

Appendix N

Interview Transcript, Sergeant Nina Sutter, Battalion Chief John Quintanar, and Jesus Ojeda

Survival Factors Group Chairman's Factual Report

Metrolink train 111
Union Pacific train LOF 65-12
Los Angeles, California
September 12, 2008
DCA-08-MR-009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

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Investigation of: *
*
HEAD-ON COLLISION OF A METROLINK *
COMMUTER TRAIN WITH A UNION *
PACIFIC FREIGHT TRAIN, *
September 12, 2008 *
Los Angeles, California *
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* * * * *

Docket No.: DCA-08-MR-009

Interview of: SGT. NINA SUTTER
JESUS OJEDA
CHIEF JOHN QUINTANAR

Los Angeles, California
Thursday,
September 18, 2008

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to
notice.

BEFORE: DANA SANZO

APPEARANCES:

DANA SANZO, Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C.
(202) 314-6534

CARLOS TAPIA, Mechanical Equipment Inspector
California Public Utilities Commission
Railroad Operations Safety Branch

JENNIFER SCHUSTER
Federal Railroad Administration

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Sgt. Nina Sutter, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department:	
By Ms. Sanzo	4
Interview of Jesus Ojeda, Security Coordinator, Metrolink Safety and Security Division:	
By Ms. Sanzo	8
Interview of Chief John Quintanar, Los Angeles Fire Department:	
By Ms. Sanzo	13
By Mr. Tapia	16
Interview of Jesus Ojeda, Security Coordinator, Metrolink Safety and Security Division:	
By Ms. Sanzo	16
Interview of Sgt. Nina Sutter, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department:	
By Ms. Sanzo	18
Interview of Jesus Ojeda, Security Coordinator, Metrolink Safety and Security Division:	
By Ms. Sanzo	19
Interview of Chief John Quintanar, Los Angeles Fire Department:	
By Ms. Sanzo	20
Interview of Jesus Ojeda, Security Coordinator, Metrolink Safety and Security Division:	
By Mr. Tapia	22

I N T E R V I E W

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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13
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MS. SANZO: My name is Dana Sanzo. I'm an Accident Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board, and we're conducting interviews for Accident Number DCA-08-MR-009, the collision of Metrolink train with a UP freight train in Los Angeles, California.

And if we can start by going around the room and everybody state their names and their agencies please.

CHIEF QUINTANAR: John Quintanar, Battalion Chief, LA Fire, Metro Rail Coordinator, assigned to NTSB Investigation Team.

MR. OJEDA: Jesus Ojeda, Metrolink Safety and Security Coordinator, assigned to assist NTSB in the investigation and interviews.

SGT. SUTTER: Nina Sutter, LA County Sheriff's Department. I'm a Sergeant with Metrolink Bureau.

MR. TAPIA: Carlos Tapia, Motor Power and Equipment Inspector, in the Railroad Operations Safety Branch of the California Public Utilities Commission.

MS. SCHUSTER: Jennifer Schuster, Federal Railroad Administration.

MS. SANZO: Thanks for being here today.

INTERVIEW OF SGT. NINA SUTTER

BY MS. SANZO:

Q. We'll start by each of us -- if each of you could let

1 us know about when you were notified and in response to the
2 accident that day.

3 A. Well, I was working at Via Princessa passenger
4 station in Santa Clarita, with a team of deputies. We were
5 doing an operations plan for fair enforcement at the time of
6 the call. Initially it came out as a deputy involved in a
7 collision, north of Chatsworth Passenger Station. I began
8 responding Code 3, advised my desk that I was responding Code 3
9 to the location. I initially thought that it was one of my
10 deputies involved in a traffic collision. After several
11 minutes, the broadcast was sent out that it was a deputy on
12 board a Metrolink train involved in a collision of some kind.
13 During my -- while driving Code 3, lights and siren, from Santa
14 Clarita towards Chatsworth, I made several phone calls and
15 notifications to my lieutenant, Lieutenant Guerrera as well as
16 our commander, Commander Finkelstein. I did not have my
17 captain's phone number on my speed dial, so I did not notify
18 him. On the way there as well, a radio broadcast came out with
19 some more information regarding the deputy on board the train.
20 Deputy Ebbert (ph.), who was a court services deputy from Van
21 Nuys Court, was traveling home in full uniform on board the
22 train during -- when the collision happened. From the reader
23 transmission that we heard, he was speaking to our
24 communications center and saying that he was on board the
25 train, many injuries, he needed help, and at that time we had

1 more units responding Code 3 on the radio to get to his
2 location. I came out of Ragola (ph.) and got off at Topanga
3 Canyon. When I was going over the 118 overpass, I saw the
4 train below in the Canyon. It was on fire. Smoke was coming
5 out the (indiscernible). I was unable to see past it. So at
6 that time I was asked to set up a command post. My
7 recollection, the only place I knew of that had any field
8 suitable for airbu to land and units to stage, emergency units
9 to stage, was the Chatsworth Park on Chatsworth Avenue in
10 Chatsworth. So I went to that location. I evacuated the field
11 and the park of soccer players. I took control of the park and
12 waited for my first units to arrive. Once my first units
13 arrived, three deputies initially arrived, I gave them
14 directions to create a command post at that location and
15 utilized it as a staging area and guided other deputies to that
16 location from neighboring stations. At that time, our captain
17 arrived, Captain Jordan, and I was attempting to make phone
18 calls to the deputies on scene. Radio communication was
19 difficult. There were a lot of people on the radio. I was not
20 able to get through the radio. So I called via cell phone to
21 my deputy, to find out what the situation was there at the
22 location. He said he was assisting, assisting patrons off the
23 train and assisting fire at that time. The lieutenant -- when
24 Captain Jordan was there, I asked Captain Jordan to go to the
25 scene. We were unaware where fire and LAPD had set up a

1 command post at, and we needed to go to that location to
2 perform a unified command of the situation. I had Captain
3 Jordan go to the location and told him to call back and let me
4 know if it's suitable for us to go over there. I did not know
5 the situation in terms of hazardous materials or what the
6 situation was at the scene. So he did go over there. While he
7 was en route, and he did not immediately call back. So I
8 contacted a deputy at the scene, Deputy Craig Lisneck (ph.) and
9 advised him that we needed to set up a unified command. He
10 needed to find the nearest chief that he could find for LA
11 County Fire and LA City Fire, who was with a uniformed LAPD
12 officer of any kind, and connect with them because most likely
13 they were the ones in command. He actually asked if I was
14 looking over his shoulder because he saw two directly in front
15 of him that were evaluating the situation. So he immediately
16 connected with them, and they led him up to the command post
17 where they had set up, and he stayed there. I in turn got in
18 my radio car and went to the location and technically I was
19 still incident commander of the scene, to control
20 (indiscernible) as our job is to assist LAPD since we would be
21 their handle, and we assign deputies to whatever they needed,
22 whether it was a landing zone, whether it was a triage area. I
23 stayed there until approximately midnight, 1:00 in the morning.

24 Q. Did you call for the Sheriff's Department's
25 helicopter?

1 A. Somebody did, but I was in transit. Somebody
2 required air bureau.

3 Q. Okay. Thank you.

4 INTERVIEW OF JESUS OJEDA

5 BY MS. SANZO:

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. This is Jesus. Here my timeline from the point -- I
8 was in the office when a page came through my phone at 4:29. I
9 looked at my phone and realized that we had a collision with
10 111 with multiple injuries. It didn't exactly tell us where.
11 I knew that 111 was on the Ventura County Line. I just didn't
12 know where. At that point, I started calling my team members
13 in the Safety and Security Division, and as I'm talking to
14 Mr. Fred Jackson, he's not quite sure what's going on either,
15 and he was in a restaurant having dinner. He looks up at the
16 TV and finds that the media was already there. At that point
17 he says, hang up, hit the road and we'll talk en route. Once,
18 once we both hit the road, we got our rollout gear. I started
19 making phone calls to our other teams members, our manager of
20 environmental and public safety, and she was not aware of what
21 happened. So I told her and she says that she had her RPIO
22 (indiscernible) station with. So I rode to Union Station to
23 pick up RPIO, and we both headed out to the, to the scene.
24 When we were en route, we had a little bit of difficulty
25 because I was driving a plain vehicle. So we could not go as

1 far as we wanted to, to get there. Once we arrived, we looked
2 -- the first command post that we noticed was the LAPD's
3 command post that was placed at Rinaldi and Canoga. At that
4 point, we made contact with them. We identified ourselves.
5 They did tell us that there is another -- that the fire had a
6 command post inside near the scene. So we walked into the
7 scene. My conversation with my PIO, I said you go out to the
8 command post, I'm going to take a quick size up of the
9 incident. During this time, I'm still in constant
10 communication with our leader, our chief of safety and security
11 which is Ed Peterson. He gave me and Fred Jackson orders to
12 marry up with the command post and give them all the
13 information that they want from Metrolink. I got there a
14 little before -- I would say about 5:00, 5:00 or so, maybe a
15 little bit before 5:00, and Fred Jackson was right behind me.
16 A couple of minutes later I told him that -- well, he knew that
17 he needed to go to the command post, and I went to take a size
18 up, take a look at the site. We had a previous incident in
19 Glendale, and I knew that this was a little bit bigger. I just
20 didn't know the extent. From a distance, as I got closer, I
21 started realizing, I passed the triage area onto the cars,
22 looked at the scene, came back to the command post and reported
23 to Fred Jackson which he had already checked in with our
24 Sheriff's and the fire department along with LAPD. Questions
25 started coming out, how many passengers did you have. Again,

1 and what we did know, that it was rush hour. So we were
2 expecting a lot of passengers. We didn't have a number, but we
3 did get the information that it was a rush hour train. We are
4 expecting over 100 passengers easy. At that point, I know that
5 our sheriffs were -- I saw Nina and she was very busy
6 coordinating her efforts. She knew that we were there. We
7 coordinated with each other, with some of the deputies as well.
8 Well, I would say about an hour, 45 minutes passed by, our
9 chief shows up, Ed Peterson. He takes over the command post
10 and Fred Jackson and I now become the runners. We start
11 following orders from Ed. He's mobilizing our staff, getting
12 the resources that we need to the scene, notifying and updating
13 our chief dispatchers and our upper management, our CEO and our
14 AEOs. Once we gave them the size up and the information, our
15 CEO and AEO started heading out towards the scene. I would say
16 another half an hour, they showed up and we brought them into
17 the command post. From a railroad perspective, there's very
18 little we can do. We did have our employees out there
19 assisting people getting off the train. That I do know. We
20 also had -- we had the sheriffs out there, and then again they
21 were very busy removing passengers from the scene and taking
22 them into the triage area. At around 10:00 that night, Ed
23 Peterson turns the scene over to me. Actually, excuse me. Let
24 me back up. Around 9:00, Chief Quintanar shows up. They end
25 up uniting with Chief Quintanar and myself, and I may be off

1 the time a little bit, maybe a half an hour, but our task at
2 that moment was to get with the USAR guys and find out what
3 they need from us, from the railroad side. If they need heavy
4 equipment, we have the heavy machinery waiting off on the side,
5 several -- about half a mile away. We had a briefing with
6 Chief Quintanar, Chief Ernst, which he was the Battalion Chief
7 in charge of USAR at that moment. They wanted to know the
8 structure of the equipment. I was given instruction from again
9 my chief, the railroad's team leader, incident commander if you
10 will, for the railroad to get our technical people, our
11 mechanical folks involved into this briefing. We did brief
12 with the fire department. Our technical guy gave them the
13 information they needed, and we did not leave that site because
14 if they had questions, we wanted to be there and answer any
15 questions or concerns that they might have with the integrity
16 of the equipment, the car. And I'm referring to the first car
17 behind the locomotive. At around 10:00, Ed Peterson had other
18 things going on and he turns the scene over to me, and then --
19 so then I take responsibility all the way until I would say
20 8:00 a.m., the next day, and at that point, I briefed the next
21 person that was coming in for me, to relieve me. Around 9:00,
22 we made the official transfer, and I stuck around until
23 possibly -- I can't remember. Maybe noon of Saturday or 12:30.

24 Q. I'll stop and ask a few follow-up questions right
25 now.

1 A. Sure.

2 Q. Talking about the resources that the railroad brought
3 to the scene, could you describe if there's any additional
4 employees that worked at the scene and/or what physical
5 resources such as heavy equipment that Metrolink brought in to
6 assist.

7 A. As you know, this was a Metrolink/UP collision. The
8 -- anytime there's a major collection, the railroads pick up
9 the phone and they call our contractor. It can be Holter (ph.)
10 or Temko (ph.). They come out full, with all the heavy
11 equipment that will be required to move equipment around. The
12 notification was made. We were going to make it, but we found
13 out that it was made by the UP, the Union Pacific railroad
14 representative, which is not a problem. That was great. It
15 was good teamwork. So we had two large companies ready to
16 start moving railroad cars if need be, if the fire department
17 required heavy equipment. So the equipment was there, and all
18 we needed was the word from the fire department as to what help
19 they needed from us.

20 Q. And could you describe a little further what
21 coordination was happening with the UP personnel that were on
22 scene?

23 A. With --

24 Q. With the UP personnel that were at the scene.

25 A. What I noticed as I'm walking around, I started

1 noticing several UP executives. We had several managers. I'm
2 glad that I knew most of them. So we started coordinating
3 efforts. They did mention that the heavy equipment operators
4 were already there at the site. So that was very helpful.
5 What other information they gave us, we were trying to find out
6 what they were carrying in those containers, whether there was
7 hazardous materials or not. The answer that we got from them
8 was no, there were no hazardous materials in those cars.

9 INTERVIEW OF CHIEF JOHN QUINTANAR

10 BY MS. SANZO:

11 Q. Chief.

12 A. This is John Quintanar. Nina, how are you? I was
13 notified of the accident approximately 4:30. I got a call from
14 a retired battalion chief who lives in Palm Springs, who I deal
15 with who is actually a consultant to Metro. He notified me of
16 the crash, and I ended up calling our dispatch center, and they
17 notified me to turn on one of the channels, and I ended up
18 turning on Channel 9, saw the incident taking place, and called
19 our dispatch center again to see if I was going to be
20 dispatched. I was finally dispatched around 6:30 in the
21 evening, 1830 hours, and arrived on scene at approximately 8:00
22 or 2000 hours. I was directed to respond to the command post,
23 which I did, and I identified myself and made myself available
24 to the incident commander, at that time was Chief Ruwada. I
25 sat through a briefing he had with the fire department

1 resources, both LA County and LA City, and sat through the
2 briefing and so forth, and once I left there, I went to the
3 command post outside, and I was asked to be the liaison with
4 Metrolink and UP. I was then introduced, and I knew Jes Ojeda,
5 and so at that time approximately 8:30, 9:00 in the evening,
6 21, 2200 hours, we were working -- starting to work together.
7 We, we would periodically have meetings with the USAR people,
8 Chief Ernst and his technical people to decide what we wanted
9 done, and the decision was made to move the cars that were
10 located west of the impacted car. We -- before that decision
11 was made to move heavy equipment in, we thought we were going
12 to bring the heavy equipment through the medical group area
13 which was the grassy knoll area, but there were issues as far
14 as the stability of the ground. So then a decision was made to
15 try to bring in the heavy equipment from the Topanga Street
16 area, utilizing a dirt road, and found out that LA County Fire
17 Department's tractor unit was clearing the road out for heavy
18 equipment to access that point, if need be. The determine was
19 made to allow them to do that, and so they brought in heavy,
20 heavy equipment to start removing the trains. That took effect
21 close to midnight when they started moving trains, and they did
22 off and on I would say up until about 7:00, 8:00 in the
23 morning. The last apparatus that was moved was the motorcar
24 from Metrolink and we -- they determined that there was an
25 engineer that possibly was dead underneath the car. So we had

1 to lift it before he was being moved. Finally, we lifted it,
2 removed the victim, and eventually moved that motorcar out to
3 allow the fire department personnel to access the impacted car.
4 This occurred at approximately 8:00, 9:00 in the morning. I
5 was then relieved at approximately 10:00 in the morning, and
6 left the scene approximately 11:00.

7 Q. And could you describe your expertise in how you're a
8 liaison officer for -- one of the rail liaison officers for the
9 LAFD? Could you describe that for us, your background?

10 A. My background?

11 Q. Uh-huh.

12 A. My background, I've been a fire department member for
13 the last 33 years and the last 4 1/2 years assigned to Metro
14 Rail. I've dealt with Metrolink occasionally on some drills
15 and some training. I know Jes Ojeda. We've worked in the
16 past. I deal with Metrolink in the Union Station area and so
17 forth. At the scene, I was asked to be the liaison working
18 with UP and Metrolink. A very good relationship was developed
19 between Metrolink and the, and the train company officials,
20 especially working well with the contractors that they hired to
21 move those railcars. They would come to me and they -- we
22 worked together. We coordinated moving each and every car.
23 There was a time there where we allowed the firefighters to
24 break and take some time off, rehabbing, and this was a time
25 where we -- where the contractor was moving the majority of

1 their cars affected by the crash. All in all, I think they
2 moved close to 10 cars out of the impacted area. They moved
3 two locomotives. One was on its side. So they did fantastic
4 work. I was very impressed by the cooperation between the fire
5 department and the two rail services.

6 BY MR. TAPIA:

7 Q. When you were liaison between Metrolink and UP, do
8 you remember the UP officer's name that you might have
9 contacted?

10 A. I'm not sure if he was a UP or a contractor. His
11 name was Mr. Hunt.

12 Q. Hunt.

13 A. H U N T. That was the person that I dealt with.

14 Q. Do you remember the first name?

15 A. No.

16 MR. TAPIA: That's all I have.

17 INTERVIEW OF JESUS OJEDA

18 BY MS. SANZO:

19 Q. Yes, sir.

20 A. Let me go back, because I left something very
21 critical out. This is Jesus Ojeda again. One of the things
22 that I left out is that during the process, during the time
23 that I was responsible for the Metrolink section, scene, I
24 would say, I kept getting calls from our passenger services.
25 When we first found out about the scene, we knew it was huge.

1 We knew that we needed to start deploying our passenger
2 services department to different locations. I then found out
3 that we were going to use Chatsworth High School so that
4 families can go there and pick up their loved ones. One of the
5 things that we -- our manager of passenger services had lots of
6 questions on was that they had, they had personnel, but they
7 didn't have information such as the names. That is a very
8 critical part of it because if people are showing up to the
9 scene, our people needed to have names to put with the
10 families. The fire department did come back to us after we
11 made that request. They helped us with a list, and I thought
12 that was very beneficial. It really took a big load off our
13 department's shoulders at this height of the families at the
14 Chatsworth High School. One of the other things that we try to
15 do as Chief Quintanar said, we did have a previous
16 relationship. I think that really paid off because when they
17 introduced me to Chief Quintanar, at the command post, I looked
18 at him, he looked at me and we knew exactly what we were there
19 for. We didn't leave each other's side. Any questions,
20 technical stuff, we had the personnel there to answer. So I
21 think that relationship really paid off, that we knew each
22 other and we knew what to do.

23 Q. Do you know who was staffing or assisting at the high
24 school with the passengers we were taking there?

25 A. We had our manager of passenger services. Her name

1 is Cheryl Curraro (ph.). She had her staff at the high school
2 as well. We also took action and we activated the -- our call
3 center. So families can call the 800 information number and
4 they can request more information through that phone number.

5 SGT. SUTTER: One more thing we did later that night,
6 Sheriff Baca and Commander Johnson responded to the high school
7 to speak to family members who were waiting to hear about their
8 loved ones, and concern had risen about the number of people
9 there waiting for loved ones with no word, and we're talking
10 probably after midnight. And so it was decided we would have
11 actually Sheriff's deputies take down the names of the loved
12 ones of the family members who were there and traverse the
13 hospitals to locate -- to try to locate the people who were
14 missing and who were unheard from.

15 INTERVIEW OF SGT. NINA SUTTER

16 BY MS. SANZO:

17 Q. Well, I would like to ask each of you the question I
18 have been asking everybody, if you could give some advice to
19 departments or railroads on how to plan and prepare for
20 responding to an incident like this. We'll start with the
21 Sergeant.

22 A. Training, training, training. I've been to incident
23 command training in Alabama, Department of Homeland Security.
24 I've been through local law enforcement incident command
25 schools, and knowing the area, we have a big different in terms

1 of geographical area, whether it's densely populated versus
2 very remote, and several of our lines go through the canyon
3 areas, and again if this had been part of Simi Valley where
4 it's non-accessible except for dirt roads, we were very lucky
5 that this was an area where we had a command post close by,
6 very lucky that there wasn't hazmat related materials on board,
7 otherwise we'd deal with evacuations by ambulance, by
8 ambulance, by ambulance. So just the mutual training
9 regarding, you know, the combination of law enforcement, deputy
10 personnel, as well as the fact that we traverse the five
11 counties. We have different agencies as well as different
12 Sheriff stations and jurisdiction of the different areas. So
13 it's a lot of people to be trained, to be familiar with the
14 train cars and what's accessible within the train cars, and how
15 to get the people out safely. And also the fact that we had
16 problems with the cell phones. Cell phone use in the canyons,
17 several areas, especially Antelope Valley, like we have here,
18 Simi Valley areas, you would have no cell phones and we have
19 some no radio communication areas where we travel up,
20 especially (indiscernible) area, there's points where we have
21 no radio communications at all on the trains, let alone cell
22 phones. So that would be an issue that we need to deal with.

23 INTERVIEW OF JESUS OJEDA

24 BY MS. SANZO:

25 Q. Jesus.

1 A. I'd like to piggyback what you said, training,
2 training, training. You can't get enough. We're all busy
3 doing day-to-day activities, but we need to take the time and
4 train with our outside friends, fire and police. From a
5 railroad perspective, we try to be a very proactive railroad,
6 and make sure that we educate the first responders so that they
7 know exactly what to do, but at the same time, the railroad,
8 Metrolink, we have been learning from past incidents. As an
9 example, Placentia, Fullerton. We've had incidents out there.
10 No doubt that the railroad -- the railroads know how to
11 respond. The railroads know how to put the railroad back
12 together quickly. There's no doubt about that, but what we
13 didn't know in the past is that learning about ICS. After
14 Fullerton, after Placentia, we learned about ICS and we're
15 putting it to use. The unified command, now there was always
16 someone with the fire -- it was always someone with the police
17 department, and in the past, we would show up, give us a size
18 up, and we'll walk away. We've learned, and I think part of
19 the learning is just implementing those lessons learned and
20 keeping them and also practice, drill on them.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 INTERVIEW OF CHIEF JOHN QUINTANAR

23 BY MS. SANZO:

24 Q. Chief.

25 A. Training. I heard that before. It's very important.

1 But I also think that the relationship you have, that you build
2 through training and through just getting together and
3 discussing possible incidents that could occur, or past
4 experiences, but I think Jes mentioned that when he knew it was
5 me and I knew it was him, we knew how we worked somewhat, and
6 we got together and we had a goal in mind and we took care of
7 that. I was very, very impressed with the Sheriff's Department
8 and LAPD officers that, you know, took action. It wasn't their
9 discipline to go in there and remove bodies and so forth, but
10 they took action. I think that we're very unique out here
11 being we've been doing this for many, many years. I've been on
12 the fire department for 33 years, and we've developed the
13 incident command system and worked with law enforcement
14 brothers and sisters as well as our rail people, and I think as
15 a result of that, I think this incident went very well.

16 Q. And speaking along those lines, how would you -- for
17 other departments, what would you say to them about the
18 importance of say having personnel that are dedicated rail
19 liaisons?

20 A. I strongly believe that having me or somebody in my
21 position assigned to a rail company is an opportunity to have
22 me liaison with that rail company and give me the ability to
23 act when I have to, such as this particular event. I know that
24 I'm very unique because to the best of my knowledge, I'm the
25 only one throughout the United States that is assigned to a

1 Metro Rail company. They pay my salary. They pay everything
2 for me. So I know that, you know, our, our Metro service here
3 is looking -- being very proactive. I would suggest that other
4 rail services throughout the United States look into maybe
5 changing their policy or, you know, allowing fire and law
6 enforcement to be part of their, you know, their operation.

7 Q. Okay. Carlos.

8 INTERVIEW OF JESUS OJEDA

9 BY MR. TAPIA:

10 Q. In areas where the cell phone doesn't work, the dead
11 zone, how was, how was communication covered from a train
12 (indiscernible). Is it a problem or is (indiscernible)? I'm
13 trying to think out in the future, any areas where
14 communications between the engineer and the conductor, and the
15 conductor and the dispatch center a problem?

16 A. From a railroad perspective, at this point we don't
17 have a problem. There are certain areas that we have what do
18 you call it, black spots or dark territory --

19 Q. Uh-huh.

20 A. -- dark spots because there's no cell phone
21 reception. On the railroad, we don't have that problem. We
22 have -- even through the tunnels, we have relays that even if
23 the engineer picks up the phone, excuse me, the radio, they're
24 able to communicate with dispatch or with the conductor inside
25 that tunnel. But the other thing I want to just finally say is

1 that you're absolutely correct. The relationship between
2 everyone, we were very happy with the way the Sheriff's
3 Department handled it. LAPD did a wonderful job, but anything
4 that we wanted, we talked to the Sheriff's Department and they
5 got for us. I mean they were very good at what they did along
6 with the fire department, of course.

7 MS. SANZO: Okay. I believe that concludes this
8 interview, and thank you very much.

9 (Whereupon, the interview in the above-entitled
10 matter was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: HEAD-ON COLLISION OF A METROLINK
 COMMUTER TRAIN WITH A UNION
 PACIFIC FREIGHT TRAIN
 September 12, 2008,
 Los Angeles, California
 Interview of Sgt. Nina Sutter,
 Jesus Ojeda, and Chief John Quintanar

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-08-MR-009

PLACE: Los Angeles, California

DATE: September 18, 2008

was held according to the record, and that this is the
original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been
compared to the recording accomplished at the hearing.

Kathryn A. Mirfin
Transcriber