

1. **Engineering Group Interview summary of Empress of the North-**

The following is a bulletized summary of the interviews conducted by the engineering group on May 15 & 16, 2007 onboard the Empress of the North. The group interviewed 4 members of the engineering staff, including: 1) the Chief Engineer; 2) the 1st Assistant Engineer (on watch during the grounding); 3) the oiler on watch during the accident; and, 4) the 3rd Assistant Engineer.

1. Chief Engineer interview summary-

- a. 26 years old
- b. Holds 2nd engr unlimited license steam, motor, gas turbine
- c. Graduated Kings Point 2003
- d. sailed 2 years MEBA out of Houston, LA
- e. started Jan 2006 with Majestic
- f. worked in yard 2 months in March 2006
- g. sailed 3 AE 2 months
- h. sailed 1 AE, started CE Oct. 2006
- i. month on/month off
- j. been on 1 month this trip
- k. works 6 am to 6 pm
- l. assigns work to engine staff
- m. daywork
- n. off 6pm night before accident
- o. bed 10:00 night before accident
- p. asleep when ran aground, awoke, checked alarms in room monitor, no bilge alarms yet
- q. got dressed, started getting bilge alarms
- r. got radio
- s. ran to ER
- t. 1AE called, said ran aground
- u. 1 AE rings Engr assistance alarm
- v. 1AE calls all ER personnel
- w. CE to ER
- x. ordered staff to check tanks and close vents, trying to find what flooded and how much
- y. Capt. calls for abandon ship, for all pax to muster at stations
- z. started ballast pumps
- aa. deballasting voids known breached
- bb. checked fuel tanks, sewage, potable water tanks
- cc. started taking stbd. list up to 8 degrees before settling out
- dd. voids pressed after about 1 hr., water out of the vents
- ee. checking accom spaces, some flooding there, used portable pumps.
- ff. started launching liferafts
- gg. used fire/bilge pump crossed over to bilge/ballast system
- hh. 50 hp pump

- ii. crossed mn. fire pump over to bilge system and used it, also ran bowthruster bilge pump
- jj. bilge alm order, void 1,2,3, forepeak, chain locker
- kk. once aground got forepeak alarm
- ll. chain locker filled
- mm. stayed in contact with bridge, letting them know spaces flooded
- nn. also let them know all flooding status, and they would keep the bridge informed of any changes
- oo. CE in contact with Capt and CM within 10 min.
- pp. based all personnel out of OS
- qq. center fuel tk.not breached, stbd fuel tank was breached- voids 1,2,3,& 4 breached
- rr. used radio and phone to communicate- used the phone to avoid talking over those dealing with the evacuation
- ss. deck using same channel,
- tt. sent one unlicensed to sound tanks
- uu. 2 & 3 AE's checking spaces, setting up pumps
- vv. kept rechecking tanks
- ww. stbd prop. drive, initially got alarm
- xx. during event, bridge had control of prop.
- yy. no stbd. prop alarms other than initial field voltage alarm
- zz. also lo oil pressure flow
- aaa. found no prop drive leaks
- bbb. looked ok
- ccc. once underway, had lo amps on motor
- ddd. slight vibration
- eee. shut down stbd prop.
- fff. no problems with prop before accident
- ggg. seemed like adrift, not hung up
- hhh. heard they had drifted whole time
- iii. have 3 generators on line, typical for running full
- jjj. had 3 on for 2 hours after aground, shut one down
- kkk. to save fuel
- lll. was not directed involving evacuation
- mmm. some unlicensed helped while out checking spaces
- nnn. gathered they had to cut some liferafts off
- ooo. after grounding, prop was down to zero, with z drives opposed, throttles at zero, bow thruster at zero, when C/E got to OS
- ppp. leading up to grounding, run 60 percent with 3 generators online
- qqq. after accident, 26 percent load
- rrr. after accident, noticed all watertight doors shut.
- sss. not shut while operation
- ttt. watertight door 1 is kept shut during operation- #1 is bowthruster door
- uuu. all doors closed by the time he was dressed
- vvv. thought they were sitting on a rock for about 2 hrs.
- www. also closed all tank vents to seal tanks- wedged goosenecks closed

xxx. bags over fuel vents in case of fuel spill
yyy. found leaks in void 3 sumps between watertight doors 5 and 6
zzz. holes in officer mess
aaaa. hole in void 3 screw holes in wall
bbbb. water leaking through wireway packing between watertight doors 5
and 6
cccc. between watertight doors 3 and 4, by void one, a manhole cover
was leaking
dddd. around gasket, could not tighten enough to stop it
eeee. manhole cover gaskets last checked in Jan or Feb.
ffff. checked during drydock
gggg. void 4 penetration had a penetration to void 3, leaking through the
sewage pump room
hhhh. had to pump this room every 30 minutes
iiii. very slow leak
jjjj. generators never lost cooling water suction
kkkk. no ER space penetrations
llll. run emerg. generator 2 hrs. every month, test for loss of power
mmmm. never lost power, emerg. gen never started
nnnn. fuel tanks- 3 forward of void 1, between ballast tanks
oooo. void one had 3 tanks across
pppp. port and starboard fuel tanks had been stripped previous week
qqqq. ctr. tank could run ship for a week
rrrr. port and stbd stripped as a precaution
ssss. checked BT, no flooding in space or framing
tttt. sewage and potable water tanks ok, no loss or gain
uuuu. checked potable water for chlorides, less than bottled water
vvvv. 1 AE and oiler on watch during grounding
wwww. 3 days previous to accident worked 6-6, normal sleep routine
xxxx. worked during yard period following last marchs grounding
yyyy. as dayworker
zzzz. that grounding damage consisted of replacing 80K pounds of steel
aaaaa. some upsets
bbbbb. damage on stbd side
ccccc. no prop side
ddddd. occurred in Columbia river
eeeee. have sms system
fffff. use standing orders
ggggg. not sure if sms has procedure for groundings
hhhhh. bilge and ballast pumps started after CE arrived in OS, started
pumps on his own
iiiiii. during time pumps were running bridge called a couple of times to
see if list had stabilized and if still taking on water
jjjjj. maintain tank sounding logs, last taken midnight before
kkkkk. tank level indicators in void 1, potable water and fuel tanks lost
power, shorted out

lllll. shows in logger when they went out, not recorded by hand
 mmmmm. automation otherwise was functioning properly
 nnnnn. eventually, power to bilge alarm controls junctions went out due to shorts.
 ooooo. by the time the cabinets with the junctions boxes shorted, we had a good handle on the control of the flooding
 ppppp. never been involved in sms audits
 qqqqq. wing fuel tanks emptied wk. prior to grounding, called randy for permission, randy ok'd
 rrrrr. has direct access to dp or port engr
 sssss. paddle wheel powered by dc motor
 ttttt. through gearbox reduction
 uuuuu. paddlewheel not working during accident, free spinning
 vvvvv. paddlewheel generally not used, 1000 hp motor, inefficient
 i. direct drive through reduction
 wwww. 1 ae first called him on phone, not radio

2. First Engineer (on watch) interview summary-

- a. generally works 6 am to 6 pm
- b. dayworker
- c. day of accident was standing midnight to noon
- d. watch schedule- 3rd engr stands midnight to noon
 - i. 1AE works 6-8 am maintenance
 - ii. takes watch from 8 am to 4 pm
 - iii. works 4 to 6 pm daywork
 - iv. 2 engr works noon to midnight- he works daywork noon to 4 pm assumes watch at 1600.
- e. all engineers work 4 hours maintenance and 8 hrs. of watch
- f. other duties include managing personnel, assign task, assign watch schedule
- g. 1st engr was standing watch night of accident cause new 3rd engr was fresh out of school, didn't want him standing watch by himself
- h. that way new 3rd could work with other engineers familiar with vessel
- i. new 3rd joined vessel saturday
- j. was on watch with oiler during accident
- k. took midnight watch saturday night because of new 3rd.
- l. night of accident had numbers 1,2, and 3 running.
- m. everything seemed normal
- n. early in watch troubleshooting problems with oiler on blast chiller
- o. checked galley and OS
- p. made round of ER
- q. everything was fine
- r. at 0130 in ER talking to oiler about blast chiller, ran aground, extreme noises
- s. instant bilge alarms
- t. stbd z drive alarm

- u. called Ch. Engr
- v. told him we're hard aground
- w. sent oiler fwd to check for water coming in
- x. also for him to check fuel oil tanks
- y. did not assist in pax evacuation process
- z. holds 2nd engineer unlimited license and near coastal chief engineer's license
- aa. maine maritime graduate in 2003
- bb. worked for Global Sante Fe for 1 year on Glomar Explorer
- cc. with USS shipping for 3 yrs. on ITB's
- dd. started with Majestic on July 25, 2006
- ee. was onboard for several near misses, navigational
- ff. periodically checks alarms & safety equipment
- gg. started with Majestic as 3rd engr, moved to first engr on Nov 5, 2006
- hh. didn't call bridge after accident, more concerned with waking engine personnel
- ii. set off engineers assistance alarm
- jj. he and chief gave staff orders
- kk. captain and chief mate were periodically calling down
- ll. after getting bilge alarms (chain locker, forepeak, void 1), got high armature volts, low lube oil flow on stbd z drive thruster
- mm. no problems with port z thruster
- nn. no propulsion problems before accident
- oo. bow thruster was not online, but started and passed it to bridge immediately after grounding
- pp. sounded engr assistance alarm after calling chief
- qq. made last round at midnight, all operating normally
- rr. Running 700-900 RPM at time of grounding
- ss. assisted in closing tank vents
- tt. all tanks were sounded at midnight
- uu. sewage and potable tanks are not sounded, use tank level indicators
- vv. after grounding, tested potable chlorides, 15 ppm, control level is 40 ppm= bottled water
- ww. Oiler did first check of void 4-Sunderland
- xx. at time of grounding, no bilge or ballast pumps, or fire pumps running until immediately after grounding
- yy. paddlewheel was freewheeling
- zz. watertight doors closed after grounding
- aaa. got a lot of alarms due to shorted connections in bilge system
- bbb. 10-12 degree list within one hour
- ccc. could hear air rushing from manhole cover in room 19
- ddd. lasted a couple of hours, I was worried
- eee. constantly monitoring list
- fff. list decreased after about 3:30-4:00 am as passengers were being evacuated
- ggg. listed to starboard

hhh. when grounded, heard a lot of strange grounding, growling, nasty, vibration like we just ran over an island
 iii. went the whole distance of boat, "the whole entire distance"
 jjj. were on pilothouse at time of accident
 kkk. propulsion went slack immediately after hitting and remained there a long time.
 lll. noises lasted about 5 seconds
 mmm. propulsion working without problem previous to accident, no issues
 nnn. ran 2 generators instead of 3 at lower speeds
 ooo. in charge of scheduling engine maintenance
 ppp. maintenance was up to date, both weekly and monthly
 qqq. 30 years old
 rrr. data logger time was correct to local time
 sss. after accident, slow steam to dock, had some vibration, lifted deckplates, couldn't see anything from ER
 ttt. slowly increased speed on the way back
 uuu. no sign of structural damage
 vvv. stbd zdrive pulling a lot less current
 www. shut down stbd z drive about 15 minutes into return transit, about 5:30
 xxx. returned to port with only port z drive
 yyy. stbd z drive turned back on for docking
 zzz. main drives were left online the entire time after grounding, also the bowthruster
 aaaa. bow thruster used primarily only for docking.

3. Third Engineer interview summary-

- a. 21 years old
- b. graduated cal. maritime academy 4/28/07
- c. maritime engineering technology major
- d. first ship
- e. signed on vessel may 13th
- f. upon signing on, 2AE showed him around ER and ship, safety equipment, emergency billet location
- g. stood first watch alone today, midnight to noon
- h. 3 previous days stood watch with 1AE 6 am to 6 pm
- i. learning plant by 1AE
- j. 1AE signed him his schedule
- k. was sleeping during grounding
- l. awoke about 1:30
- m. jumped up, roomed with 2AE
- n. got dressed
- o. heard capt on pa telling all to don lifejackets, and go to main deck
- p. went to main deck
- q. there told to go to emergency station

- r. went to OS operating station
- s. CE directed him to start pumping voids
- t. void across from his room was venting air, his room was 18
- u. as directed
- v. used double diaphragm to pump spaces per CE
- w. used fire and ballast pump to pump void, attempted
- x. used bilge and ballast as well
- y. smaller diaphragm pump also
- z. didn't use submersible pump
- aa. didn't hear engr's assistance alarm
- bb. went up port side ladder to main deck
- cc. with 2 AE
- dd. when he arrived in OS, also there were: 1AE, oiler, maint, and other oiler.
- ee. CE directed personnel in emergency
- ff. read standing orders after coming aboard
- gg. never received paperwork from CE regarding familiarization
- hh. familiarization with 2 AE lasted a few hours
- ii. hired through job fair at school
- jj. responsible for lifeboat maint- battery condition, running weekly,
- kk. also watertight door maint.
- ll. had monthly maint. checklist
- mm. all watertight doors working ok
- nn. was comfortable with plant by time he was on alone
- oo. 1AE made sure he was comfortable with being on watch alone
- pp. had reviewed daily, weekly, monthly maint sheets
- qq. responsible for rescue boat maint.
- rr. good working relation with CE and 1AE
- ss. holds 3AE license for stm., motor, and gas turbine
- tt. new maint. computer program, as well as paper copy, maint. items have to be signed as well
- uu. 1AE additionally puts out day maint items as they become necessary.
- vv. was on watch previous to grounding 6-6
- ww. everything was running normal.

4. Oiler (on watch) interview summary-
- a. 33 years old
 - b. 5 yrs. marine corp
 - c. started sailing passenger vessels 5 yrs. ago as bartender
 - d. moved to oiler on American queen, back to oiler
 - e. been on this vessel since feb 1st of last year, as first maintenance, then oiler
 - f. been oiler since September
 - g. been on this trip since Ketchikan, about 1 and a half weeks
 - h. work 6 pm to 6 am, assist engr on watch
 - i. duties to assist watch engineer as necessary
 - j. conduct routine maint during watch

- k. came on at 6 pm night of accident, previous
- l. normal watch up to grounding
- m. 1AE relieved 2AE at midnight, all normal conditions
- n. worked on blast chiller with 1AE for an hour or so
- o. discussing blast chiller at time of accident in OS
- p. extreme jar, hit something
- q. few seconds before first alarms
- r. felt kind of like "last time"
- s. first bilge alarm was void one
- t. 1AE sent me fwd to see if water coming aboard
- u. on his way to void, heard capt on 1NC asking crew to come get dressed and come topside with lifejackets.
- v. starting banging on doors waking crew
- w. deckhand told him water coming in room 19, void hatchcover had buckled
- x. assisted deckhands in getting pump to it, told them not to open hatchcover
- y. sounded tanks at instruction of CE
- z. banged on CM and exec chef doors
- aa. was onboard last grounding about 1 year ago
- bb. got pushed out by a barge, his understanding
- cc. vessel was OOS for 2 weeks
- dd. on as maintenance
- ee. thought everybody did a great job
- ff. capt kept crew and passengers informed
- gg. CE very calm
- hh. engr completes log
- ii. does not make set round times
- jj. didn't hear engr assistance alarm
- kk. called CE after grounding
- ll. also checked bowthruster space, no water
- mm. licensed engr makes numbers round for logbook
- nn. has PM schedule he is responsible for
- oo. has weekly, monthly, and quarterly PM to take care of
- pp. did not pump water, instead checked spaces
- qq. one oiler, one QMED, and one maintenance man for unlicensed
- rr. maint man stands 0900-2100 daywork/watch, including hotel maint.
- ss. reports directly to watch engineer
- tt. machinery condition is quite well, no major problems
- uu. no daily or weekly problems
- vv. all equipment working aside the blast chiller
- ww. 1AE assigns maint
- xx. also PM book
- yy. keep work log book, have to sign off on PM

PM system is SINEX