

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

In the Matter of:	*
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MAJOR MARINE ACCIDENT	* NTSB Project ID
COLLISION JAPANESE FISHERIES	* No. 51701
TRAINING VESSEL EHIME MARU AND	* DCA01MM022
U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR ATTACK	*
SUBMARINE USS GREENEVILLE	*
	*

Friday,
March 15, 2002

INTERVIEW OF:
CAPTAIN RICHARD SNEAD, USN

PRESENT: TOM ROTH-ROFFY
BARRY STRAUCH

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. The time is now about
3 16, correction 15:48. The date is 15 of March 2002.
4 And we are here to interview Captain Snead, Commander
5 of Squadron 1.

6 My name is Tom Roth-Roffy. I am with the
7 National Transportation Safety Board, Office of Marine
8 Safety. Also joining in the interview is Barry
9 Strauch. And I will go ahead and turn it over to Barry
10 to start off with the questioning.

11 MR. STRAUCH: Thank you, Captain, again, we
12 appreciate it.

13 I bet this has been a very difficult year for
14 you.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yeah, it has been interesting.

16 MR. STRAUCH: Have you had any other year like
17 this since you became a commodore?

18 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No. I am not sure if I can
19 recall anybody who has ever had a year like this.

20 MR. STRAUCH: Well, how long have you been a
21 commodore?

22 CAPTAIN SNEAD: About 18 months. I relieved
23 in August of 2000.

24 MR. STRAUCH: Can you walk us through your

1 career?

2 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, I graduated from the
3 Naval Academy in 1977. Went straight into submarine
4 training, reported to my first ship, I think it was
5 late winter 1979, U.S.S. Nathan Hale, Ballistic Missile
6 Submarine, made five ballistic missile submarine
7 patrols, mostly out of Hollyhock, I think a couple out
8 of Charleston, South Carolina. And then I went, I was
9 there 40 months, and I went to the Submarine Officer
10 Advance Course, which is Department Head School and
11 then to the U.S.S. Cincinnati, a 688 Moor as an
12 engineer officer, where I served for about 30 months.
13 I left in the summer of 1985, went ashore to NASC in
14 Washington for awhile. I was there about two and a
15 half years, got a Master's Degree while I was there and
16 went back to Norfolk to that attack submarine U.S.S.
17 Baltimore as executive officer, left there in May or
18 June, I think, of 1990.

19 I went back to Washington, where I worked in
20 the Programming Division, it is a money job for a
21 couple of years, I went to the National Work College
22 for a year, I think the end of the perspective
23 commanding officer pipeline. Took command of the
24 U.S.S. Oklahoma City in the late winter of 1993 and had

1 command of that ship until summer of 19, let see is
2 that right, late spring of, or late winter of 1994, and
3 had command until August of 1996.

4 I had, my command tour was, the first half of
5 it was proofing this big combat. We were the test
6 platform for a big combat systems upgrade for the
7 submarine force and then I deployed with all of that to
8 the Mediterranean. We were involved in the early
9 aquatic operations for the Bosnia conflict and that
10 kind of business.

11 When I left command, I went back to
12 Washington, back into the money business, no, no, I
13 went to the Naval Academy, went to the Naval Academy as
14 a battalion officer, was a battalion officer for
15 academic year and then flected up to be the deputy
16 commandant, midshipman, I was deputy commandant
17 midshipman for a year, and then I went from there to
18 Washington, back into the budget shop, and came
19 directly from there here in August of 2000.

20 MR. STRAUCH: In reading your testimony before
21 the Court of Inquiry, one of the things that came
22 through was you really said very good things about
23 Commander Waddle.

24 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I think what I said was

1 is that during the few months that I worked with him,
2 he did what I would have expected a CO to do.

3 MR. STRAUCH: Okay. How would you compare him
4 before the incident of February 9 to the other --

5 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Commanding officers in the
6 squadron?

7 MR. STRAUCH: Yes.

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, direct comparison, I
9 would, I would not have made a direct comparison if at
10 all possible because I never watched Waddle operate his
11 ship. Just because the ship's schedule reasons, I
12 never had the opportunity to embark them. They were
13 underway very little during that time that I had
14 command, so, really all you had to go on was what your
15 staff told you. By the time of the accident, I had
16 reason to question some of the evaluations that my
17 staff actually had of people. Not just Greeneville,
18 per se, but just because of some other things that were
19 going on in the squadron.

20 The other thing is, is at the time we had
21 another submarine that really was in trouble, one of
22 the worse submarines I have ever seen in my life. And
23 it had a brand new CO, you know, who would you have
24 been comparing him against. You would have been

1 comparing him against a very senior commanding officer,
2 two very senior commanding officers, both of whom had
3 made deployments and been successful. He clearly would
4 have ranked behind those two guys just by default if
5 you had been ranking him.

6 One of the objectives was, I do believe,
7 which was put in place before I came here, was to let
8 Waddle have an opportunity to deploy, so that he would
9 get an opportunity to prove, you know, if he was any
10 good or not in command. The other guys would have
11 been, one emergent fill CO on a ship that we were
12 having trouble with, who was a brand spanking new, just
13 getting started. That comparison is, I mean, it is
14 elementary because it is just the way it works out.
15 So, I would say, you know, you didn't, I didn't really
16 have a very good comparison at that point in time. I
17 was a little circumspect, anybody, well, I won't say
18 anybody, I was, you know, in retrospect I can say, you
19 know,, did Waddle put you off a little bit? Yeah, I
20 had some conversations with guys that, my classmates,
21 another squadron commander, who was in command out
22 there, who is a Pacific guy. I had never served in the
23 Pacific before, and did not know Waddle or anybody,
24 anybody else for that matter out here. So, I talked, I

1 talked to a classmate and friend of mine, whose
2 judgement I trusted, and you know, he kind of, this was
3 after an incident, Waddle actually did something, a
4 social incident, did something which I thought was in
5 poor taste. And so, I asked this classmate, you know,
6 and he kind of rolled his nose, said, I don't know a
7 whole lot about him, but, you know, he seems like a
8 blow hard to me, in essence. I mean, that was social.

9 So, you know, you had this check block for Waddle. It
10 was kind of not filled in yet. You don't want to be
11 too judgmental of a guy. He clearly had a very strong
12 personality, came on strong. He would tend to do
13 things that probably, at least for a professional Naval
14 officer, that I felt was a little out of bounds. Like
15 he would want to buy you a case of beer and all that
16 kind of stuff, you know, that kind of stuff tends to
17 rub me the wrong way. But, that was the way he
18 operated. But, again, I tried to withhold judgement
19 of him as a commanding officer a little bit until I had
20 seen him operate a ship.

21 Now, my deputy had been in his job for over
22 two years out here, and he thought that Waddle was
23 okay, at least as far as a submariner. From a
24 commanding officer's skills, a tactical skills



1 perspective, he thought Waddle was okay. And the
2 ship's inspection record was average, which is not
3 abnormal for a ship that had not deployed as long as
4 Greeneville had. Greeneville had been withheld from
5 the deployment rotation, essentially be a test bed for
6 the advanced **civil liberty** system. And that program
7 has had all kinds of problems and so, you know, delay,
8 delay, delay, delay and Greeneville just ended up
9 sitting around here.

10 So, on the, you know, on the data that I had,
11 Waddle was kind of still a question mark. If you
12 looked at the way he executed his SRA, selective
13 restrictive availability, the three months in the
14 shipyard, there were a lot of very positive things to
15 say about Waddle and his guys and how organized they
16 were. As I think I testified, that was the cleanest
17 submarine I had ever seen in my, and I still say that,
18 to this day. Now, with the benefit of all this
19 perspective, it becomes pretty clear that they did a
20 lot of those things in lieu of other things they should
21 have done. But, it got that ship out of SRA in just
22 sterling fashion. Not a bleep on the radar screen for
23 many of the oversight people around here like the Naval
24 Reactors's Office. The SRA went absolutely flawless.

1 And he executed sea trials well. None of those, you
2 know, sea trials is kind of a effort and availability
3 like that is, is kind of a give me, but nonetheless,
4 they were organized. They paperwork was together. The
5 things that came across my desk, looked very good.
6 And, you know, read positive press from, he had just
7 finished an East Pac swing, a San Diego swing that
8 fall, because all now know about some of the things
9 that went on during that run. But, he had produced a
10 lot of photographs and a lot of things that had, he had
11 circulated. And there were a lot of accolade, he was
12 getting a lot of slaps on the back for having done a
13 great job with that kind of thing, that PR effort and
14 there is not doubt about it he was an expert at doing
15 that kind of thing, even from Headquarters Naval
16 Reactors and things like that. So, you heard a lot of
17 good things in that thing about him.

18 So, I mean, that,  that is kind of it in a
19 nutshell. It is a very incomplete assessment, but, I
20 had, and as I had said, the test of the, of a
21 submariner is to, particularly commanding officer, is
22 to watch them operate their ship and then watch things
23 over, you know, a period of time, where you can really
24 come to a good assessment of how well the ship in total

1 is run.

2 MR. STRAUCH: How many submarines are in the
3 squadron?

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right now there is five.
5 There has been six, U.S.S. Kama Maya is being retired.

6 MR. STRAUCH: But, at the time of the accident
7 there were six?

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: At the time of the accident
9 there were six.

10 MR. STRAUCH: What was the social incentive
11 you are referring to?

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Oh, Waddle was, to hear him to
13 tell it, it was a gag, but there is a ladder way, a
14 stairway over Headquarters that everybody has to
15 traverse to go in and out of the ops spring, and there
16 are a lot of kind of historical submarine pictures in
17 that, in that stairway going up and down. Waddle went
18 in there, and took all the pictures down, and put all
19 these pictures of the U.S.S. Greenville with stuff
20 written on it, like World's Greatest Submarine and all
21 this kind of thing. But, he did it coincident with the
22 Major Commander Conference, when you had all the
23 squadron commanders and everybody else in here. The
24 timing was not coincidental. It couldn't have been

1 coincidental. So, I called him up about that and said,
2 hey, you know, good guys don't need to talk about it.
3 We had that kind of little discussion. That put me off
4 a little bit. And since my classmate was in town, I
5 took the opportunity to ask him, "Hey, what is the deal
6 with this Waddle character? Do you know him?" That
7 was it.

8 MR. STRAUCH: What was his reaction, Waddle's
9 reaction?

10 CAPTAIN SNEAD: All it was, oh, but, you know,
11 don't get me wrong, that wasn't what I was trying to
12 do, it was just a gag between me and the flight
13 secretary or somebody, dah, dah, dah. You know, it was
14 one of these kinds of explanations.

15 MR. STRAUCH: What went on in East Pac?

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: He, well, he went to Santa
17 Barbara and they had to anchor out. Now, of course, I
18 learned about this, this is one of the things you learn
19 about way time late. He went to East Pac, and the
20 story, the hearsay is and I happen to know that it
21 happened more or less, because the XO and other people
22 have told me since, that this essentially happened. He
23 was anchored out and the weather was too rough to do
24 boat transfers. Well, Waddle was absolutely hell

1 bent on getting on those VIPs on the ship. And so, he
2 basically overrode the advice of everybody and says, we
3 are doing these small boating. And the PAO, who was
4 assigned to cover that, was threatened enough, felt
5 threatened enough by it, that she refused to embark,
6 stayed on the beach. Reported off. Not a peep, but
7 nonetheless, it was an indicator, you know, now looking
8 back, you could say clear indicator where he put his
9 priorities and the kinds of things he is willing to do,
10 for that, for the appearances of executing this PR
11 mission or whatever it was. Appearances. That is
12 kind of how I feel about it today. Now, I didn't learn
13 about this until, I mean, way late, after Greeneville
14 had deployed. I learned about it from the squadron
15 whose PAO was job to do that. It is kind of
16 interesting, just another piece of the puzzle.

17 MR. STRAUCH: You heard about this after the
18 accident?

19 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Oh, yeah, way after the
20 accident.

21 MR. STRAUCH: What was your reaction?

22 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, by that time, I had
23 learned of the incident where he supposedly mercy blue
24 a long time ago, and so, I wasn't terribly surprised to

1 hear that, in fact, he had made that judgement.

2 MR. STRAUCH: I am sorry, mercy blue, I am not
3 familiar with that.

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: He, a long time ago and I
5 don't even know when this was, right after, it was
6 shortly after he took command, back in 1999, far before
7 I got here. There is, the story has it, that and
8 again, people around the ship, say the essence of this
9 is true, if not the facts, is that the ship had messed
10 up its navigation a little bit and ended up slightly
11 out of area. You have got to stop me if you already
12 know some of this, but I will try to, you know, kind of
13 run through the little primar, managed water space not
14 unlike aviation managed air space, you can't get two
15 submarines in the same water space, right. So, he had,
16 they had lagged behind their speed of advance, PIM we
17 call it, planned indicated movement, a little bit and
18 ended up, would have been out, his water would have
19 expired. He was due to be in the next water and so
20 rather than go our of area and I am not even sure about
21 how far, at several minutes prior to the witching hour,
22 they emerged blow service, used the emergency blow
23 system, blow service, which is, it is pretty, it is
24 just misjudgement of relative safety concerns here, you

1 know. Now, I have no idea whether they cleared baffles
2 at 150 feet before you do it, or did it or anything
3 else. The sense you got is that and I haven't talked
4 to anybody that was an eye witness to the fact, the XO
5 was not there when that decision was made, I don't
6 think, in fact, I think maybe he was still asleep
7 waiting to be CO, I don't recall exactly. My deputy
8 was embarked or the guy who was eventually my deputy,
9 was the deputy commander at the time, was embarked in
10 the submarine when that happened. And he was asleep, or
11 was in his rack or something, and after the fact, came
12 up and talked to the CO, as I recall the story, you
13 know, talked to the CO tried to find out what happened,
14 and then he brought the story back to the squadron
15 commander.

16 Now, you know, the particular thing, the
17 thing that perplexes me even more, again, based on the
18 hearsay that I have of this, and I never questioned
19 Waddle about it, because once again I learned all this
20 after the collision, was that Waddle came in,
21 supposedly, the guy I relieved, I called him about this
22 when I learned of this, said, "Hey, what did Waddle say
23 to you? What was the deal here?" He said, "Well,
24 Waddle came in and said, he surfaced and I really

1 didn't think much of it. And then Tony came in", Tony
2 Gortez, the deputy, and said, "Hey, let me tell you
3 what he did." He said, at the point he called him in
4 and chewed him out. He said he discussed with SubPack
5 Chief of Staff, called Waddle in and read him the riot
6 act about what an egregious misjudgement that it was,
7 okay. That is what he said. And now we can all now
8 sit and second guess. That happened after they had him
9 in command a couple of months.

10 Now, looking back on this, you can draw some
11 strings through all of these things. There was another
12 incident, which was similarly, misrepresented is maybe
13 a little too strong a word, which happened just prior
14 to collision. That happened going through the Golden
15 Gate, when he took a bunch of water down the hatch.
16 My deputy again was embarked, same guy, as was the, let
17 me see, is that right, or was the squadron engineer.
18 No, my deputy was not embarked. The squadron engineer
19 was embarked along with N4 from Sub Pac, the Deputy
20 Commander for Materials, what not. There is a place
21 in there where you get a standing vertical wave, you
22 know, and it happens, if the period happens to match
23 the length of the submarine, you can get some
24 significant oscillations and result in water being

1 taken high on the sail or even over the sail. It is
2 known about, been known for years. We have had trouble
3 in there for years with all class submarines. It is
4 written about in the outboard, it tells you what you
5 should do. The outboard leaves some of those things to
6 judgement of the CO. It is pretty clear that unless
7 there is some compelling circumstance, and it could be
8 reduced visibility, or something where you feel you
9 need to stay up there, you know, you can't clear the
10 channel and there is going to be a tanker inbound or
11 something, you don't want to be waddling around trying
12 to wrestle the periscope. But, other than that, you
13 ought to clear the bridge, shut the hatches, not run
14 the risk. Waddle was late to shut the hatches, and he
15 took some water, significant amount of water. I was,
16 my, the initial report from Waddle was that he took
17 some water, how much, 100 gallons or so. That is my
18 recollection. I mean, it wasn't, and again I am a 688
19 guy, I have been on a lot of 688s, I have shipped a lot
20 of green water on the sail in my day. It just, the way
21 the things were built it happens. A couple hundred
22 gallons, that is a problem. But, it is not a
23 catastrophe. You worry about a lot of wetted
24 equipment. And that was kind of it. That was the only

1 report I had for some time. Eventually, I learned and
2 I don't even recall today how I learned, that they had
3 taken enough water to get water into the busy one fire
4 control consoles in the torpedo room. That is more
5 than a couple of hundred gallons of water. I have
6 been there. I know that is a lot more water than
7 that.

8 You know, once again, now we have an
9 incident where a case was not, I think he was a lot
10 less than forthright with me on what happened. You
11 know, and I asked him, well, what was going on, well,
12 we were just a little late to shut the hatch, you know,
13 this, that and the other. I didn't pull a string on
14 that really aggressively because it is, quite frankly,
15 it wasn't as if he had done something that he was
16 absolutely prescribed from doing. A matter of
17 judgement and it didn't seem to be too horrendous, now.

18 Now, the story later develops that probably what was
19 going on, and this comes from a lot of just hearsay,
20 oh, yeah, we heard him on the radio. What morning was
21 that?" That he was either up there, talking on his
22 cell phone to a radio station here in Honolulu doing
23 one of those radio spots, or that he was up there
24 making arrangements to have a photograph taken from the

1 Golden Gate Bridge of the ship as it passed.

2 Again, I didn't learn about until after the
3 collision. We didn't have all these pieces. I never
4 did get a report from Sub Pac about the incident. Did
5 I pursue it? Nay, because at the time we were in the
6 last stages of trying to deploy my problematic
7 submarine, and that was at, the Force Commander made
8 it very clear to me top priority that was. So, we were
9 very much focused in on, at the time U.S.S. Los Angeles
10 in trying to get that ship out of here.

11 MR. STRAUCH: What were some of the problems
12 with the Los Angeles?

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: The Los Angeles had had a,
14 they did very, very poorly on the -- safeguard exam.
15 Very poorly. And this was the week after I took
16 command and I was in Korea for an exercise. And then
17 the week after that, the leading engineering laboratory
18 technician killed himself. And that, I would say
19 tripped off the typed commander. There had been
20 indicators in Los Angeles of morale problems for
21 sometime. My turnover report was the ship is having a
22 tough go of it and my predecessor's assessment was, we
23 have got some real, really weak and recalcitrante chief
24 petty officers that are causing real troubles in that

1 ship. And he was in the process of trying to replace
2 in some order and had replaced some. Well, when I got
3 back, after the suicide, I basically got on an airplane
4 and came back.

5 The type commander, Admiral ~~Coniskey~~Konetzni,
6 clearly decided at that point in time we are going to
7 relieve the CO. And they had a lot of data about the
8 number of captains mass there had been and a lot of
9 just, so, I hadn't had an opportunity to embark on that
10 ship. So, Admiral ~~Coniskey~~Konetzni pulled the cord on
11 the CO, who took my, one of my deputies at the time I
12 had actually just gotten my second deputy, and jerked
13 him and put him in command of the U.S.S. Los Angeles.
14 And I went to sea on that ship and I am telling you, it
15 had seven chief petty officers going to sea. That was
16 it. It is suppose to have 17. And it had been that
17 way for about four months. Now, you know, if you
18 looked at the books, the books would say, well, he has
19 a lab, well, four of those guys were 102, because my
20 knee hurts, my shoulder injury, you know, and all these
21 kinds of problems. Underneath them they had, if you
22 counted the number of petty officers in the ship, who
23 had actually served on another submarine before, which
24 I would call sea experienced petty officers, were 10,

1 totally on the entire ship. Everybody else was first.
2 Not enough experience on that ship to run it. And if
3 you put on top of that, Los Angeles had developed this
4 sort of an aura about them, that they were bad boy
5 operators, you know, cowboy comes to mind, I don't know
6 if that is a good term or not for a submariner, but, it
7 was very much that attitude in that ship. You know, it
8 was one of these, we don't train, we don't do PMS, we
9 just operate. They had had a number of operational
10 successes, that ship had, no doubt. And they were good
11 about doing some things, but a lot of the basics that
12 were required to keep a submarine, you know, running
13 over the long haul, were just absolutely missing in the
14 ship. And so, we set about trying to fix all of that
15 and I am down one deputy, I am basically consumed that
16 fall. And that is when the things about the staff
17 started to become apparent, there were problems both in
18 the talent and dedication and, and all of it goes back
19 to a lot of what had been going on in the Navy and the
20 Submarine Force and in the Pacific in particular, over
21 the last two years, of, you know, we had taken a large
22 squadron organization. We had, we had basically
23 shuffled those guys around in the Navy Centralized
24 Maintenance concept, and so what you have done is you

1 have really weakened the squadron. We had never put in
2 place a formal structure to tell, to say who was going
3 to do what to who. There was a lot of uncertainty.
4 It happened at the same time, there was a lot of
5 discussion about the squadron's role was to mentor and
6 this, that and the other. The standard interpretation
7 of that were meant to be a big brother and hold their
8 hands, which doesn't work, you know, there has to be
9 another side to that, you know, always. So, that is my
10 assessment today. I mean, it is very easy now to sit
11 back and look at this. You know, it was a piece of me,
12 even at the time that kind of felt this thing was out
13 of balance. I mean, we were taking rope yard
14 Wednesday, I mean, we were taking two days off a week.

15 It was kind of no doubt now looking back why we
16 couldn't keep these submarines running. A lot of those
17 kinds of things that I think created a lot of
18 uncertainty. In my view the squadron had become less
19 than the best place to go. I am not sure we were
20 getting the talent that we should have gotten. I can
21 tell you now, looking back, we absolutely did not have
22 the talent. And further more, we weren't training
23 ourselves worth a heck, you know, it was terrible. And
24 so, the contact between the squadron and the ships was

1 inadequate. What contact there was, was unproductive,
2 or at least not fully productive. And we had in the
3 last year, taken a lot of steps to try to fix that. Me
4 even getting, started to fill some of these holes and
5 not, you know, not having a deputy commander is a bit
6 deal. That is, you know, when you only have got five
7 officers, that 05, 06 guy is a big, has a big role to
8 play in keeping the rest of the staff on the straight
9 and narrow and doing the things you are suppose to do.

10 Lost a lot of our -- And I did without him for a lot.
11 So, when you have a ship like that, you had to recover.

12 The Admiral's direction to me was he wanted that ship
13 deployed before Christmas. We went to sea on
14 September, and there was no way, no way.

15 So, we just did the best we could with them.
16 And when I could not get them to deployed by Christmas,
17 you know, he kind of got adamant about the fact that
18 that ship would be deployed before his change of
19 command. And so, we worked very, very, very hard in
20 January to get that ship, the reactor safeguard exam,
21 because it had done poorly enough that we had to have a
22 reexam. And so we had to get, we had to get the right
23 supervisors in place. We had to repopulate the ship to
24 a certain extent. I took from all my other ships to

1 repopulate the L.A., including a guy from Greeneville.

2 And then right after the reactor safeguard, we had a
3 successful reactor safeguard exam at the end of
4 January, and then right into Palm to deploy him in
5 early March. And so that is what we were doing. We
6 were working on trying to deploy L.A. And boom, this
7 Greeneville thing happens. There is a bolt from the
8 blue.

9 Now, at the same time we were working
10 Greeneville up for an OARS, that East Pac that he made
11 just prior to the collision, my guys, those guys were
12 aboard to assist him in making preparation for his
13 reactor safeguard exam. And you are familiar with the
14 discussion of Waddle and I and my deputy had about do
15 we go to sea this weekend, or you know, adjacent to the
16 DV cruises and all that kind of business. I think I
17 have made it clear how that all happened.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Why did he like DV cruises so
19 much?

20 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It fit his personality
21 perfectly. He was good at it. And he had been taken
22 out of the deployment rotation, what hell else was
23 there for him to do, I mean, I guess.

24 MR. STRAUCH: What was the nature of his

1 relationship with Admiral ~~Coniskey~~Konetzni?

2 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I don't know. I,
3 well, in retrospect, I think that they had a pretty
4 close relationship. Certainly Waddle felt like he had
5 a very close relationship. The sense you got from
6 Waddle is he felt he could always run across the street
7 if he wasn't happy. And there were a couple of
8 episodes that I became aware of as they were executing,
9 which indicated to me that it was more than just a
10 casual relationship.

11 For incident, Waddle was downtown one
12 weekend, around the Christmas holidays, prior to the
13 collision and he ran across Bobby Kennedy, Jr. down
14 there. It is a long story here. Basically, invited
15 him out to his ship. So he has got Bobby Kennedy, Jr.
16 and his family about the U.S.S. Greenville. I didn't
17 know anything about this. I learned about it because I
18 was coming into the office the evening that it was
19 happening, and I saw Waddle with the Admiral and this
20 entourage going down the pier, dressed up, you know, a
21 little bit. I said, I wonder what the hell is going on
22 in the Greenville, because I don't know what is going
23 on in the Greenville. Later I found out what had
24 happened. Waddle had called the Admiral, they come

1 over and socialized and they went to the Admiral's
2 house for a cocktails or what not afterwards. So, it
3 was more than just a simple, you know, or typical, I
4 guess, type commander/CO relationship. I am not so
5 sure that, I mean, my sense now looking back and having
6 now met and learned a lot about these people out here,
7 that was unusual. The Admiral typically did not have a
8 lot of close relationships with COs. His
9 relationships tended to be if anything with more junior
10 people in groups, you know, and not so much so with the
11 officers and the ships. That is my sense.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Well, looking back it now as you
13 put the pieces together, you have described three
14 incidents involving Commander Waddle, reflect poorly on
15 him.

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

17 MR. STRAUCH: How aware were you of these
18 incidents before February 9?

19 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I wasn't. I had knowledge of
20 them and I explained to you how I assessed them. But,
21 the others, learned about well after the collision.

22 MR. STRAUCH: Were these the types of events
23 that you should have been aware of when they happened?

24 CAPTAIN SNEAD: The one that happened in the

1 DVM bar, off Santa Barbara, I would have hoped would
2 have been reported. That one, for an officer to feel
3 afraid for her safety, but, I am not sure she
4 communicated that to her squadron commander in a timely
5 fashion. I think maybe, you know, that is one of those
6 things where you go, well, that SOB, but, you know, you
7 get involved in doing your job, you don't necessarily
8 go back to the boss with that kind of thing,
9 particularly if it executes, you just kind of go, okay,
10 well. I would have hoped though to have heard about
11 that.

12 The other one, it happened so long ago and
13 the squadron commander felt like it had been dealt
14 with, and there was nothing for well over a year, so I
15 don't necessarily think it egregious that that one
16 didn't show up. Should we be better about filing those
17 kinds of things in the record? Absolutely, in
18 retrospect now, given my experience in this job. But,
19 I will tell you that it has been my experience, in my
20 career, that that is not what we have done. We have
21 never done that kind of thing. Because guys will make
22 mistakes and what you tend to do is when there is one
23 of them, you talk to them about it and there is no
24 written record. When there is a second one, that is

1 when you start putting pen to paper and start building
2 records and those kinds of things. So, if, in fact,
3 this was the only one, maybe there were others, but I
4 don't know of them, then, you know, I think it would be
5 very judgmental to say that, yeah, they should have
6 written that one down and, and told me about it a year
7 and a half later. I mean, he, he, said he talked to
8 the chief staff about it, so I think that went to the
9 right level. That his what I would have done, had that
10 been me, again, you know, this is 20/20 hindsight now
11 for me to sit and talk about it.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Should you as his supervisor
13 have been informed about it before you took or when you
14 took command?

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I would say that is a matter
16 in judgement in a commander. And if he felt like that
17 he had enough question about Waddle at that point in
18 time, the time that I relieved him, for that to be,
19 that incident to be material to his uncertainty or
20 judgement, then I think it would have been appropriate.

21 You know, McCall, quite frankly, left me with the
22 impression that Waddle was a bit of a bull in a china
23 shop, but that his ship appeared to run okay. And I
24 will tell you the staff, the Squadron 1 staff, was hard

1 over that Greeneville was the best ship in our
2 squadron. In fact, they voted him the Battle E winner
3 that year. And I said, no, because he hadn't proved
4 anything to me. So, you know, the squadron commander,
5 if he believes in his staff and that is the kind of
6 feedback he is getting from the deck, we know now that
7 feedback really wasn't worth half a hoot.

8 MR. STRAUCH: And what is the nature of the
9 deficiencies and the feedback?

10 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Bad judgements. I mean, here
11 again you had an environment where the squadron was
12 suppose to go down and "train and mentor" the ships.
13 What really does that mean? Training to most of this
14 means showing in the business of operating complex
15 machines, it means showing people how to operate them.

16 See, that, I can tell you today as an experienced,
17 what that means. We do some of that. The fact of the
18 matter, what we really do is we teach the training
19 process, or we teach a training process. We teach guys
20 how to train themselves. We teach them to fish, we
21 don't give them the fish. And so I think that there
22 was a loss of perspective in that era where we quit
23 doing inspections in Sub Pac and a lot of those things.

24 And by the way, the Navy was doing the same thing. And

1 the stand down of PMS inspections, we now know not
2 good, getting back into all those businesses and it
3 just takes it to run these complex machines. So, I
4 think there was a real uncertainty on the part of the
5 staff as to what they were really suppose to do. And
6 so I don't think they kicked the can. I don't think
7 they kicked the tires hard enough. I know they didn't.
8 I know they didn't. And we have been working very hard
9 to try to train this new staff, largely a new staff, in
10 how to go about doing all of those things.

11 MR. STRAUCH: So, how does the Commodore find
12 out what is going on in the vessels that he oversees?

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: You listen to your staff, and
14 principally your deputies, the deputy commanders,
15 because those guys, at least one of those guys, post
16 command and he should be picked, selected based on his
17 performance of command, so that he brings something.
18 You know, once again, there is, one of the things the
19 submarine force has done in the wake of Greenville is,
20 is that it reassessed the caliber of post CO that it is
21 assigning to waterfront activity. Because I think we
22 realized that we weren't getting the kinds of guys that
23 we really needed it. So, you look at those things.
24 You listen to all those things. And in the end you

1 ride the ships, yourself. And you have to ride a lot.
2 I spent a lot of time riding these ships. And, you
3 know, you have a little, you have all the ride reports
4 from all the guys that went before. We also have a
5 training cycle, you know, that we go through. Now,
6 over these same years, we were, where we weren't doing
7 inspections, we were abbreviating our training cycle
8 tremendously. We were short cycling a lot of guys.
9 Post collision, Admiral ConiskeyKonetzni told me that
10 he wanted Greeneville to go out on schedule. She was
11 suppose to port in May. Hell, we didn't get out of
12 drydock until April. So, it was a little difficult to
13 deploy that. And I went back to him and said, "Boss, I
14 think maybe August, how does that sound? Maybe we can
15 make August."

16 MR. STRAUCH: What was his reaction?

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: He accepted it. You know,
18 there is, we have instructions and it tells you all the
19 things that you must do. When there is an operational
20 imperative, and again through the Cold War, there were
21 a lot of these. Squadron commander gets to make some
22 judgements about if he wants to cut any corners in this
23 regime, but there has got to be a rationale, you know,
24 you pass some judgements on what you can cut. So,

1 doing that, it is not foreign to us. We have been
2 doing this for 30 years in the Cold War. But, I think
3 all of us failed to realize how much had changed. I
4 mean, now, in retrospect, I think we can more clearly
5 see that on a lot, lot of these things, a lot more than
6 we ever thought changed in the sense of the experience
7 of the people on the ships, I mean, the impacts on the
8 poor attention years, on depth of experience in the
9 ships. All of those things. The amount of time, it
10 used to when you are on deployment, you were really
11 doing tactical stuff all the time. Now, these guys go
12 on deployment, they operate a lot, but is the intensity
13 of operations what it ought, I mean, so, it is just a
14 different kettle of fish today in a lot of ways.
15 Which means that this new submarine force commitment to
16 the basics, scraping these down to bare metal,
17 rebuilding, paying an awful lot of attention to
18 inspecting basic skills is more important than ever
19 because we don't have the old salts running around our
20 submarines, for whom that is all second nature. So,
21 you know.

22 MR. STRAUCH: Now these changes, back to the
23 basics, when did this come about?

24 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It has been coming about since

1 the collision. It took some time, I think, for
2 everybody to sort of settle down and get their
3 bearings. Certainly after the COI came out, we really
4 started to assess it. The, but the truth is, the roots
5 of it, probably pre collision. The guys on the Sub Pac
6 staff that are responsible for this thing, had been
7 writing what they called IDTC, Inter Deployment
8 Training Cycle Instruction for some time and trying to
9 get, trying to get this thing to see the light of day
10 and it just hadn't been top on the priority list. But,
11 that thing really started to come forward in the months
12 prior to the collision, after L.A. and there had been
13 some other issues, you know, there was some issues that
14 were starting to show that maybe guys weren't handling
15 themselves as we had come to assume they would. After
16 Greeneville, that thing gained tremendous momentum and
17 in fact, Admiral [ConiskeyKonetzni](#) signed it out before
18 his March change of command. So, it didn't take him
19 long to sign that. Now, it has been revised since. We
20 have gone back, taking a look at it, with some
21 operating experience and revised it.

22 You guys can read this thing, I mean, it is
23 not very long. It basically divides an inter
24 deployment training cycle into trimesters, and it

1 defines the training cycle as 15, 16 months, which is
2 something we have taken a lot of license with in the
3 two years prior to Greeneville. We were turning guys
4 around out here on 12 months for operational reasons.

5 So, when I say back to basics, I mean, there has been
6 a reassessment of everything. And, you know, I am told
7 the reassessment of personnel assignment policies and
8 all kinds of things that are way beyond my job today.
9 But, I see the impact of all of this when it comes to
10 the cycles that we are having to keep when we train
11 these guys between deployments.

12 MR. STRAUCH: So, what you are saying is that
13 after, as a result of the February 9 collision, that
14 there was sort of a self examination.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

16 MR. STRAUCH: Of what the Navy could do.

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

18 MR. STRAUCH: To prevent this from happening
19 again, and as a result of that, there were changes with
20 regard to training, deployments and even selection of
21 COs, is that a fair statement?

22 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I am not sure about selection
23 of COs. I wouldn't want to go on record speaking
24 specifically about that, but I will tell you,

1 definitely selection of people for the staffs, for the
2 squadron staffs. And also, also, the type commanders,
3 TRE teams, because now, we used to call it, just to
4 show you sort of the nuance difference, there was a
5 thing called the combat systems training team prior to
6 the Greeneville collision. And now it has become, gone
7 back to the tactical readiness examination team. The
8 difference in those words is huge. And it reflects a
9 return to the, to what I would say the basics of
10 submarining, that is to be tried about, you get what
11 you inspect, not what you expect. One of the things
12 that I pointed out to my staff when we were doing our
13 own little self assessment after the collision, was
14 that the Navy regulations never were changed to say
15 that ISIC, immediate senior in command, that is what I
16 am, is suppose to train and mentor. It says that ISIC
17 shall inspect.

18 MR. STRAUCH: This sort of inter inspection
19 for want of a better word, was it, how would you
20 characterize it? It is a formal kind of thing, where
21 people get together and say, well, you know, what do we
22 do now? Or is it something that sort of evolves
23 slowing and gradually without anybody realizing it?

24 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No, I think it was formal.

1 There certainly were formal sessions of different
2 folks, most of it way above my pay grade. We kind of
3 did our own at the squadron. And kept our ear to the
4 ground so we knew what the type commander was doing,
5 particularly with this inspection regime, this IDTC
6 instruction, we were the ones that were going to have
7 to execute it. And, in fact, when they, when they
8 issued their instruction, and said you shall do all the
9 following, I took U.S.S. Los Angeles, next IDTC, which
10 is the one we were currently executing, told my ops
11 officer, go lay all this down against Los Angeles'
12 schedule and see if it fits, see if it all works. One
13 of the things I do in my squadron that nobody else
14 does, we do the submarine special worker. I have all
15 the CO staff. And it is a demanding training burden
16 that nobody else carries, but I have never gotten any
17 allocations in the IDTC to do it. We get the CO now,
18 currently, well, until I change instruction, we used to
19 have to give them 84 days a year, underway, to train.
20 That was 20 percent of my training allocation. We are
21 now down to 60. I have got one submarine, it is 20
22 percent and I no longer have the special purpose
23 command, Maya, we are doing it on S.N.s, basically 20
24 percent of my IDTC underway time goes to do that,

1 nobody else has to deal with that.

2 So, I have been very plugged in to all these
3 discussions about what we were going to do because we
4 were, I felt, right on the edge of being unexecutable
5 most of the time, to meet all the requirements. And
6 so, I think we have made end roads and we have gotten
7 people to recognize what we are doing here is, requires
8 allocations. And I am actually working right now to
9 change the Los Angeles' next deployment date so that we
10 can do everything that they tell us they want us to do
11 and do it in a ordered fashion, you know, because
12 enough of this business.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Who were some of the people that
14 were, that, above your pay grade, who were involved in
15 the reexamination?

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I can only assume because I
17 didn't get much feedback, you know, we would see
18 messages, lessons learned messages from Admiral
19 [ConiskeyKonetzni](#) and then from Admiral Padgett, but I
20 know that, well, I know for a fact that Captain Kyle,
21 his organization, the N7 organization here and that who
22 owned the CSTT, and now owns the TRE team, that those
23 guys were involved in it intensively. I also know that
24 N1 has been involved in some groups, both with Sub Land

1 and the people in the bureau over us, you know, doing
2 studies and looking at, you know, where these guys came
3 from. You know, and then I heard, I just heard
4 socially or over the telephone or something, about guys
5 pulling Waddle's record and looking at it and going,
6 how in the hell did this guy get to command, and I hear
7 all those stories. And okay, so, there has been, there
8 had been people talking about all of that. And there
9 have been formal groups. And Admiral Grossenbocker at
10 Sub Land, who is Com Sub 4 in the new regime, he has
11 been kind of in the lead of doing all of this. Again,
12 I only know by just what I hear, informally. I am not
13 in the chop chain. They don't make reports to me, you
14 know. But, I have taken opportunity to make my views
15 known as we figured out what went wrong at Squadron 1,
16 to the Chief of Staff.

17 MR. STRAUCH: Can you walk us through that,
18 what went wrong?

19 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I told you before, I mean, it
20 is essentially three things. We had inadequate contact
21 with other ships. The contact that we had was of
22 insufficient quality to effect in a consistent
23 measurable way out comes on the ship. And the squadrons
24 had lost their priority and were being used, basically,

1 as a surge tank to fill other things. I had
2 experienced guys taken from my staff to be chiefs of
3 the boat and the job left gapped. My assistant
4 navigator was gapped for nine months. And that
5 assistant navigator that came into fill that position,
6 was a brand new, newly promoted chief petty officer.
7 He had served as assistant navigator in a submarine
8 that had been in overhaul. So, he had been an expert
9 core master, but he never really served as an assistant
10 navigator. Because I didn't know this at this time
11 either. I mean, all this happened before I came here.
12 But, in our, you know, inter inspection, and our
13 reassessment of all of this, all these things started
14 to come out, because I went through the service records
15 of every guy I have got, when they were ported and what
16 were the circumstances and then I find out that it
17 seems so and so had to go be a cob so he could gap his
18 billet. That ANAV, that guy I got, has got certified
19 Greeneville to go to deploy. That is the guy that
20 didn't find out that she was missing all those charts.

21

22 MR. STRAUCH: I am sorry, missing charts?

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yeah, Greeneville went out and
24 ran aground in Saipan and was missing a bunch of

1 charts.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Oh.

3 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It happens they were the wrong
4 edition when they ran aground. So, you know, you go,
5 how the hell can that happen? They have got all these
6 checklists they are suppose to execute. Oh, yeah, they
7 signed the checklist, but in what, in what depth were
8 we completing our nav evals and all those kinds of
9 things. Not, not deeply enough. And when you really
10 rank, when you pull the chief through the grind, find
11 out what he was really doing, taking too much for
12 granted when he was doing his inspections, based on
13 just, instead of making them show him. So, there are
14 two problems there. The guy was really never trained
15 to be an ANAV. Certainly not a --

16 MR. STRAUCH: What is --

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: ANAV, assistant navigator.
18 Certainly not a squadron assistant navigator where you
19 have got to go and inspect all these things. You
20 certainly should have served as a successful, West Pac
21 assistant navigator before you go certifying. I would
22 think. I don't necessarily have a navigator, a guy who
23 has served as a navigator in my staff. And I have not
24 had. So, do we, can we train him in the staff? As I

1 told the type commander, we should not have to train
2 these guys. They ought to come to me full up rounds,
3 ready to step out there, and do their jobs. If I have
4 to train them, we are going to have to slow down.
5 This guy was not ready to be a squadron assistant
6 navigator. It is an issue of manning priority. Where
7 was the talent going? Admiral Grossenbocker, I am
8 told, has injected himself into the chief of the boat
9 manning process, you know, selection process, etc.,
10 etc., because I would guess, I would guess, you know,
11 my sense is that too much of the chief petty officer
12 talent submarine force have been migrating out of the
13 submarine force, going to big Navy.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Big Navy.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yeah, going to staffs and
16 surface ships, you know, to be command master chiefs in
17 big decks and things like that. I think it is clear,
18 maybe we need to keep some of that talent. And for
19 instance, when we end up with a trouble ship like
20 Greeneville today is, maybe we ought to take a guy who
21 successfully served before and put him back in the
22 submarine for a second go at it, because we need his
23 experience. We need it to be a successful nav in that
24 ship. Those kind of things. I think we are starting

1 to do those kinds of things. So, this is not, I don't
2 think original thought.

3 But, we, so, those three things were not
4 right. And we had let that, just kind of happen to us.
5 You know, in the draw down, in the early '90s, there
6 was this, the thing to do was try to consolidate and
7 get, become efficient and we, you know, I was there, I
8 was in those budget shops. I have listened to all of
9 those. I prepared the briefs, I did all that stuff.
10 It was sort of a notion that we as line officers might
11 have about what was going on in business, whatever kind
12 of notion that was. And then maybe we could apply some
13 of those rules and achieve some of those efficiencies
14 and save some money because we were going to get nexed
15 seriously. And we did some things like the Pearl
16 Harbor Pilot Consolidation of Maintenance out here, to
17 which we matched the Naval Submarine Support Center as
18 the liaison. We stripped a lot of the talent out of
19 submarines and put it, submarine squadrons and put it
20 over there. And basically what we did, we left the
21 newly squadron staff, that didn't have a lot of
22 priority at the time. We weren't doing inspections per
23 se anymore. We were just doing training. We weren't
24 real sure what we were doing, in retrospect. It

1 didn't work. It was too weak.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Now, you said after the
3 collision you went through the records of people.

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, I did. I went through
5 all the service records of all of my guys, on my staff.

6 MR. STRAUCH: You did that as a result of the
7 collision?

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I did that, I am trying to
9 remember exactly how I did it. I think I was actually
10 in the process of doing it when they grounded. So,
11 after the Board and everything else. After the
12 collision, though, the next few months we were just
13 trying to get the ship out of drydock. And my
14 challenge was to recertify the crew. But, the
15 proceedings were sequestered, so everything I knew I
16 was getting off of TV.

17 MR. STRAUCH: Court of Inquiry?

18 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

19 MR. STRAUCH: When you went through the
20 records, did you learn anything that you, that
21 surprised you?

22 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, I learned about my ANAV,
23 having, that surprised me. I learned, I had some other
24 guys who really, who it was pretty clear should not

1 have been assigned squadrons, that we had changed, we
2 were filling holes in squadrons, instead of screening
3 guys and picking them. You know, in the old days,
4 though, and again this is one of those things that we
5 didn't think through ahead of time, to the extent,
6 perhaps we could. Maybe we did. But, if we did, we
7 didn't get it right. When I was, up through command,
8 I was in squadron 12, somewhere between 12 and 17
9 ships, between 12 and 17 ships, you can pick the
10 squadron staff, and get a lot of talent, but when you
11 have got five, can you pick? Do you have enough, by
12 the way, if you go to somebody else's squadron, well,
13 hell, he is just going to have to come to yours, so it
14 is all a zero some gain here.

15 So, you know, we are having to reassess all
16 of that. Here in Pearl Harbor, because of the
17 assignment policies, people tend to come here and stay
18 here. That is not helpful when it comes to
19 distribution of talent. We also run it in deficient to
20 the rest of the submarine force on chief petty officers
21 on the average and their submarines and on sea
22 experience personnel, on average on our submarines,
23 because people don't want to come here, when they are
24 more senior and they have children and their wives want

1 to work, you know, they just won't do it. All of that
2 works against Pearl Harbor in my view, talent in Pearl
3 Harbor. And I think the submarine force should
4 recognize that the Purse 403, the enlisted detail was
5 around here this week, and we talked about those
6 things. I mean, I think they recognized that they are
7 looking at ways to incentives so that there is a more
8 natural, more equal distribution of that kind of
9 experience and talent. So, there is and it is going to
10 cost us money. I mean, you know, you are not going to
11 get something for nothing. So, we are going to have
12 to, we are going to have to do that.

13 MR. STRAUCH: If you had gone through
14 Commander Waddle's records before, the way you did your
15 squadrons, and I am sure you did after the collision.

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No, I didn't. I don't have
17 access to those records.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Well, knowing what you
19 know now, would Commander Waddle be the type of CO that
20 you would want to see in command of a submarine?

21 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No.

22 MR. STRAUCH: Why not?

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, because his judgement
24 was, was asked. Waddle did not have a proper judgement

1 of risk versus gain, to put it in those terms. I mean,
2 and it is, you know, why, I think to a large extent, he
3 had never been given the opportunity, the experience.
4 Waddle's first two tours, now I know this because I was
5 told this, not because I looked in his record, Waddle's
6 first two tours were largely in shipyards. Waddle came
7 in the submarine force at a time we were building five
8 or six submarines a year. Somebody had to man those
9 things. And so, we would end up, excuse me, taking
10 guys, because they had done it successfully once, and
11 put them right back in there, you know, because it
12 takes a certain skill set, certain local knowledge
13 around the shipyards, to make stuff happen. And when
14 the ship being ready and executing well, impacts
15 contract costs in a big way, that becomes an imperative
16 and it was in those years.

17 But, it is also absolutely clear to me that
18 the basic and mariner's basic instincts are formed
19 early on. My best ship handlers, it is not a
20 coincidence that I know from where they serve as junior
21 officers, that is where they got it. They served for
22 able commanding officers and ships that were doing
23 things and they developed those instincts. They were
24 trained by those COs, early on. Those basic instincts

1 welding together. You know, some people would
2 suggest, well, it is personality, you know, it is kind
3 of this personality set. Well, personality set is not,
4 not conducive of being a good submariner. I don't
5 agree with that. I mean, what kind of personality is
6 that? Oh, it is a navigator's personality, you know,
7 you hear that kind of thing. Well, those guys do some
8 pretty dangerous stuff, you know, so, I don't buy that
9 personality business. I think that it is an issue of
10 basic training. I don't think Waddle instincts were
11 trained early on, didn't have the opportunity. Then
12 he goes to be XO. He didn't drive a ship as XO. When
13 you get your instincts about driving a ship, is when
14 you actually have the com and you are putting the
15 rudder over it. And the captain is standing there
16 looking at you or talking to you, you know, what are
17 you doing? I mean, you know, that is how you learn.
18 You read the books, and then you stand there and you
19 watch, you get to watch the CO, and if you are
20 interested, it is like driving an automobile, if you
21 really want to be good about it, you know, you have got
22 develop all those senses so that you, particularly in a
23 submarine where your picture is not through the window,
24 you know, it is synchronized from sensors. I will give

1 you an example of his bad instincts.

2 The morning of the collision, he got
3 underway, his ASDU was out of commission, Audio,
4 Visual, Signal Display Unit, the sonar display. I
5 didn't know that. Had I known that, I would not have
6 let him go to sea, because I can't believe that a
7 submarine skipper can get underway for something like a
8 DV cruise, without that. That is the, there are few
9 displays of truth in the control room. That is what I
10 teach my COs, very few. Most of it is processed
11 information. Process means possibly incorrect. Very
12 few displays of raw truth and that is one of them. A
13 guy who is really trained right, and by the way, it is
14 a terrible user unfriendly display, but nonetheless,
15 it was not a bad, it was not a bad go at trying to get
16 a lot of information, a little piece of thing. You
17 guys maybe have had an opportunity to look at it. And
18 let me tell you, that over a career, you can become
19 expert at reading that thing like a weggie board. I
20 can't imagine going to sea for other than some tactical
21 urgent, urgency, without that thing. Because that is
22 how you get your ship to PD. And that is how you know
23 when you have got somebody that is too close and you,
24 you know, you are standing into peril, in all kinds of

1 operations. That is, that is a tale tell right there.

2 And that is how you train JOs to drive the ship. You
3 have got to train those guys to look at that thing and
4 do a simple mental mathematics that they need to do, to
5 tell if they are safe and it can be done.

6 MR. STRAUCH: Is there anything written that
7 would say that Commander Waddle was not to go out to
8 sea --

9 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No, there is not. There is
10 not.

11 MR. STRAUCH: Of the things that he did wrong
12 on February 9, can you point to any rules that he
13 violated?

14 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, absolutely, I mean, the
15 business about operating the ship with classified
16 speeds and depths is clear and that is night and day.
17 I was astounded. I thought I had, I have been to sea
18 an awful lot. I have made really seven full length
19 deployments, and five SSB patrols and a couple of
20 special patrols. But, and I thought I knew all the
21 tricks, but Waddle knew some tricks that, I mean, that
22 business about putting those styrofoams cups,
23 compressing them, I had never heard of that in my life.
24 And the fact that he would take a ship to periscope, to

1 test depth just to do that, is astounding. Because I
2 think I testified to that. Admiral Mathman asked me
3 about that. You know, what is the difference between
4 the unclassified depth and the classified depth? I
5 mean, it seems, I mean, you can't tell --

6 (Change of tape.)

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. This is tape two.

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I didn't know that the morning
9 I testified that he had done those styrofoam cups and
10 sailed. You know, I had to think about it for a few
11 minutes, because I had never even thought about doing
12 this, ever, never seen it done. So, I don't know if it
13 is because the proceedings were closed that I didn't
14 know about it. But, you know, I guess people said it
15 was, well, it was just one of those facts that emerged
16 as the natural course of the investigation. It was
17 just kind of interesting.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Any other rules?

19 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, yeah, well, I mean this
20 business about, rules is a little too strong of a word.
21 But, guidelines in the Naval Publications, about how
22 you clear baffles. The baffle clear maneuver he did
23 was horrendous. If you had to do that in a battle
24 situation, because, with weapons flying around, because

1 you were worried about, you know, I mean, if there was
2 an absolute imperative in war time, could you do
3 something like that? I would hope so. I mean, an
4 experienced CO should be able to whip a ship around and
5 be able to tell if he has got if he has got somebody
6 real close and get the ship to periscope depth. But,
7 Waddle was not an experienced CO. And he did not have
8 the damn ASDU working. I mean, what, what was he
9 looking at, listening to the XO and sonar? When you
10 are maneuvering your ship fast like that, you don't
11 have time to listen to the, you know, all that
12 business. It is just like operating an automobile at
13 high speed when you are doing that kind of thing. You
14 have got to instantaneous sensory input because things
15 will change very, very quickly if you have got a close
16 in situation, and he was maneuvering this ship as if he
17 were extremes. That is horrendous. There is no rule
18 that says you shall not, because again, our rules are
19 written to accommodate tactical situations of
20 extremeness, where CO's judgement as to relevant risk
21 has to prevail. But, the general guideline is, for
22 instance, if you should be steady, on course for about
23 three minutes, before you are willing to call a bearing
24 rate a bearing rate. In other words, measure, use the

1 simple range formula to calculate range. And that is
2 the way we train our junior officers, to operate the
3 ship day in and day out. That is not a long time,
4 three minutes.

5 If you have one sonar contact, I will give
6 you just a scenario. DO you have to stay three
7 minutes? If you maneuver, you have one sonar contact,
8 and after two minutes he is going left at five degrees
9 a minute, well, it is pretty clear what the bearing
10 rate is, so what are you going to learn by staying
11 another one minute? Okay. That is the kind of thing.
12 However, if you a second sonar contact, has a very low
13 bearing rate, then we ought to stay the third minute,
14 get the best bearing rate we have because a small error
15 in that determination on the next leg, can make a
16 significant difference in range. And there is a lot
17 more to this. I mean, those ranges, to make those
18 ranges accurate, you have to time correct them. You
19 can time correct them in your head. That is the way I
20 train my officers, that is why I try to get my COs to
21 train theirs. So, you can tell that range may be way
22 in the past, you know.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Is it fair to say that the Naval
24 Warfare Procedures give the CO considerable discretion

1 because they are written for tactical situations.

2 CAPTAIN SNEAD: They do. It is fair to say
3 that.

4 MR. STRAUCH: So, where it breaks down then is
5 if you have a CO who is not worthy of that kind of,
6 that kind of discretion.

7 CAPTAIN SNEAD: That is right. It is clear
8 this was not a tactical situation. It is clear.

9 MR. STRAUCH: And it was not a tactical
10 situation because it was not war time?

11 CAPTAIN SNEAD: He is out doing a kiddy
12 cruise, basically. He is out doing a demonstration,
13 off Waiukee. What was the compelling need to do things
14 in such an all fired hurry? There was no compelling
15 need. Waddle, it is clear, wanted to get back to port
16 as soon as he could. When I heard about all of this,
17 the first time, my first assumption was that Waddle had
18 been in a hurry to get back. Why? Because, you know,
19 time limits is one of these measures of a Naval
20 officer, you know, you always show up on time. And by
21 the way, that is what he cared about, was those kind of
22 appearances.

23 Now, I later learned that there was some
24 social engagement or something else that may have, I

1 don't know, maybe he had an invitation, I mean, who
2 knows. But, whatever it was, it is very clear that he
3 was in a hell of a hurry. And it was, that was, that
4 is just one of the most egregious things I have ever
5 seen in my life. A CO driving his ship like that and
6 having no sense of reinput, in that circumstance,
7 unbelievable.

8 MR. STRAUCH: Then, where this broke down was
9 the CO wasn't worthy of this kind of discretion.

10 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I think that is clear in
11 retrospect that he wasn't.

12 MR. STRAUCH: And how do you know there aren't
13 other COs out there?

14 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I don't.

15 MR. STRAUCH: And who do we check the system?

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I can tell you that I
17 don't have any in my squad, because I watched them all
18 operate at sea. And I have, well, I tell you what we
19 do, is we, this trimester system, what you do is you
20 build more and more demanding scenarios to where you
21 really are driving guys around to make judgements about
22 what they can do. Certainly not judgements on safety,
23 but judgements about picking between different, let's
24 say missions, you know, you have got a list of

1 priorities, you shall do this and this and this and
2 this, and list of priority. Okay, so they all present
3 themselves. Now, how do you choose where you go and
4 all this kind of business? And the water spaces
5 changing, so you get it all moving dynamically, and you
6 get to watch them screw up. And you get to watch
7 their thought process. And I had one here recently, the
8 guy is going to be out of area, now what is he going to
9 do now that he really, because out of area is a big
10 deal. You have got to send message to type commander,
11 tell him what a dumb shit you are, you know, and that
12 kind of thing. So, it is very illustrative in
13 watching the way they think. So, that is what we do.
14 And we are, we are still kind of pioneering the way
15 here, and I am kind of thinking we are reaching the
16 limits of how far we are going to take this. We have
17 got some very demanding scenarios and we have got, and
18 we have got them in a lot of gradations, so we can
19 start from the first trimester, which is called the
20 Basic Submarine Assessment Trimester. We can work all
21 the way through the Palm Cert. And we can use these
22 things sort of interchangeably. We can walk these guys
23 through this progression, you know, from an evaluation
24 of boilerplate basics and you know, regs and procedural

1 compliance, communications, all the way up to the
2 captain's decision making process and how well his team
3 manages things like very rules of engagements and
4 nuances and all these kind of things, weapons release,
5 etc., etc. All those kinds of things.

6 So, I think we have come a long way. I know
7 in my squadron, we didn't have any of these scenarios
8 when I came in, there were none, you know, it was
9 nothing. So, it was a -- roast and we really built
10 them all. Talked to the other squadrons and, and
11 principally the CSTT team and now the TRE team, to try
12 to cross populate that. I think we are all coming
13 along at the same rate.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Is it possible that the CO would
15 act differently in the presence of, of his ISIC or --

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, absolutely. So, how do
17 you know?

18 MR. STRAUCH: Yes.

19 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I don't think you can
20 ever fully be sure, but there are, I think, that they
21 are doing some things in the PCO course to evaluate
22 this a little bit more clearly. And I think that if we
23 watch them enough, if we get the quality and quantity
24 of contact, see, the CO may act, if I can get the kind

1 of reporting back from my chief petty officers on my
2 staff, when I am not embarked, you can learn a lot of
3 things about the CO that way, too. And I think and the
4 system has, I still have faith that the system, which
5 has worked through the Cold War, even though, as I said
6 earlier, this is a little bit different kettle of fish,
7 because of experience levels, etc., etc., I still think
8 the system will work as long as we get our guys doing
9 what they are suppose to do. The type commander is
10 absolutely committed to also sticking his guys into the
11 parade, and that is fine, I can appreciate why they
12 want to do that. But, I think we can get a pretty
13 good read, there is no guarantees, I don't think,
14 necessarily. But, I think, I mean, I think you can
15 basically get back to where we used to be. And we also
16 have to, you know, we have to, one of the ways to not
17 have this happen, this is not the immediate solution,
18 but to not have this happen, is we have got to train
19 these guys that are going to be COs when we have the
20 opportunities, we have got to train division officers,
21 we have got to train department heads and we have got
22 to pay particular attention to our XOs and make sure
23 that we fill in egregious holes like this.

24 MR. STRAUCH: Well, the other thing is you are

1 putting, you are putting DVs into what is essentially a
2 war weapon, weapon system.

3 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

4 MR. STRAUCH: And asking your COs to basically
5 alter the nature of their mission, which is take a
6 weapon system and make it into a passenger carrying
7 vessel.

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

9 MR. STRAUCH: Without changing the rules under
10 which they govern. In other transportation modes, we
11 have very strict rules.

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

13 MR. STRAUCH: It doesn't seem to be these
14 kinds of strict rules here.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I tell you what, I don't
16 think the rules were, in the sense that you are
17 speaking, those rules clearly didn't exist. There were
18 rules, but certainly not rules about how much you can
19 throw these things around, all that kind of business.
20 The Submarine Force along with the rest of the Navy is
21 reevaluating all of that. I don't know where it
22 stands. I know that that was part of the outcome in
23 the COI and Admiral Fargo endorsed all of that. I
24 don't know where that stands. I know I have not done

1 one since this, in my squadron, so I haven't had to
2 worry about it much, but --

3 MR. STRAUCH: Done one?

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: A DV embark.

5 MR. STRAUCH: Yes, I guess, I don't see a
6 check and balance. I see, I see COs that have
7 considerable discretion they way they do things. There
8 are supervisors, who rely on inspections to make sure
9 that the COs are worthy of that, but once they are not
10 around, it is based on trust.

11 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

12 MR. STRAUCH: And if, if circumstances bring
13 out the worse in the CO, then where is the perfection?

14 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, you know, when that guy
15 is under fire, it is the same thing, it is him. The
16 sort of Joseph Conrad's little command at sea thing,
17 that is the essence of it.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Should the Navy be considering
19 the policy of putting distinguished visitors onboard
20 nuclear submarines?

21 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I think the answer is
22 yes, and I think they are. Should they prohibit it? I
23 don't think so. I mean, I think we clearly showed that
24 we can do this and do it safely and do it well. There

1 are a lot of things that I think contributed to Waddle
2 being an aberration. And I think Waddle was an
3 aberration.

4 MR. STRAUCH: He fell through the cracks.

5 CAPTAIN SNEAD: To a certain extent. I mean,
6 you know, it was just, his personality in this
7 environment, a guy that thought a lot more of himself
8 than, than what he really was, when it comes to just
9 basic submarining skill. All of those things combined
10 in just the right measure, to create this terribly
11 dangerous situation. It could happen again and
12 statistically it is certainly possible. But, I think
13 that we have made the changes necessary to prevent it.
14 And I, I think that all those changes are not yet fully
15 effective. And we will work at it over a period of
16 time to fix those things.

17 MR. STRAUCH: Well, the changes that I have
18 heard you describe refer to getting more information
19 about the caliber of the Cos.

20 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, and also, and their
21 ships, the teams that are working underneath and their,
22 well, and their crews and their ships. So, the teams
23 and the ships materially, all of those things, all of
24 those things.

1 MR. STRAUCH: Have there been any changes in
2 the rules under which submarines operate?

3 (Pause.)

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, we have changed the
5 rules for things you can do on DV embarks. Like you
6 can't do emergency blows anymore and that kind of
7 business.

8 MR. STRAUCH: Any other changes?

9 CAPTAIN SNEAD: But, there have been no
10 substantial limitations of the COs ability to maneuver
11 and operate his ship in tactical situations which is
12 what all the rules are written for as a result of the
13 Greenville. There have been some pretty careful
14 reassessments of sensors and a lot of those kind of
15 things and most of those things are ongoing, so it is,
16 we really haven't seen the full, you know, those things
17 bear fruit yet. But, you know, for instance, there has
18 been a reawakening of, maybe a wrong word, but, a
19 reemphasis of the use of for instance active sonar in
20 clearing baffles. It is almost, there is no direction
21 you shall. The question is why did you not. And what
22 we are trying to do is get everybody to educate
23 themselves on what they, you know, we can predict what
24 the probability of success of -- and it is pretty

1 accurately, and so, in sonar search planning. So, why
2 don't you do it, evaluate the probability of success
3 and then employ it, and have some reasonable
4 expectation or if there is no expectation of success,
5 you know, the Submarine Force, active sonar for one
6 thing has been, we have, in the last 10 years, we have
7 played around with active sonar an awful lot. And our
8 active systems just aren't too good. Active is, you
9 guys probably know more about this, but, you know,
10 active has got its problems because of environmental
11 limits and all of that kind of business, but, some of
12 the systems that we have are better than others. And
13 certainly close in, you know, if you are trying to
14 avoid, for instance, hitting a sailboat, under sail,
15 you might get a return. If you can detect them more
16 than mine, maybe you can detect that guy, maybe. Sea
17 return might prevent it, but, and so there are those
18 kinds of things that have changed, that say you should
19 do this rather than you shall do this. You should
20 consider the employment of and so what we do is we go
21 to the, do these examinations and stuff. We look at
22 their sonar search plan. And we see is there an active
23 plan for both the HF systems in the main frames, etc.,
24 etc. We want to watch them plug the machines, you

1 know, the environmental models, and all those kinds of
2 things. We want to see if they evaluate and then we
3 want to watch them to see if they can operate the gear.

4 Because the gear has gotten pretty sophisticated
5 actually, and it is not always straightforward to use.

6 So, we are doing that. So, is that a change? I
7 suppose that is a change, but, it is really has always
8 been there, we just had sort of fallen out of the habit
9 of using it.

10 MR. STRAUCH: What about changes to the rules
11 governing non tactical operations such as this one?

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Other the DV changes.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Or emergency blows.

14 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right. In some cases, I tell
15 you, we are getting to be a little less conservative
16 about operations in non tactical situations. For
17 instance, and it is for training, because we, you know,
18 we went God damn it, is it really true that there are
19 department heads in Submarine Force that don't believe
20 that you can get underway after dark? And the answer
21 is absolutely. Why? Because we have had basically 10
22 year moratorium on getting underway after dark. Why?
23 Because somebody says it is not worth the risk. Well,
24 holy moly, let me tell you, when you show up, when you

1 cue up to the Suez Canal, it is at night and there are
2 lights everywhere. My, you know, my kind of thing
3 about this, was, well, if you are going to have a
4 collision, would you rather have one in Thimble Shell
5 Channel or would you rather have one it on the
6 approaches to Port Sine, because the guys can't figure
7 out what the light pattern is. So, there are some of
8 those things where we have sort of rebalanced our
9 approach. Yes, we need to plan to do some of these and
10 we need to, walk up to it, walk before we run, so we
11 know. For instance, we will put them on a little
12 torpedo retriever here and take them around the harbor
13 after dark, the navigation party, so they can identify
14 with binoculars, their navigation aids and all that
15 kind of stuff. So, they know what they are going to
16 be looking at when they are in the submarine. And then
17 we let them do it. Lo and behold, the JOs realize that
18 they, when they are 22 years old, they can see great at
19 night, and they can drive the submarine at night. We
20 are letting guys make unassisted moorings without tugs.
21 It is kind of interesting to look at the evolution of
22 that. Twenty years ago, we didn't have fiberglass
23 nose cones on submarines. They were steel. No problem
24 doing bumper drills. Same thing with the surface guys

1 before they had those big battles, you know, guys are
2 coming in and putting their nose against the pier and
3 pivot on it. Once the skin started to get fragile, you
4 know, you couldn't do that. So, all of sudden, all
5 these tugs and nobody has ever making any unassisted
6 landing. As soon as you get deployed, the guy shows up
7 and he has got a little mike boat, and he can't push on
8 your ship, because it will tear a hole in the rubber,
9 all he can do is pull, so now you are in four knots
10 occurring, you have got to tie this submarine up. So,
11 we figured out that you know what, a proper operational
12 risk management here suggests that we train on this
13 stuff, rather than have these prohibitions. So, to a
14 certain extent, I said, less conservative, but in the
15 end I think it is more conservative approach. It says
16 we have got to train on these things. We know that
17 some of guys in their careers is going to have to
18 confront. So, there is this, you know, that is all
19 part of this reassessment of how are we going to train
20 these guys to operate these things competitively. In
21 merit situations, you can't necessarily predict,
22 exactly, but you could predict them categorically,
23 because we have kind of all been there one way or the
24 other.

1 MR. STRAUCH: What about changes in preventing
2 the kind of operations that you are referring to with
3 Commander Waddle from, from being out there with other
4 Cos?

5 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes. Well, I think we have
6 done a careful reassessment of who we have in command
7 today. I don't have anybody in my squadron that I
8 worry about having that kind of problem. But, now, if
9 you talk about preventing the next generation, all that
10 kind of stuff, it gets into the personal assignment
11 business, I really can't speak to.

12 MR. STRAUCH: What are the aberrations with
13 regard to Commander Waddle, that you are referring to?

14 CAPTAIN SNEAD: The unique combination of
15 personality, lack of experience, almost irrational self
16 confidence, which was part, which was to a certain
17 extent, encouraged by the environment in Pearl Harbor.

18 It was kind of this where you are, you know, cigar
19 smoking kind of, it was this, it was this kind of
20 partial, some would say partial, I would say partial.
21 Others would say distorted, misunderstanding of what
22 World War II submariners really did. You know, and if
23 you go into the, into the Skipper's Bar over here, and
24 look at where those guys talk to each other after the

1 war, you look at some of the stuff in there. There is
2 this big plait that says, "Tribunal War" and all this
3 kind of business. It was put up recently. All of that
4 kind of stuff, Waddle ate all that kind of stuff. He
5 thought that what it was all about. He, I am not sure
6 Waddle has read much more than his patrol reports or
7 Gene Flucky's and found out or Slate Cutter's and found
8 out how much training and how much PMS they did when
9 they were out there, just to make sure the beast was
10 going to function, you know, when it had to. There
11 was this notion that we were just smoking cigars,
12 shooting torpedoes, watching ships blow up and then
13 return to Pearl Harbor and vacation down at the Royal
14 Hawaiian. See, I would say it was a partial
15 understanding because they just didn't realize it.
16 But, Waddle really ate all that up. That is exactly
17 what he was. He was the kind of guy that went out and
18 handed out Greeneville T-shirts and smoked stogies and
19 had beers, you know, and did all that kind of stuff.
20 And he did all the kinds of things that people would
21 see. And by the way, he had a talented crew. You
22 know, I talked about the U.S.S. Los Angeles, and the
23 deficient that they had in manning, Waddle didn't have
24 any of that. He had more sea experience guys on that

1 ship than anybody in my squadron. So, you are
2 wondering what the hell is going on in that ship.
3 Well, it is because the guys took their lead from the
4 Skipper, and he taught that, aw, worrying about this
5 details and stuff, is not important. What is important
6 is that we are, spic and shine when somebody is
7 watching and all this kind of stuff. I mean, it was,
8 it was kind, it is really a perverse kind of mixture
9 that we had there, in my view, and his chief of the
10 boat, and you know, all of them.

11 Now, the XO tells you after the fact, you
12 know, that he had worked to try to stop all of this,
13 and it was just, it was, Waddle's critical mass, that
14 you know, he couldn't be talked to and all that kind of
15 business. We have had that discussion. You know, this
16 force for back up business, because Waddle wasn't
17 backed up. I am not so sure anybody could have backed
18 Waddle up that day, but it was pretty clear that
19 everybody, his crew accepted that he was a one man
20 band. We have talked about, what do we do if we have
21 an XO who really feels the guy is dangerous? What do
22 we expect him to do, come into the Squadron Commander?
23 Yeah, I have asked, I asked people at Sub Pac that
24 question. You want me to ride the ship and assess the

1 situation and it all looks okay to me, and then that is
2 it? What is going to happen is the XO, the CO finds
3 out that his, what is going to happen now? What do you
4 think is going to happen there? Are we ready to rotate
5 that XO? I know of one case where this happened. And
6 Slate Cutter was the XO on a ship, made war patrols,
7 this was in an era where, you know, guys were getting
8 killed and we were having trouble with COs who weren't
9 aggressive enough and all of this kind of stuff.
10 Slate Cutter came back and said this guy is dangerous,
11 and they said, thank you very much, and gave him
12 command of another submarine. But, that is the only
13 case I know of where that has worked productively. So,
14 we have had this discussion and I am not so sure that
15 we, I am not so sure that we decided exactly how best
16 it is to handle that, or if to handle it.

17 I know that if you want to rotate an XO,
18 between ships, you basically have got to get the fleet
19 commander's concurrence to do it. So, I don't have
20 the authority to rotate a guy. It is also my
21 assessment that if we do business right, we should
22 never get to that situation. Shouldn't.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Is it incumbent on the ISIC to
24 be aware of what his COs are doing?

1 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Absolutely.

2 MR. STRAUCH: And if that system breaks down,
3 then the whole thing breaks down.

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: That is right. I think that
5 is right. I mean, I think that, the type commander
6 wants to go right, so he gets his own, but the truth of
7 the matter is, that they can't be on the ships enough
8 to, the squadron commander has, the squadrons have to
9 have that assessment. They are the guys that see, you
10 watch the operate, not just operate at sea, but
11 executing in port. You watch their work habits, you
12 know, you see what is going on. We have got a lot of
13 reporting structures in the Submarine Force. Over the
14 last three years, we just didn't use it. We weren't
15 enforcing, even enforced that to the extent that we
16 should have. And if you make the guys submit the
17 reports they have to, you can start drawing strings
18 through things. And then, you know, you could just
19 say, okay, Captain, can you explain this? What is
20 going on in your submarine? You can have those kinds
21 of discussions. And we are doing that today, much
22 better, much better.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Increasing the information that
24 you get.

1 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

2 MR. STRAUCH: And how have you done that?

3 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Mainly by training my guys, my
4 staff and training them to know how to do their jobs
5 better, to know what kind of information we want to
6 hear, to, to better indoctrinate the guys on the ship,
7 calibrate the guys on the ship to understand that they
8 are going to be, you know, they are going to be two
9 sides to their hat. There are going to be days that
10 they are down there to show them how to do things, and
11 there are going to be other days they are down there
12 evaluating how they do things. And they are always
13 going to be feeding that back up to the squadron. It
14 takes a certain, you know, the ships are going to have
15 to readjust to this new, new, I think we are really
16 going back to what we once did. But, we are going to
17 be much more rigorous, I can tell you than we used to.
18 When a squadron staff had 10, 17 ships, he didn't too
19 much time on any one of them. We didn't have these
20 kind of problems, either, so.

21 MR. STRAUCH: If you had the system in place
22 with the Greeneville would Commander Waddle's
23 weaknesses would have been spotted?

24 CAPTAIN SNEAD: What would I have done about

1 it?

2 MR. STRAUCH: No, would they have been
3 spotted?

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I absolutely believe so. I
5 absolutely believe so. I mean, I think, to a certain
6 extent, if you have got the right kind of deputy
7 commander of the squadron, who watches the CO operate,
8 and the CO is a little less self conscious with the
9 deputy around then he is with his boss, the squadron
10 commander, you get all these different looks at this.
11 I think you have got a pretty good idea how the captain
12 operates.

13 And the thing is about done?

14 MR. STRAUCH: Okay. We will take a break and
15 we switch the tape.

16 (Change of tape.)

17 MR. STRAUCH: Given the emphasis on obtaining
18 information about the CO's performance, if some of the
19 deficiencies in Commander Waddle's performance would
20 have been spotted and I think your answer was it would
21 have been and also that with Deputy Squadron Commander
22 onboard, the COs are more likely to be themselves.

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I will tell you that I think,
24 I am not absolutely positive of this, because I am not

1 positive about anything, but, I think that if I had
2 ridden the ship, during the Palm process, had this not
3 happened, and my riding the ship during the Palm
4 processes, they work towards their May deployment date,
5 I think it would have become clear that, I mean, just
6 my method. What I do, is I just go sit in the control
7 room and I will sit there for three, four, five hours,
8 because if you sit there long enough, they eventually,
9 it doesn't take them very long to start going about
10 things the way they normally would. And then you start
11 to get a sense about how the ship really operates. And
12 then when you start questioning the CO about things
13 that you think aren't quite right, you start to develop
14 a fuller sense about him as well. You get, you know,
15 you give them, you say, okay, here is the things I
16 think are, you need to work on. And you come back a
17 month later, and you watch them again, and you see
18 whether, have they worked on those things, worked on
19 them effectively. Oh, by the way, the staff is
20 watching them work on them in-between and this is part
21 of this process education. Do they have an effective
22 process, how do they do self assessment and all of
23 that? If he has done what he has suppose to do, I
24 mean, you know, you get a pretty good sense of the COs

1 has got his arms wrapped, but if he hadn't, or if they
2 have fixed only those specific things but left other
3 things untended, you start, you start to get a sense of
4 and you watch the way he carries himself. Watch the
5 way he carries himself around the ship, watch how often
6 he gets around the ship, watch how much he actually
7 cares about guys that are in the ship. Somebody
8 recently suggested that one of the MOEs of the CO was
9 his approachability. And I observed this, how Scott
10 Waddle at least created the perception that he was the
11 most approachable CO in the Submarine Force. Well, I
12 am not so sure that is a very good MOE. Maybe we need
13 COs who actually listen, who aren't arrogant, you know,
14 is a better MOE. How do you find out if a CO actually
15 listens? You just sit around, you have to sit around
16 and watch him. You have to watch the information. You
17 have to watch the ship perform. See how he listens to
18 his officers and his watch standers and all this kind
19 of stuff. Particularly in these, these operational
20 scenarios where things are changing. He is having to
21 reposition his ship or this and the other, and they
22 have to come up with a plan. How much does he listen?
23 How much does he just walk in the control room and say,
24 the hell with this, we are going over here, whack, you

1 know. Abort the plan. You can get a pretty good
2 sense by doing all of those things. Watch them shoot
3 torpedoes, do all of that, you get a pretty good sense
4 because it is a pretty high paced operation and stuff
5 always doesn't go according to plan. And that is when
6 you get a sense by the CO and his team.

7 So I would like to think, I am not absolutely
8 positive, because there were things about Greeneville
9 we clearly didn't read right, clearly didn't read
10 right. So I would like to think that I could have
11 gotten a pretty good sense of what role Waddle was
12 coming from.

13 MR. STRAUCH: And what would have happened if
14 you had seen those deficiencies?

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, if I thought he was
16 unsafe, if I had come to the conclusion that he was
17 unsafe, I don't know what would have happened, I would
18 have gone to the Chief of Staff and said, hey, I am not
19 going to certify this guy, I think he is dangerous.
20 I mean, it would have been as simple as that. Let me
21 tell you why, he would say, what, I mean, you know, you
22 would have had one of these. He has been in command
23 two years, what the hell you are talking about. And we
24 would have gone through it, you know, you know, this

1 is, I do the same old thing that everybody has been
2 doing for 50 years, I carry my little wheel book. And
3 then we transcribe all these things, and we sit down
4 and think hard about it. But, I am, I would have had
5 to substantiate my case and then we, you know, we go
6 from there. And then go talk to the Admiral. In these
7 kinds of matters, I go talk to the Admiral.

8 When they deploy, you know, the squadron
9 commander has to certify them.

10 MR. STRAUCH: In this situation you had
11 potentially complicated factors that the Admiral had a
12 personal relationship with the Captain.

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right. Right.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Would that have played a part?

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Who is to say, that would be
16 subjective. It is clear, I mean, it is clear that
17 Admiral ~~Coniskey~~Konetzni had a real fondness for Scott
18 Waddle. I mean, after the collision, you know, he said,
19 hey, he is a good guy, really smart, really gets way
20 out in front of his guys, you know, this and that and
21 the other. But, it is a good crew, and all that kind
22 of business. I mean, he clearly had an infinity for
23 Scott Waddle. So, would that have played a factor? I
24 mean, it would have had to play a factor. Would that

1 have affected my ability not to deploy him? I don't
2 know. Who knows.

3 MR. STRAUCH: Have you been in a situation
4 like that before?

5 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, similar situations, but I
6 am not so sure, certainly not at this level, a decision
7 of that, that gravity.

8 MR. STRAUCH: Now since this collision, you
9 mentioned the grounding in Saipan and I guess one of
10 the things that, that puzzles me about that, is that
11 the ship was recertified.

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: That is right.

13 MR. STRAUCH: And I guess it raises that
14 question about certification.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Absolutely.

16 MR. STRAUCH: But, you said that you have made
17 changes since then.

18 CAPTAIN SNEAD: We started making changes
19 before then, but they were not effective in finding the
20 problems in Greenville that led to that grounding.
21 And we have changed a lot of things since then. And we
22 are also very, very circumspect about our data.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Could you elaborate on that?

24 CAPTAIN SNEAD: We spend a lot more time

1 double checking the information and getting, doing
2 things like making guys certifying in writing that they
3 have seen and this and that and the other. You know,
4 we just go through all of that, so that they understand
5 what they really are signing up for. That it is yours
6 to, don't, you cannot make assumptions. And then we
7 double check it more frequently, so we have other
8 people, like I have had the TRE team guys come in and
9 check navigation. When my assistant navigator, after
10 the grounding, I took an XO off one of my ships, who
11 had served as navigator, and who I personally observed
12 as being a strong, a strong in navigation skills and
13 understanding, and I sent him to sea with my assistant
14 navigator to observe my assistant navigator doing a
15 navigation. And before we did that, I pulled the
16 assistant navigator in and we had a session. And we
17 talked about all of the things that he had not been
18 doing correctly. All the assumptions he had made, all
19 the things that had to change. And then I sent him out
20 to evaluate whether or not he was basically competent,
21 with the basic navigational rule sets and skills to
22 continue to function. That was at that point. Not
23 whether he was mature enough to be able to stand up to
24 a guy senior to him, but whether or not he had the

1 basic skills to function. And we, and this XO came
2 back and says, that he did. And so we continued his
3 training program and we retrained him. And I had him
4 do another one within a month and had the senior
5 quartermasters from, from the type commander, from Sub
6 Pac, go watch him do it. And then I had them do a nav
7 eval on those ship. I mean, we have been through all
8 of that business.

9 We have gone through and completely changed
10 the navigation certification process. We found out
11 that, we just found out a mirror of things, it is
12 almost a book's worth of stuff. And we have changed
13 the revisit rate. We have changed the way that we are
14 doing things like inventory to charts, you know, we
15 found out sailors can't do an inventory. I mean, they
16 just flat out can't do an inventory. I mean, it is
17 incredible. You think you could get an inventory. Sub
18 Pac just put out a message that says, here is, we did
19 all the ships and here is how many charts all ships
20 were missing. And there was a, very few ships in the
21 entire force actually had all their charts. It is more
22 than charts, it is also navigational publications. By
23 the way there is no single list and so, there gets to
24 be a little bit of local knowledge and experience

1 involved in actually doing this thing correctly. That
2 is a problem. We are going to move to fix that. But,
3 we found out that basically, if you didn't have the
4 navigator doing it, it was not going to be accurate.
5 So, that is unsatisfactory. We can't have the
6 navigators having to do this themselves. And there is
7 no depth in that. We have got to have a third class
8 petty officer be able to do these inventories. So,
9 this ANAV that has screwed up the Greeneville, built
10 this computer based thing, which actually is pretty
11 good. We turned it over to the type commander and it
12 makes it very easy for a guy to go and inventory his
13 1800 to 2000 charts.

14 (Pause.)

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I guess we had a little
16 problem here with the tape. Go ahead, sorry.

17 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

18 CAPTAIN SNEAD: And we have done a number of
19 other things. We have found, for instance, that at
20 local operation out here, is not demanding at all
21 navigation division. And they get a block of water and
22 they go out there and they sit. So, why do that? Why
23 not create the situation which one of the guys on the
24 Atlantic Fleet, at the, of the Gulf Stream and all

1 those op areas, cascade against each other all the way
2 up and down the coast, when they are moving out in and
3 around all the time, it is navigational demanding.
4 So, we just create that out here. We just cycle them
5 around. We will change the water, we will make them
6 move. And we will make them operate in that all the
7 time. And we will move them in closer to shore water,
8 where there are special requirements and then we will
9 move them back out, you know, we will do all these
10 kinds of things. And that is what we are doing. We
11 are doing it all the time. So, and we are watching
12 them. So, we are getting a much better read on their
13 basic skills all the time. And their depth, and how
14 well they can accommodate changes rapidly. How well
15 they can change areas and have to, you know, prepare
16 new charts. And we are talking about doing a lot of
17 even more aggressive things, like sending guys, sending
18 guys out of here not let them just go local op areas,
19 basically make them a beeline for Wake Island and come
20 back, you know, go out and come back. And maybe we
21 send two submarines, you know, we are talking about
22 doing all these kinds of things, so that we get a more
23 realistic training environment all the time and we can
24 build depth and experience, because the, you know, the

1 truth of the matter is, that all the kids want to do
2 right. We have just got to create the environment or
3 we can bring our experience to bear and train them to
4 do right and teach them the process. Because rules are
5 out there and the rules have changed. So, that will be
6 on navigation. The shortcomings in Greeneville's chart
7 business were just unforgivable. And there are, you
8 know, there are a lot of things that just, the ship had
9 been on automatic distribution, but the automatic
10 distribution mailing address was Norfolk Ship Builders.
11 So, they were still being sent after all these years
12 there. And they were returning them. And so the ship
13 had been forever going over here to Nimma, at Pearl and
14 picking up charts. And supposedly he had written some
15 letters to get it fixed from time to time, but the
16 system, you know, is unresponsive. We are going to,
17 the type commander is all over that. We are going to
18 get all of that fixed. So, that can't happen.

19 My guys are in the process of looking at all
20 the ships automatic distribution lists. Why would they
21 differ, because the chart sets it the same? We can
22 handle this the same way we handled keying material.
23 You, guys, know what that is, keying material for the
24 radio's crypto.

1 MR. STRAUCH: Keying map.

2 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, we can handle this the
3 same way. And then after it becomes that automatic.
4 Are we going to have two person controls in place, so
5 that guys just can't fall asleep and think it is, so it
6 doesn't get done to them the next time? I think we are
7 all over this one.

8 Basic skills, Greeneville ran, Greeneville
9 ran aground again because the commanding officer made a
10 very significant misjudgement. Basically chose to
11 drive his ship over charted show water, based on some
12 message that said, you know, we have successfully
13 navigated in here. But, the message wasn't specific
14 enough to delineate exactly what track that guy took.

15 That is really the reason that they ran aground.
16 Notwithstanding, all this other stuff which was so --,
17 that, it took a buoy on the wrong side, I mean, we have
18 pulled the string on all those things. And the method
19 by which COs approve charts, PCOs being trained on it
20 today. We are going to go back and retrain everybody
21 because we know we have got guys out there who weren't
22 trained right, whose habits aren't good enough to
23 prevent them from falling victim to just administrative
24 deficiencies in the navigation division. So, to put

1 depth back in this thing, and we are retraining COs and
2 XO's about exactly how they are to do it. It is
3 prescriptive. You shall do this. Okay. This is your
4 only way of knowing.

5 So, I think we have been, the type commander
6 went out there after the grounding and ran a pretty
7 much a fine tooth comb through Greeneville and found
8 some other, you know, sort of systemic problems and
9 then we came back and again, you know, going back to
10 things like PMS inspections and what not. We quit
11 doing inspections, guys quit doing, executing the
12 systems accurately and we are getting back into that,
13 hook, line and sinker.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Is it possible those same kind
15 of deficiencies are present in other vessels in your
16 squadron?

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Navigation deficiencies?

18 MR. STRAUCH: Just, the kinds of breakdown in,
19 both in command and support that was with these two
20 incidents?

21 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Absolutely it is possible.
22 And I will tell you that we have taken these things at
23 their root cause, and I have addressed it with all of
24 my commanding officers, the root causes of all these

1 things. You know, for instance, how do you approve
2 your charts? How do you know that the navigation
3 process is working? Who is actually correcting charts?

4 And half the guys tell you, well, the assistant
5 navigator does. Well, that is screwed up. I want a
6 third class petty officer correcting charts. I want
7 the assistant navigator being the first checker. Now,
8 the assistant navigator needs to train them to do it.
9 And then he is to say here you do this, call me when
10 you are ready. That is, you know, we have been through
11 all those process issues with them, responding most
12 specifically to the issues identified from Greeneville,
13 also generically.

14 The PMS thing is a tough one. The PMS is a
15 huge system. We have computerized it so it is no
16 longer easy for junior officer to go and get the card
17 deck and just read it. Have got to get the computer,
18 you have got to get on the LAN, got, you know, it
19 doesn't all fit on the darn screen, so you are paging
20 up and down. It is typical annoyances in trying to
21 work off a laptop. But, we are putting back in place
22 command monitor programs to include PMS monitors, which
23 means you pick a PM and the officer goes and watches
24 the chief monitor his guys doing a PM. So, we are

1 going to start doing a certain number of those every
2 week. And we are going to rotate through the watch
3 sections. And we are going to ask, for instance, in
4 the basic skills assessment examination, we are going
5 to give written examinations. We are going to ask
6 junior officers some questions about PMS. We are going
7 to find out whether they have been, you know, whether
8 the commanding officers have actually started this
9 thing on those ships yet. And we will be able to tell
10 because the J, it is going to be basic, we will be able
11 to tell if the JOs have some sense about it. So, we
12 are going to start, we are continuing to do a lot of
13 these things that come out of these, these unfortunate
14 circumstances with Greeneville. Because, by the way, I
15 mean, they are not limited just to Greeneville.

16 MR. STRAUCH: What about changes in the
17 certification of ships?

18 CAPTAIN SNEAD: All of this business from
19 basic skills assessment to the torpedo weapons
20 proficiency examination, where you go and shoot
21 torpedoes, to the tactical readiness examination, which
22 is at the beginning of the Palm period, six months
23 prior to deployment, it is a robust four or five day
24 exam, to the cert, itself. The cert, itself is a seven

1 day operation. All of those things are having all this
2 rigor put back into them.

3 For instance, in seven, that is Captain
4 Kyle's outfit, has developed attribute sheets,
5 exhausted lists of attributes for every evolution. And
6 we use those to score these guys. And what we want to
7 do is come up with a data base for squad that over a
8 period of time will let us assess where the averages
9 are. And we will be able to tell, hey, if the average
10 is 60 percent, but all of us know that 60 percent is
11 terribly unsat, and there is a lot of work to be done
12 here, you know. We are starting to get some data. He
13 has got a few sets of data. I have just done two certs
14 and we have a bunch of data.

15 Now, the target, you know, each one of these
16 things are a little bit different. The certification
17 is to certify a guy to go do a set of peace time
18 missions. The business of shooting torpedo, missiles
19 and etc., etc., war time missions really are examined
20 in the TRE, prior of deployment. So, we get through
21 all the war time business, because we consider that to
22 be boilerplate. And all the peace time stuff, which
23 is, you know, your intelligence surveillance,
24 reconnaissance, and all of that kind of business, we do

1 in the sur process. Leadership interdiction
2 operations, combat, search and rescue, all of that kind
3 of stuff. We do that in the cert. All of it is
4 getting the same kind of reexamination and re infusion
5 of rigor into it, where actually and it is taking a
6 long time to do it, a lot longer to do it. I am
7 actually happy with the process at this point, I think,
8 well, I am happy with the process. I am not yet happy
9 with the result. I am happy that we are on the right
10 track. We are asking the right questions. We are
11 going to find out based on my experience and all the
12 things I have had to do in my submarine career, I think
13 we are actually getting the bar back in the right place
14 in most areas.

15 MR. STRAUCH: And you base that on what?

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: On my, what I have had to do
17 in submarines. And what I have seen be effective.

18 MR. STRAUCH: And on data that you, that you
19 caught yourself, observations that you have made
20 yourself?

21 CAPTAIN SNEAD: What I would say is based on
22 my extensive deployed experience and submarines that
23 have operated well or less well. And I have been on a
24 couple of fixer upper ships. I think that we are, we

1 are placing the proper emphasis on basic submarine
2 skills. We are placing the proper emphasis at the
3 right times on the command decision making process.
4 And that team, we are building back up early and we are
5 testing its functionality middle and last cycle. We
6 need to stay committed to our cycle and execute this
7 thing over a period of years, collect all this data and
8 see where we stand. And just continue this
9 reassessment. There comes a point, the nukes have done
10 this great, you know, the propulsion plant, and what
11 this method is, is nothing other than their method,
12 written exams, oral interviews. I am getting ready to
13 give oral interviews here with Greeneville. And we
14 are going to do a basic skills assessment on
15 Greeneville pretty soon, both Greeneville and then I am
16 going to do Los Angeles, who is coming out the docking
17 period, just shortly after that. And I am going to sit
18 these officers down and ask them basic questions and
19 make them do basic things. And I am going to have a
20 lot of fun doing this, because we are going to find out
21 what the depth of the basic watch, basic submarine
22 qualification program is today. We are going to find
23 out a lot of things about how well they read the, I am
24 going to stand up there and watch them. I am going to

1 ask, I do this now anyway, ask the ODs questions about,
2 what does that mean? What is that? What is that, what
3 is that line going across there like that? Most of
4 the time they don't know the answer, even that or they
5 pretend to be and they can't give it to me. But, we
6 are going to continue that process, which I think is
7 absolutely the right way to go.

8 MR. STRAUCH: And you are going to ask all the
9 officers?

10 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No, we are going to pick and
11 choose. What we will do is we will pick the newly
12 qualified officers, because what I am interested in
13 doing right now, in the basic skills assessment
14 portion, is assessing what their qualifications
15 standard is. What is the standard it takes to pin on
16 the dolphins or qualify the watch. That is what we are
17 going to do. For instance, we are going to mandate
18 that the ship have a certain number of under
19 instruction watch standers. Because we want to
20 evaluate the interaction between the non qual and his
21 qualified overseer. We want to see how they are
22 training themselves. And then we are going to pick
23 recently qualified watch standers. We are going to
24 interview them. So, the basic skills assessment

1 portion here, we are trying to assess what is the
2 qualification standard in the ships. Is it in the
3 right place? All right, I will tell you right now, I
4 think the answer is no. We are to prove to ourselves
5 it is not. And we are going to get some data and then
6 based on the data we are going to react and we are
7 going to change some of the rules. We are going to
8 change some things to make sure it gets back to where
9 it used to be.

10 And then later on, what you do is, you ask
11 questions. Down in the TRE portion, we are actually
12 going to war fighting, we start asking questions of
13 ODs, the department heads, who are standing officer of
14 the deck watch. Because now you are assessing the ship
15 at its, the way it is actually going to operate on
16 station. You do the same thing with Palm cert for the
17 peace time missions.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Now, these changes, had they
19 been in place before February 9, would the things that
20 you learned about Commander Waddle that surprised you,
21 would you have known, would you have known about them
22 before?

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Oh, absolutely we would have
24 known about them. I mean, I would have certainly known

1 his ODS couldn't read the ASDU.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Would you have known about the
3 violations of classified speed and depth?

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Probably not. I mean, not
5 unless he had done it before. If he had done it
6 before? If the process had been executing all along,
7 we would have known about those things before, because
8 the deck log is one of those things that gets looked at
9 in a navigation eval, a correctly done navigation
10 evaluation.

11 MR. STRAUCH: Now, a couple of things came out
12 of that, that were kind of surprising. It was frankly
13 surprising that Commander Waddle had apparently done
14 this before. Didn't think there was anything wrong
15 with it. And is there any way to explain that?

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No, I mean, there is not,
17 there is no good explanation for that. I mean, I can't
18 imagine, the explanation kind of goes back to bit and
19 pieces of what I have already told you. He did not
20 have the basic exposure that he should have as a JO and
21 a department head. So, therefore, he had no really
22 significant experience conning the ship around and
23 certainly in tactical situations. He had enough to
24 get qualified, I guess, and that was it. He made it a

1 deployment with his XO and he observed as a command
2 duty officer, but that is a whole different kettle of
3 fish. And I, my personal opinion is that is over sold
4 as a, as a remedy for experience. I don't think you
5 can ever backfill for having had your hands on the
6 tiller, you know, you need to have the con and drive
7 the ship.

8 You know, it just defies explanation, how
9 you could ever rationalize the big ocean, little ship
10 theory, that is what that is.

11 MR. STRAUCH: I am sorry?

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Big ocean, little ship theory.

13 It is a big ocean, little ship, it is, the chances are
14 infinitely small you can actually hit anything, you
15 know. Which is preposterous. We have never operated
16 our submarines that way. I mean, you know, all of the
17 ASW scenarios and all that kind of stuff, we have never
18 operated our submarines that way. So, it is just, that
19 is incredible.

20 MR. STRAUCH: The other thing that I think was
21 kind of surprising was that the Chief of Staff was
22 onboard and presumably was aware of this, of what, of
23 the way Commander Waddle was operating the ship. But,
24 in our interview with him, he, he indicated that up to

1 the time of the collision, he was impressed with the
2 way the ship had been operating.

3 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yeah. Waddle, if he were
4 sitting right here, he would impress the hell out of
5 you. I mean, you saw him on TV. So, that is one
6 skill set. But, that skill set has nothing to do with
7 your capability to stand between the periscopes on a
8 submarine and make good decisions.

9 MR. STRAUCH: And the fact that he would
10 impress us if he was here, I am not sure how that
11 relates to what the Chief of Staff saw and --

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I am not so sure, you
13 know, the Chief of Staff was only under way with him
14 for a few hours, and most of that was spent dragging
15 around the DVs. So, what he was watching, I think, was
16 Waddle doing his, you know, in his salesman's mode, not
17 in his ship driving mode.

18 MR. STRAUCH: So, if you look back on the
19 incident of the, of the grounding in Saipan and the
20 February 9 incident, what common threads do you see
21 there?

22 CAPTAIN SNEAD: The, an obsession with
23 appearances and a lack of attention to detail and
24 procedural compliance, all of the rules that we have

1 written, you know, and really in blood over decades of
2 submarining. All of those procedures, all those
3 lessons learned that go into those things, a disregard
4 for this really, really the sanction of those
5 procedures. An arrogant attitude about picking and
6 choosing which you would follow from what time to what
7 time. And the young sailors didn't know any better,
8 because that is what they were observing. And so, you
9 know, here we go, we go out and do a Palm cert with
10 these guys. We put a CO on the ship who has got a
11 great reputation. We bring aboard guest riders to come
12 evaluate the gushing guys, and what we see is
13 acceptable. So, it is clear the knowledge is there.
14 But, because we didn't have the quantity and quality of
15 contact over a period of time, we missed the fact that
16 that was sort of window dressing. That was a show put
17 on for us. They weren't committed to that overall long
18 period of time. And, you know, some would say, well,
19 it was also a compressed Palm period, you were in a
20 rush to get them out of here. Those things are true,
21 but, but, that doesn't, even if it hadn't been that,
22 the fact of the matter is, is that I wasn't getting
23 the quantity and quality contact that I really needed,
24 and part of the reason was because of this manning

1 problems and all this kind of business. And also this
2 lack of focus coming out of this, sort of two year
3 hiatus inspections and whatever else here in Pearl
4 Harbor. That is my assessment of it.

5 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

6 (Change of tape.)

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. This is the start of
8 Tape number three.

9 CAPTAIN SNEAD: When you look at the tail out,
10 you see them in watch standing, you see them in
11 maintenance, I mean, you see the standard business. I
12 mean, that standard is set, references and look at the
13 procedures, and think through in detail, pull all the
14 references, etc., you see that consistently in just
15 about everything Greeneville did. Now, I think based
16 on my most recent data on the ship, that we have come a
17 considerable distance in correcting that. And we will
18 go, this is the kind, this is the kind of thing that
19 L.A. had. It was a generalization issue. It was a
20 culture problem. How did we fix it in L.A? We got rid
21 of half the damn crew, you know, we changed those guys
22 out over a period of time. And I got a CO who has
23 absolutely the right instincts in what to do. I have
24 got a chief of the boat, who has the right instincts

1 and a lot of old school in him and he has been very
2 effective with the young sailors on that ship. And out
3 of the ashes, has come L.A.

4 The same thing is going to happen with
5 Greeneville. We are going to change out a bunch of
6 guys this year in that ship over the next few months.
7 And in the fall it will be not, I mean, that will not
8 be the same Greeneville crew in the fall that was there
9 on 9 February.

10 MR. STRAUCH: One other common thread that I
11 see is the CO selection. What changes have you made
12 to improve?

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I don't know, again,
14 that really is not my, I take what I get. I get the
15 COs I am given. I don't have a boat at all in the COs
16 I get. That screening process is, and the Chief of
17 Staff participates in that, with Purse 42, the officer
18 distribution guys. And the Admirals get to vote on the
19 slate. It goes to Naval Reactors, all that kind of
20 business, but I don't, I don't get a voice in that. I
21 don't get a voice in who I get anywhere, except lately
22 I have been asked, I have been asked to take a look at,
23 and participate in the commanding of Greeneville here
24 as we are changing out a bunch of guys. And I did get

1 asked to pick the CO after Waddle from, I had three
2 choices. They said pick one of these three guys. And
3 I picked the guy.

4 MR. STRAUCH: Have you learned from that?

5 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yeah. What I learned is, is
6 that the roots of this goes back some number of years,
7 because, you know, this guy was, if you looked at this
8 guy's record, it looked like this was a guy, this was a
9 guy called COSS guy, I forgot what it stands for. But,
10 what it really means is it got screened for command,
11 but he was held in excess for numbers. He was on the
12 top of the list. He had a great record. Everybody
13 said everything good about him. The guy who was in
14 command for whom this guy was XO, I knew, and I called
15 him and I called the squadron commander from the squad
16 from where this guy was working. I knew both those
17 guys. And I trusted the judgement of both those guys.

18 And they both said great things about him. And I will
19 tell you that today I would do the same thing, because
20 what else do we have to do than do that. So, I thought
21 I checked him out pretty good. And he looked, I mean,
22 he had SSN experience. He had Pearl Harbor experience.
23 And lo and behold, after we had this grounding out
24 there, and I asked him, I said, is this the way that

1 you guys prepare charts in that other ship, and he
2 said, yeah. I mean, was this the process you used for
3 approving charts, you and the CO? Yeah. Well, it was
4 a good process. It was effective. Probably because
5 they had some old salt ANAV who was good, and he never
6 produced a screwed up chart. But, we have got guys out
7 there, and that is why, you know, I keep, one of the
8 things I said at the first, is our real job is to train
9 guys how to train themselves. Our real job is to look
10 at these processes and make sure they are adequate.
11 Given that we have less experience in our ships than we
12 have had. I mean, we don't have guys that have made a
13 dozen Cold War missions, you know. Pretty soon all of
14 those guys are going to be playing golf a lot, a lot
15 more than we are now. So, what we are doing is
16 adapting the process, I think, in a very thoughtful way
17 to deal with what we have to deal with today. And I
18 think we are, our eyes are much more wide open about
19 what it is after this recent state of events. Because
20 we looked around, as I told you, and it is not just
21 Greeneville. There are a lot of things about
22 Greeneville that are actually better than some of the
23 ships.

24 MR. STRAUCH: Such as?

1 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Level of knowledge and things
2 like strike, missile employment. We have tested it, we
3 know, that there are things that ship does pretty
4 doggone good. But, that is no substitute for this
5 osteoprobatic substructure that we have got down there,
6 you know, which collapses on itself occasionally. So,
7 we are going to fix that. Squeeze some proxy and all
8 of that stuff and firm it up.

9 MR. STRAUCH: You characterized the
10 difficulties on the Los Angeles as a generational
11 problem or culture problem.

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It was, absolutely.

13 MR. STRAUCH: What do you mean by that?

14 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It was this business of we
15 don't train and we don't do PMS, we just operate. Show
16 me a target and point me in that direction, and I will
17 go take care of it. And they have been pretty good at
18 it, but for, I will give you a for instance. For
19 instance, we, through slobily practices, lost some of
20 our ventilation filters. These are these mesh, metal
21 mesh things that go on fan suction, you know, to keep
22 dirt, all that dirt and stuff from being sucked into
23 your cooling coils and everything. Did we get any new
24 ones? Nah. So, we just kind of shuffled the ones we

1 had around, you know, we would pick which cooling coil
2 was going to get fouled, and the thing basically for
3 two years sat there and just filled up with dirt, until
4 the point where the ship's heat bounds was affected.

5 And oh, by the way, all that dirt was sitting there,
6 was sweating copper tubing and it was moist and
7 corroded out the whole bottom and the whole damn thing.

8 You know, I mean, if you only have to serve on the
9 ship for two years, not on your watch. So, you just
10 operate the damn thing. That, there was a lot of that
11 culture in L.A., and so we had to go back, scrub this
12 thing to bare metal, go back to procedures, start
13 walking before we ran. We had to, you know, we had to
14 figuratively slap some people around a little bit, get
15 their attention. We had to get rid of some people. We
16 had to put some more experienced in at the right levels
17 that came to us recommended that they understood the
18 right answer. And then quite frankly, I was fortunate
19 to have just a good CO and he is a COSS guy, again, a
20 guy we picked off the COSS list, and I will tell you he
21 is just, he is being wonderful. He has been a
22 wonderful CO. So, it was a culture problem. And now,
23 when you are, or at least half of generation removed
24 because of just the internal off the ship and we got a

1 lot of those guys who just absolutely did not want to
2 hear the right answer, we got them off the ship.
3 Things started to turn around pretty fast.

4 Now, as I told the CO, turn around that fast,
5 I mean, there will still be some underlying vesture of
6 that in that and you cannot relax until the end of your
7 three year tour. And after three years, if you
8 continue to improve that ship, and you get another
9 successful deployment under your belt, dah, dah, then
10 you can say, proudly and order right in your attachment
11 fit record that you fixed L.A. because at that point
12 you probably have, but it takes awhile. And
13 Greenville is no different. We are going, we are
14 going to get Greenville fixed yet.

15 MR. STRAUCH: Will the fix be the same as the
16 Los Angeles?

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: The method is the same, the
18 method is the same. Having also simulated the things
19 we have learned since. I mean, Los Angeles, I will
20 tell you, Los Angeles is an interesting case. We did a
21 chart inventory on Los Angeles. Los Angeles had 3,000
22 charts on the ship. They had charts coming out of the
23 overhead. And the reason was because the process
24 wasn't working effectively, again, even in that ship.

1 And they were just, you know, they were accumulating
2 charts that they just didn't need. There was
3 systematic purging of it to make sure that it was down
4 and so, we have learned a lot of lessons. The CO
5 wasn't aware, as soon as the CO became aware that was
6 the situation, he fixed that problem really fast. And
7 they reevaluated their self assessment process. So, we
8 are all kind of coming along together in this business
9 of self assessment and training of how you do it, what
10 it really means. What it really means to supervise,
11 for instance. What does that mean? "Hey, Chief,
12 supervise." What do you really expect? Where is he
13 expected to be standing at any given moment in an
14 evolution? What is his role? Yeah, when you had all
15 of these guys who had all this sea experience, we sort
16 of took it for granted they knew how to do that and I
17 guess they did because things went kind of okay.

18 So, as I said, we are more, we are applying a
19 lot more rigor to that process, assessment process and
20 that teaching process. And Los Angeles is the
21 benefactor of a lot of these lessons as well.

22 MR. STRAUCH: How different would things have
23 been with the February 9 accident if you hadn't been
24 preoccupied with the Los Angeles as you were?

1 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It is hard to say. (1) I
2 would have ridden the ship. The key thing is I would
3 have ridden the ship on that East Pac. Because when he
4 was in East Pac, I was on L. A. for about three weeks.

5 So, the real difference, if there was going to be a
6 substantial difference, because, I mean, given the
7 staff I had, my input, and the staff was indignant I
8 didn't give Greeneville the Battle E, except for my
9 Deputy, he could understand my perspective. The
10 enlisted staff was kind of indignant about it, you
11 know, what do they have to do win the Battle E. I
12 said, well, deploy and do something real, that is what
13 they have to do. But, that is not their fault. Well,
14 I know it, but, they will get their chance this year,
15 you know, Waddle has got another chance. I would have
16 ridden that ship in East Pac if I hadn't been the L.A.

17 In fact, that was my plan until we got redirected.
18 And maybe that would have made a big difference. Maybe
19 20 days on that ship, or it probably would have been
20 10, it probably would have been 10 days of sitting
21 there in the control room, maybe that would have made a
22 difference. I would like to think it would have made a
23 difference.

24 MR. STRAUCH: The other thing you said that

1 kind of troubles me is that Commander Waddle was less
2 than forthcoming about some of the incidents that
3 occurred before the collision.

4 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It appears that he was.

5 MR. STRAUCH: In a large part of what makes
6 the system works is the trust built between you and
7 your Cos.

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

9 MR. STRAUCH: What does, what does, what do
10 you do to ensure that that trust is verified, is worthy
11 of you giving somebody that trust, as apparently it was
12 not Commander Waddle?

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: You mean what do I do? I
14 think I, get a COD and tells me have truth or anything
15 like that, we have a very personal discussion about it.

16 I mean, there will be no doubt in his mind that he is
17 on thin ice, because as you say, commander of a war
18 ship is a trust thing in the end. You can't put a
19 political officer on there. God forbid. So, I mean,
20 that is how I would deal with it.

21 MR. STRAUCH: Is there any way to know
22 beforehand that you are getting the full story?

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No, I think it has got to
24 happen to you once. I mean, I think it happens once

1 and then you have the discussion. If it ever happens
2 again, you replace them.

3 MR. STRAUCH: You look back on what happened
4 with the incidents.

5 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right.

6 MR. STRAUCH: How do you know that you are
7 getting the full story from your other Cos?

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, what happens is
9 eventually the information mitigates to you. And I
10 think today that I am getting a little bit better
11 information than I got before. That particular one,
12 that happens out of home port, and there is time and
13 distance between the actual occurrence and such and
14 such. At the point that I learned that he had water in
15 the, in his torpedo room consoles, that is when it
16 would have been absolutely clear to me that it took
17 more than just a couple of, a hundred gallons of water,
18 in fact, which would have led to a lot of questions.
19 Call the CO in and say, hey, how much water did you
20 take in the ship? How did water get such and such?
21 Was the water on the deck in the control room? How
22 much water was in the D-builds and the machinery space?
23 You know, all of those kinds, you start asking a lot
24 of questions like that. You ask your guys, hey, go

1 find out and get back to me, I want to know the
2 following. So, you just pull string on them and then
3 you confront him with it. That is the only thing you
4 can do.

5 Now, you know, I eventually learned those
6 things, but, again, it was, his return from East Pac
7 was so shortly before the collision that I didn't find
8 that stuff out until the collision. And of course,
9 then the collision just got, wiped everything off. So,
10 I, I tel you I think that those kind of incidents are
11 hard to keep quiet. Although, having said that, that
12 is one of the amazing things to me, is that he could
13 have blown, as he supposedly did, you know, back in
14 1999, and done things that wouldn't have made that crew
15 mighty nervous. I have been on, I have been on
16 submarines where things have happened, where the crew
17 would get nervous about the CO's judgement, you know,
18 about his sense about when to fix stuff or whatever.
19 And they tend to get, you know, it tends to get, you
20 can feel it. It is incredible to me that there was
21 none of that from Greeneville. And I, I cornered and
22 questioned my command master chiefs about that.
23 Because at the time my attitude was that couldn't have
24 been. There had to be goat locker, chief petty officer

1 scuttlebutt about that, because those guys have ridden
2 enough submarines in their collective careers that they
3 pretty much got to know what is right. At least that
4 was my assumption at the time. I am a little less
5 committed today. I will promote a lot of, we promote a
6 lot of chief petty officers.

7 So, you would have thought that there would
8 have been some tremors that stuff was going on in that
9 ship. And maybe there were, maybe my predecessor
10 didn't pick up on it, maybe it is because of who Waddle
11 was and the way he, you know, wined and dined his guys
12 and everything. They just weren't going to, maybe that
13 was their notion of loyalty, I don't know. I don't
14 know what it was.

15 MR. STRAUCH: One of the things that he did,
16 it was said he would call, periodically call parents of
17 some of these guys on the boat and tell them what a
18 good job their sons were doing. Do you know, have you
19 ever heard of that, another CO doing that?

20 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I have heard of COs calling
21 parents to tell them that their sons were having
22 trouble. But, seldom to call and say their, you know,
23 finding time to do, to just call and say he is doing a
24 good job. You know, in itself, that seems commendable.

1 When you start looking at all this in totality, go look
2 at their workroom service, their china, and all their
3 table cloths. It is beautiful, wonderful. But, one
4 wonders, you know, that is overhead that has to be
5 maintained, you know, in a war ship. When I was in
6 command I tried to do that, too, and it was, and I had
7 a great ship, that ship ran fabulously, and I actually
8 found a little bit of time to worry about things like
9 that. But, that is overhead, and one wonders, you
10 know, where you find the time to do all of the kinds of
11 things like that, that he supposedly was doing. He
12 told me after the fact, all the time he spent on the
13 Internet, you know, checking out people and stuff. I
14 don't know how you find time to do that and command a
15 nuclear submarine and worry about all the things that
16 we just spent two hours talking about. All the things
17 that, the important things, the basics, of how that
18 submarine is suppose to operate. There is some, there
19 is some bothersome things. I mean, there is a E-9 on
20 that ship that is coming up to my staff, I think, who
21 has been there for the whole thing. It is bothersome,
22 a little bit, where was he, you know, his attitude, his
23 response supposedly, they have given this to me, is
24 that, well, I am not the chief of the boat. But, wait

1 a minute, there is a collectively responsibility God
2 damn it on these ships for this kind of thing.
3 Certainly you had to know that that particular event
4 was not, well, then, you know, you get, well, I wasn't
5 onboard for that event or well, I was on liberty when
6 that happened, you know. We talked about that in my
7 squadron, about this, the collective responsibility of
8 the chiefs, which is one of the messages, by the way,
9 which does not go down very well, because that starts
10 to look like, you know, that starts to make them feel
11 like they are in the field of fire. And they don't
12 like that. That is an uncomfortable feeling. But, we
13 have got to work on that, because that is part of this
14 forceful back up thing that we are really trying to, as
15 a basic tenant that we are trying to work on.

16 I have told my Cos, for instance, and I did
17 this in command, way before any of this bull shit, I
18 told my navigator, I said, I want you to be prepare to
19 run aground. What that meant, of course, the first
20 time I said that, they are, their mouths dropped open.

21 What that meant was, let's do things so well here,
22 that if it ever happens, it clearly have been an act of
23 God and there will be no culpability, okay. Let's run
24 our training programs and let's do all that. And then

1 you, navigator, because my, you know, my basic sort of
2 instinct was to be, I had a ton of experience and I
3 knew I did. I knew I had seen most situations before
4 and so, I would always have a tendency to con a ship
5 like you drive your automobile, if it was me in a
6 tactical situation, which means changing the plan,
7 seeing opportunity, I trained him, every time that
8 happens, you say, Captain, that is not in accordance
9 with the plan. And let's at least slow down enough so
10 that the guys can have, unless there is life or death,
11 we have got torpedoes in bound or something, you know,
12 we have, at least have an opportunity to let some
13 people agree that it is not unsafe. Okay. And I have
14 tried to teach my COs, you have got to be able to do
15 that. You have got to be willing to not hold it
16 against a navigator, for instance, or an OD, to
17 absolutely forget about it, and consider it a matter of
18 professionalism, if they object stridently to the point
19 that they are willing to put in the deck log, that they
20 disagreed with your decision. You have got to tell
21 them that you, if you don't disagree writing in the
22 deck log. Lieutenant Commander so and so does not
23 agree with the Captain's decision. That is okay. They
24 need to feel like they can do that without prejudice.

1 And if they can't, then you have got a problem.

2 My classmate ran blue fish into the damn reef
3 out there, submerged years ago, same situation. He
4 was, you know, a head strong cigar kind of guy,
5 certainly no Waddle, but, you know, everybody wanted
6 him to turn right and he wanted to turn left, so he
7 turned left, hit the reef, like 400 feet or something.
8 Not a good thing, you know. So, I think that, at least
9 in my squadron, I feel pretty comfortable that the
10 message is out there, and my assessment of my COs is
11 that, (1) I don't have anybody head strong. I just
12 happen to not have head strong one right now. And that
13 there is a good balance. Now, there is incredible
14 variances in experience and in ship handling talent and
15 in personalities. You know, I have got some guys that
16 are very conservative kind of guys, and you have to
17 probe them to get up there and, you know, put your nose
18 in the fray here a little bit.

19 So, it is kind of, it is interesting. It is
20 an interesting job from that perspective. You have to
21 kind of work with all these different guys, try to sort
22 out.

23 MR. STRAUCH: What kind of person in your mind
24 makes the ideal CO?

1 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I don't think there is an
2 ideal CO. You know, you have these sort of rose
3 colored glasses images of people like Slate Cutter and
4 the guys from the World War II, making comparisons, I
5 mean, it is ridiculous comparisons, one, you don't
6 know. I actually happen to know Slate Cutter. I
7 actually, so I can actually talk about him. I
8 understand his personality a little bit and know him.
9 But, it was a different era, you know. I think that
10 the best submariners have tended to be commanding
11 officers who are just a little bit conservative.
12 Because under those kind of guys, things slow down just
13 enough to avoid near misses, which then by the grace of
14 God become catastrophe. And so what you do, is you
15 look for that in these teams, you know, you look to see
16 that and that is what we are trying to teach. We are
17 trying to teach a process that makes that happen
18 naturally. Some unexpected happens, time out, why did
19 that happen? Maybe we need to turn around, go back
20 where we came from, and let's go down the wardroom and
21 critique. That is the method we are teaching, because
22 we want to control the pace, the overall pace of
23 operations and get these guys to be mindful of all of
24 these unexplained circumstances, because very, very

1 frequently at the same time, they will not have seen
2 it.

3 MR. STRAUCH: If all things were equal, do you
4 think that taking, what effect would sort of
5 volunteering for DV cruises have had on a CO's career?

6 CAPTAIN SNEAD: There was a time in the
7 Submarine Force where you would have avoided it like
8 the plague. And I think most guys still do, actual DV
9 cruises because it is a hassle. I mean, you actually
10 have to worry about your wardroom service. And since
11 most guys don't have time to worry about that, they
12 don't know what is going to come out the, out of the
13 drawer when they, you know, bring the guys down there,
14 so they would view that as a hassle.

15 I would say that the business of doing import
16 tours, though, has taken on a different complexion, at
17 least and particularly on the East Coast. I mean, when
18 you are close to Washington, you have to do a lot of
19 them. And everybody wants to do them well, it is just
20 part of the mission. And it an important part of the
21 mission. I mean, you do do a lot of education,
22 principally of those young congressional staffers, who
23 are in for, really influential, but, they don't know
24 anything. So, I think that program is important. You

1 want to do it well. The DV cruise part, I don't, I
2 mean, I don't know. I wouldn't volunteer for it.

3 Now, on the other hand, you know, I pressed
4 hard to do a tiger cruise when I was in command,
5 because I wanted to take the youngest to sea so they
6 could see what their dads do. And I pressed hard to do
7 dependence cruises, because I wanted to take the wives
8 out even though out of Norfolk, it was, that was a
9 grueling day out of Norfolk, because it is so far to
10 dive. You dive for an hour and come right back in, and
11 you are gone all day. But, you know, those things were
12 important for morale and team building and everything
13 else in the submarine. Just to haul around a bunch of
14 DVs, I personally view that as kind of a hassle. When
15 I was engineer, we got detoured from an opt to go into
16 New Jersey and pick up Richard Nixon. That was a real
17 hassle.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Why was it a hassle?

19 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Because we were out, you know,
20 we were out operating. We were going to do, I forgot
21 what we were going to do. Now we had to turn around,
22 go into port. It was cold, you know, on the Atlantic
23 Seaboard, all the seas and there is water coming over
24 the bridge and of course, I was department head, so I

1 had to drive. And it was a hassle. It just took us out
2 of our way and, you know, it was kind of neat to, to
3 see Richard Nixon and, you know, see, get him to sign
4 the guest book. That is kind of a neat thing. But, it
5 was kind of a hassle, too.

6 MR. STRAUCH: Was this before or after he was
7 elected president?

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: After.

9 MR. STRAUCH: Oh.

10 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It was after he was, after he
11 left office.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Has Bill Clinton ever gone out
13 on a DV cruise?

14 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I would imagine, but I don't
15 have any idea. I would imagine. I would imagine, it
16 could easily be more than once, but, I don't know.

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We are getting close to
18 the end of the tape. This is Tom Roth-Roffy. Captain,
19 I know we are getting tired and all of us are, and I
20 hope you can bear with me just for a couple of more
21 questions. And I will try not to ask repetitive
22 questions. But, a couple of things I wanted to follow
23 up with you on.

24 The incident that occurred on the Greeneville

1 in San Francisco, where they took water down, it seems
2 to me in the Court of Inquiry, that it was treated as
3 positive reflection on the crew. Also the trip report
4 from Captain Hughler, I believe his name was.

5 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Hughley, yeah.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Hughley, was also very, spoke
7 very positive of the incident. And I just see kind of
8 a disconnect there. Maybe you can explain why in the
9 COI that they said the, the crew was praised for their,
10 for their response to that flooding incident, but, you
11 know, they really never did inquire into how it
12 actually happened.

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I don't know. I mean, I don't
14 know what the line of questioning was and I haven't, to
15 this day, I have not spent the time to go back and read
16 through all that business. I read the Admiral Fargo's
17 final report and as a basis for action and stuff, but,
18 so, I don't know, you know, I don't know. I don't know
19 why, but let's differentiate, the crew's response, the
20 crew's response to this, the hammering Ehime Maru was
21 admirable. I mean, they responded about as well as you
22 can respond in a submarine, I think, to a maritime
23 emergency. Okay. You know, it is kind of okay, once
24 the water came down that hatch, did we know what to do?

1 Yeah, and they probably did very well. That is not
2 the point. See, my point is that if I am to believe
3 what I am later told about why they were in that
4 situation. That was, that is a problem. He should not
5 have been in that situation, because it was not
6 visibility, it was no reason to be on the bridge.
7 So, I mean, that is the problem I had with that. Not
8 that the ship didn't respond okay, and not that he
9 almost didn't get away with it, because he was below
10 and the engineer, I believe, was the OD, was shucking
11 the clam shells when that water came over. So that is
12 the issue. Why they didn't go there, the COI had no
13 idea. And I didn't even know they didn't, but --

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And in Captain Hughley's trip
15 report --

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Interesting, I have never seen
17 the trip report.

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: He basically described the
19 incident, they took on some water, several inches of
20 water and -- I am reading from Captain Hughley's, is it
21 Captain Hughley?

22 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yeah.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Trip report, some water also
24 sloshed forward in the CO, XO state room areas and

1 under the door of the combat systems equipment space.
2 And he talks about the grounds and sonar tripped off
3 line, SECP grounds. And he calls it an unfortunate
4 event. They had, the ship had anticipated the
5 possibility of heavy waves, but had not gotten the
6 hatch closed in time to prevent this event. The hatch
7 was only seconds from being shut when this occurred.
8 But, a good recovery by the ship. So, there was
9 actually no negative comments made, you know, as to the
10 cause of the flooding incident. And it seems to me if
11 there was, you know, some culpability on the crew's
12 part in allowing the water to come down for whatever
13 reason, it should maybe been reflected in that trip
14 report. So, I was a bit surprised to read that, you
15 know, portrayed that way.

16 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I don't know where Dennis was
17 when that happened. I have no idea. I did not talk to
18 him at all after the ride. My engineer was aft when
19 it happened. He was in the engine room. And so, I
20 don't, you know, I just don't know how to evaluate that
21 silence. You know, had he been in the control room, I
22 don't even know if Dennis knows what the op board says
23 as far as that goes. I would be guessing. If you read
24 the op board is it pretty clear. I mean, if there is

1 not a reason to be up there, don't be. Okay, it is
2 pretty simple as that. And certainly not to call your
3 buddies or a radio station, if, in fact, that is what
4 was happening. And I don't even know, because again I
5 learned that way after Waddle was gone.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: In your testimony in the COI,
7 you mentioned the MOE, and you also mentioned it here,
8 your measures of effectiveness for a command climate.
9 Are you still using that similar structure to assess
10 the ship's command climate?

11 CAPTAIN SNEAD: No. I am not. And the reason
12 is that I did it for over a year, and, well, let me go
13 back and say. We are selectively using a few of the
14 things. And I, I rattled at the time a bunch of stuff,
15 as I recall, that was, that was the reaction of the Los
16 Angeles. And particularly a lot of the accusations
17 that were made and a lot of the insensible reasons for
18 sacking the CO. I wanted to get a broader measure
19 across the squadron and see what the heck was going on.
20 See if there was any trainable patterns, and so we
21 just started collecting a whole lot of data. It didn't
22 tell us anything, you know, it was all over the, all
23 over the place, or it, you could have things indicating
24 very favorably in ships that just weren't doing well.

1 So, what does that tell you? And it was onerous to
2 keep up, it was hard to make accurate, because the
3 doggone ships sometimes just are, are, that is just
4 another thing they have to deal with and so, it was
5 hard to get accurate data. And furthermore, what I was
6 really after, what I was really after was I wanted to
7 accurate data on chiefs of sea returning petty
8 officers, which is not a category that is, that Navy
9 Manpower System tracks, because I wanted to, it was
10 clearly a problem in Los Angeles. I mean,
11 notwithstanding the chief issues. The chief issue, the
12 system would have eventually fixed, because they track
13 that. The other one, I saw as a snake in the grass and
14 I wondered if we were having problems in Pearl Harbor
15 and it has proved that we have. That was really why I
16 did that. I wanted to get some data, because I wanted
17 to build a case and then I wanted to go out and see if
18 I couldn't fix it.

19 Today, the truth is, is that argument, that
20 has some air, and Sub Land is over there, I am told,
21 assessing that, and finding out if we do in fact have a
22 distribution and a quality that needs to be addressed
23 and then it will, that will have to be addressed in the
24 policy issues and manpower assignment and find out if

1 they can sendivise(ph) that and what not.

2 Now, having said that, the type commander has
3 picked up a chunk of it, which they are using, they
4 call "Command Metrics". And I basically wished them
5 well with it, but, I think that it is going to be very
6 difficult to draw good conclusions. You know, you can
7 get a good, a good commanding officer, who can suffer
8 mildly for quite a while in some of those categories.
9 For instance, numbers of captain's mass, you know. If
10 you have got a ship like Los Angeles was, and you can't
11 get anybody to help you out with quality chief petty
12 officers, you can easily get a situation where you are
13 going to end up taking a lot of sailors to mass for
14 malperformance. So, I am just a little circumspect
15 about it and I am because I gathered the data for about
16 15 months and looked it at pretty hard. I still have
17 got it all. But, we quit collecting it, most of it.
18 We still collect a few things. We are still interested
19 in the sea returning experience and a few other things
20 in there. And there are a couple of things that we are
21 looking at, like leave balances, you know, we will go
22 down and, as part of our BSA, we will go down and look
23 at the leave balances. It is kind of interesting. And
24 we look at trends in leave balances, you know, what is

1 going on in the ship. How come nobody ever takes any
2 leave? Sometimes, you know, the engineer will never
3 take any leave. It is just the nature of the beast.
4 The captain has to tell the engineer he is going on
5 leave. So, we, we do look at some of the things that
6 are useful. But, for instance, there was one number of
7 pace courses completed, okay. I mean, that was turned
8 out to be a manning -- and some of the others were
9 redundant, in fact. And so, we just don't it anymore.

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And you talked a little bit
11 earlier about the high level of responsibility and
12 authority the Navy gives commanding officers, I
13 believe. Do you also, do you feel that the shore side
14 management or command also shares the responsibility
15 for the performance of commanding officers and the crew
16 and are they held to some sort of accountability --

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I sure feel like I am.

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

19 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I don't know about the rest of
20 the guys. You have got to ask them. I tell you, I
21 mean, you know, for what I hear, the reaction Admiral
22 Grossenbocker and the Submarine, this thing and they
23 clearly are interested in trying to fix it, and I hear
24 that there is a lot going on and reassessing the

1 command pipeline and all of that business. So, my
2 sense is that they do. Now whether or not, you know,
3 how many blows does it take before three stars get
4 called on the carpet, I don't know. I mean, I have no
5 idea. But, I will tell you, I sure feel responsible
6 for my guys. And I would like for them to be
7 successful. I would like to be able to train them all
8 to be successful. Some are going to be more successful
9 than others. But, certainly we are not going to live
10 with anybody that is, sends any signal, whatsoever,
11 that he might not be adequate or unsafe.

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you feel like you are
13 being held accountable by your superiors for the
14 performance of crews on your submarines?

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, I sure do. Sure do.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You mentioned also --

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I will tell you something, I
18 will elaborate on that. I think that if not, that I
19 wouldn't, I would, I have gotten some traction with
20 these arguments about quality and quantity and staff.
21 For instance, my deputies were as of January, I
22 finally, no longer had a gap in the deck. I mean,
23 that is incredible. And, in fact, the gap, if you will
24 look at it, the gap was back to the Fall of 1999, now

1 that is horrendous. Basically it was involving, a guy
2 come in and he would rotate right out. He would get
3 called for this and that, and the other. A guy comes
4 in, he has family problems, and so he can't, I mean, it
5 just one thing after the other. Finally, so I do think
6 that, you know, the sense that I am accountable and,
7 therefore, they have to listen to me, when I say you
8 are not giving me the tools to be successful.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We talked about the ASDU, and
10 the fact that had you known the ASDU was not
11 functioning, you would not have let the vessel get
12 underway.

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Right, I wouldn't have.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: The Navy has a system for
15 reporting equipment failures. I believe it is the
16 CAS --

17 CAPTAIN SNEAD: CAS RIP.

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And the category rating of
19 the CAS RIP, I think has something to do with whether
20 or not the ship can get underway. Has that been
21 changed? What, number one, was the Greeneville, did
22 they required to submit --

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: It was CAS RIPable.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And what would the sea rating

1 have been?

2 CAPTAIN SNEAD: C-2, which means he can
3 continue his mission.

4 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Has there been any
5 thought about changing the C rating of that particular
6 piece of equipment?

7 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Not that I know of. I think
8 C-2 is right, because I think in the broad context,
9 that you can continue your mission without an ASDU
10 failure, but I be damn if I would get underway for a DV
11 cruise with it. Now, I will tell you what, I this one
12 right here I would have bounced off some other people
13 and not everybody agrees with me, because not everybody
14 drives off the ASDU the way I learned to and the way I
15 think submariners should drive their submarines.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: One of the issues that was
17 cited as a problem on the Greenville on the day of the
18 accident was the relationship, the forceful backup that
19 the Captain was receiving and the team environment.
20 What sort of specific training are the crews being
21 given now or before and has that changed since the
22 accident?

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: To build teams.

1 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes, let me, I have already
2 given you the answer. Probably several times. But,
3 let me kind of collect it. This whole thing about self
4 assessment, critique, etc., etc., that is one of the
5 things it comes out right off the bat, how come chief
6 of the watch, you didn't say such and such, diving
7 officer? So, if you follow that process, what you do
8 is, is you train them when and how to provide backup.
9 Now, if you get a CO moving as fast as Waddle was that
10 day, there is no opportunities for backup. Roger what
11 the, in my view, roger what the inspection said, other
12 than the XO coming in and throwing something at him and
13 going, and start hollering, or something, you know,
14 some cataclysmic kind of thing like that, perhaps that
15 would have stopped them. But, he was basically driving
16 his ship just as if they were under attack. I mean,
17 that is the kind of the pace of which things were going
18 on right there. With him, essentially, having the con.
19 The OD was just the mouthpiece. And so, was there an
20 opportunity for backup, not a lot. Maybe the chief of
21 the boat could have got his attention, in my view.
22 Now, should that have happened? Yeah, because I mean,
23 there was clearly no need for the urgency. Somebody
24 should have gone in there and said something. That is

1 part of this issue of what if the XO done that, what
2 would we do, you know? What if, what would, you know,
3 and I think we are training guys correctly. I think
4 that the issue of backup and the absence of it, is more
5 applicable to the, their willingness to operate with a
6 watch bill on the side. People not understanding that
7 there is a reason that all those basics have got to be
8 in place. And there are people in the ship that are
9 responsible and accountable for making sure that those
10 basics are always in place. That is the backup you are
11 talking about. Getting the charts prepared right, for
12 crying out loud, having an effective and viable
13 inventory and all of those things. That is backup.
14 And having a navigator who or a quartermaster that will
15 stand up and say, "Hey, you are driving right at show
16 water, do you know what you are doing?" We are still
17 training guys to do that. We are still training guys
18 to do that.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Now this training that you
20 say that you are giving the guys, is this through an
21 assessment of scenarios, or are you actually taking
22 them into some kind of a simulator training and putting
23 them together as group and showing them how to actually
24 function as a team and what they need to do?

1 CAPTAIN SNEAD: We do, we do it in scenario
2 based training. And I, you do it in the trainers to a
3 certain extent on the tactical side with the, we call
4 them the tact trainers, but it is really a ship drive,
5 it is where, with the periscope and the fire control
6 system and sonar is actually processing a battle
7 problem. So, we do it in there, and we assess it
8 directly in there. People don't always say forceful
9 backup, forceful backup, but you have got all these
10 teams in there and just by the nature of the way it is
11 suppose to work, the questions are being asked
12 continuing about, how come you, junior officer of the
13 watch are sitting here looking at this and this
14 information is not being passed and etc., etc. So, we
15 work on that and that is, but we also work on at sea
16 continuously with this business of dropping back and
17 critiquing and even in sit you in the control room.
18 And say, how come it is for instance that the diving
19 officer doesn't feel compelled to call out that he is a
20 couple of feet off depth with the ship operating in the
21 vicinity of a threat radar, you know, how responsible
22 is that? I mean, that is just something that comes to
23 mind. I mean, that kind of thing. That is the kind of
24 backup we are talking about. Not, we don't create a

1 situation where somebody is about to do something
2 really hair brain stupid like Waddle did, and then just
3 see if people will chime in.

4 And we have got, this is going to be, this is
5 one of these culture things, we are going to have to
6 continue to work on this on a continuing basis for a
7 long time to make sure people understand. But, when
8 they are on watch up there, they are on watch. Those
9 words, see, we are going to back to some of those
10 things, what on watch means. Trying to make them
11 appreciate what that really is and what their
12 responsibilities, therefore, really are.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Another issue, I think that
14 was cited as maybe causal is complacency.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Yes.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Have you taken any training
17 thought about how you might train to help crews to
18 recognize when they are being complacent or how to deal
19 with it?

20 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, I tell you we see it
21 every day and they don't always recognize that they are
22 being complacent. And, again, I think that, I haven't
23 done anything specific to say, okay, you, guys, this,
24 paint the scenario, and say that is being complacent.

1 But, when we see it, we tell them about it. We had, we
2 had an issue here recently on a submarine, for
3 instance, they had a depth control problem, while
4 trying to operate the -- and we have got a special
5 izzmo on the ships so we can operate real slow and
6 basically hover at periscope depth. And they, I am
7 trying to remember the exact circumstances here. What
8 happened is, is it got the ship pointed wrong way in
9 the sea and the automatic system didn't work, was
10 starting to have problems working and they, they were
11 slow to take control of the box and when they did take
12 control, the controller, they didn't do it precisely in
13 the course of the procedure. And the interesting thing
14 about it is, is that had happened before on the ship.
15 And it was interesting that, the Deputy started asking
16 questions about, you know, what are you guys doing, how
17 are you going, how did you get in this situation? The
18 XO goes, ah, mmhm, I guess we were being complacent.
19 Yeah, you damn right you were being complacent. Okay,
20 so let's now, let's go downstairs and let's talk about
21 that. So, we have opportunities and we do talk about
22 it.

23 Some people just flat out, they know the
24 rules and they just, they think they are better than

1 are and there were some of those in Greeneville that
2 day, absolutely to be sure.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I have got just a couple of
4 more questions.

5 You mentioned ORM, and just wanting to get
6 your thoughts about that, if that has a place as a
7 formal process in submarine operations?

8 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I think it does. And quite
9 frankly, if you look at the principles of ORM, that is
10 a new, it is just kind of a, I guess, a new, I don't
11 know how old it is, but to the Navy a relatively new,
12 last couple of years --

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I believe 1997 was the first
14 version of the instruction.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: So, we hung this thing on a
16 process, which quite frankly the Submarine Force has
17 had in place forever. The way that we operate the
18 reactor. And to a large extent that is the way that we
19 have operated before in our ships for a long time. I
20 don't think there is anything new here for submariners.

21 We got a new name, and you know, it may take on a
22 slightly different appearance, but if we do what I have
23 been talking about here for the last two hours and we
24 go back to these basics, I think all of that falls out

1 as a part of it, because that is part of the self
2 assessment critique process and all that business.
3 That is ORM is, is being able to assess those things
4 and then get the right people brought to bear to make
5 decisions about managing risks.

6 So, the answer is yes, I just think we have
7 had rudiments of it and have practiced it for a long
8 time and we just have fallen out of the habit or as
9 part of this.

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Is there any plan to
11 implement ORM as a formal process either in your
12 training or your evaluation of the trained crews?

13 CAPTAIN SNEAD: I think, I think it is being
14 implemented as a formal process, certainly in the
15 school houses right now. Reteaching people the basics.

16 And I am using it as I said as part of this, because
17 that is the process we are teaching. I have, I have
18 read the instruction, I read the instruction and all my
19 COs have read the instruction. And the fact of the
20 matter is, is that one of the deputies has got this
21 thing right now to try to see if, in fact, we really
22 are complying with it or are we missing some of the
23 nuance of the instruction, as part of this issue of
24 training people of critique and self assess and

1 training this process we are teaching. I don't think
2 so, but, I was just thinking here about, that is one of
3 those things we are going, I hope to bring to closure
4 in the next month. I have got two, two significant
5 administrative processes and that sort of outliners we
6 have been trying to get done for a long time. That is
7 one of them. The other one is my organization
8 regulations manual, which we are trying to get
9 published, which gets back to the structure, you know,
10 some people know who is doing what, for who, an
11 organizational matrix that provides some instructions
12 that you need to be effective day in and day out.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I think I have one more
14 question.

15 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Okay.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: It is a very brief one.
17 Regarding the Auden collision that occurred in Arabian
18 Sea, was the Greenville in any way at fault in that
19 collision?

20 CAPTAIN SNEAD: We don't know yet. The
21 investigation hadn't been done, hadn't been released.
22 So, we just have to wait to see.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I appreciate it.
24 Barry, if you have got a couple of more

1 follow on.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Yes, a couple of quickies.

3 You know, my background in NTSB is aviation
4 accidents and after there has been an airplane accident
5 on the commercial side, the airlines or the unions have
6 a program to help the crew cope with the trauma of an
7 accident, because I am sure you appreciate, it is a
8 pretty traumatic, what has the Navy done to help the
9 crew of the Greeneville cope with the traumas that they
10 have encountered, particularly one involving loss of
11 life?

12 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Well, we spent a lot, I spent
13 a lot of my time right after the collision, worrying
14 about that. And both Admiral ~~Coniskey~~Konetzni and I
15 talked to the crew and their wives, kind of provide
16 them a way ahead. Mostly what happens to these young
17 people and these are very young people, is that they
18 just become very uncertain about what the future is.
19 Once you can kind of solidify that for them, they tend
20 to take care of themselves pretty well, you just have
21 to pay attention to them on the ships. We use the
22 chaplains a lot here, to walk around, just kind of
23 talk, get a sense if there is any underlying and quite
24 frankly, Greeneville has been remarkably resilient, so

1 resilient in fact that I often wonder whether or not
2 they really, you know, some of those guys in there got
3 the message. But, morale on the ship still tends to be
4 pretty good. They are very, very worn out after this
5 deployment, because this was long one. They were gone
6 about seven months, so.

7 MR. STRAUCH: Did this also include you and
8 Admiral [ConiskeyKonetzni](#) talking to the folks and their
9 wives, did that also include Commander Waddle,
10 Lieutenant Commander Fifer and Lieutenant Cohen?

11 CAPTAIN SNEAD: Lieutenant Commander Fifer,
12 well, [ConiskeyKonetzni](#) turned Waddle over to me right
13 after the collision, said, you take care of him. I
14 spent quite a bit of time with Waddle. I was at his
15 house right after, you know, right after he got back
16 and all that kind. That weekend, that first weekend is
17 the one we really worry about the most. So, we took
18 care of him and got him, and he had his moments, you
19 know, but he did okay. Same thing with five for, we
20 use part of our network here to take care of those
21 other guys.

22 Cohen, I talked to him a couple of times, but
23 I tell you, Cohen was pretty reclusive through the
24 whole thing. Didn't act like he really wanted anybody

1 around. He, I am not sure, he was not very close with
2 a lot of the other officers -- And I think he was just
3 tended to be standoffish. Now, I spent personally
4 several sessions with him, hours long each over the
5 full course of this thing, talking about him, and etc.,
6 etc. And we tried to give him, you know, all the room
7 he needed, didn't make him go to sea immediately
8 because he had some reservations about it. But,
9 eventually we got him back in the saddle just to see,
10 you know, I mean, it is kind of like hair of the dog,
11 you are getting paid to be a submarine officer, you
12 need to go to sea in submarines and you can do this. I
13 think we handled all of that reasonably well. And we
14 used the chaplains and what not, and did not have any
15 problems, didn't. Through all these things we haven't
16 had any real problems with damage and all like that.

17 MR. STRAUCH: An officer or an enlisted person
18 who wants to make the Navy his career or her career and
19 move up in the ranks, what do, where do you expect them
20 put the Navy in terms of their priorities in let's say,
21 including also in comparison with priorities, family,
22 children, hobbies?

23 CAPTAIN SNEAD: You know what, there is not,
24 that answer changes over time. There are times in the

1 ships when you are assigned a ships, when you are
2 assigned a ship in particular, there are times on a
3 ship's life where that has to be top priority, barring
4 some, you know, really bad development, like a serious
5 illness of a spouse, issues of child care and all that
6 kind of business. Barring that, you know, if it is
7 just the dog and the washing machine and all the stuff
8 we all deal with all the time, there are times in a
9 ship's life where a sailor is going to have to commit
10 himself first to that ship or otherwise you just can't,
11 and doggone submarines and every ship has got to be
12 operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and they
13 break. They are complex machines and they break and
14 they have got to be fixed. And they have got to be
15 managed and they have got to, you know, you have got to
16 do, all the work has to be done. So, it kind of
17 changes. That is a tough question. Most guys, most
18 JOs will tell you they leave because they don't like
19 the separation and everything. I don't know, I think
20 most of them leave because they, they leave for a
21 variety of reasons, that is one of them. I think they
22 also tend to leave because they don't get enough
23 attention, JOs in particular. And I don't think it has
24 anything to do with being, in the old days people used

1 to leave because they didn't like, leave because they
2 were tired of having the crap pounded out of them. I
3 don't think it is true anymore. In fact, I think
4 almost sometimes we aren't paying them enough
5 attention. We don't hold them accountable enough. We
6 don't make them feel like they are really valuable
7 enough.

8 So, the same is true with the sailors. It is
9 not for everybody because there are times, you know,
10 these deployments, hey, you know, who else does that?
11 The Greeneville was just gone seven months. And that
12 is tough. I was gone a lot, let me see, I used to have
13 a number, I used to have a number and somewhere between
14 five, it was around five and a half year, six years, I
15 have actually been submerged. So, you know, it takes a
16 certain kind of family to be able to accommodate that.
17 I will, I will go on to say this, though, my sense is
18 from what I have heard from my classmates who long ago
19 went into the commercial sector, those guys that are
20 really going to be successful elsewhere, they may not
21 have to be put upon these lengthy periods of time, but
22 all in all, it requires about the same level of
23 commitment, you know. I mean, you have always got to
24 squeaky wheel that prevents you from being able to

1 work, then, you know, you are going out the front door.
2 So, I think it kind of works out. Our circumstances
3 is a little bit different because it tends to happen to
4 youngsters very early, that is very hard, you know,
5 they just come from some, Oklahoma, you know, some out
6 in the country and then they get thrown into this.
7 They tend to make the mistake of getting married too
8 early, now you have got, you know, you are dealing with
9 all of that. That tends to make it, and by the way,
10 the JOs are having to deal with them. Having to manage
11 that in their division. So, that tends to make it a
12 little bit different. But, I don't know how you change
13 the balance if you are going to operate these ships at
14 sea.

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. This is a convenient
16 time to stop. We are at the very end of this tape.
17 The time now is about 18:57 and that will conclude our
18 interview with Captain Snead. And we certainly very
19 much appreciate your coming down, sir.

20 CAPTAIN SNEAD: You are welcome.

21 MR. STRAUCH: Do you have any questions of us?

22 (End of tape.)