

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

**INTERVIEW OF CAPTAIN TOM KYLE, U.S. NAVY  
IN REGARD TO THE MAJOR MARINE ACCIDENT -  
COLLISION OF THE  
JAPANESE FISHERIES TRAINING VESSEL EHIME MARU  
AND THE U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE  
USS GREENVILLE  
DCA 01 MM 022**

Monday, March 18, 2002

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the National Transportation  
Safety Board:

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BARRY STRAUCH

## P R O C E E D I N G S

12:30 p.m.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: The time is now about 12:30.  
It's Monday, the 18th of March.

My name is Tom Roth-Roffy. I'm with the  
National Transportation Safety Board. And we're here  
also with Barry Strauch of the NTSB, and we're here to  
interview Captain Tom Kyle, Deputy Commander of Com Sub  
Pac.

Good morning, Capt. Kyle.

CAPT. KYLE: Actual title is Deputy Chief,  
Staff and Training -- (inaudible) -- Tactical --  
Tactics and Training.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Barry, you want to go  
ahead and start with the questioning?

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Tom, could you walk us  
through your -- your career, starting -- starting with  
your -- your education? I know you graduated from  
Stanford. Could you start from there and just take us  
through --

CAPT. KYLE: Graduated from Stanford  
University with a Bachelor of Science in Civil  
Engineering in 1973. I was an ROTC student, naval ROTC  
student, and was commissioned in the Navy the day after

1 I graduated, and then two or three days later commenced  
2 nuclear power training at -- (inaudible) -- California,  
3 just across the Bay from Stanford, San Francisco Bay.  
4 Nuclear power training took a year, six months of --  
5 six months of schoolhouse training and six months of  
6 practical training, and after completing this -- the  
7 practical training in Idaho Falls, I reported to my  
8 first submarine here in Pearl Harbor, USS Flasher (ph)  
9 in August of 1974.

10 I served on the Flasher until mid 1977, took  
11 the submarine through a fueling overhaul at --  
12 (inaudible) -- California, and ended up to go to home  
13 port in San Diego after the overhaul was complete.

14 And in 1977 I transferred from the Flasher to  
15 the USS Haddo (ph), also in San Diego. I served on the  
16 Haddo as department head. In Navy parlance, that's  
17 second -- second level of responsibility in the officer  
18 boardroom. Department head weapons officer on the  
19 Haddo.

20 And spent about a year on the Haddo and  
21 transferred then to a shore assignment in Connecticut  
22 at Nuclear Power Training Command, Windsor,  
23 Connecticut, where I was responsible for maintenance  
24 and operation of nuclear power -- nuclear plant

1 operations in a land-based training program type  
2 reactor in -- in the middle of Connecticut. I was  
3 stationed there for about three -- just about three  
4 years exactly, and then returned to fleet duty after a  
5 10-day department head school in Groton, Connecticut  
6 for six months.

7 I returned to sea on the USS Guardfish (ph)  
8 back in San Diego as navigator operations officer, and  
9 that tour was about two and a half years long.

10 And after that tour was complete on  
11 Guardfish, was transferred again to Mirror Island for  
12 overhaul at -- part of the boat, just as she arrived at  
13 Mirror Island and reported to duty as a -- on the  
14 Commander Submarine Group Seven staff on the submarine  
15 tender USS Proteus (ph) home ported in Apper (ph)  
16 Harbor, Guam, where I over -- had direct oversight of  
17 maintenance conducted by the Proteus on various  
18 submarines in the Pacific Fleet, maintenance and --  
19 primarily maintenance oversight responsibilities. Was  
20 on that assignment for two years.

21 I think we're now up to about 19 -- I guess  
22 1985. In 1985, I was transferred via prospective  
23 executive officer school to be executive officer on USS  
24 Georgia, Trident class, SSBN, home ported in Bangor,

1 Washington. And I spent three years as XO on the  
2 Georgia and in 1989 received orders to prospective  
3 commanding officer school.

4 I spent about six months in that process,  
5 three months of nuclear power training and three months  
6 tactical training before reporting to my boat, which  
7 was USS Puffer, home port in San Diego, California. I  
8 was on the Puffer for three years. Was commanding  
9 officer. I made two extended deployments and two short  
10 deployments on the ship, so I had quite a bit of  
11 operating time on the Puffer.

12 And when that job was completed, I was  
13 detached in 1992 and was assigned to the staff of  
14 Commander of Submarine Force Pacific Fleet here in  
15 Pearl Harbor as a tactical inspector and did a lot of  
16 -- probably 50 tactical exams of all different  
17 submarines, different types of submarines here in the  
18 Pacific Fleet. Did some in the Atlantic as well as  
19 sort of a cross check.

20 And after doing that job for two years, was  
21 then assigned as the prospective commanding officer  
22 instructor. Taught -- as I mentioned a minute ago, I  
23 was in PCO school, prospective commanding officer  
24 school. There's a three-month tactical course taught

1 where all -- all command -- all officers going into  
2 command of submarines attend, and I -- at this point in  
3 my career, I became the instructor of that tactical  
4 course and did that job for two years.

5           And then, after that assignment, was assigned  
6 as the commander of Submarine Squadron One, commodore  
7 for Submarine Squad One, and at that point in time,  
8 that -- that commodore's job was two years, but it was  
9 a period of tremendous transition. We were  
10 decommissioning 637, or sturgeon class, submarines,  
11 which constituted the majority of my squadron. And  
12 they were being replaced by the newer Los Angeles class  
13 submarines as they came in. We were getting some ships  
14 from the East Coast and some new construction  
15 submarines. Ironically, USS Greenville came to our  
16 squadron at that time out of new construction. And so  
17 we -- we brought her into the fleet and started working  
18 her up to fleet readiness standards probably in 1991 or  
19 so. I'm sorry, 19 -- I'm sorry. 1990 -- must have  
20 been about '97 or '8, something like that, 1998 maybe.

21           And -- and then, I was in that job from 1996  
22 to '98, and at that point I was transferred back to the  
23 staff of Commander of Submarine Force Pacific Fleet  
24 where -- transferred to this assignment I'm in right

1 now. I've been here since 1998. That's sort of a  
2 quick rundown, sir. If I can help you to amplify any  
3 of those periods further, if you have any questions.

4 MR. STRAUCH: Why do you say "ironically"  
5 when you said --

6 CAPT. KYLE: Well, it just happens -- not  
7 ironically. It just happens that I became imminent --  
8 intimate with the Greenville. I got to know the  
9 Greenville as -- came -- checked into the Pacific  
10 Submarine Force new construction, so I'm pretty  
11 familiar with her beginnings, anyway. Very, very  
12 familiar with her. Matter of fact, she came to the  
13 Pacific, I'd say, better prepared for adaptation into  
14 the submarine force than -- than many of her sister  
15 ships that came into new construction. They -- they  
16 had done a lot of advanced work to prepare the crews  
17 and families to come to Pearl Harbor and -- and really  
18 overcame a lot of the problems that some of the other  
19 ships had had coming from -- some culture shock coming  
20 from new construction on the East Coast and moving  
21 their families through to Pearl Harbor, which causes a  
22 lot of -- lot of trauma, if you will, just because  
23 you're long way from where you started. And Greenville  
24 did that better than most -- most ships. She was

1 noteworthy in that -- that regard. I thought they did  
2 a lot of -- lot of good work to make that transition  
3 smooth.

4 MR. STRAUCH: Was Commander Waddle the second  
5 CO of the Greenville, then?

6 CAPT. KYLE: I think he was the third CO.  
7 There was a -- there was a new construction guy, and I  
8 don't remember who that was. Second commanding officer  
9 was -- was now-Captain Guy, Robert Guy, and he's the  
10 individual that I worked with. I'm pretty sure he was  
11 the second CO. I never knew the first. He was the guy  
12 that I worked with, and that was pretty standard.  
13 They'd have one guy -- one -- one CO in there who'd do  
14 most of the construction, then he'd be replaced during  
15 the end of the construction period by another CO who  
16 brought it out of the shipyard and got it ready for its  
17 first deployment, and that was the fellow that I dealt  
18 with primarily. And -- and then he was relieved by  
19 Commander Waddle.

20 MR. STRAUCH: And you report to Captain  
21 Brandhuber?

22 CAPT. KYLE: I actually report to Admiral  
23 Paget. Captain Brandhuber is the chief of staff, so he  
24 is -- I have some -- I keep him advised, and he's sort

1 of the coordinator of the staff, if you will, but my  
2 boss, the person who signs my performance evaluations,  
3 is Admiral Paget.

4 MR. STRAUCH: What did Commander Waddle do  
5 wrong February 9th?

6 CAPT. KYLE: Well, he -- answer that question  
7 multi-level basis, but approximately -- approximate  
8 cause, approximate wrong things is he cut --  
9 disregarded established submarine operating principles  
10 and practices. He disregarded those in favor of  
11 expediency and operated -- basically, operated the ship  
12 in an unsafe manner to go first to periscope depth to  
13 do a periscope search. He did an inadequate periscope  
14 search. He did an inadequate evaluation of the sonar  
15 conditions and the contacts present on the sonar  
16 display. And then, based on faulty information,  
17 believed it was safe to conduct an emergency surfacing  
18 evolution when in fact it was not. And he ended up,  
19 obviously, having a collision and killing nine people.

20 Those are all approximate issues. The  
21 fundamental -- you can try to peel back the onion and  
22 understand what the core of the issue is. Commander  
23 Waddle's major error was a failure to critically assess  
24 his own crew's capability and performance against

1 established standards in an objective manner and ensure  
2 that the -- the crew was operating at those standards.

3 Instead, he tended to believe that he was better,  
4 believe that his crew was better than what it -- better  
5 than they were in fact, and -- and that was -- and  
6 really believed that to the point where he tried -- he  
7 conveyed that information. I believe -- I mean, I  
8 don't believe it was a deception. That -- you know, an  
9 intentional deception. He really did believe that the  
10 crew was better than it was at doing the basic level,  
11 basic submarining issues, basic stuff you have to work  
12 at to be a sound, capable mariner.

13 I don't care whether it's a submarine or a  
14 surface mariner, you have to do things right, do them  
15 properly, and you have to give the sea its due respect.

16 If you don't, you'll end up paying a price, and that's  
17 in fact what they did. They were not as -- not working  
18 as hard at the job as they should have been.

19 MR. STRAUCH: Could you point to any rules  
20 that he violated?

21 CAPT. KYLE: Rules? He -- he -- his -- his  
22 sonar search prior to going to periscope depth was too  
23 short of duration. This is discussed at length in the  
24 court of inquiry, and it's -- it's -- I testified in

1 that court at great length about that. As a result,  
2 there was inadequate time to analyze the range of the  
3 contacts. He was -- passive -- passive tactical  
4 analysis of the contacts, which -- which is the way we  
5 typically do that work because it's -- we've found it's  
6 the most reliable and -- when done properly, the most  
7 reliable and accurate way to -- to get a good  
8 situational awareness of the contacts around the ships.

9           And -- but -- but you have to do -- you have  
10 to spend a certain amount of time doing that. You  
11 can't cut that. You have to do a proper analysis. You  
12 have to spend enough time to allow the data to be  
13 consistent and, you know, there are certain  
14 inaccuracies in the data as it comes in. You have to  
15 wait 'til that -- 'til you get an understanding what  
16 the inaccuracies are and that your -- certain  
17 parameters that you are keying in on to make your  
18 decisions. And because he was in such -- such a hurry  
19 to -- to accomplish this procedure, he did not allow  
20 his watchstanders, his subordinates, enough time to  
21 study and analyze the data. He was doing a mental  
22 analysis that he thought was good enough, but it in  
23 fact was not really thorough enough when you look at  
24 the times that he spent doing that prior to -- prior to

1 periscope depth.

2           So, he went up to periscope depth with an  
3 assumption. He said -- he came to the wrong conclusion  
4 thinking that every -- the contacts were distant.  
5 There were some indicators on some of his displays and  
6 some of his watchstanders had misgivings about that  
7 fact, but because they had -- the watchstanders had  
8 sort of an inherent trust in their commanding officer,  
9 they didn't speak up when they should have. And again,  
10 this is sort of also an outcome of the belief on the  
11 ship that they were really better than they really  
12 were. They hadn't earned this information, but, shoot,  
13 if the captain thinks it's okay to go up, who am I to  
14 stand in front of him and tell him it's not right, so  
15 they kind of just rolled on the captain's decision to  
16 go up.

17           Based on the fact that he thought that there  
18 was no one really close, he spent -- an inadequate  
19 amount of time, the second mistake he made, an  
20 inadequate amount of time searching the periscope  
21 looking for contacts. And he was in inadequate depth.

22           He did not -- he did not get the ship shallow enough  
23 so that he could see with his periscope above all the  
24 waves that were out there that day. And there was a

1 fair -- fair sea state running, so he needed to get a  
2 little shallower to see above the top of all the waves  
3 and a good -- do a good careful search around -- around  
4 the horizon prior to conducting this emergency  
5 surfacing procedure.

6 Normally, stealth and discretiveness is not  
7 an important factor when conducting one of these  
8 events. Standard practice for that is to get very,  
9 very shallow, close to broaching. Get the periscope up  
10 very high so you can see a long way around the horizon,  
11 and he didn't -- he elected not to do that. My belief  
12 is that he didn't feel it was necessary because he had,  
13 based on his assumption of the sonar search, he didn't  
14 think there was anybody close, so he thought this was  
15 more or less perfunctory, I'll just do a quick check,  
16 verify there isn't anybody lying too quiet that I  
17 didn't hear on my sonar close-board, and then we'll  
18 just be on our way and get our -- get our surfacing  
19 done. I don't know that for a fact, that's just an  
20 assumption on my part.

21 But he -- I do know that his search with the  
22 periscope was of insufficient duration and at a depth  
23 that was not shallow enough to allow a good search down  
24 to the horizon, to the visible horizon on that day.

1           And then, I guess those are the primary -- if  
2 I was to focus on what -- what he -- what he really did  
3 wrong specifically on those days, those would be the  
4 two big things. There's a lot of other smaller issues.

5       There were some equipment degradation that had gone on  
6 on the ship. The sonar repeater on in the control room  
7 was out of commission. And he didn't properly mitigate  
8 that in terms of, you know, what -- what do we -- how  
9 are we going to live with this piece of equipment that  
10 we rely upon for contact analysis, how are we going to  
11 deal with that in a formal fashion, promulgate a  
12 methodology for working around that problem.

13           He -- he stepped in way -- in the way of  
14 allowing his -- his -- his watch officer to do  
15 independent analysis and thought. He essentially took  
16 -- he took -- while -- while this is not technically  
17 wrong in terms of any kind of violating a rule or  
18 regulation, it's -- it's certainly a dangerous practice  
19 to -- not dangerous practice -- not inherently  
20 dangerous, but it's not a very good practice to take  
21 the watch from subordinates. Much better, in our view,  
22 to stand back and allow the subordinate person to  
23 operate the ship at his own pace and evaluate his  
24 performance, back his performance up by taking the con

1 himself, essentially.

2 He didn't really in -- in official Navy  
3 parlance make the announcement that he had the con, he  
4 was essentially telling the officer of the deck  
5 specifically what to do and de facto had the con. He  
6 basically took his subordinate backup out of the  
7 picture because he was telling him exactly what to do.

8 And I -- I think that was a mistake. That was not  
9 necessary or really appropriate under these  
10 circumstances to take that and be actually driving the  
11 boat that day.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Is there a rule that says that  
13 you -- that legs have to be three minutes?

14 CAPT. KYLE: Yes, there is.

15 MR. STRAUCH: Do you know the number of that  
16 rule offhand?

17 CAPT. KYLE: It's in the court of inquiry,  
18 referenced, and I don't remember the exact -- it's in  
19 the -- well, it's in the commanding officer's own  
20 standing orders where he had -- it's in that  
21 instruction specifically where it says three minutes,  
22 and that's based on a study in the "Sonar Employment  
23 Manual" for the sonar systems using it.

24 And the reason that is -- it's very

1 technical, very specific reasons, and that is that the  
2 display that you're looking at for contacts are broken  
3 into display bins that are six degrees wide. So, until  
4 a contact moves six degrees, it's going to appear to be  
5 in the same bin as any of those six degrees. So, you -  
6 - so what -- what you're basing your analysis on is how  
7 fast the bearing -- the angle between north and the  
8 contact you're looking at, how fast is that bearing  
9 changing over time. So, from a -- from a visual  
10 display standpoint, it takes -- a contact must move six  
11 degrees before it moves to a new -- a new display  
12 window and gives you that appearance that the contact  
13 has in fact shifted to another bearing.

14 So, three minutes, if you start -- if you do  
15 the mathematics on it, if you're talking three minutes,  
16 you want -- and you want to see the bearing rate of a  
17 couple -- two or three degrees a minute, you need to  
18 let a length of time to elapse to see this thing move  
19 from one bin to another. And -- and to be -- to be  
20 able to visually say that this contact has measurable  
21 bearing drift, you need a little bit of time for that  
22 to evaluate.

23 Now, the tracker, the automatic tracker that  
24 is providing data to the combat analysis system, it

1 will track within that three minutes of data, and  
2 that's why -- that's why the operator -- the operator  
3 at the consul had some indication that there was a  
4 contact closer and he was about to -- you know, he was  
5 in a, I would suspect, very close to saying something  
6 about it but didn't say anything about it because the  
7 ship maneuvered again.

8 To do this analysis mentally or otherwise --  
9 to do it mentally, let's just put it that way. To do  
10 it mentally, it's easy -- it's -- we typically do it  
11 with one ship on a steady course and speed as well  
12 because then at least one -- one ship's contribution to  
13 the bearing change is then at least stable. It's not  
14 changing, so you can see what the bearing is doing  
15 relative -- caused by the other ship, not by what  
16 you're doing because either ship's motion, the ship  
17 you're riding versus the ship you're studying, can  
18 cause the bearing to change. And -- and by holding one  
19 of those at least constant, it helps you analyze what  
20 the other guy is doing.

21 Well, in this case, another mistake made in  
22 here was the ship was never staked during the entire  
23 baffle-clearing, contact analysis phase of this test.  
24 It was never steady in force and speed. It was always

1 changing. There was all these parameters of own ship's  
2 motion changing that would affect the bearing rate  
3 contacts around it. So -- so, a visual assessment and  
4 a recognition standpoint, he made it very difficult for  
5 any of his operators to make a conclusive call that any  
6 of these contacts were close.

7 On the other hand, the machine analysis takes  
8 -- backs out of its calculations and its presentations  
9 all of own ship's motion. So, the data presented to  
10 the combat control system was operated by one of his  
11 operators who was receiving up-to-date information that  
12 was analyzable but, again, the time allotted for him to  
13 do an analysis was much shorter than is typically  
14 allowed, so he was -- this -- and he had several  
15 contacts to analyze, not only the Ehime Maru but -- a  
16 couple other sonar contacts -- (inaudible) -- study.  
17 So he was going -- the individual studying those  
18 contacts was sequentially working through each one at a  
19 time and he didn't -- he wasn't given a lot of time to  
20 handle three or four contacts. He needed more time to  
21 do that.

22 So, the second reason you want to go three --  
23 at least three minutes is to allow the guy who's doing  
24 the analysis enough time to move through all the

1 contacts, update, study the solution, and be ready for  
2 the second -- the second -- (inaudible).

3 MR. STRAUCH: Is there -- did he violate any  
4 rule by not doing a full periscope search?

5 CAPT. KYLE: Yes. There is -- there are  
6 specific periscope searching technique instructions  
7 that talks about how long should be allowed to do each  
8 -- each sequence of sweeps of the periscope high-power  
9 -- low-power magnification to high-power magnification.  
10 There are certain time lines for each of those  
11 solution -- each of those searches. The higher the  
12 power it is, the less field of view you have out the  
13 periscope and you have to turn the scope slower. So,  
14 in order to do a high-power search, it takes several  
15 minutes to do an effective high-power search 360  
16 degrees around the ship. He didn't -- he only was up  
17 to periscope depth for about 90 seconds total. You  
18 need -- it's all in the court of inquiry, all the  
19 times. I don't have all those things memorized right  
20 now -- lost it, but we've added them all up, but it's  
21 several minutes' time to do a complete, thorough search  
22 with the periscope 360 degrees, assuming that you're at  
23 shallow enough depth to see above the waves, which he  
24 was not.

1           MR. STRAUCH: Do you know offhand the rule  
2 number regarding the periscope depth?

3           CAPT. KYLE: It's -- it's a manual. It talks  
4 about periscope depth. I don't have -- I don't have  
5 that number off the top of my head. "Periscope  
6 Employment Manual." Again, it's quoted in the court of  
7 inquiry, I think. I don't have -- I don't have it, not  
8 in my head.

9           MR. STRAUCH: Well, I guess part of the  
10 reason why -- why -- why I'm asking this is because I  
11 had the sense at the court of inquiry that what  
12 Commander Waddle violated weren't so much rules as they  
13 were guidance, and -- and that's why I'm asking you to  
14 make that distinction for us between rules and  
15 guidance.

16           CAPT. KYLE: Rules and guidance. Okay. All  
17 the things I've told you, and you've got to -- there's  
18 a -- well, let me ask you this question. What --  
19 what's your definition of a rule and what's the  
20 definition of guidance? And I'll try to tell you  
21 whether what I just talked to you was a rule or  
22 guidance.

23           MR. STRAUCH: A rule is something that if  
24 somebody else was on board who observed that could say,

1 Commander, you violated this rule, and there would be  
2 some consequences to that. Guidance is something where  
3 if somebody pointed that out, the -- the CO then would  
4 say, I understand that but that's just guidance and  
5 therefore it's up to me whether or not I want to follow  
6 that or not.

7 CAPT. KYLE: Okay. It -- in each of these  
8 cases -- let me think just real fast here.

9 (Pause)

10 CAPT. KYLE: The periscope -- I mean, the --  
11 the sonar search -- the sonar time on leg is guidance.  
12 And -- and periscope search interval is guidance  
13 because -- and the commanding officer really has -- in  
14 essence, he's given license to violate those -- those  
15 things.

16 Now -- now, certain elements, if you put them  
17 in those two categories, rules versus guidance, and you  
18 say, well, there's a spectrum. I say there's a  
19 spectrum between a rule, you know, like a speed limit  
20 on a -- on a highway which you get a citation -- if you  
21 violate that you get a citation, you know. The speed  
22 limit's 35, you're 37, you're two miles over, you get a  
23 citation. We have very, very -- we have some rules but  
24 not very many rules because most of the -- most of the

1 way we operate the boat is subject to -- subject to  
2 modification under tactical or special conditions where  
3 you have to do something extraordinary. You know,  
4 you're under a wartime condition or you're in a combat  
5 condition. Clearly, none of those were appropriate or  
6 applicable on this particular day, but the commanding  
7 officer's given latitude to -- to make decisions,  
8 violate standard policy or guidance in his -- if  
9 required by conditions of the sea or by tactical  
10 conditions in which the ship is found.

11 Certain of the guidance -- and there's a  
12 spectrum. There's things that are quite liberal  
13 guidance and there is other guidance that is much  
14 restrictive in terms of, you know, this is -- this is  
15 more -- closer to a rule than it is to open guidance.  
16 And so, the -- the short baffle leg clears, the short  
17 sonar searches, and the periscope searches are much  
18 closer to a rule, especially under the conditions of  
19 the day. It would be noteworthy to say, wait a minute,  
20 there's no reason to violate or cut these corners on  
21 this particular -- there's no good reason anyway to cut  
22 these corners on these safety elements on this  
23 particular day. There's no tactical conditions, we're  
24 not in combat, we're not sneaking up on somebody. The

1 weather conditions, though they're a little bit -- if  
2 anything, the weather conditions dictated more time at  
3 the periscope because it was so -- kind of a tough day  
4 to use a periscope up there. High seas, gray  
5 background. If anything, that would -- you look out  
6 and you say you ought to slow down more, do more time  
7 with the periscope as opposed to less time.

8           So -- so, I would say, are there conditions  
9       -- you know, is it a citation-worthy event if he went  
10      less than three minutes? No, but if I was to see that,  
11      I would say there's no reason to cut this short. You  
12      are not -- there's nothing here that's necessary that  
13      would cause you to want to cut any of the safety  
14      elements of -- the ship. But the ship is designed for  
15      combat. It is a combat vessel. And the guidance we  
16      put out, the procedures we put out are written with  
17      those -- that -- with that framework in mind. And we  
18      rely on the training and the judgement and experience  
19      of commanding officers to make sure that where are we  
20      fitting on that spectrum of what rules can be violated  
21      and not violated, what rules and procedures or  
22      guidance. There's a lot of dependence upon the  
23      judgement of the commanding officer, so we spend a lot  
24      of time discussing those things at that tactical course

1 I was talking about. And Naval Reactors. When they go  
2 to Naval Reactors School for operating propulsion.  
3 That same -- same sorts of discussions, you know, on  
4 what conditions -- what do you do ifs. A lot of the  
5 hard questions about where there's conflicting rules  
6 and conflicting guidance and how do you interpret what  
7 the -- walk through those. You know, how -- how should  
8 you make your judgements, so.

9 MR. STRAUCH: So, is it fair to say that --  
10 that guidance, procedures, training are all predicated  
11 on the skills and judgement of the CO?

12 CAPT. KYLE: Yes.

13 MR. STRAUCH: And if the skills and judgement  
14 of the CO aren't worthy of it, then what happens?  
15 Aren't worthy of the trust that's based -- that's  
16 placed in this person's hands?

17 CAPT. KYLE: Well, I think we have sufficient  
18 -- we have -- you know, we have a lot of checks and  
19 balances in there to ensure the CO has those -- has  
20 earned those traits. And so, you know, we are -- we --  
21 we screen the guy coming into the job, first of all.  
22 Fairly intense screening process. You have to be  
23 recommended, first of all, by his series. I went  
24 through -- (inaudible) -- there was many jobs and many

1 different people looking at me before I got the chance  
2 to go to be a commanding officer. So, you know, those  
3 -- all those guys had to sign off that I was -- that I  
4 had acquired the experience, knowledge, judgement  
5 requisite for the job. And then, I'd been to several  
6 schools where, again, senior submarine officers  
7 evaluate you in the school environment under --  
8 simulated combat situations to see if you have the  
9 proper makeup and judgement capabilities, knowledge.

10 Then, at the end, the culmination of this is  
11 you go through this training pipeline where, again,  
12 you're under -- from the minute you step in there.  
13 You're under very -- you recognize that you're under  
14 very careful scrutiny, the decisions you make, your  
15 judgement, your attitude, your -- your response under  
16 stress, your decision-making capability under stress  
17 are all under review.

18 Once you get in the job, that's just -- you  
19 get into the job in the first place, and once you're in  
20 the job, then your decision-making process continues --  
21 is continued to be evaluated by infrastructure above  
22 them, the squadron, particularly -- primarily the  
23 squadron. We have a team from the -- works for me that  
24 goes out and rides ships and evaluates performance of

1 the ship. And we have a senior post command  
2 representative who rides the ships and evaluates --  
3 looks -- watches the captain, how he makes his  
4 decisions.

5 So, we try to -- any -- any issues at all on  
6 those types of questions of judgement or experience,  
7 they're addressed as they happen, as they're seen. And  
8 -- and frankly, having done this for a long time,  
9 almost 10 years in a row been involved in this sort of  
10 oversight role, the -- the norm is we are talking about  
11 very small issues. You know, we didn't think that was  
12 quite the best way to do it, you know, this could have  
13 been better, but it's not -- it's never been an issue  
14 that, man, this shade -- this ship -- this guy, you  
15 know, is -- is no good, you know, he shouldn't be in  
16 this position.

17 So, it's -- to get back to your question, is  
18 we carefully look at the guys going to command and see  
19 if they have the required experience, background,  
20 knowledge, and procedures and then continue to look at  
21 them after they're in the job, oversee them.

22 MR. STRAUCH: Given these checks and  
23 balances, why were so many of the things that came out  
24 February 9th a surprise to the court of inquiry when it

1       seems to me that all of this should have been predicted  
2       beforehand and known and addressed?

3                   CAPT. KYLE:  That is an excellent question  
4       and is the crux of the whole matter to which we have --  
5       you know, we have -- we, the Navy, have really done a  
6       lot of soul searching on this whole business.  And --  
7       institutional soul searching, if you will.  Gone back,  
8       looked at the records, looked at the -- the  
9       information, and there's a combination of many factors  
10      that I think let this situation kind of get to where it  
11      got on February 9th, you know.  How they got there, why  
12      they got there I'll discuss a little bit, but we're  
13      very much sadder but wiser as we understand a little  
14      bit more how we let this happen to ourselves.

15                   The -- Commander Waddle went through the same  
16      training process as I discussed just a minute ago.  He  
17      went through the screening.  He was evaluated by his  
18      commanding officers.  He had been successful as  
19      executive officer, been successful as an engineer.  He  
20      understood -- understood a lot about how the ship was  
21      supposed to be driven.  I think if you asked him -- if  
22      you sat down and asked him, you said, how long should  
23      you be on each leg of a periscope search beforehand, he  
24      knew all that stuff.  I mean, that's not -- it's not a

1 matter that he didn't know what the rules are. He  
2 could have told you what the periscope searching rules  
3 were probably better than I can right now. You know,  
4 he probably has that stuff -- it's more current day-to-  
5 day operations.

6           And he went through the PCO pipeline and  
7 school. He got all the knowledge. He was observed  
8 operating his ship -- I mean, simulated ships --  
9 operating ships by senior submarine officers, and  
10 nothing really stood out as being -- you know, he had  
11 -- matter of fact, he had above average tactical  
12 skills, which was a skill that was -- had a lot of  
13 experience.

14           So, he got to his ship and now he's in an  
15 operating mode where at -- at the time -- at the time  
16 that he -- the earlier parts of his -- his time on his  
17 ship, we had made a change in the oversight and --  
18 there was a couple things. We -- first of all, he --  
19 let me just explain one thing. He -- his ship was in a  
20 longer than normal interdeployment training length. He  
21 had -- typical ship comes back from one deployment and  
22 deploys again in about 15 months, normal. And that's  
23 where we kind of set it today. And -- and most of the  
24 oversight, the standard oversight protocol is key to

1 that ship's progress down that deployment process  
2 during that 15-month period so that certain milestones  
3 along that 15 months where he gets looked at in a  
4 formal basis at a minimum -- minimum of oversight  
5 periods.

6 In this -- in Greenville's case, for reasons  
7 I can't remember exactly, but I think they were  
8 maintenance related or modernization related, the  
9 deployment cycle for him was longer -- significantly  
10 longer than a 15-month period. So, there was basically  
11 a longer gap, which meant that the standard inspection  
12 points were spread out longer, so there were farther --  
13 fewer between observations by higher authority by his -  
14 - by his boss and less -- few formal reports and formal  
15 observations and formal protocols were spread out  
16 further than was probably optimal.

17 So, second -- second thing happens is that  
18 that particular squadron, most -- very, very  
19 complicated here. Lot -- just bear with me. In -- at  
20 the same time that Commander Waddle's in command, there  
21 was a change in the oversight practices. We -- we'd  
22 run a tactical exam on a ship every 12 months, hell or  
23 high water, no matter what. Twelve, 15 months, we run  
24 a tactical exam on the ships. Leadership at the time

1 Commander Waddle was in command decided that that was  
2 probably not necessary to run them at that interval  
3 strictly speaking but to key it primarily to the  
4 interdeployment training cycle I just mentioned a  
5 minute ago. So, if -- if the interdeployment training  
6 cycle was a little bit too long, there wouldn't be this  
7 automatic trip wire that says, well, 12, 15 months he  
8 has to have one of these tactical exams. His exam  
9 interval gets stretched out. He did not have this  
10 formal -- formal look.

11 The second thing that happened at that time  
12 was the squadron commands reduced in size in -- in an  
13 effort to gain efficiency on -- in management and  
14 oversight of the various submarine squadrons. And  
15 there was a major perturbation -- suffice it to say, a  
16 major perturbation in the oversight infrastructure. A  
17 new command was set up and they had certain  
18 responsibilities. The old squadron command had some  
19 residual responsibilities. The billets were coming and  
20 going. We were filling out -- filling out these new  
21 arrangement -- new oversight manning levels, so there  
22 was a period of time when there was -- I won't -- it  
23 was a little bit disrupted and confused as to who was  
24 doing what and had enough people to do it so that

1 oversight infrastructure was, I can only say, in  
2 transition for a good period of time there and probably  
3 not as well focused as a result as it had been previous  
4 or since.

5           The third thing that happened was that  
6 particular squadron, while its size was reduced at the  
7 same time, was struggling with another boat that had a  
8 -- a series of problems, and they were trying -- and  
9 this -- that ship was in fact on a short duration,  
10 short fuse to deployment. She was on a deployment  
11 cycle and trying to get ready to go at this date and  
12 was having -- having problems which commanded a great  
13 deal of attention from its direct oversighting --  
14 overseeing squadron, which further caused there to be  
15 less attention placed on the Greenville which was not  
16 in a deployment, you know, chute if you will, getting  
17 ready to go out on deployment.

18           So -- and then, when the squadron did go down  
19 to the boat or any other senior people went down to the  
20 boat, there was this sense of -- of we're really good.

21           And a lot of the -- a lot of the cursory and -- and  
22 superficial I guess indicators of readiness were all --  
23 looked good. You know, the boat was clean, the crew  
24 was positive, it had good retention. There was good

1 indicators out there, you know, that the -- this is a  
2 healthy command climate, the crew is happy with their  
3 leadership. You know, it seems to be running well.  
4 The boat's nice and clean. It's spiffed up, looks  
5 good. The ship -- crew members were real proud of  
6 their organization. And -- and the commanding officer  
7 told a good story about his ship. He would talk about  
8 how proud he was of his people and he'd point out the  
9 accomplishments the sailors would have. And so, it --  
10 you know, if you just looked at that superficially, you  
11 would say, boy, this is -- this is good, this is  
12 looking pretty -- it's going well.

13           If we had taken the time, there's no doubt in  
14 my mind because we've done this subsequently, to really  
15 -- it was -- it was classic -- you know, if you looked  
16 under the rugs, corners of the rugs, or kicked over a  
17 few stones and looked really hard, really scraped back  
18 and studied in detail how the practices were going and  
19 what these crew members really do and what were the  
20 foundation -- fundamental practices on the ship, I  
21 think we would have seen the harbingers of problems.

22           But for all the reasons I just kind of went  
23 through, the fact that there was a distractor in the  
24 squadron, the squadron was reduced in size, all these

1 things were fairly subtle. We didn't put them all  
2 together until now that -- in hindsight we're now  
3 looking at how did all this get by us. It was not a --  
4 not obvious to us at the time these -- that all these  
5 things were contributing to a lack of focus on the  
6 Greenville. That's -- to answer your question, that is  
7 how these problems kind of went undetected in the  
8 months preceding February 9th, 2001.

9 And I mean, you go back and you look now and  
10 you say, jeez, there were some indicators. You know,  
11 we had this water through the hatch problem in San  
12 Francisco Bay. We had some other things that occurred  
13 that kind of just went, well, that was just a bad day,  
14 you know, just didn't do very well on that. Talked to  
15 them about it, scolded them on it, and said, you  
16 shouldn't have done that, you know. No one really  
17 connected all the dots together and said, hey, you  
18 know, this -- we've really got to get down on that boat  
19 and take a good look at this guy and see how they're  
20 doing there, can I get them back and see if  
21 everything's okay.

22 Now, you ask, well, how do I know there  
23 aren't other ships out here today operating in the same  
24 -- same manner on -- undetected? You know, how do we -

1 - how are we doing that? Well, we have changed the  
2 methodology by which we evaluate the boats. All boats  
3 are now evaluated on a regular basis independent of how  
4 long they're back here. There is a multi-step process  
5 by which they are surveyed, the first one being at a  
6 very basic and fundamental level. So, we -- you know,  
7 the first -- the first step in the process when a ship  
8 comes back from deployment will be what we call basic  
9 submarine assessment where the ship is -- and I'll tell  
10 you, frankly, this is a direct outcome of -- I think it  
11 was through an assortment process where we're talking  
12 -- when Greenville happened, but we are now  
13 absolutely convinced this is critically important.

14 But we now take the submarine crew members  
15 and evaluate them in very fundamental -- evaluate their  
16 fundamental understanding of -- of their jobs and  
17 responsibilities at a much lower level, much more basic  
18 level than we had in previous -- previous programs.  
19 And that is to go and to see that the fundamental  
20 training being done on the ship is being done right so  
21 that the -- the schemes, the things that we would like  
22 to in many cases are assume are in place, to verify  
23 they're in place, that they understand -- very basic  
24 level what their jobs are. So, that's done first.

1 It's the first step.

2 And out of that -- out of that assessment  
3 comes out the corrective actions that are required to  
4 be completed, and those are tracked and monitored to  
5 completion and reinspected as required. You know, each  
6 one of those is sort of evaluated on its merit. If  
7 it's a very serious issue or potentially very serious,  
8 then -- then it could require action and full  
9 reinspection. Otherwise, it may be a spot check or  
10 it'll be noted or carried forward to the next look.  
11 And there'll be some evaluation of that particular area  
12 if it's found weak, a recheck of that the next time we  
13 go to sea, depending on the -- depending on the  
14 severity of the issue.

15 And then, about six to eight to nine months  
16 after that, second -- second formal review is now  
17 conducted. This is at a little higher level, little  
18 bit more polished. It is a -- it's a check of the  
19 ship's readiness to go on deployment basically, but  
20 before -- about seven to eight months before he goes on  
21 deployment to see if he's making the right progress to  
22 get his crew up to speed before deployment operations.

23 And very detailed inspection that's conducted by --  
24 the first inspection is conducted by his commodore.

1 The second inspection, as mentioned, is conducted by my  
2 staff here at my office. This on-board inspection team  
3 goes down and looks at them and kind of baselines them  
4 against everybody else. And the commodore is  
5 responsible for directing those -- commodore --  
6 commanding officer is responsible for correcting those  
7 problems.

8 And then, those deficiencies from that review  
9 are tracked again in a similar fashion. Significant  
10 ones, ones we consider particularly noteworthy are  
11 highlighted and evaluated on an ongoing basis. Minor  
12 comments are -- are put in the spot check category when  
13 we go back out again. And then, just prior to -- just  
14 prior to deployment, there's a very thorough review of  
15 the ship's readiness and major warfare competencies  
16 they have to have in good shape to go on deployment.  
17 And the whole package then of -- of basics all the way  
18 up to the more complex levels of submarining are then  
19 evaluated and commented on in a letter from the  
20 squadron commander up to the admiral on whether this  
21 particular ship is ready to go or not.

22 So, at -- so, at a minimum, any ship that's  
23 going through in -- in the -- (inaudible) -- has three  
24 -- at least three major events they have to pass

1 through in a 15-month interval. And I'm not talking  
2 about -- I'm just talking tactical side. He also has  
3 to pass two engineering inspections which check many --  
4 some -- some similar type, you know, on-board  
5 processes. The squadron is down on-board watching the  
6 ship's processes and that -- that whole sequence as  
7 well. So, there is a lot of oversight, a lot of people  
8 riding on submarines watching the performance of the  
9 ship, and each one is specifically, you know, tracked  
10 as they go through this process.

11 We now have a -- a process in place where  
12 everybody is graded to a absolute common standard.  
13 There's different people writing up grade sheets, so  
14 there can be some different -- differing results based  
15 on standards of inspector, but it is pretty much a  
16 baseline scrub of every process we do. It's compared  
17 so we can look at force-wide -- force-wide performance  
18 in a particular process and compare this mode to that  
19 force-wide level of performance evaluation. That's all  
20 kind of new changes.

21 Do I think it's working? Yes, I do. I think  
22 there's a great deal of sensitivity out there to  
23 readiness, almost to the point where we've probably  
24 over-corrected in a way. The last two or three ships

1 we've gotten ready to go on deployment haven't left on  
2 time because of unreadiness detected in the process.  
3 We're probably -- we're probably -- you know, there's a  
4 little bit of backlash going on here in terms of making  
5 sure that there aren't any uncovered stones and that's  
6 okay. You know, we'll settle off at the right -- not  
7 uncomfortable with that. The ships are still leaving  
8 and I think they're ready, and we are finding some  
9 other little process problems we'll have to resolve and  
10 fix up, some navigation issues that -- (inaudible) --  
11 hey, maybe there's a shortfall in our training for our  
12 navigators and stuff. We're looking at that right now  
13 as we speak, so I think process is very healthy at this  
14 point in terms of looking at the ships. We have a  
15 very, very critical eye before they go out.

16 MR. STRAUCH: Now, were these changes in  
17 oversight implemented before the two subsequent events  
18 that the Greenville encountered?

19 CAPT. KYLE: They were done subsequent --  
20 well, it's hard to explain that a little bit. In fact,  
21 some of these -- some of these changes to the training  
22 process were in discussion on February 9th. They were  
23 penned out, probably in place by the time after she  
24 left, but Greenville itself did not benefit from this

1 full process because, if you recall, there was a need  
2 for her to go on deployment. I think the -- the  
3 collision occurred in February and her need to go on  
4 deployment was June or May. I think it was May. We  
5 decided to send her out in June, a month late.

6           So, as a result, she did not benefit,  
7 although there was some of this stuff implemented in  
8 some of her certification processes. It was not -- it  
9 was not a full slate thing. It was not -- we did not  
10 take her back to the basics. We probably should have  
11 but we didn't. At the time we didn't think it was  
12 necessary. Looking back on it now after the fact,  
13 that's a -- had we gone back to the basic level and  
14 said, hey, Commander of the Greenville, this isn't  
15 going to deploy this time, you know, we've just got to  
16 take her back and start over again with this boat and  
17 understand, really, the full scope of the problem. We  
18 would have forestalled these other two events. At the  
19 time we just didn't understand. We didn't think that  
20 that was necessary. We really looked at the boat and  
21 said the program we had looked enough, and -- and the  
22 fact of the matter is we probably should have done a  
23 little bit more scrubbing on the basics, getting into  
24 the basic practices of the boat after the -- after the

1 original collision before we sent her out.

2 We did go in to look at some of the -- if I  
3 was to tell you what we looked at in that deployment  
4 certification, we looked at sort of the higher level  
5 processes, not at the fundamentals, which we needed to  
6 get down to the fundamentals to correct some of the  
7 issues that led to the grounding.

8 Do you have a problem with the tape there?

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I need to switch the tape.

10 CAPT. KYLE: Okay.

11 (End of Tape 1, Side A)

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. This is the start of  
13 Side 2 of Tape 1.

14 CAPT. KYLE: The -- the most -- although I  
15 haven't seen the results of the final investigation of  
16 the latest collision Greenville suffered, my suspicions  
17 are and what I know -- what I've heard thus far is that  
18 that was, though some -- in some regards similar, in  
19 many other regards different than -- than the other two  
20 incidents. That latest one was -- whereas the --  
21 whereas the first two -- first two incidents were a  
22 breakdown in -- in command structure and the whole  
23 series of checks and balances on board the ship and the  
24 failure to, you know, a guy raise his hand and say,

1    yeah, I think this is wrong, I think we ought to do  
2    something different.  This latest one was a case where  
3    -- (inaudible) -- personnel transfer at sea and under a  
4    tough condition, and the plan that they derived that  
5    was just -- that was attempted to being executed was a  
6    plan that was concocted and agreed upon between the two  
7    commanding officers of the ships with very little  
8    involvement of the subordinate groups of people on the  
9    ships.

10                So, it was more of a -- it was an error,  
11    certainly, in ship handling and probably an error in  
12    judgement on those part -- on those parties.  And I  
13    don't want to declare that.  I -- I don't know.  I'm  
14    not party to the -- I'm not investigating the portion  
15    here, but it was probably an error of some kind of ship  
16    handling arrangement.  But there wasn't this -- it  
17    wasn't an established process.  It wasn't a normal  
18    thing for either ship to do, and it really didn't have  
19    the benefit of a whole preparation.  They -- they had  
20    tried to prepare for this by briefing, discussion of  
21    practices.  They got up and they found the conditions  
22    were different than they expected and they had to go to  
23    a different location, and they were operating a  
24    different ship in a different place, and as a result,

1 there was a lot of impromptu -- impromptu, ad hoc plan  
2 development on the bridge. So, the submarine under  
3 those conditions that did not allow for comment by the  
4 backup support. So, it's a little bit different in the  
5 sense that -- just because of the short fuse nature of  
6 the plan that was being -- (inaudible).

7 In the collision with the Ehime Maru,  
8 although some would argue, and I -- I would be one of  
9 them, that there probably should have been more  
10 discussion and briefing on what the plan was for the  
11 day, at least they had a plan of the day. They had an  
12 outline of processes they were going to do for that  
13 day, and there was a chance to discuss, is this  
14 appropriate or not. So, there was -- there -- you  
15 know, the crew -- the general crew knew what the  
16 objectives for the day were going to be.

17 In the grounding of Saipan, again, that was  
18 all briefed. They knew where they were going to go.  
19 The plan was portrayed up on blocks. No one challenged  
20 that plan at all. In this case, they had a plan. It  
21 was probably a good plan from the briefing -- what I  
22 understand, and it had to be changed because of various  
23 reasons. Had to be moved to a different location and  
24 different time. They got out in the wind and sea

1 conditions were such that it couldn't be done in the  
2 manner they'd planned, and so there was a lot of, like  
3 I say, ad hoc planning being done on the bridge that  
4 was not seen.

5 So, I think it's sort of a similar but it's  
6 also different in a way, this third event.

7 MR. STRAUCH: You said earlier that there  
8 were some certain indications that -- that were  
9 available about Captain Waddle's skills. You mentioned  
10 the water taken -- taken over the hatch --

11 CAPT. KYLE: Mm-hmm.

12 MR. STRAUCH: -- in San Fran. What were some  
13 of the others?

14 CAPT. KYLE: That -- I mean, that was the one  
15 I knew of. I really -- I didn't really put that all  
16 together until, I guess, your last time here in Pearl  
17 Harbor when you were interviewing Ed Cohen and he kind  
18 of laid out from his perspective, having been on the  
19 ship for a, you know, finite period of time and being  
20 -- from my perspective as -- sitting at this level,  
21 overseeing the whole -- the whole force, most ships  
22 will have mishaps. You know, usually minor ones that  
23 come along, and you deal with them as they come, more  
24 or less. So, you know, Greenville's periodic mishaps

1     came up, dealt with, moved on, next -- next one comes  
2     up along the line.

3                     But from Lieutenant Cohen's perspective, he  
4     lived through all of them, so he -- when he lays them  
5     all out there in a row and he says, those are some of  
6     the things that happened on the ship, it becomes kind  
7     of telling.

8                     I guess another one that was discussed on  
9     that day that I didn't know about at the time was this  
10    issue of emergency surfacing to 150 feet without a  
11    baffle clear. And there's a classic example of what  
12    you're talking about. Is there a rule against that to  
13    not do that? No, it's not a strict rule, but if I had  
14    been on that boat, that was so far out -- so far close  
15    to a rule that was violated for no good reason, that  
16    would have been almost citation time. You know, that  
17    was not -- that was not appropriate. Clearly not  
18    standard and very much out of normal practice.

19                    Clearly, the procedure is such that you  
20    conduct an emergency surface whenever you need to do  
21    one, if you have to do one. If you're -- if you're  
22    flooding at 800 feet, you'd better emergency surface  
23    right away or you're not going to come back to the  
24    surface ever. So -- but that was not the case in that

1 emergency surfacing event.

2           So, there is another one that came up that I  
3 guess some people in the oversight knew about or were  
4 informed of, and there was action taken, you know, in  
5 terms of a sense of -- I guess there was one-on-one  
6 directed counseling session that went on in response to  
7 that. But it did not -- that incident did not become  
8 common knowledge to the submarine force hierarchy. It  
9 didn't go higher than the squadron, to my -- the best  
10 of my knowledge.

11           So, I guess there were some other incidents  
12 that had -- had we pulled them all together, you know,  
13 if we really stood back and looked at the ship, in  
14 hindsight, you say, boy, there were some indicators  
15 there, we would have been smart to say, look at these  
16 things in a row here. We may have caused us to -- to  
17 take a little harder look at this boat.

18           MR. STRAUCH: What changes have been  
19 implemented to make sure that when data are available  
20 there's -- about the CO and the state of preparation  
21 for Captain Waddle -- (inaudible) -- somebody will be  
22 able to connect the dots?

23           CAPT. KYLE: Well, there are a couple things.  
24 First of all, the -- there is most definitely a

1 heightened sensitivity because of the vulnerabilities  
2 posed by -- by the Greenville incident at -- at this  
3 level, at the command level, the force -- the force  
4 commander's level. So, we kind of -- we're watching  
5 each -- each boat -- you know, and stovepipe --  
6 (inaudible) -- force-wide, you know, going down this  
7 vertically as opposed to horizontal view of the overall  
8 performance. The squadron commanders have also been --  
9 you know, they discussed the performance of each  
10 commanding officer over a period of time, so they are  
11 looking at performance levels of the ships.

12           There is a -- there is a boat tracking  
13 function now. We look at events that occurred over the  
14 course of a given -- given command interval so that we  
15 can see that here is a dossier based on boat. This  
16 given commanding officer has been on there basically --  
17 it's a dossier on the boat, but it's -- there are  
18 chapters in this dossier for each commanding officer  
19 that we are now tracking for -- to look for indicators  
20 of trouble.

21           Ironically, this other boat that was in the  
22 limelight that was the distractor I mentioned was  
23 subject to the same sort of problem. There was a  
24 series of incidents on that boat that -- that didn't

1     come to light until far down the path. We realized,  
2     jeepers creepers, this guy on this boat was having a  
3     lot of problems here. And so, you know, we -- we  
4     didn't catch that until late in the process as well.  
5     And so, at -- both of those incidents brought it to our  
6     attention that we need to be watching -- you know,  
7     keeping a file, basically, on each boat. We had some -  
8     - as a new one comes in, we put it in the folder, look  
9     at it in conjunction with the rest of the history of  
10    this thing, and we look at that. How does it -- how  
11    does this fit in the context of the rest of the history  
12    of that particular submarine?

13                 So -- so, I think the process is in there now  
14    to -- I'll tell you, the process is in there to ensure  
15    that we are, you know, monitoring for indicators of  
16    trouble as we go along, as the guy goes through his --  
17    his command tour.

18                 MR. STRAUCH: Who was the person who actually  
19    keeps the -- the records of the indicators?

20                 CAPT. KYLE: It's the -- it's the personnel -  
21    - turned out to be the personnel guy who monitors the  
22    assignments for everybody else. It's Captain Cox.

23                 MR. STRAUCH: And who is the person who then  
24    looks at the indicators to see whether there's a trend?

1           CAPT. KYLE:  It'd be -- it'd be him.  There's  
2 officers down there that look at those trends, and so  
3       -- so what happens is, is let's say -- let's say that  
4 a mishap occurs, you know, you get some other thing --  
5 some anomalous thing that doesn't look -- it's not a  
6 good thing, you know.  He sends it -- (inaudible) --  
7 something went wrong.  The discussion of that  
8 particular incident, that -- that would be the context.  
9       Basically, the history of that boat would be  
10 resurrected at that point and discussed in an open --  
11 in forum, basically, of the department heads, the  
12 staff, and the squadron commander would be invited to  
13 share his perspective on what -- what's the impact of  
14 this particular incident in view of his particular  
15 tasks, is this -- is this viewed as being an isolated  
16 incident.  Sometimes things happen.  Or, is it -- is it  
17 an indicator of an ongoing trend of problems on the  
18 ship.

19           MR. STRAUCH:  Would somebody from Com Sub Pac  
20 be involved in that, also?

21           CAPT. KYLE:  Yes.  Oh, yes.  I say the --  
22 department heads of this staff -- if I say the  
23 personnel guy, he's a Sub Pac guy.  And then, that's  
24 discussed -- those incidents when a ship has a problem

1 like that are discussed on -- all the department heads  
2 of the staff in terms of what is our -- what is our  
3 perspective of that, the history of the ship under  
4 those -- you know, would be brought out at that point  
5 and discussed. Here's the case, here's what happened  
6 with the ship, you know, this is the guy that did this  
7 and this and this, and oh yeah, I'm with you, I'm on  
8 the track, here's the record, here's his performance up  
9 to date, this is what we think about it.

10 MR. STRAUCH: And what changes have been made  
11 to make sure that the data would -- would get from the  
12 convoy to -- (inaudible) -- because, apparently, from  
13 what you said, the data on the emergency blow --  
14 (inaudible) -- did not get beyond the commodore.

15 (Pause)

16 CAPT. KYLE: It's still -- still dependent on  
17 the integrity of those officer to come forward and say,  
18 hey, this guy had this problem. Matter -- it's --  
19 there's no -- there's no other function -- there's no  
20 other -- other than you've got to trust -- you've got  
21 to trust your commodore down there. He's got to come  
22 forward with the right information. I don't -- you  
23 know, I -- I don't have one -- one -- having worked  
24 with all these commodores on here now, I -- I don't

1 have one little doubt that they would bring forward  
2 information on their ships.

3 But, is it possible that they're trying to  
4 hide something down there? I expect, but I don't -- I  
5 don't know that that was even trying to be hidden in  
6 those days. I mean, I think in the -- in that  
7 emergency surface condition, I think that commodore  
8 thought he handled it in the proper -- proper fashion,  
9 so I don't know how -- you know, he still got it --  
10 that guy has to tell -- he has to come forward with the  
11 information that there was a mishap. I -- I don't know  
12 if they had a way to do it. I don't know how else to -  
13 -

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Just to follow up on that,  
15 is there a policy letter from Com Sub Pac that  
16 establishes the requirement that it's the --

17 CAPT. KYLE: Yes. We have --

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- squadron commanders come  
19 forward with this information?

20 CAPT. KYLE: We have -- we have a process by  
21 which we -- we've now -- we have reinvigorated a  
22 program that's been in existence for a while called --  
23 it's actually referred to as -- we have an incident  
24 reporting system in the nuclear propulsion side that

1 goes to Admiral Bolen (ph). We also have a -- we have  
2 reinstated and reinvigorated the non-nuclear incident  
3 reporting program, and we've laid out in -- in message  
4 format to all the ships what constitutes a non-nuclear  
5 incident. And -- and they use the same reporting  
6 format as you use for a nuclear incident, which  
7 includes a critique of the -- of the occurrence,  
8 keeping a factfinding body to understand the root cause  
9 of why that happened, and to determine permanent  
10 corrective action to prevent occurrence.

11 Non-nuclear incident reports are submitted to  
12 my office for initial review and -- (inaudible) -- and  
13 -- and then, if appropriate, we'll take those -- in  
14 most cases it is appropriate -- take those incident  
15 reports and put out a lessons learned message to the  
16 rest of the force, such a ship had this problem, if it  
17 is of training value to the rest of the group. We put  
18 that out on some things, not all. That -- that will be  
19 the database -- those incident reports which feeds the  
20 database on those things.

21 Now, could a guy still not submit an incident  
22 report -- get away with it? I suppose, but I don't  
23 think that would happen. I think we're pretty --  
24 pretty good at reporting ourselves because it just

1 doesn't make sense not to do that. Somebody sooner or  
2 later -- anybody who would think about it for a few  
3 minutes recognizes there are very few secrets that  
4 won't eventually come out in the submarine force. If  
5 somebody's thought -- found to be covering something up  
6 like that, it may be bad -- may be worse than the  
7 incident itself.

8 MR. STRAUCH: When was this policy  
9 reinitiated?

10 CAPT. KYLE: Recently. Within the last four  
11 months. It's been there, but we've reemphasized it  
12 because we recognized that some things were not being  
13 reported. We have now a good pile of all that stuff.

14 MR. STRAUCH: How many reports have you  
15 gotten since the policy was reinvigorated?

16 CAPT. KYLE: Several. I have to -- I can get  
17 back to you on that. I don't have the exact number.  
18 But we are getting them. We have a pretty good file of  
19 them. I'll get back to you on that.

20 (Pause)

21 CAPT. KYLE: I'll give you an example if I  
22 can find -- I'll have somebody bring down copies just  
23 to show the depth and scope of the evaluation. That'll  
24 give you an idea.

1           MR. STRAUCH:  Would you expect someone to  
2 report an emergency blow if it's done to remain within  
3 an ops area?

4           CAPT. KYLE:  Yes.  That's -- that's a  
5 definite error.  The -- the hard part about that is --  
6 and I'll just tell you frankly that, you know, had that  
7 -- had -- had the squadron deputy not been aboard that  
8 ship that night when that happened and he was told  
9 that, and you have -- you know, it's very, very, very  
10 possible that if the CO directed that to happen then no  
11 report would be made.  The officer thought it was okay  
12 to do that.

13           So, we have to -- we have to get back to what  
14 we talked about earlier, and that is to -- and we --  
15 you know, which we have done, is -- is improve or  
16 enhance our screening and our evaluation and oversight  
17 of the commanding officers as they go along to ensure  
18 that they've got the right framework on line because  
19 otherwise you have a guy who'd think, you know,  
20 completely erroneously that it's okay to do this kind  
21 of surfacing in the middle of nowhere.  Got -- gotta  
22 have the oversights on board.

23           In fact, we had that deputy on board that  
24 night.  That's exactly why we do that.  When we have

1 the deputies ride, the squadron people -- the deputy is  
2 a member of the squadron, deputy commander of the  
3 squadron -- riding the ships a lot to see that there  
4 are anomalous behavior like this going on. It is  
5 important that both -- one -- one without the other is  
6 not going to be effective.

7 MR. STRAUCH: And the deputy reported it?

8 CAPT. KYLE: Yes, he did.

9 MR. STRAUCH: And as a result of that, what  
10 was the outcome of any subsequent action?

11 CAPT. KYLE: The outcome, as I understand it,  
12 although I have not been able to talk to the commodore  
13 at the time, Commodore McCaw (ph), was that Commodore  
14 McCaw had -- had a 101, very pointed counseling session  
15 with the commanding officer emphasizing the fact that  
16 it was inappropriate to -- that his actions were not  
17 correct, not appropriate, and violated established  
18 safety tenets. That's all -- I don't know. You know,  
19 that's like third party -- third party report that I  
20 received. The commodore at the time is retired, not in  
21 the Navy at this point. Hard to -- hard to get hold of  
22 him.

23 MR. STRAUCH: There was also -- the incident  
24 that you mentioned, the water over the hatch in San --

1 San Francisco, there was also somebody from your staff  
2 on board then, too, as I recall. Captain --  
3 (inaudible) -- was on board. He wrote a report about  
4 it.

5 CAPT. KYLE: Mm-hmm.

6 MR. STRAUCH: Have you seen his report?

7 CAPT. KYLE: I have. A while ago.

8 MR. STRAUCH: According to his report, it was  
9 actually a positive occurrence, that Captain Waddle  
10 apparently appropriately, and was very -- sort of a  
11 positive portrait of what happened. When you talked to  
12 Captain Snead on Friday, you got a very different  
13 perspective on -- on the event that was very similar to  
14 what Lieutenant Cohen reported.

15 CAPT. KYLE: I think Captain Snead's  
16 perspective on that is -- as a result of Lieutenant  
17 Cohen's discussions, we went back and kind of looked at  
18 that whole -- that whole event and sort of the  
19 motivation and why they got into that situation and  
20 what all happened there. It was basically some  
21 additional information. It's like going back to the  
22 crime scene with additional evidence and looking at it  
23 from a different perspective and the crime scene looks  
24 different.

1           The -- what I think Captain Hughley (ph) was  
2 talking about was the response of the crew to this in-  
3 rush of water and how they isolated everything and  
4 jumped into action and protected equipment, stopped the  
5 flooding of the water coming in, doing that stuff.  
6 That was -- you know, that -- that all went pretty  
7 well. But, the motivation as to why did we get into  
8 that situation in the first place was cast into doubt  
9 when Lieutenant Cohen said, well, I think the captain  
10 was up there talking on the radio to -- to the local  
11 radio station, or talking on a cell phone, I guess.  
12 You're going, wait a minute, we all thought that they  
13 just didn't read this procedure because we had  
14 established procedures in there that said leaving San  
15 Francisco you're going to button up your hatch because  
16 we've had this happen before.

17           Unique sea conditions out there cause you to  
18 be -- to submerge early, if you will. Be ready, be  
19 prepared. They said, well, we didn't -- you know, we -  
20 - the initial answer, well, how come you weren't ready?  
21 You know, well, we hadn't read that procedure very  
22 well, and then when -- after we -- Lieutenant Cohen  
23 made that statement, we went and took a look and said,  
24 well, yeah, we kind of didn't know that procedure and

1 kind of added verification to what Lieutenant Cohen  
2 said, that the captain had other, maybe, motivations in  
3 mind.

4 So, Commodore Snead's perspective on this is  
5 probably tainted by the fact that he knows a little  
6 more about this incident than Captain Hughley knew at  
7 the time. Captain Hughley was looking at --  
8 specifically at -- probably didn't understand at the  
9 time what the -- why the hatch was open in the first  
10 place.

11 MR. STRAUCH: Well, the other thing Captain  
12 Snead said is that -- that considerably more water went  
13 over the hatch than he had been led to believe. But  
14 isn't that something that Captain Hughley would have  
15 known also?

16 CAPT. KYLE: I think Captain Hughley's --  
17 it's always very difficult -- you have water coming  
18 down a hatch, it's a lot of water coming down a hatch.  
19 It's -- it looks like a heck of a lot of water. And  
20 when it's all settled down and you get down to the  
21 bottom of the boat and look at it, it probably isn't  
22 that much water, but it sure seems like a lot at the  
23 time when the water's pouring down the hatch. It's  
24 frightening.

1           So, I would not trust either -- either guy's  
2 assessment of how much water went over there. There  
3 shouldn't have been any water going over the hatch,  
4 frankly. You know, we should have had the protection  
5 in place coming out of that harbor. There's specific  
6 guidance and warning about coming out of that wharf,  
7 and it's well -- well known. Back in 19 -- (inaudible)  
8 -- in 1973, we lost -- lost a commanding officer over  
9 the side right in that same location. He got washed  
10 right over the top of the bridge. He was up there  
11 without a harness on and he got washed off the boat.  
12 At that time we instituted these, you know, rules --  
13 here are some rules, some guidance, very strong  
14 guidance about how to get out of -- out of San  
15 Francisco safely on a submarine.

16           I -- I went out of there on my boat and  
17 experienced the same sort of sea conditions. Followed  
18 the guidance, had the hatches shut, but we came very  
19 close to getting wet up on the bridge -- over-wash.  
20 So, it's -- it is a very definite -- it's not a -- it's  
21 not -- it's just a very unique place. Just the period  
22 of the seas, the swells coming into San Francisco  
23 Harbor. We were at a shallow area that caused that to  
24 happen.

1           MR. STRAUCH: Captain Hughley was a  
2 representative of the -- of the Com Sub Pac?

3           CAPT. KYLE: Yes.

4           MR. STRAUCH: Shouldn't he --

5           CAPT. KYLE: He was in the job that Captain  
6 Borchardt is in.

7           MR. STRAUCH: Shouldn't he, if anyone, have  
8 been familiar with the reasons why the hatch wasn't  
9 closed on time since he's -- if he's essentially  
10 playing a supervisory or oversight role on the ship?

11           CAPT. KYLE: Well, it's hard to know exactly.  
12 I think if I was on the ship, because I had that  
13 specific experience myself and was familiar with that  
14 harbor and done -- been in and out there enough times,  
15 I think I would have tripped to the fact, how come the  
16 hatch isn't shut and what's going on here. But he --  
17 Captain Hughley -- although he had specific experience  
18 -- I'm trying to think here.

19           It's pretty well known -- pretty well known  
20 problem there. I don't know -- I can't -- I can't -- I  
21 don't know why Captain Hughley didn't know that. I  
22 mean, whether he knew it or didn't know it, I -- hard  
23 to know. I mean, I don't -- I don't know why he didn't  
24 know that. I would think he would, but I'm not sure.

1 I can't -- I would think he should -- should have known  
2 that. Why he didn't say anything about it, it's  
3 possible that he didn't know and forgot that that was a  
4 requirement in there, to shut the hatch and be ready  
5 for water. He may not have been involved -- he may not  
6 have been up in there and realized the hatch was open  
7 at the time. He may have been involved in some other  
8 aspect of the ship supervision at the time. I don't  
9 know. I don't know what the circumstances with his  
10 presence on board.

11 But -- but yes, you hope -- you would hope  
12 that a guy with more experience, like Captain Hughley,  
13 riding the ship, would -- that's the whole reason he's  
14 there, is to provide that sort of backup to the command  
15 if there's something that's not being done properly in  
16 accordance with established practices or guidance. So,  
17 why -- why he didn't back that up or didn't understand  
18 it, I can't answer that because I wasn't there and I  
19 don't -- I don't remember the details.

20 But I -- I know that they had a critique  
21 afterwards. There was a statement made that they did  
22 not know about the procedure to shut the hatch. Why --  
23 why Captain Hughley didn't know that or didn't realize  
24 the hatch was still open, he may not have been in the

1 right position to even realize the hatch was not shut  
2 at that point in time.

3 MR. STRAUCH: Well, you -- I mean, we could  
4 take it a step further. If the real reason the hatch  
5 wasn't shut in time was because Captain Waddle was  
6 talking on the cell phone to a radio station, I should  
7 think that would have been known throughout the ship,  
8 that --

9 CAPT. KYLE: No, you wouldn't know that. You  
10 wouldn't know that throughout the ship necessarily.  
11 No. He -- you know, I don't know exactly -- if he had  
12 an antenna up there, he still -- he still would have  
13 people on the bridge, so it's just a matter of whether  
14 the hatch is open or not. And -- and here -- here's  
15 the area out here where the potato patch, where it's --  
16 where you're susceptible to problems. So, the boat is  
17 -- boat's proceeding out to this area. It's okay back  
18 here. The seas are fine. Under the Golden Gate, no  
19 problem. It's out -- it's like four miles down the  
20 road or five miles or something down to Golden Gate.  
21 They were proceeding down that direction and the OD,  
22 you know, he's up there talking on the radio, on the  
23 cell phone, and approaching the potato patch.

24 And whether he knew that he was supposed to

1 shut the hatch or not, let's say he did know he was  
2 supposed -- well, I just need 30 more seconds to finish  
3 this up. So, he's got this wire going through the  
4 hatch. Soon as I get done on the phone I'm going to  
5 put my phone down, my antenna down, and we'll shut the  
6 hatch.

7           So, you know, he's dealing with this. He's -  
8 - captain is talking up to the watch officer on the  
9 bridge about this issue, and you know, it would not be  
10 common knowledge throughout the boat that this hatch  
11 was open when it should have been shut for this  
12 particular little patch in transit because they would  
13 go through there. Once you're past that particular  
14 vulnerability spot, everything becomes back to normal  
15 and you can open the hatch again. It's just a little  
16 localized place where the seas come up into a shallow  
17 area.

18           So, at -- I don't know that -- you know, he  
19 could easily get by, and if you easily got by Captain  
20 Hughley if he wasn't out -- you know, if he is out in  
21 the control room at the time this all occurred,  
22 standing out there for whatever -- this is where he  
23 decided he needed to be at that particular time, he may  
24 have realized, hey, you know, shut this hatch at the

1 right place here. You know, and he probably made it  
2 happen, but I can't guarantee that that's where he was  
3 at that time. It's not just one little -- it's about  
4 15 minutes of transit time that you've got to be  
5 careful through there.

6 MR. STRAUCH: Now, after the February 9th  
7 collision, the Greenville was recertified, and then the  
8 Saipan grounding happened. To an outside observer, one  
9 could say that that recertification wasn't as good as  
10 it could have been and you would think that --

11 CAPT. KYLE: Not only to an outside observer  
12 but to an inside observer.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Well, could you explain that to  
14 an outside observer?

15 (Laughter)

16 CAPT. KYLE: I think I tried to explain it.  
17 I'll go over it again. My point -- the issue that I'm  
18 trying to get at is that when we went out to certify  
19 the boat for her -- for that first deployment there in  
20 May or June or whatever, and I was part of that  
21 inspection team, we went out and our focus was at the  
22 higher level processes. And I guess we just weren't --  
23 I mean, we -- we had had other boats have problems  
24 before but not -- this is sort of uncharted ground.

1 We had never had this level of problem.

2           And we had changed his captain, new captain  
3 there. And -- and it was felt that a lot of the  
4 problems we -- we -- I think -- think the issue was we  
5 -- we allowed ourselves to kind of get into a mode  
6 where we felt like, well, that guy, he just didn't have  
7 the right standards, the right makeup. So, we changed  
8 that guy out and then we'll go check out these higher  
9 level processes and make sure everything's okay. We  
10 have a new guy coming in that's a pretty good guy, and  
11 it should -- it's good to go as anybody else.

12           What we didn't do, what was wrong with our  
13 logic there was -- and it was a good inspection. We  
14 did good stuff. We took them to some hard places to  
15 operate. Ironically, we looked at their navigation  
16 practices. I did a lot of the navigation evaluation  
17 myself. I found them below standard at the time, so  
18 they had to do some corrective action as a result of  
19 that.

20           And -- but we didn't -- we didn't stand back  
21 and say, you know what we really need to do is go down  
22 to this fundamental, baseline level and try to change  
23 the culture on the boat. Didn't take in -- didn't  
24 fully appreciate how embedded the culture of believing

1 you're better than you are had pervaded -- was  
2 pervasive throughout that submarine. People -- there  
3 was a reticence to challenge a commanding officer,  
4 decisions that didn't feel comfortable doing that,  
5 didn't feel like that was their place in life. A lot  
6 of the practices that are fundamental to operate a ship  
7 at sea were -- had been neglected and had not been  
8 carefully looked at. And didn't -- didn't recognize  
9 that very well at the time.

10 We did recognize that we had sort of a weak -  
11 - the squadron -- squadron review of the navigation  
12 practices on the ship prior to deployment, they -- when  
13 we go on to do the certification, we assume there's a  
14 certain level of oversight that has been conducted by  
15 the squadron. My opinion that particular individual in  
16 that particular squadron that's responsible for  
17 navigation oversight was not one of the stronger people  
18 we have that could have been doing that job, use of a  
19 weak person doing that, weaker -- weaker than average  
20 person doing that stuff.

21 So, if we had done a more thorough baseline  
22 assessment, the kind I'm talking about we're going to  
23 do on a regular basis, at that time recognized that  
24 that's -- that's -- that would have been the

1 appropriate level of inspection to do first and then a  
2 higher level inspection afterwards, I think we would  
3 have caught these problems. But we never -- just like  
4 I say, uncharted ground. We never had this -- sort of  
5 effect and we just didn't realize that we should have  
6 gone to that bounds -- you know, scraped back -- you  
7 know, chipped off all the rust, gone down to base metal  
8 and seen where we really were, get all that kind of  
9 stand off that that culture was down there.

10           Whether in -- in hindsight, if I was telling  
11 you, I don't -- I think we found what we found, we  
12 probably never would have deployed that submarine at  
13 all because we'd have found that there was going to be  
14 more work there to fix those problems than we had time  
15 to do and get around to everything.

16           MR. STRAUCH: So, is it fair to say that the  
17 failure in this case stemmed from a belief that change  
18 the CO, you change the -- (inaudible)?

19           CAPT. KYLE: In a very simple way to say it,  
20 yes. There was other factors involved. There were,  
21 like I say, some weak -- weak looks done by the  
22 squadron in the navigation area, which -- you know, for  
23 instance, there were a lot of charts the ship was  
24 carrying that were out of date. There's no -- there's

1 -- you know, on that certification run, I'll just skip  
2 it. Just a practical example what I'm talking about.  
3 On a -- on a standard certification, high level  
4 certification, we might spot check a chart or two or  
5 three on there and look at it and see that it was up to  
6 date and has the proper revisions and changes in it,  
7 but we wouldn't do the whole inventory. The whole  
8 inventory is hundreds and hundreds of charts. We would  
9 expect that to have been done by the squadron as a  
10 precursor to this event.

11 Well, that particular squadron guy had not  
12 done a very good job of, you know, looking through all  
13 her charts and seeing that, yep, the fact of the matter  
14 is all her charts are most current editions in their  
15 proper -- in course with the -- you know, required  
16 holdings list, they had all the charts they were  
17 supposed to have.

18 And so, if we had done a baseline scrub, we  
19 would have looked at that. We would have done -- we  
20 would have started -- that's the level we go to. Okay.

21 Let's look at your chart inventory program. We'll  
22 take that one apart, and how do you get your charts,  
23 how do you get your changes, how do you manage them,  
24 how do you install them, let's take out, you know, 25

1 charts out randomly out of your lockers, take a look  
2 and see that they're maintained right. That's --  
3 that's the level that we're doing now on a regular  
4 basis of all the ships, and we should have done that  
5 kind of level. In hindsight now it's pretty obvious we  
6 should have done that level of look on the Greenville  
7 before we sent her out of here on -- on her initial  
8 deployment.

9 Now, the recertification we did in Guam, we  
10 did much more -- to -- to answer your question earlier,  
11 was she the benefactor of all that type of revised  
12 process, no, because her deployment was so imminent on  
13 -- we were changing these things as we were getting  
14 ready to send her out there. By now, by the time  
15 Greenville had grounded, some of these things were  
16 already kind of understood, this is what we wanted to  
17 do and we -- and we want to do some more baseline level  
18 inspections, and that's much more -- that's why she was  
19 in Guam for, like, two months or something. We were  
20 doing a lot of baseline level training and  
21 investigation while she was in Guam getting recertified  
22 after her grounding.

23 So, she sort of benefitted but it was not a  
24 full package in place when she was getting ready to go

1 forward.

2 Can I take a break here? I need to make a --  
3 take a call.

4 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

5 (Brief recess)

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. The time is now about  
7 13 minutes after 2:00, and we're resuming our interview  
8 with Captain Kyle.

9 MR. STRAUCH: Well, I just wanted -- we were  
10 talking about the COs and the -- the idea that the  
11 problem -- whatever problems there were were --  
12 revolved around the COs. But -- but that raised  
13 another issue, and that is that how come COs seem to  
14 have been selected for the Greenville seemed to have  
15 all these problems associated with them after the fact?  
16 And, is there something about the way COs are selected  
17 that could be improved upon?

18 CAPT. KYLE: Well, actually, we're looking at  
19 that whole process in some detail now, and we've  
20 scrubbed that pretty hard. And I'll tell you that -- I  
21 don't -- I'm not -- we're still -- we're still  
22 struggling with that a little bit because we -- we all  
23 kind of believe, and I -- and we've studied it, looking  
24 at the continuity of the training process, how do we

1 get -- how do we grow our COs, what's the training  
2 pipeline they go through, what's the process by which  
3 we select them, what experiences do the COs have before  
4 they come to make sure that their experience log is  
5 full and they've had all the requisite experience. We  
6 are in the process of struggling right through that  
7 right now.

8           We have not come to conclusion, but there are  
9 -- I'm telling you that there are some fundamental  
10 elements that have to be kind of sustained, and that is  
11 that the process for selecting the CO is an extremely  
12 fair process that involves selecting -- selecting the  
13 best of the best based on a very careful peer review  
14 where every officer gets a fair shot to go to command.

15 Every guy who -- who is recommended to go gets a fair  
16 shot. Not all of them will go. There is selectivity.

17 And so, the process by which you weed out people that  
18 aren't going to go is -- has got to be done very  
19 carefully and very -- you know, in a method beyond  
20 impeachment. And -- and we're all pretty comfortable  
21 with that element of the process, that we picked -- we  
22 pick who we think are the best guys.

23           But there are some elements that we -- we  
24 recognize we need to work on, one -- one of which is

1 this issue of the experience log, experience. We're  
2 going to generate -- we just haven't come to a  
3 conclusion yet on the format of it, but we're -- we  
4 will generate a -- a officer's experience log similar  
5 to what -- well, sort of similar to a -- an aviation  
6 guide log, flight log or something like that which  
7 shows how many landings, takeoffs, drafts, and so forth  
8 you've done. And we're trying to struggle through that  
9 format.

10 Now, that being said, we're going to -- what  
11 really should be said is we're going to redo what we  
12 already do in a more experiential, focused way. We  
13 have -- we have a process by which we track an  
14 individual's progress. We have a -- we have this  
15 program called Qualification for Command where they  
16 have to accomplish certain interviews, demonstrate  
17 certain knowledge areas, and accomplish certain  
18 performance factors. If they are to be even considered  
19 for command, he has to complete this.

20 Well, this log I'm talking about would be an  
21 adjunct to that with much more regularity in terms of  
22 how many times you've done critical elements, more like  
23 an aircraft experience log. The log, as I said, right  
24 now, for instance, you have to do -- you have to shoot

1 so many torpedoes. Well, we want -- we want to track  
2 how many torpedoes did the guy really shoot and what  
3 were the results, not just that he shot one or two.

4 And that experience log will be a factor in  
5 -- not so much in the selection. I mean, it would  
6 and could, and that's something we have to come through  
7 a little bit, but more importantly, it'd be a factor in  
8 his assignment process. So, if a -- if an officer is  
9 progressing down the pipeline and he is shy in  
10 experience in a particular area, that he will get -- we  
11 would use that to assign him to a job whereby he should  
12 be assured the opportunity to fill in that experience  
13 deficit. And -- and that -- and that will be a good  
14 improvement if we could make that happen.

15 MR. STRAUCH: Are there any other -- any  
16 other areas that you all are looking at that we haven't  
17 touched upon so far this afternoon?

18 CAPT. KYLE: Well, I'm not done. There's  
19 other things we're doing in this experienced officer  
20 business, but I don't think it'll be an earth-  
21 shattering. We're going to -- we're going to adjust  
22 and tweak and -- and look there.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Well, you -- you look at  
24 inspections, looked at oversight for the squadron

1 level, you've looked at selectivity of COs. Are there  
2 any other areas that -- that ya'll are looking at?

3 CAPT. KYLE: Let me see. (Inaudible). If  
4 you could -- if you could just turn off -- I have to be  
5 on my -- office for a minute and I'll get something.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We'll take a brief  
7 break.

8 (Brief recess)

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- on the record after a  
10 couple-minute break.

11 CAPT. KYLE: Okay. This is answering  
12 Strauch's question about what else have we done. We  
13 haven't really discussed about -- we had -- I'll just  
14 talk about -- I'll just go down the line here. Maybe  
15 this'll spark some questions.

16 We have -- we have revised our submarine  
17 training policy and instruction guidance on how to do  
18 submarine training to emphasize performance base, and  
19 it has specific levels of competency required so that  
20 as we are going through the training process we -- you  
21 know, it's sort of a different focus from what we have  
22 had in the past. So there's -- that was a fairly  
23 significant change now being -- the force, in my  
24 estimation, is sort of -- it's taken a while for them

1 to adapt to that new outlook, but it is -- it's been  
2 very well received across the force.

3 We have -- one of the elements that --  
4 supervises the training -- our training is now focused  
5 on -- we -- we kind of group it in a -- for -- for a  
6 given submarine like the Greenville, as I mentioned  
7 earlier today, the interdeployment training cycle is  
8 kind of the period of time when we work with the boat  
9 to make sure that when it leaves here it is in as good  
10 a shape as we can, and we kind of watch its operations.

11 That's where we have the opportunity to get on board  
12 and watch how they do business. So, that's the focus  
13 of our surveillance time. When they're on deployment,  
14 they pretty much operate independently.

15 So, one of the things we have done that we  
16 hadn't done previously is our -- our two -- at least  
17 two what are referred to as training arrival  
18 conferences, which examine the boat, boat -- a boat,  
19 really, comes to this conference and he runs the  
20 agenda. He presents information that is germane to  
21 that particular submarine so -- so that we can  
22 customize this training process to every different  
23 boat. So, if, for instance, he's going to have an  
24 unusual number of personnel transfers during the next

1 training cycle or he's going to have key players leave,  
2 you know, like the chief sonar man or the fire control  
3 guy or the quartermaster or whatever, if he's having a  
4 complete turnover in his navigating team or something,  
5 that can be -- that can be mitigated through the entire  
6 training process. We can -- we can customize his  
7 training -- training process to account for that  
8 particular problem. That's just an example of  
9 personnel.

10 Through the equipment modernization there  
11 could be a -- jeez, this particular ship has a big  
12 bunch of modernization periods in there and she's going  
13 to have little time to operate, and therefore we need  
14 to figure out how we're going to compensate, give her  
15 the operational training time she needs.

16 And in that very window, the oversight -- the  
17 oversight plan is laid out. We'll have -- we'll have  
18 oversight in this, this, and this. We'll make sure  
19 that's all laid out. So, this is all done well in  
20 advance. It is not done on an ad hoc basis. Those --  
21 those training rides -- very carefully laid out and the  
22 plan customized at every moment. And that -- and that  
23 -- that's a -- that's a change.

24 We have -- the squadron deputies that I

1 mentioned which are critical to the oversight process,  
2 we have changed our assignment policy for that position  
3 as a result of this collision. They are now the very,  
4 very best commanding officers we have. They come off  
5 being a commanding officers to go into this job. And  
6 in the past we sometimes would cut their tours short  
7 because if they were a good guy, for instance, they  
8 would have -- somebody else would want them for a  
9 follow-on assignment. We've stabilized that to the  
10 point where we are going to -- not only best -- best  
11 guys into that job, we're going to leave them there for  
12 at least two jobs to really harvest their experience  
13 and knowledge and plow that back into the -- into the  
14 mentoring or oversight of the COs or incumbent.

15           Similarly, the two principal evaluators, at-  
16 sea evaluators, who for me and Sub Pac staff are two of  
17 our best guys as well, that same very top, top, pick of  
18 the litter type commanding officers, and they will be  
19 in this job for two years. In the bulk of my time that  
20 I've been here, we've only been able to have one senior  
21 inspector post command fellow on this staff in that  
22 role. I just got my second guy today. He's -- he's on  
23 board now, or last Friday he showed up. And so, we --  
24 you know, I've been fighting for that second guy for --

1 for almost three years, but I have him. So, in many --  
2 he's a really good guy. So, there is a change in the  
3 -- in the assignment and oversight policies, who's --  
4 who's involved in doing this oversight business.

5 Let's see. Squadron manning. I mentioned  
6 earlier that squadron manning had been shrunk in size,  
7 and that was sort of a contributory factor to the fact  
8 that Greenville did not get as much -- many looks as --  
9 as had been done in history, in historical view. Well,  
10 that squadron size has been reevaluated and plussed  
11 back up again as a result of the -- of the oversight  
12 issues.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Now, by "squadron" meaning --  
14 you mean the number of people reporting to the  
15 commodore or the number of --

16 CAPT. KYLE: Yes.

17 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

18 CAPT. KYLE: So -- so, there are more people  
19 now on that staff in order to cover more -- more ground  
20 and more -- be able to ride the boats and provide  
21 oversight on an ongoing basis. And that's one or two  
22 guys, but they're significant help players, and we need  
23 our senior people going into positions that will fill  
24 key holes and allow the commodores to spend more time -

1 - commodore's staffs to spend more time on the ships.

2           We are still working on this, but it's a work  
3 in progress. We have looked at the whole -- as I  
4 mentioned, the whole officer continuum -- training  
5 continuum, and -- and there will be changes made in how  
6 we conduct our courses, our training courses, for the  
7 officers as they go through en route to command and  
8 more accountability required, entrance and -- entrance  
9 and passing exams, you know, interest -- final exams  
10 basically that the officers will have to pass in order  
11 to get -- move on. Much more stringent requirements.  
12 So, we are -- we are looking at the course content,  
13 what kind of training do we give the -- give the  
14 officers en route to command.

15           Ship handling training. We have just  
16 instituted another whole module on ship handling that  
17 we hadn't had before. It's been enabled by some  
18 technologies, some virtual -- virtual reality helmet  
19 type training capability where we can now put ships in  
20 a ship-handling scenario so this incident that occurred  
21 -- most recent incident, two ships full sub-board, we  
22 can -- we can do low risk, high quality training with  
23 ship drivers before they go -- ever go on deployment  
24 from base and do that regularly throughout their --

1 through the training curriculum -- (inaudible) -- very  
2 early ship drivers all the way up to the point of  
3 command. They're going to be out practicing ship  
4 handling much more robustly than they have in the past.  
5 That's -- that's a technology enablement.

6 Periscope -- we are changing -- we are  
7 changing our periscope operating procedure yet a third  
8 time. We -- we feel that practices are sound but we  
9 need a national certification that any given operator  
10 of a periscope has those skills understood and they can  
11 demonstrate proper periscope technique. So, we are  
12 going to institute a qualification program where a guy  
13 is not eligible to operate the periscope until he  
14 completes certain practical elements and understands  
15 such things as how much scope is required above the  
16 entire seas, not just above the -- above the troughs of  
17 the waves, proper way to look at contacts. So, we've  
18 taken periscope qualification and formalized it quite a  
19 bit.

20 I mentioned that already. Senior officers  
21 who ride submarines -- we mentioned that earlier,  
22 Captain Hughley's ride. We're in the process -- this  
23 is, again, a work in progress, but we are going to --  
24 we are going to a database. We are going to

1 specifically ask that officers -- senior officers who  
2 ride to look at specific elements and have them better  
3 prepared to ride that submarine and understand what  
4 their strengths and weaknesses are, provide -- provide  
5 a standard, formatted report of their ride to  
6 supplement that database of experience on that ship so  
7 we can use -- use all of those senior officer  
8 observations to better -- better frame the ship's  
9 performance against long-term experience.

10 For instance, Captain Hughley's ride on that  
11 ship was -- was probably an unscheduled. Well, when  
12 I'm talking about unscheduled, it's -- wasn't really  
13 part of the formal oversight process. I mean, he was  
14 on there. I can't remember exactly why he -- but the  
15 senior guys, like me, who have been in the submarine  
16 force a long time are required to ride submarines so  
17 many hours a month. And I think that was the case  
18 here. He was just getting his proficiency ride time.

19 And so, we were going to try to make best use  
20 of that time by giving these guys who were riding these  
21 ships, you know, specific things to look at and  
22 responsibility report back on -- on that ride, what he  
23 discovered. And so, there -- so, in addition to the  
24 squadron commanders riding the ships with their staffs

1 or the Sub Pac staff senior officers' ride, they will  
2 provide data. In addition, part of the process will be  
3 to select -- selectively place those officers -- senior  
4 officers on -- on ships of interest. For instance, the  
5 program as it -- as it exists today and has existed for  
6 a long time is pretty much catch as catch can as far as  
7 which ships -- the ships going underway at least  
8 matches my schedule, then that's a good one for me to  
9 ride. Whether or not that's the top ship of the group  
10 or the bottom ship of the group, we're going to try to  
11 vector people into the bottom of the group so that we  
12 get those feedbacks on those ships that are struggling.

13 So, we're changing the senior officer riding  
14 program.

15 (Pause)

16 CAPT. KYLE: One -- one of probably the most  
17 key elements of the -- like I say, I recommend that you  
18 talk to Commander Bruner, who is our prospective  
19 commanding officer and instructor. And one of the  
20 things -- one of the key -- one of the probably most  
21 significant possible change we're going to make to our  
22 officer training curriculum is we're going to afford  
23 that prospective commanding officer course, which we  
24 consider is the best course we offer in training and

1 entering the prospective officers, we're going to --  
2 we're looking very hard and I think it's going to go in  
3 this direction, to -- to having all of the prospective  
4 executive officers attend the same course. So, you get  
5 the XO's and the CO's at the same -- same level of  
6 background, same level of experience almost, except  
7 that one guy will have one more tour, but the same  
8 level of experiential learning.

9           And -- and we think that we'll have a lot of  
10 benefits out of that. First, the XO will be much more  
11 inclined to step up and challenge the captain on issues  
12 of technical or tactical merits, much more grounded.  
13 You know, he's going to have a lot more -- he won't be  
14 like a second in command. He will be the second in  
15 command but he'll much -- be much more prepared to  
16 stand up and say, no, I don't think this is the right  
17 way to go, this is gotten a lot more credibility.  
18 There's a lot of the same training that the captain --  
19 and it gives each captain, then, or each commanding  
20 officer will have two -- two experiences at this same  
21 course, two different instructors on more submarines.  
22 That's probably one of the biggest strengths of this  
23 thing, is they actually ride submarines to sea and they  
24 see processes in progress, and they talk about, what do

1 you think of this, what do you think of that problem,  
2 how do you think this is working, what do you think  
3 about that style of leadership, that approach to that  
4 problem. And that's where most of the worry occurs.

5 So, now, an officer will go through that  
6 process two times and have twice as many of those  
7 positive experiences. So, I think that's --

8 (End of Tape 1, Side B)

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

10 CAPT. KYLE: So, we are making -- I guess  
11 bottom line of all that is we're making -- we've tried  
12 to look across the board in all elements: oversight,  
13 training. Technologically, we're looking at improving  
14 our sensor packages. I mean, this -- this is  
15 definitely a longer term process, but we're going to  
16 look at developing factors of acquirement now to go out  
17 and develop a sonar system that would provide bearing  
18 and range to passive contacts that are fairly close.  
19 You know, in this case, they were going to periscope  
20 depth, getting ready for periscope depth, it would be  
21 almost incontrovertible evidence on the ship that  
22 there's a contact within 2000 yards or 3000 yards of  
23 the ship on a -- on a decreasing range scenario. So,  
24 there are -- there are things we can investigate, and I

1 think we're looking at those for price and  
2 affordability and how we can do that to give the ships  
3 better sensor packages to understand the situation  
4 around them. We need that for more than just -- more  
5 than a great -- you know, prevent another Greenville  
6 thing. We need it as a -- if we think we can get  
7 there, we should try to install those on all our boats,  
8 so.

9 MR. STRAUCH: This self-examination, is that  
10 something that's being done at Sub -- for Sub -- Com  
11 Sub Pac or -- or the entire sub force?

12 CAPT. KYLE: For the entire sub force, but  
13 it's being done right here. Yes, but it -- but, for  
14 instance, Admiral Paget (ph), who's just on a -- he  
15 just was in a meeting with Atlantic Submarine Force,  
16 the folks, and he is -- all this information is being  
17 shared directly with the Atlantic Submarine Force. And  
18 they -- they in fact are coming up with some ideas, you  
19 know, of their own. And the whole Ehime Maru and the  
20 Greenville saga, if you will, has been discussed at all  
21 levels of the submarine force. There are training  
22 materials out now that talk about the -- what happened  
23 in each of the incidents. They are required viewing  
24 and study.

1           So, as people think about this, no idea is  
2 going -- thrown in the garbage can without -- you know,  
3 without consideration.

4           MR. STRAUCH: Was this like a formal body  
5 that's been set up to carry out this self-examination,  
6 or --

7           CAPT. KYLE: Well, there have been stand-up  
8 groups that have worked on specific elements of this,  
9 like the training review group, and there's been a  
10 sensor group and there's been an oversight group. And  
11 they've kind of stood up and, you know, floated some  
12 ideas and come back. There's been a sort of  
13 independent review group guise that we're not directly  
14 involved with any of these specific processes to look  
15 -- kind of bottom-up review and say, what have we got  
16 to do. Non-process owners, non-direct process owners  
17 looking at this.

18           Most of everybody who's looked at it, though,  
19 has been submarine officers because it is a submarine  
20 thing. Can't think of anybody -- any main player who's  
21 a non -- non-submarine people, but it is -- it has been  
22 discussed at the very highest levels of submarine.  
23 Four stars have -- have been briefed on this program.  
24 Admiral Paget just briefed all submarine flag officers

1 on this and got, basically, approval from all those  
2 people that we think you've got everything covered,  
3 there's no -- no obvious things that the submarine  
4 flags or the rest -- the submarine flags have discussed  
5 what's going on.

6 Admiral Fargo is obviously a submarine  
7 officer. He's fleet command, Fleet Sync (ph). He's  
8 been briefed on this, and although he's a submarine  
9 officer, he knows -- he has a good background in  
10 submarining. He's not a submarine -- his job is much  
11 more bigger than submarine business now. It's all the  
12 entire Pacific fleet. And he's been very intimately  
13 involved in the oversight of this recovery action. And  
14 he -- you know -- (inaudible) -- so it's -- I think  
15 it's pretty widely vented.

16 MR. STRAUCH: And who's the person who's  
17 directly responsible for overseeing this self-  
18 examination?

19 CAPT. KYLE: Admiral Paget.

20 MR. STRAUCH: And you're part of that team?

21 CAPT. KYLE: I'm part of the team.

22 MR. STRAUCH: The document that you were  
23 looking at, is that something that you can share with  
24 us?

1           CAPT. KYLE: I'd like to, but I don't have --  
2 I've got to make sure that it's -- I wrote that  
3 basically for you folks and I would like to give it to  
4 you, but I don't have -- I can't give it to you yet.

5           MR. STRAUCH: Okay. We -- (inaudible) --  
6 requested it.

7           CAPT. KYLE: Yeah. I will -- it's sort of a  
8 compendium of what we've done. I would like to get  
9 that to you. That's why I spent the time to do this.  
10 I just haven't -- haven't got everybody's blessing on  
11 it yet. I want to make sure it's complete. I don't  
12 want to make -- what I'm getting at is I don't want to  
13 hand you something that says, hey, you forgot 15 things  
14 here.

15           MR. STRAUCH: That would help.

16           The -- didn't the Navy do a similar self-  
17 assessment after the Houston accident?

18           CAPT. KYLE: I can't answer that question  
19 very well because it was a pretty long time ago and  
20 people who were in leadership at that time have long  
21 retired. As -- as -- as a -- when the Houston had her  
22 accident -- that was in 1989, yeah, '89. I was just  
23 going into command at that time of my submarine. In  
24 fact, one of my -- when did that happen? That happened

1 in 1989.

2 And I -- I don't -- it was not -- it was not  
3 the level of introspection that this event has  
4 occurred. I can tell you that. I mean, there was an  
5 investigation. We did get trained on the approximate  
6 causes. It was covered by my squadron commander how  
7 and why it happened and what were the issues. And it  
8 still -- it's still being trained today, that incident,  
9 how it happened and what mistakes were made in ship  
10 handling and the fundamental issues. Why it happened  
11 is still in our training package.

12 But the degree of the investigation and what  
13 was done at the headquarters level and who reported to  
14 whom and -- I don't have that package. I don't have  
15 that full body of investigation anymore. It's not --  
16 it's not -- turned the staff upside down. I can't find  
17 a copy of it. It's probably in the Office of JAG  
18 somewhere if you really -- if you really want to go dig  
19 it up, but it'd be hard to go get. It's in archives.  
20 Probably there with the Ark of the Covenant, Raiders of  
21 the Lost Ark, or some big warehouse someplace  
22 somewhere. But it's there. We can get it if you  
23 needed to get it.

24 But I don't know -- I don't -- I don't have

1 the sense that it was this size of full-scale soup to  
2 nuts, top to bottom look. This is probably, I can  
3 honestly tell you, viewed by us as being in a bent of  
4 ever-changing, ever -- never the same after this type  
5 event, a benchmark event that we're going to have to  
6 think about, study, and learn from for many years to  
7 come here. It's not -- it's pretty clear -- pretty  
8 clear we're not prepared for this -- this event. We  
9 didn't expect this to happen to us.

10 So, how did that happen? How did it sneak up  
11 on us in this manner? And -- and you know, recognize  
12 we cannot let this happen again, and so we really want  
13 to put all the pieces and parts in place to give us  
14 enough checks and balances in here to make sure we  
15 don't have a ship that's operating recklessly --  
16 needlessly in a reckless manner. Go to combat or  
17 something, that's one thing. Takes risks. But taking  
18 dignitaries out for an orientation cruise in a local  
19 operating area, that's not a place to take any risks  
20 that aren't necessary.

21 MR. STRAUCH: The last question I have is,  
22 Admiral Kinetsnee (ph) and Colonel Waddle appear to  
23 have had a close relationship. Both testified to that  
24 fact in the court of inquiry. How would that have

1 affected the chain of command of Commander Waddle?

2 CAPT. KYLE: How did it affect the chain of  
3 command? Degree of oversight, you mean? What -- what  
4 do you mean specifically? What do you --

5 MR. STRAUCH: Did that have any effect on --  
6 on the oversight of -- over Commander Waddle, the  
7 nature of his relationship with the squadron commander?

8 CAPT. KYLE: I -- not that I know of. See,  
9 I'm a third party in that -- in that crowd, and I  
10 certainly was not -- I mean Admiral Kinetsnee had a  
11 good relationship with a lot of very friendly, outgoing  
12 individuals. So, the fact that he had a close  
13 relationship with one of the captains of the submarines  
14 around here, it's not that unusual. He liked those  
15 captains a lot, and I don't know that I would have --  
16 you know, I didn't -- I didn't make anything of that.  
17 I mean, it's not unusual. That's normal, so.

18 Now, if anything, I was probably -- more  
19 independently surmised. I know the -- that Commander  
20 Waddle -- when I -- when I first -- Commander Waddle,  
21 first met him as a neighbor. He was a neighbor of mine  
22 in Navy housing on -- (inaudible) -- island. And at  
23 the time he was serving as executive officer on the USS  
24 San Francisco. And I know in just talking to him about

1 the occurrences that were happening on the boat -- on  
2 that boat, what they were struggling with and the  
3 problems they were having, dealing with on a daily  
4 basis, I got to know him a little bit about what he was  
5 doing. And I grew to kind of respect, at least based  
6 on what I was hearing from him, respect.

7           You know, he was working on a hard problem.  
8 It's -- the ship -- the ship had -- the San Francisco  
9 had a good reputation and did well. The commanding  
10 officer did well. And Waddle was part of the success  
11 of that ship. It turns out that at the time -- then I  
12 relieved as the squadron commander of Submarine Squad  
13 One, and when I relieved at the job, that -- the San  
14 Francisco was a different squadron. And as I was  
15 saying, it was -- I took the job in Squadron One in a  
16 period of transition for retiring the sturgeon class  
17 submarine, and one of the ships I inherited out of that  
18 process was the San Francisco with Captain -- now  
19 Captain Neiderhauser was the commanding officer of the  
20 San Francisco.

21           And you know, so I -- Waddle was still the  
22 XO, and I just got the boat. I really hadn't had a  
23 chance, but when -- as soon as it came to my squadron,  
24 it immediately went into a maintenance period, so I

1 didn't get a chance to see the boat operate right off  
2 the bat. And you know, and I -- and I kind of opened  
3 business with sort of an open-minded idea about  
4 Commander Waddle as sort of, like, you know -- I was  
5 impressed by this discussion I'd had with him as a  
6 neighbor, and I'd talked to the skipper about his XO  
7 and the skipper was -- said, well, he's okay but he's  
8 prone to some weird things now and again. You know, he  
9 does some unusual things and I have to kind of watch  
10 him now and again. But he's -- he's good. He runs the  
11 crew well, he keeps the ship running on time, and you  
12 know.

13 I could get -- I kind of got a sense from the  
14 captain that he wasn't totally happy with Commander  
15 Waddle's performance. I mean, he was but there were  
16 some issues, I guess is the best way to say it.

17 Ship came out of overhaul -- out of the  
18 maintenance period, dry docking period. New XO came  
19 aboard, and so I never really got a chance to go out to  
20 sea with Commander Waddle, but I went out to sea with  
21 Bob Lion, so. And that was a different relationship  
22 altogether. The skipper was very happy with that XO  
23 and the ship did well. It was a good -- good running  
24 ship.

1           So -- so, my -- in the -- when Waddle came  
2 back, then, as the CO of Greenville, I kind of had this  
3 mixed -- well, I had this one impression, sort of a  
4 good one, and then I had sort of a caveated one. A  
5 little bit, hmm, to go from no, so I'm looking at him  
6 and saying I don't know what to make of Commander  
7 Waddle. I think he's a pretty good guy and I heard  
8 that from a lot of other people.

9           So, I don't think that my perception as being  
10 one of the guys in the chain of command was affected by  
11 a relationship between Waddle and Kinetsnee. It's  
12 more what I knew about this individual first-hand.  
13 Honestly, Admiral Kinetsnee has good relationships with  
14 lots of officers. It's uncommon to see that he's not a  
15 good friend of a submarine officer. That's just the  
16 way he is. If you get to know him, you'll understand  
17 what I'm talking about. He's just a friendly guy.  
18 Easy-going, friendly, people -- people-oriented, easy  
19 to talk to individual. Very down-to-earth kind of  
20 person.

21           So, I don't think -- I can tell you my own  
22 experience. I can't tell you about the rest of the  
23 chain of command. I don't think that -- my --  
24 (inaudible) -- is not that way. Just because he had a

1 good relationship with Admiral Kinetsnee didn't mean  
2 that -- (inaudible) -- not have problems.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Captain, I just have  
4 a couple of questions.

5 The lessons learned that -- from the  
6 Greenville collision one, have they been -- you say  
7 they've currently been presenting --

8 CAPT. KYLE: Yes.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- to --

10 CAPT. KYLE: The submarine force.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- to the submarine force.

12 In what format is that being done? Is it --

13 CAPT. KYLE: It's in a -- it's in a video  
14 presentation, a formalized training process on the  
15 submarine on-board training process program. It's a --  
16 it's a compendium, kind of takes the person through the  
17 whole collision process. It's playacted. It's a video  
18 type --

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Oh, is that right?

20 CAPT. KYLE: -- interactive. We can probably  
21 get you a copy of that if you'd like to -- would you  
22 like that? You're nodding "yes."

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yes. Yes, we would like  
24 that. Now, was that put together by the Submarine

1 Development Squadron?

2 CAPT. KYLE: No, we have a -- we have a team.

3 It's actually managed by the submarine school in  
4 Groton, Connecticut, and -- and we had some contractors  
5 do the actual production of the -- of the printed  
6 material. We do that -- you know, we -- we have an  
7 ongoing program -- (inaudible) -- key copies, and  
8 obviously, this is, say, a watershed event here, so.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: When someone is selected for  
10 the PCO pipeline, six-month pipeline, during that  
11 pipeline he's evaluated and has to exhibit certain --  
12 has to pass certain requirements in order to be  
13 selected to continue on the pipeline. My question is,  
14 what's there in the pipeline? Does anybody ever wash  
15 out or are they just mentored through it and eventually  
16 they make it through?

17 CAPT. KYLE: It's not common that they wash  
18 out. There is not -- it's not unprecedented. And in  
19 fact, we just had a guy not too long ago, I'd say  
20 within the last year, who failed out of -- of the  
21 technical side, the naval reactor side. It is not  
22 uncommon that we have reassigned officers from the --  
23 based on the tactical experience to other ships. We've  
24 done that in the past where we've taken officers whose

1 performance was somewhat less than expected and moved  
2 them to a boat perhaps with less challenge, with a  
3 better mix, or different -- different type of setup in  
4 there.

5 I'll tell you that the -- yeah. So, we have  
6 -- we -- we have a -- (inaudible) -- when that --  
7 (inaudible) -- that is one that is up for discussion  
8 among the submarine leadership right now is whether we  
9 ought to fail people out of that tactical side. And  
10 very well may happen, we may have performance -- strict  
11 performance criteria with written examinations and so  
12 forth to -- to do that, but frankly, I'm not that much  
13 in favor of that. I -- I think the process we have,  
14 which is where we -- if the commanding officer  
15 demonstrates -- prospective commanding -- I mean, I  
16 guess it was -- when I was the instructor, there were a  
17 couple guys that had some serious -- what I considered  
18 serious issues in the way they dealt with people. And  
19 what -- the way I always handle it is I -- I -- I  
20 highlighted that to the flags, to the Sub Pac. I said,  
21 I think we've got to watch this guy because, you know,  
22 he's really hard on people or he doesn't deal with  
23 people well, doesn't handle stress well, whatever kind  
24 of -- sort of a subjective issue. Not really -- I

1     couldn't quantify it and say, he doesn't know this or  
2     he doesn't know that. I mean, if he didn't know  
3     something, that was my job to teach him that stuff, and  
4     we were able to teach -- these guys are bright guys,  
5     you know. They could learn the stuff.

6             And what happened then is that the -- the  
7     flag said, got it, and he alerted his -- the officer's  
8     eventual chain of command, who watched the guy very  
9     carefully, you know, kind of put extra eyes on him.  
10    And turned out that despite counseling and despite  
11    advice to the contrary to fix his behavior, he didn't  
12    and he was relieved. He was taken off the boat.

13            So, that's -- that's the more common way that  
14    you kind of wash out. It's not like wash out of the  
15    school, but you eventually wash out of command, if you  
16    don't take a -- (inaudible) -- you know, the  
17    prospective measures and get on with it. So, it's  
18    really -- if you've got a case that's not -- the guy's  
19    not doing well, it'll be handled on a case basis.  
20    There's no standard formula for handling that type of  
21    loss.

22            MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Concerning the San Francisco  
23    incident that occurred in January prior to the  
24    collision, I believe in our discussion with the

1 executive officer he mentioned difficulty in finding or  
2 using the op order, and I was wondering if you could  
3 just shed some light on -- on how that op order process  
4 works. Is it -- are these orders piled in a certain  
5 place and before a certain evolution they're required

6 --

7 CAPT. KYLE: That's almost incredible to me  
8 that -- that the op order has a section -- first of  
9 all, it's desk reference -- (inaudible). There are  
10 several copies on board the boat. So, finding the op  
11 order -- it's the -- it's the principal op order for  
12 operating the submarine in the Pacific fleet and it  
13 tells you, like, here are the procedures for entering  
14 this port or that port or what, you know. It is a --  
15 it is the operating bible by which we operate the boat,  
16 so it's -- the issue of not finding it is not true.  
17 It's on board the ship.

18 And then, in that section, in that book there  
19 is a section for every major port frequented by  
20 submarines that tells them about specific and unique --  
21 it's almost like a sailing guide -- unique aspects of  
22 entering that port, from what radio frequencies to  
23 monitor to what piers you can anchor at, unique aspects  
24 of navigation like this one. So, there's a section in

1 that book very clearly laid out. The San Francisco --  
2 lessons learned from operating in San Francisco  
3 operating areas. You have the compendium of all that  
4 stuff in there.

5 And it's -- I just wouldn't buy it. I mean,  
6 I just -- I'm sorry. I mean, it's -- it's their  
7 obligation to study that op order. That's the book by  
8 which they operate the boat, so you know, I -- I just  
9 think that's a rationalization, in my mind.

10 Now, we don't go to San Francisco as often as  
11 we used to, so the on-board -- you know, the common  
12 fleet knowledge that you'd say, just ask any -- any  
13 person what it's like going into San Francisco, you  
14 wouldn't get that sort of response we used to have when  
15 we had a very strong naval presence in San Francisco.  
16 But it's still written there and it's still in the book  
17 -- (inaudible) -- and all those guys responsible for  
18 operating the ship are required to read this op order  
19 on a regular basis anyway to -- (inaudible) -- so I  
20 can't -- I can't say that it was -- I don't know. I  
21 don't buy that.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Being as it's -- it's  
23 -- it's a little after 3:00, I'd like to probably bring  
24 this to a close so you can --

1           CAPT. KYLE:  Okay.

2           MR. ROTH-ROFFY:  -- meet your other  
3 obligation.

4           Barry, did you have any short follow-up  
5 questions?

6           MR. STRAUCH:  Okay.

7           MR. ROTH-ROFFY:  Okay.  So, that'll conclude  
8 our interview with Captain Tom Kyle.  The time is now  
9 three minutes after 3:00.

10           (Whereupon, at 3:03 p.m., the proceedings  
11 were concluded.)

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