



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Office of Marine Safety

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT IS A SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPOSITION OF MR. Hong Zhi Wang, TAKEN FROM December 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 and 10, 2008, PURSUANT TO RULE 15, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

FOR PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY REASONS, TO INCLUDE PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS AND MATERIAL WITNESSES, THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE DEPOSITION WILL NOT BE REPRODUCED IN THE NTSB'S PUBLIC DOCKET UNTIL A DETERMINATION IS MADE BY THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL THAT ALL CRIMINAL LITIGATION RELATED TO THIS MATTER HAS CONCLUDED, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE PARTIES TO THOSE PROCEEDINGS HAVE CONSENTED TO PUBLIC RELEASE.

Dates: December 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 &10, 2008

Place: San Francisco

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT INFORMATION FROM HONG ZHI WANG

- The third officer signed employment contract on October 22, 2007 and took a train, ferry and bus. Got off the bus in Busan, Korea on October 24, 2007.
- He had little opportunity to discuss transfer with old third officer from the previous crew. As a third officer I'm in charge of the fire emergency and rescue devices. He would have liked to have talked to him about their position and their condition. Also, he would have liked to talk to him about the duties of a third officer on board the ship. He had little opportunity to learn about the ship and my duties before we sailed form Busan.
- Remembers participating in a rescue drill and two fire drills during the evening of October 24, 2007. Two drills were needed because the crew was unfamiliar with the vessel's fire equipment. The drills were in English (Capt. Singh) and the Master translated into Chinese.
- Had the evening watch until 12 when arriving on Oct 24th; gangway watch monitoring loading cargo. Normal work hours underway: 8-12, and in port: 6-12.
- When the Cosco Busan left Busan he was unfamiliar with the equipment on the bridge and Capt Singh had to show him how to operate it and what his harbor transit duties were.
- During the harbor voyages the Master never told him what jobs to perform other than standing by or operating the EOT, monitoring the helmsman and keeping the record books. Normally stood behind EOT. These are the same duties as third that he did on the last vessel I was on.
- The third gave the pilot card to the pilot who signed it and returned it.
- Discussed the operation of the radars with the pilot. Noticed pilot adjusting the VRM underway but did pay attention to the specifics of what he was doing. Set the VRM up for the Pilot. Never ask the pilot why he wanted the VRM circle set up on the radar. Does not remember the pilot using a .33 nm. VRM. Too busy to ask how the pilot was going to use the VRM.
- First time he had been involved in a total crew change out.
- Capt Sun did not tell him he was the OOW [during harbor voyages].
- No formal training with the electronic chart system. Had previous experience with electronic charting equipment on previous vessel when he was a cadet. He remembered-- looked at it the symbology with second officer and the chief officer and had a discussion and talked about how to make an inquiry and how to zoom

in and zoom out, center and off center; also other basic functions.

- One of the functions on the electronic charting system is called query. When you point to that and click on it then it will display information.
- Prior to November 7, 2007, he did not receive any training aboard the COSCO Busan about how the job of an officer-of-the-watch in pilotaged waters relates to the job of a ship's captain and/or the ship's pilot.
- Prior to sailing on Nov 7, 2007, there was no bridge team meeting with the Master and Pilot. The master did not hold a pre-departure meeting with his crew on the outbound passage plan.
- Plotted two fixes; one at 8:00 and at 8:30. Master or Pilot never told him to take fixes. The third officer added two fixes (8:10 and 8:20) after the vessel rammed the pier. He was concerned he might lose his job. He says there really wasn't time to add these fixes underway. Too many other things to do.
- The CG did not ask the crew to preserve the paper chart with all the fixes. The two intermediate fixes (8:10 and 8:20) were erased. The crew needed the chart for further navigation in the harbor.
- The superintendent was upset that the Master had not arranged his transportation on the morning of Nov 7th and that it was his job to do so. Master was upset with the superintendents because of the lack of their travel arrangements interfering with departure.
- Briefed the pilot on some of the basic functionality of the electronic chart; course, speed, zoom. The third remembers reducing the scale of the electronic chart at the request of the pilot so he could see ahead of the channel and the whole bridge.
- Speed log was not working; however, speed could be obtained from other sources.
- He read and signed the Master's standing Orders.
- The passage plan was put into the computer by the previous crew. There was no paper version of the passage plan that was berth-to-berth.
- Third officer would not sign the post accident berth to berth passage plan.
- Remembers hearing the Delta tower fog horn but not sure when. Thought it was from another vessel. Bow watch did not report a fog horn.
- Leaving the channel he was aware there were buoys when he looked at the chart. He didn't see them because it was too foggy. Thinks he remembers the bridge doors being open.

- Although aware of the paper chart and the pencil track line he was unaware of the actual route the pilot was to take leaving San Francisco Bay.
- Believed the harbor waypoints had been entered into the electronic chart system by the second mate.
- Electronic chart system has an alarm function if vessel was off course. The third mate did not monitor the GPS to see if the vessel went off course during the accident voyage. Normally only use electronic chart navigation in open ocean. The third officer Once tested off course alarm feature at sea.
- Prior to the allision while underway neither the pilot nor master asked the third for help operating the electronic chart system or to monitor the vessel's track.
- The bridge tried on several occasions to radio the chief officer on the bow without success (8:18, 8:35, 8:36). The third was not sure why the master was trying to reach the chief officer.
- Track line on chart put there by the second officer was a guide, a reference; however, the pilot will use a different course. The third did not show the pilot the paper chart with the track line. The chart was on the chart table on the bridge.
- From electronic chart knew before Nov 7, 2007, RACON between D & E for navigation assistance. For other reasons a vessel might not pass directly under the RACON (water depth, obstacles, etc).
- Before getting underway the third, master and pilot worked on setting up the radars and master conversed with the second officer via walkie-talkie for help. Occurred between 7:00 to 7:30. The pilot was eventually able to acquire targets using the radar.
- The master-pilot info exchange card. Third checked all the boxes both only verified the more important items.
- The pilot-to-pilot passage plan (paper version) was on the chart table with the nav. chart.
- On the vessel there were many manuals; too many to learn.
- The master never designated the third to closely and continuously monitor the ship's progress along the prepared track.
- In pilotage waters the crew are suppose to help the pilot navigate the vessel.
- No one on the bridge was designated as the lookout.
- Third completed radar training in 2001 and did not take a course in BRM.

- The third signed the master's 'standing orders' but he was not sure when; before or after the accident.
- Superintendents in Busan said to use the old computer way points and passage plans.
- Third studied operating manual and played with the electronic chart system while underway from Busan.
- May have heard the D tower foghorn just prior to allision, but not sure. The bridge doors were open, he thinks.
- The third didn't pick up on the 'red triangles' conversation because the master and pilot were talking too fast. Same with the VTS callout to the pilot. No one asked the third about the red triangles. He could have shown them on the electronic chart with the query capability; clock with the mouse.
- Red triangles were navigation signals, buoys.
- The third did not see the SMS until after the vessel was underway from Busan, Korea.

END OF SUMMARY

/s/ R.W. Henry (3/12/2009)

Robert W. Henry