January of 1998. We had one report that was not a malfunction of the crossing at all, but a track light on the dispatcher's panel in March. We had a false activation in April due to the armature brush. That is two false activations. We had an alleged false activation that was not confirmed that was cleared on arrival in May. We had a confirmed false activation June 10th due to the time clock. That is three. We had a confirmed false due to a tripped breaker in July. So, we had four false activations in early 1998; no activation failures, and in three of the incident reports, one involved the accident itself and calling out maintainers for that. One was not confirmed, and the third had nothing do with the crossing. There were seven reports in our computer, but they were four false activations. MR. WALPERT: Thank you for clarifying that for me. Do I understand correctly then the only way of knowing of the false activations would be by the reports filed? There is no not being reported on the -- go ahead. MR. SHARKEY: They may be recorded, but what was difficult, what we -- you know, normally we would get a report if it was a false activation. Sometimes, what is difficult is to determine if it is a train move or switching move or something like that from the recording device. MR. WALPERT: Subsequent to the accident, do you have any reports of activation failures? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. WALPERT: Could you tell us how many? MR. SHARKEY: There were three. MR. WALPERT: Were those investigated? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. WALPERT: What was the determination of that investigation? MR. SHARKEY: There was one incident that involved a warning time that was shorter than normal due to a high resistance bond in the track panels that were put in place right after the derailment. Subsequently, the panels were welt welded back in. There was an incident while we were testing a circuit and making a change at the street. We were upgrading the control circuitry at a street, two streets to the north of a TR-37, which is a new circuit. During the test period, a switcher came out for something and thought the crossing was protected, and it was not. We filed that as an activation failure. Then there was a situation where a grain car was leaking soy meal. It has tendency to cause a coating on the subsequent axles in that car, and we had a momentary loss of shunt. While the train was transferring some crossings, the gates started up and went back down. MR. WALPERT: Subsequent to the accident, have there been any reports of false activations to your knowledge? MR. SHARKEY: I don't recall. MR. WALPERT: Let me ask you this question: How does the engineer on an approaching train determine if the warning devices are activated correctly? MR. SHARKEY: On the side of flashing light signal heads, there are, sometimes they are referred to as peep sites. That is basically a clear lens on the side of the flashing light signals where you can see the flashing lights. There is a white light coming through the side of the flashing light signal. MR. WALPERT: Are there any virtual cab signals the engineer could observe to ascertain that the signals are working properly upon approaching those signals? MR. SHARKEY: No, sir. MR. WALPERT: If a signal may malfunction, is there any way that an engineer, a locomotive engineer, could know that a signal had malfunctioned without actually observing the signal on approaching it? MR. SHARKEY: I am not sure I fully understand you. MR. WALPERT: Is there any visual observation in the cab or any signal that may be radio or otherwise that may be sent to the locomotive engineer or the cab to let him know that the signal at the crossing may have malfunctioned? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. WALPERT: Those are all the questions I have. Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, sir. Mr. Sweedler? EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY MR. SWEEDLER: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. Earlier in your testimony, you mentioned that after the accident, you had proceeded to the signal house and downloaded the event recorder and then locked the house or the cabinet; I am not sure which. MR. SHARKEY: I didn't personally do that. I instructed the field management personnel to proceed and do that. MR. SWEEDLER: I am just curious, and the reason I am asking this question is you are probably aware the Safety Board has had some difficulty with locomotive event recorders. We now have an understanding that with event recorders, nothing is to be done with them until the Safety Board or the FRA actually arrives on the scene and actually witnesses or actually do the downloading. I am wondering if anything could be done to the recording of what occurred with the signaling system by downloading it or doing anything else to it. My question is: Should it be locked until the authorities arrive so you can do this together with the authorities? MR. SHARKEY: Well, I guess fortunately or unfortunately, and I would say fortunately, I have never gone through a situation like this before to where I was involved in the NTSB coming out. It was a judgment call on my part to make sure we did preserve what evidence we did have in the event something else could have went wrong to eradicate the information. We were able to reproduce the exact same recording in the presence of the NTSB afterwards. MR. SWEEDLER: Do you think in the future it might be a good policy to not do that until the FRA or the NTSB is on the scene? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. SWEEDLER: Have there been any changes to the crossing equipment since the accident? MR. SHARKEY: As I stated, we removed the grade crossing predictor that was not in service and had it tested. Subsequently, we obviously put another one in its place, and that is the way it remains. MR. SWEEDLER: I understand you had video recorders or cameras at the crossing for a period of time. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. SWEEDLER: Could you tell us what their purpose was and are they still there or what did you learn from having them there? MR. SHARKEY: In the weeks and days after things were put back in service and everybody left town and the road was opened, we were getting various reports of various types of malfunctions at the crossing. It was at McKnight to the south or to the north. Basically, our field people were running out there all times of day or night doing downloads to find out that it was somebody complained four hours ago and it was the switcher switching, and that is what they saw. So, it became another way of recording what was going on. When a switching move occurs, the recorder just indicates that the train hit the island circuit. It doesn't indicate when the train hit the edge of the crossing, so an engine switching could pull up on the island circuit, and it shows a ten second warning. There were also reports of vandalism. We had reports of people throwing things at trains, and we were hoping to capture just anything. MR. SWEEDLER: Can you tell us what you did capture? MR. SHARKEY: We never captured anybody throwing anything. We did observe the one incident, the incident that I talked about with the loss of shunt with the grain car. By basically reviewing the films, that is how we determined that it was the grain car losing soy meal, and we were able to identify the car from the photograph and go back and verify that. MR. SWEEDLER: Were you able to pick up anybody driving around the gates? MR. SHARKEY: I personally did not review every film. I didn't refer to many at all. I don't recall. There were times when the county sheriff tried to ask us whether a person had stole a truck at the crossing. The police were starting to ask us to use it for other law enforcement purposes. MR. SWEEDLER: Are the cameras still in operation? MR. SHARKEY: I am not certain. MR. SWEEDLER: Are there any other plans to modify or upgrade the whole system at this particular crossing? MR. SHARKEY: Right now, I don't know of any. I don't know if the Commerce Commission has any plans or if the OT has any plans. Nobody has brought anything forward. MR. SWEEDLER: Thank you. That is all I have. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Morning. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: I want to ask you a couple of questions. Could you tell us a little bit about whether or not the east gate operates independent of the west gate? MR. SHARKEY: The east gate receives its control relay internal to -- that gate mechanism is energized off the same circuit as the west gate. So that relay, I am referring the XRPR, energizes it and sends the signal basically to both gates to be energized at the same time. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Is there separate information recorded for the operation or activation of each gate? MR. SHARKEY: No; it is working off one common control circuit. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Essentially, what you are saying is the information recorded would be applicable to both gates' operation? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Did now notice any discrepancies on the east gate in your review of the post-accident information? MR. SHARKEY: The only thing was a piece approximately a foot and a half long that was broke off at the tip. That was the only damage. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: No other items in terms of the operation of the gate at all? MR. SHARKEY: No; it operated correctly. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Let's talk a little bit about the west gate. Did you have an opportunity to review the gear box of the west gate? MR. SHARKEY: Briefly, yes. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Could you briefly describe what your observations were? MR. SHARKEY: It appeared that the gear train was okay, that it would rotate and things. It was not damaged beyond repair inside that we could tell. The counterweight arms and different parts of it were broke off, but the gear train appeared to be intact, and everything appeared in order inside. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Any witness marks on the gear teeth in the box itself? MR. SHARKEY: Not that I know of. I probably didn't look though. I am not familiar with what you are asking me. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: You mentioned earlier about the damage to the west gate. Would the event recorder identify damage that was made to it in any form or shape at this point? MR. SHARKEY: No, sir. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Essentially, other than physical examination, there would be no mechanism that would record the damage beyond your visual observations? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Dunn? MR. DUNN: Exhibit 2D shows the west gate. What did all the destruction, not to the gate, but to the rest of the mechanism? What do you think hit it, the train truck or the rebar? MR. SHARKEY: I think the rebar hitting the base of the signal caused such a violent impact that it shook the signal and basically snapped all these parts. That scrap has been broke off. MR. DUNN: It was the rebar that hit the pole? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. DUNN: The problems that were shown on the video that you had, did the computer verify these as a problem? MR. SHARKEY: Yes; they correlated exactly. MR. DUNN: The last question is: With all your tests you did and your simulations and everything else that was down out there, did those gates, on March 15, 1999, work, from what your tests showed, as they should have? MR. SHARKEY: Yes; with a high degree of engineering certainty, I would say those gates operated as intended. MR. DUNN: Thank you. I have no further questions. MR. LAUBY: Mr. Sharkey, I have a couple of questions for clarification. I would like to know a little bit more about the gate mechanism. Specifically, can gates come down at different speeds? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. LAUBY: What would affect them? MR. SHARKEY: There is the resistance units that I mentioned as an adjustment inside the gate, and when the gate is descending and the motor is driving it down, if those resistors were adjusted differently, they would have slightly different times. MR. LAUBY: How slight are we talking about? MR. SHARKEY: They would be adjusted so they would come down together within a second. MR. LAUBY: Do the gates come down by gravity for the most part? MR. SHARKEY: Well, they are driven down by the motor from 90 degrees to 50 degrees. Then below 50 degrees, it would be by gravity. The force exerted on it is controlled through that resistor network and how it acts as a dynamic snub on the armature of the motor, intended to brake it, act as a brake. MR. LAUBY: If you take power off the gates and they drop naturally, are they going to come down faster or slower than the programmed drop? MR. SHARKEY: Usually faster. MR. LAUBY: When you come up to the island circuit, you energize the island circuit or you shunt the island circuit with a switch engine, does the three or four second delay still apply to the gates after the flashing lights come on? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it does. MR. LAUBY: Yesterday you heard testimony from Mr. Fosburgh, who talked about the gates. He said he never noticed the gates or the lights activated. We also heard from Mr. Nieves, who indicated he felt the lights and the gates came on simultaneously after the truck was already up on the track. Is there any engineering explanation? Is there some failure or some reason that could happen that you know of in your experience? MR. SHARKEY: You want to maybe divide that into one scenario? It might be easier. MR. LAUBY: Sure; that would be fine. Let's start with the testimony of Mr. Fosburgh, that he witnessed no activation whatsoever. MR. SHARKEY: Actually, I thought what he clarified in one of your questions at the end was the fact that he didn't notice the signals on. I think he tried to -- MR. LAUBY: Let's back up. Let's go to Mr. Nieves who seemed a little bit more certain about what he saw. He came down to our display here and showed the position of the truck, and he indicated the position of the train. He felt he witnessed the lights come on. I believe he also said they came on, the gates dropped, and the lights came on simultaneously. My question is: As an engineer, is this possible, this scenario? MR. SHARKEY: I would say no. I think there was confusion as to what he observed. There is that relay delay time that is going to cause the gates to start down. That relay was tested afterwards, and it was consistent with those timers. The probability of something like that happening once and not being repeated, I would say that would be very rare from an engineering standpoint. I cannot really think of a scenario where that would have occurred. MR. LAUBY: To your knowledge, there is no failure of a relay or a component or a shunt that could cause this equipment to act in that manner? MR. SHARKEY: I would say that there would have to be so many things going wrong at once never to be repeated again. I believe there was a four second delay between the time that the lights activated and the gates started to descend. MR. LAUBY: Let me ask you a couple of questions about the event recorder. Basically, the information gathered from the signal event recorder, does this agree with the statements of the witnesses we heard yesterday? MR. SHARKEY: It I would say it completely agrees the Troy Schultz, the crane operator. Mr. Schultz talked about seeing the lights on, picking up his scrap, seeing the glow of the headlight; rotating to the right, dropping his load, and looking to the left and seeing the impact. In the tests we did that Friday night, I believe the times averaged somewhere in the 23 to 26 second range. Even if we compensate or try to compensate for cold oil versus hot oil, the fact that he didn't see the lights come on, he noticed the lights on. I was part of taking his statement that Friday afternoon, and he talked about not seeing the gate, but believed it was down. Some of his comments didn't come out on the tape that I recall. I was there. Even if the motions on Friday night were slower, I think it is totally consistent with what he said, that the 26 second warning was accurate. He also went on to talk about the glow of the headlight, of being up south of the grain elevator, and he said it was approximately a half mile. Well, the distance from the center line of McKnight Road to the center line of Saint George Road where that grain elevator is just south of is just over 2,700 feet. So, that is totally consistent with his statement. The statement of Mr. Fosburgh, I believe if we say that the truck was getting up close to the crossing when the lights came on, the truck would have obstructed Mr. Fosburgh's view of the signals on the east side of the crossing. I am not sure why he didn't see the signals on the west side of the crossing. There are several electric poles or whatever on the west side between approximately where he was according to one exhibit. So, I am not sure why he didn't notice the lights on. In the last questions you asked him, I believe he said that he did not see the gates not on. As far as Mr. Nieves' testimony, I think there is a little bit of difficulty in maybe sensing distance when you are looking down the road and trying to judge where the truck is compared to where the stopped cars or the signals are. So, I am not sure if it is totally out of character or inconsistent with what he said. I believe if we judge that the truck was probably going slower, that the timing is consistent with Mr. Nieves' testimony. MR. LAUBY: The event recorder we have on this system, have you ever known the event recorder not to agree with the physical movements or physical occurrences at a crossing? MR. SHARKEY: No, sir. MR. LAUBY: Have you ever seen a discrepancy in your career between what the event recorder says has happened at the crossing scene? MR. SHARKEY: No. That particular recording device has been available since early 1991 I believe. As far the times, especially the elapsed times of the events, it is consistent. MR. LAUBY: The incident we had, the two activation, I guess three activation failures we had since the accident at that crossing, did the event recorder reflect the occurrence as it was viewed on videotape? MR. SHARKEY: Yes and consistent with what the train crews reported, yes, the event recorder matched. If it was a short point in time, it matched. If it was a loss of shunts when the train was traversing the crossing, it matched. MR. LAUBY: There was no discrepancy between what physically happened and what the event recorder recorded? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. LAUBY: Thank you very much. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, Mr. Lauby. What is the voltage that goes through this activation relay to turn on the lights and to activate the gate? I guess there are two different relays for that. What is the voltage? MR. SHARKEY: There is a 12 volt, a basic enamel 12 volt circuit. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Basically, everything operates at the crossing of 12 volts. Is it a DC circuit? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The reason for that is so you can have battery back up if you lose commercial power? MR. SHARKEY: Yes; that is correct. The battery chargers are, the crossing batteries are very similar to how a car works. Instead of an alternator, we have battery chargers that are keeping the batteries charged and supplying the majority of the motor. CHAIRMAN BLACK: So it always operates off the battery, and you use the AC, the commercial power, just to charge batteries? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: That is a fail safe operation? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. CHAIRMAN BLACK: With regard to this, Mr. Jacky got into this a little bit, and some of questions I had from the media and my own questions have to do what you were recording on the event recorder. I understand it is a lot easier to measure or to monitor these relays than it is to monitor the physical movement of something like a gate. That would require some kind of switch that is activated when the gate got all the way down out at the crossing, which means it would require two wires running back to the house, isn't that correct, if you wanted to monitor the gates? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. I would like to point out that the wiring going to the gate is consistent with the original gate design before recorders and stuff were ever conceived. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I am talking about the future now. We are sort of progressing into what are we going to do in the future. It would seem to me it would be useful, certainly from an investigatory standpoint, but really even from a monitoring standpoint and maybe you could even use it in court, if you did have something that would physically sense the full extension of the gates and the activation of the lights. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Obviously, this opens up whole areas of discussion. We have already talked about the relays. It has been my experience as a traffic engineer, the traffic signals, that low voltage relays do last a long time as opposed to what we used to have when the same equipment as 110 volt relays, AC relays, which arced and caused problems. There was a question I had earlier about what you would not go to low switches like we did in traffic signals. I think I know the reason: It is cheaper and it is more reliable than a lower voltage is. Is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. It is a very specially designed relay. The contact makeup does not fail and arc when you weld the contact shut and stuff like they do in a normal electrical contact. These are very fail safe devices. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I would suggest, however, this is great to have this event recorder, but if it doesn't actually sense the actuation, but rather just the impulses, that does leave always this question about did it really work. That is more an observation on my part than it is anything else. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. In fact, we have started to add a contact in the gate mechanisms now that closes at five degrees so that we could have a circuit. In our new installations, yes, we do have to run additional wire. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I saw when I was visiting there when we met on the crossing a few weeks ago that you did have video cameras. I believe you got them on the first crossing north. Was the Indian Oaks or something like that? MR. SHARKEY: Saint George Road. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Saint George Road is the one just past north of the grain elevator? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Are they on that crossing to the south, just south of the steel mill also, the video cameras? I didn't look. MR. SHARKEY: They were, yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: So, you have three? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I actually saw, when I was sitting watch the crossing, a man come out on Saturday or Sunday and change the videotapes. Did he save -- I guess I am trying to figure out what happens to those videotapes. Does anybody review them or do you not look at them unless you get a complaint? MR. SHARKEY: In general, it is based on a complaint basis. We just tape them over. We rotate them and over-write them. They last 24 hours by the way they are recorded. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You mentioned a few moments ago that something you used to monitor back home was the broken gate reports and their correlation to gate running. How many sets of broken gates did you say you have had in past years at this location? Do you recall? MR. SHARKEY: I don't recall there being one in that period of early 1998 where we had the malfunctions or any -- CHAIRMAN BLACK: Just any time. MR. SHARKEY: I don't recall that we have had any broken gates. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You have had no previous broken gates at this location? MR. SHARKEY: No. I mean I looked back. Our records went back to January of 1998. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Do you find that is usually a good indication there is a considerable problem with that at other crossings? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. If the control circuitry is doing what it is intended to do and consistent with type of train operations switching, that will minimize broken gates if you have properly designed circuitry at the location. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Where are the pieces of the gate now, the original the wooden pieces and the gear mechanism from the west gate? Where are they physically located? MR. SHARKEY: The wooden gate arm is on the west side, and the tip on the east side of it, I think a portion was cut off, and it was taken by the Illinois State Police. The gate mechanism itself on the west side, we asked if there was any need to keep it since it was damaged beyond repair for that type of equipment. It was indicated that there was no reason to keep it, so it has been disposed of. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Are you sure it is disposed of or is it just lying around somewhere? MR. SHARKEY: I don't know. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I would like to ask you, if you could find that, I would like for you to send it to us and let us look at it. MR. SHARKEY: I was told it was scrapped. Sometimes, there is a time delay. I can't verify the type of physical handling it has had in the meantime. CHAIRMAN BLACK: If you could find it -- it should be pretty easy to identify -- I would ask that you send that to us and let us complete this issue that Claude raised a minute ago. Since it has been raised, I think we need to look at it in Washington in our Metallurgic Department. MR. SHARKEY: You are looking for marks on the gear teeth? CHAIRMAN BLACK: We are looking for anything we could find. The gate arms, are they still in the possession of the police? MR. SHARKEY: Not to my knowledge. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you for your testimony. Are there any issues raised that either of the parties would like to talk more about or the technical panel here? (No response.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Hearing none, thank you. I think you helped me understand the track circuit better than I did before. You did a good job of explaining that. Thank you very much. (Witness excused.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Let's take a 20 minute break, please. (Recess from 10:58 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Would you like to swear the witness, please. SWORN TESTIMONY OF MARK R. CORBO MR. DUNN: Mr. Corbo, for the record, would you please state your full name and spell it for us. MR. CORBO: Yes, sir. My name is Mark Corbo. M-a-r-k is my first name, and C-o-r-b-o is my last name. MR. DUNN: Who are you employed by? MR. CORBO: Safetran Systems Corporation. MR. DUNN: What do they do? MR. CORBO: Think manufacture railroad signaling electronics equipment. MR. DUNN: What are your duties and responsibilities at Safetran? MR. CORBO: I manage the technical support engineering group at our electronics division. Our primary responsibility is to support crossing control products pretty much from the time they are released from product development through their entire life as a salable product and actually after we stop manufacturing them. MR. DUNN: Thank you very much. I will now turn the questioning over to our Technical Panel, Mr. Ruben Payan. EXAMINATION CONDUCED BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. PAYAN: Mr. Corbo -- MR. CORBO: Good morning. MR. PAYAN: Good morning. I would like to start with if you could tell us approximately how many units of this type are currently in operation? MR. CORBO: Yes, sir. We have shipped approximately 20,000, 3000 systems. MR. PAYAN: This is worldwide? MR. CORBO: Yes; we market our products worldwide. MR. PAYAN: As far as Safetran Corporation and all its types of crossing control devices that it manufactures, where does the GCP-3000 range as far as available technology? MR. CORBO: The 3000 is our current top of the line crossing control device. It utilizes microprocessor technology, and to this point in time, it is the most technologically advanced product we have offered for sale for crossing control. MR. PAYAN: Mr. Sharkey provided a brief operational description. Could you provide us some additional description of the crossing predictor of the GCP-3000? MR. CORBO: As was mentioned by Mr. Sharkey, the key defining factor of our system is that we transmit any "C" signal down the rails or we utilize the rails as a circuit. In order for this process to work, we depend on a constant current transmitter. The result of transmitting this current into the rail or into the track circuit gives you a generated voltage. The receiver of the 3000 monitors this voltage. In terms of when a train enters the bounds of the circuit, which is the defined by determination shunts which Mr. Sharkey pointed out, the received voltage is going to change in a downward direction. This is because of the both mechanical and electrical characteristics of the train's axle. It actually shorts out some of the rail or the circuit load. It causes a reduction in voltage. The processor of the 3000 monitors both the amplitude of this voltage and also the rate of change of this voltage. The amplitude is representative of distance from the crossing, and the rate of change of this voltage is represented in the velocity of train. When both of these factors are taken into account and when the train is a programmed amount of time from the crossing, we will extinguish our relay drive output which is normally then translated to operating the warning system. MR. PAYAN: Once the microprocessor calculates the speed of the train and makes a prediction of when to activate the crossing, does it continue to monitor the approaching train? MR. CORBO: Yes. The actual processing for or train detection process is a continuing operation that occurs actually regardless of the presence of a train or if the train is, in fact, moving. So, it is continuous. MR. PAYAN: What is the microprocessor? How does it handle a train that stops on the approach? MR. CORBO: The 3000 system has what we call a time-out feature. Assuming that the warning system has been initiated, when the processor determines that the train has stopped, it will, after a calculated time, will start a time-out process. At the end of this time-out process, we will resupply the relay output from the system, which would then cause the warning system to clear. MR. PAYAN: Basically de-activating the crossing? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. PAYAN: Does it restart if the train moves again? MR. CORBO: It would restart assuming the movement is toward the crossing. MR. PAYAN: It knows the difference if the train is moving towards the crossing or away? MR. CORBO: Yes. We actually utilize the, if you will, whether the rate it changes upward or downward to determine the direction of movement. MR. PAYAN: Can you tell us what the data recorder module is and what it is used for? MR. CORBO: The 3000 that I inspected from McKnight Road contained an 80,015 data recorder. This device is manufactured primarily for assistance to maintenance or field forces. MR. PAYAN: Can you describe how the data recorder interface assembly fits into that? MR. CORBO: The data recorder interface, which is the 80025, allows the data recorder to monitor up to 16 digital inputs external to the 3000. Commonly, these monitor the contacts of the relays. MR. PAYAN: Where is that data stored? MR. CORBO: The data is stored in memory on the 80,015 card itself. MR. PAYAN: How often and when is the data recorded or how is it time stamped? MR. CORBO: There are really two types of data that are recorded. There is the external data and the internal data. Essentially, to answer your first question, how often, it is recorded when there is a message initiated. So, it is, again, a continuous monitoring process. Time stamp wise, all data that is recorded is time and date stamped. As I believe mentioned earlier, we record to the last full second. So in other words, if a recording came in, in that one second, plus .3 seconds more than that, we would record it to that one second mark. MR. PAYAN: I would like to kind of clarify: For the microprocessor, the GCP-3000's clock, and the recorder clock, is it possible for the time that events happened and the times that are recorded to be different? Does the recorder module have a clock of its own? MR. CORBO: The recorder module actually has it own clock and handles the time and date stamp activity. That is something, as Mr. Sharkey mentioned, that you adjust to the particular time. MR. PAYAN: Is it possible for the recorder to record 26 seconds of warning time and the computer to provide a shorter warning time? MR. CORBO: I don't quite understand what you are asking. Because warning time is a message fed from the GCP, there is no action taken on that message by the data recorder other than to assign a time and date stamp. It just records the information which it is fed. MR. PAYAN: The recorder is just told to record? MR. CORBO: Right. The recorder is essentially a monitoring device. It does not actively process any of the information which is fed to it other than assigned a time and date. MR. PAYAN: Are there any measures that Safetran uses to measure the reliability of these units, the GCP-3000, any standard measure? MR. CORBO: Pretty much the industry required standard, if you will in other words, what our customers ask of us when they are utilizing one of our products is mean time between failure. MR. PAYAN: Could you explain what that means? MR. CORBO: That is pretty much the number of hours or the amount of time that a system would be expected to operate before a failure occurs. MR. PAYAN: Do you know what mean time between failure is for the 3000? MR. CORBO: Based on 1998 numbers, it is better than 60,000 hours. MR. PAYAN: Post-accident, Safetran was asked to verify the set up at McKnight Road. Could you tell us what you checked and the results of those tests? MR. CORBO: Yes. April 15th actually was the day we were on site to look at the unit. We inspected the plans to see if the system programming made sense based on what we could see, and no exceptions were noted in that respect. Then we went about actually looking at some of the parameters of the 3000 which was in operation at the time, and again, no exceptions were noted. Then actually, a key part of it which, of course, as you know, ducking between the rain drops, that taking over the course of the whole day, we also watched several train movements, and the system performed as designed. MR. PAYAN: Following the field test, you also factory tested the unit. Could you describe what the analysis of that or what the outcome of those tests were? MR. CORBO: The outcome was that the system performed as designed, and we took no exceptions. MR. PAYAN: As far as the recorder module and each circuit board, were any exceptions taken? MR. CORBO: None. MR. PAYAN: Mr. Jacky has some additional questions for you. MR. JACKY: Good morning, Mr. Corbo. MR. CORBO: Good morning. MR. JACKY: I would like to ask you a couple of questions, first of all, in regards to how the GCP or the Grade Crossing Predictor determines what the train's speed is and get a little more detail into that. If you will, as the train is coming down the track, my understanding is that at some point some distance from the actual grade crossing, there is a shunt. Then when the train's axles actually cross through that shunt, the predictor starts, seems to change the amplitude of the voltage that is on the current or on the rails and also the rate of change of the current or voltage that is on the circuit. How long in time does it take for the Grade Crossing Predictor to determine what the train speed is? MR. CORBO: Are you looking for it takes an action after that or just that process by itself? MR. JACKY: Just that process by itself at this point. MR. CORBO: Generally, up to four seconds from the time it first detects motion or movement. MR. JACKY: In terms of physically, the train, is it considered to be the absolute front axles of the train that are actually causing this or is it just the entire length of the train or as the greater portions of the train enter, pass the shunt I should say, that actually provides the change in the amplitude of the voltage? MR. CORBO: Effectively, we are looking at the front axle of the train. There is generally no further calculation other than the front axle. MR. JACKY: Once the Grade Crossing Predictor determines what the speed of the train is, how long does it take then for the predictor to act upon that speed? MR. CORBO: It depends upon the distance from the crossing and what the speed is. It could, for a high speed train for the particular location, react within the same four second time frame. If it were a train, for example, running approximately one third speed for that particular area, it would wait a significant amount of time until the train was actually the programmed time from the crossing. MR. JACKY: In this case, let's focus for a second on this train or a train that would going the same approximate speed, approximately 79 miles an hour. MR. CORBO: Okay. MR. JACKY: The distance that the originating shunt would be north of that signal would be -- that distance would be based upon what factors then? MR. CORBO: The desired operation time of the warning system plus what we call a system reaction time, which is generally four seconds for the 3000, and then an area which I cannot determine based on this location would involve clearance time additional seconds for traffic to clear across; for example, a double track crossing or width. So, you would add up those total number of seconds, and then based on district speed, put your termination shunt at that particular point. MR. JACKY: Then you mentioned it takes the Grade Crossing Predictor approximately or up to four seconds to determine the train's speed. Are those four seconds added into the programmed warning time that is entered into the keypad of the GCP? MR. CORBO: No. The programmed warning time that the user puts into system via the keypad actually reflects the amount of time that you want the warning system to operate or the flashers to operate. MR. JACKY: I guess I don't understand that. If I am programming in 30 seconds into the keypad, are you saying then that it would take 30 seconds of activation or for gate activation or -- MR. CORBO: If 30 seconds were programmed into the 3000, you would get, assuming you had adequate physical distance for your high speed train moves, you would get 30 seconds of operation from the warning system or at least our output would extinguish 30 seconds prior to the train's arrival. MR. JACKY: The 30 seconds of operation would not necessarily mean, or the start of that operation would mean the start of the GCP working as opposed to the start, say, of the relay being open to move the lights and the bells on a crossing? MR. CORBO: Right. The time programmed in reflects the period of time that our relay output is extinguished. MR. JACKY: One more question just so I have it certain: Would that mean that the train would have entered past the shunts approximately 34 seconds prior to hitting the signal or the grade crossing, or would it mean 30 seconds from the time that the -- it would be 30 seconds from the time that the train first passed those shunts? MR. CORBO: Again, the shunt only establishes our circuit limits, the termination shunt. Our system initiates operation or removes relay drive when the train is a programmed number of seconds from the crossing. That distance from how far he is into the circuit or gone past the termination shunt varies according to, obviously, the speed of the train and how long that the approach limit actually is. MR. JACKY: How often is the amplitude of the voltage and the rate of change in the amplitude sampled? Is that actually sampled or is it constantly monitored by the grade crossings system? MR. CORBO: It is a sampling process. MR. JACKY: Do you know what the sampling rate is? MR. CORBO: I believe it is 16 times a second. MR. JACKY: I would like to put up the print-out from the signal event recorder if possible, and I would like for you to go through, if you will, and show us on the print-out for the -- MR. CORBO: Give me a second to practice with the pointer here. I can't see too much. Can anybody in the back see it? (Audience responds.) MR. CORBO: I will talk about it. MR. JACKY: We have one over here that we could probably provide to you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Out of curiosity, what happened to the one from yesterday? (Audience responds.) MR. CORBO: That, at least I can see it. MR. JACKY: Mr. Sharkey walked us through what the different signal changes and things like that are. What I would like to direct your attention to are the warning time and also the different speeds that are placed upon there. What I would like to do is get a sense of, or if you could please, explain to us how the Grade Crossing Predictor determines the speeds that are -- where they are listed on there and how the Grade Crossing Predictor determines those speeds. MR. CORBO: I think the best thing is to refer to my earlier statement that this is really meant as a maintenance tool, and the specific area where that is of importance is with our speed read-outs. That is a relative number, and our design is just to give maintenance personnel a relative idea. For example, for this area (indicating), this would be considered a fast train. Can we expand this out a little bit and look at the rest of the page, please? You will notice at that time top here, we have a slower train, probably a freight, in this neighborhood, but it is a train relatively running 30 miles per hour. That is the general goal of the information. The three speeds that we do provide are detected speed, which is the first speed. That is an instant or snapshot read-out taken out of our continuing process. The middle speed is the average speed of the train, which is more of a continuous average calculation from the time the system predicts or starts the warning system until he arrives at the island. Then the last is the island speed which is, again, a snapshot speed. As Mr. Sharkey pointed out, the information that we are really interested in or we could get from this gives you a general or rough idea that the train is accelerating or decelerating. Then you could translate that over to the warning time, which is a precise measurement which is from the time we extinguish relay drive until the time the island drops or the train reaches the island circuit. MR. JACKY: So then in your opinion, would there be any basis for comparing the speeds that are listed there, those average speeds, against the speed that may have been recorded by an event recorder on a locomotive? MR. CORBO: I would say I really can't answer that because I am not aware of the other types of recorders. I just know ours gives you a relative idea, but it was not really intended to be a precise, down to feet per second accuracy for speed. MR. JACKY: You would not be surprised then if those speeds were to be different from another source measuring a locomotive speed? MR. CORBO: No, other than I will say this: This is relatively accurate; okay? I think I showed the one that we are talking about, the bottom train. Go to the right, please. Okay. This tells us or tells me that the train in question was moving certainly faster or around 70 miles an hour. You know, beyond that, I am not willing to say, but I do know that is different than a train moving 50 or 40. MR. JACKY: Conversely then, the warning time there, is that considered to be a relative time also or a relative measurement also or would that be more exact? MR. CORBO: That is, our warning time is an exact measurement, which is from the time we extinguish our relay output until the island is extinguished or the train, in other words, reaches the island. That reflects that amount of time, 26 seconds in this case. MR. JACKY: Thank you. My next question is -- Mr. Payan asked you a couple of questions about recording the information, and just for clarification: To your knowledge is there any or what is the recording delay from the time that, or is there any recording delay on the Grade Crossing Predictor computer or recording module? MR. CORBO: What are you looking for? MR. JACKY: Just in that the time? Let me back up. The times that are stamped within the recorder are the times, I believe you testified that those are the times that are the information is recorded on the recorder? MR. CORBO: Right; received by. MR. JACKY: Would you expect there to be any difference in the time that it is received by from the time that the change is monitored or noticed by the GCP? MR. CORBO: I am not sure I quite understand how to answer that question because the way the recorder works -- could we put that back up, please? This on the right side here (indicating) is what we call the message section, okay. In fact, in this case, its message has a T-1 train move. Those items or the entries in the right portion of the recorder screen here reflect messages fed to the data recorder from the predictor or from the processor of the 3000, and they are logged in when they are received. In fact, there is an interrogation process that continually occurs between the 3000's processor and the data recorder. MR. JACKY: If I have a, in a signal entered a 30 second warning time into the Grade Crossing Predictor, would you expect at any time or any situation to actually see on the print-out a 30 second warning or will that always be less than the programmed warning time? MR. CORBO: Help me here. Of all the 3000s I have walked up to or what? MR. JACKY: No. I would say in any general case, would you expect -- if I typed in a 30 second warning time into any one of the processors, would there be a condition where the warning time, as it is computed, will actually be 30 seconds exactly or will it, because of time delays and the time it takes to sense the speed of the train, will that warning time always be less than 30 seconds? MR. CORBO: It really depends on train operations as Mr. Sharkey was discussing this morning. If you have a location where the trains typically run at a constant speed and do not change speeds at least during the inbound portion of the approach, I would expect to see a very large number of 30 second warning times. On the other hand, if this is a location that has train variances due to, for example, signals where trains run on yellows and then catch a green so they change speeds, that would cause a variation in the times. Then of course, if you have the presence of switches or switching trains -- locals, if you will -- that will give you a great variation in the times that I would expect to see. MR. JACKY: I have no further questions, but Mr. Raby has a question. MR. RABY: Good morning, Mr. Carbo. MR. CORBO: Good morning, sir. MR. RABY: Just one question: Earlier Chairman Black asked Mr. Sharkey about the description of the voltage of the system. I believe I heard 12 volt, a battery, and the only AC in the system was in the charger that kept the battery charged. You indicated a few minutes ago that it is an AC signal going up to that shunt; correct? MR. CORBO: Correct; the actual signal that 3000s transmitter produces is an AC signal. MR. RABY: I am still having trouble understanding this timing sequence. If you have to meet a standard, the FRA says 20 second minimum warning time for the motorist before the train enters that crossing, and you determine that, that point is the edge of the roadway of the crossing, not the island circuit which is some 60 feet from the center of the roadway of the crossing towards the direction the trains come from, and if you program 30 seconds into this computer box, why don't you get 30 seconds on the print-out? Why doesn't event recorder give you 30 seconds? Why doesn't the system give you 30 seconds so the event recorder can record 30 seconds? MR. CORBO: I had hoped I had kind of answered that with Mr. Jacky in terms of it is really dependent on the types of movements the trains are making as to whether or not you get the precise or programmed time. MR. RABY: The regulation says you must give 20 seconds of time. It doesn't say depending upon the operation of the trains. That is what I thought this co-processor, this computer system, the constant warning, that is what it did. That was the advantage of it, that it will always give whatever timing you program into it. That is what this computer is supposed to do. The old system that didn't have the constant warning. Then the speed of the train, they had to set the time to compute to the highest speed of the train so that when the highest speed train came through, they met the 20 second regulation, and when a slow train came through, it may be on for a minute. MR. CORBO: Right. MR. RABY: I thought that was the advantage of the constant warning system, that it would not require then the motoring public to get impatient, go around gates and things, that they would always have a 20 second minimum wait time regardless of the speed of train. You are telling me or at least I am understanding and what I am hearing is yes, but still we get a variation. I don't see why a computer cannot compute the speed of the train and determine when to start that 20 second or whatever is computed or been set up for this, but I will use the 20 seconds to keep a standard here for a baseline. That computer only has to say, Okay, I looked at the train; it is running 50 miles an hour, so I know where I need to start that 20 second time sequence so at the end of 20 seconds, the nose of that train or the front axle of that train is at the edge of that crossing. So, if that motoring public is at least sitting there, he never has to wait more than 20 seconds for a train, whether it is doing 30 miles an hour, 50 miles an hour, of 79 miles an hour. That is the way I understand it. If I am wrong, please correct me. MR. CORBO: You are correct except the proviso with certainly Safetran's equipment, we will provide a constant warning time with a constant speed train. So, the train has to be moving at the same speed for essentially the entire inbound portion to the street in order to get a constant or, if you will, consistent warning operation. MR. RABY: I understand that. I was being very basic in saying the 20 seconds and making assumptions the most simple situations. Then if the train does decelerate in that time frame, of course, they will have more than 20 seconds. If they accelerate in that time frame -- excuse me, not time frame, but in that space beyond that or the calibration where the equipment calibrates the speed, detects the speed, then if he accelerates as in I think was found in Fox River Grove, then the time signal was less than the amount. Barring that, and I assume that is why then things like -- in order to meet the 20 second minimum, there are variances in the length of vehicles, the speed of vehicles, the width of the crossing of more than one track, and that is why 30 seconds was put in here, so that this crossing and this railroad could always meet that minimum standard of 20 seconds because of the variables there. The time line should be the same. I guess that is where I am having trouble understanding why that computer, once it determines the speed and even though it monitors the speed on through until it hits the island circuit, it doesn't, if I understand correctly, it doesn't -- any information it receives after that initial computation is made, it doesn't reflect the timing sequence. It didn't go in and say, Wait a minute; I am in the middle of a timing sequence. The lights came on, but you know, I am going to wait eight seconds before I start the gate down because I have got some new information that came to me after I made that initial assessment of speed out there. MR. CORBO: The best thing I can tell you is the 3000 itself has one control output, and that is extinguished when we indicate the train is an amount of time away from the crossing. After that process has taken place, there is nothing else the system can do. It is not capable of doing anything differe