

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

**MAJOR MARINE ACCIDENT
DCA 01 MM 022
INVESTIGATION INTERVIEWS**

Interview of LCDR Gerald Pfeifer

Tuesday, November 20, 2001

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the National Transportation
Safety Board:

JIM SCHEFFER
TOM ROTH-ROFFY
BILL WOODY
BARRY STRAUCH
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On behalf of the U.S. Navy:

CAPTAIN JOE MULLOY

P R O C E E D I N G S

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3 MR. SCHEFFER: We're here in the RE
4 Conference Room and we're going to be interviewing
5 Lieutenant Commander Gerald Pfeifer, and I'll do the
6 introductions at the table.

7 This is Jim Scheffer, the IIC on the
8 Greeneville-Ehime Maru, NTSB accident investigation.

9 I -- I have along with me Dr. Barry Strauch,
10 who is part of the Human Factors Team.

11 I have Dennis Crider from the Office of
12 Research Engineering.

13 I have Bill Woody from Office of Marine
14 Safety.

15 And I have Tom Roth-Roffy from the Office of
16 Marine Safety.

17 We have the -- the Navy's party spokesperson,
18 Captain Joseph Mulloy.

19 And we have with us Lieutenant Commander
20 Gerald Pfeifer, who at the time was XO aboard the USS
21 Greeneville.

22 I'll now turn it over for the formal
23 interview phase to Tom Roth-Roffy.

24 Tom?

1 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Good morning, Gerry. Good
2 to see you again.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Good morning.

4 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: My name is Tom Roth-Roffy,
5 just for the record and the transcriptionist.

6 I'd like to maybe start with a couple of
7 background questions. If you could tell us about your
8 background in the Navy, your experience and training
9 that preceded your assignment to -- to the Greenville.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Pfeifer. I attended the Naval
11 Academy, graduated in 1986. I had a -- I earned a
12 degree in Aerospace Engineering. Attended the Nuclear
13 Training Pipeline and reported to my first submarine in
14 1988, USS Nevada. It's a ballistic missile submarine,
15 and I served there for 40 months.

16 I then went to the Naval Post-Graduate
17 School, earned a Master's in Electrical Engineering,
18 and then some more advanced training in nuclear
19 submarines in Groton, Connecticut, followed by an
20 engineer tour on the USS Batfish. Those -- the Batfish
21 was in Charleston, South Carolina, and then when that
22 base closed it changed to home port in Groton,
23 Connecticut.

24 Following the engineer tour I reported to the

1 CINCPACfleet staff and worked as a -- on the Nuclear
2 Propulsion Examining Board. I did that -- inspected
3 nuclear submarines and nuclear surface ships for two
4 years and then reported to the USS Greeneville as
5 executive officer, where I served for over a year
6 before the accident.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Regarding your
8 experience and training and observation of sonar
9 display, do you have any specific training in that area
10 that you could maybe talk to us about? Were you,
11 perhaps, a Weapons Division officer?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. Before you report to
13 your first submarine a standard -- when I say the
14 Nuclear Submarine Pipeline, it's not only nuclear
15 training, there's also submarine off -- officer basic
16 course, which was several weeks long, that I attended.

17 My first submarine, there's a qualification process
18 that you go through. And a lot of that was training on
19 board ship. I don't recall specifically but I probably
20 received additional training on the submarine sonar
21 system during that first tour.

22 Before reporting as engineer I -- I mentioned
23 I had additional training. That was at the Submarine
24 Officer Advanced Course, a six-month department head

1 school for submariners where there was an extensive
2 additional submarine training. And then a refresher
3 before I reported as XO at the prospective executive
4 officer school in Groton, Connecticut.

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Regarding the fire
6 control displays on the Greeneville, was there a
7 standard setup by which these consoles were arranged
8 displays on board Greeneville and was that the --
9 something standard that perhaps was in some sort of a
10 written policy, or how was that?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: There certainly wasn't any
12 written policy that I'm aware of. There -- there may
13 have been a -- a way that the guys generally had them
14 arranged but nothing specific sticks out in my mind.

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: All right. So, on the day
16 of the accident do you recall what the arrangement was
17 on -- on the fire control displays?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- no.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Do you -- do you know
20 what the standard setup was for TMA operations? Was
21 there a standard setup on Greeneville?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: I keep forgetting to say my
23 name. Pfeifer. And --

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Oh, that's all right. As

1 long as we're --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- within the same --

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. No, I -- there --

5 (Pause)

6 LCDR PFEIFER: The operator analyzing the
7 contact would normally be in -- and the console
8 adjacent to that would be in time-bearing. Now, which
9 exact console that was --

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Right.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I think it varied. But
12 certain individuals may have had a certain way they
13 liked to do it. And I don't recall any set pattern
14 being written down.

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. With regard to the
16 ESM system, was there a standard procedure that the
17 officer of the deck would use prior to going periscope
18 depth in arranging or setting up the controls on the
19 periscope?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, there is.

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. How was -- what was
22 that and how was that -- where was that outlined? By -
23 - by policy or by --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: The commanding officer

1 standing orders -- I don't recall. I believe -- it's -
2 - you know, on some submarines with exact switch
3 lineups that are placed and then there's also
4 operational guidelines, naval publications that say
5 this is what you should do.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you recall -- could you
7 describe some of those? If you can. If you can
8 recall.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: I can. I -- the captain will
10 let me know if I'm getting into some classified area,
11 but you -- -- you'd raise the scope and there's a
12 couple knobs here. You'd make sure they're lined up.
13 One is -- I won't say what they do, but one's down,
14 one's pointing at you a little bit. And you make sure
15 the volume's turned up. You push a button to test that
16 you hear an audible noise which will alert you to a
17 certain signal strength or a certain -- actually a PRF
18 that you're attuned to, and you look at a visual light
19 on the periscope to make sure that the signal goes into
20 the ESM system and back. And the ESM operator will
21 also listen for that audible signal, and there's some
22 communication you do between the two of you to make
23 sure that the system's working right before you proceed
24 to periscope.

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: This is Captain Mulloy.
2 Just -- what it is, it's an ESM test. You're checking
3 that you're in omni and all, do you have all the bands,
4 and it's a -- it is in the NWP, Naval Weapons
5 Publication, and almost every ship has their standing
6 orders. The OOD raises the scope at 150 feet before
7 you go up.

8 And that test, what it is normally you say a
9 video test and an ESM sees a video light also is that
10 there are, like, seven or eight ESM bands but you only
11 hear one beep and it's, like, a 400 hertz tone. If you
12 hear the beep it means you've tested that band. If you
13 see the light, that's a series circuit that all bands
14 have tested sat, that you've inserted a frequency -- a
15 measure of a PRF that's a representation of that. And
16 you only get the video light if every band tests sat.
17 If they don't test sat, you can still hear the beep but
18 you wouldn't know what -- so normally you look to see
19 video light. Video light -- and ESM will say "Video --
20 video test sat." What it really means is a ESM system
21 check. And if you don't get the light you can still
22 test it because then you go out omni band and go band
23 by band, beep, beep, beep, beep, beep. You may have a
24 problem with the light circuit.

1 But typically it -- it allows you a quicker
2 way to get to periscope depth, so if the ship follows
3 their standard procedures, you've tested your ESM
4 system, and you also get the -- and typically you hit
5 the -- beep, and if it's too loud you'll know it. But
6 it allows you to set that noise so it's above
7 background but not over-driving your system, either.
8 And that's your standard ESM setup on periscope.

9 (Pause)

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Had there been any problems
11 with the ES -- ESM system on the Greeneville prior to
12 the accident day, that you recall?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Pfeifer. No, I recall none.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Had there -- had
15 there been any prior instances where the ESM had failed
16 to detect a commercial navigational band radar similar
17 to what happened on -- on the day of the accident on --
18 on the Greeneville or any prior sub that you had served
19 on?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: I think your question is two
21 parts, and I don't recall any material problem with
22 the -- with the Greeneville's ESM either before or
23 after. There may have been. You can check the
24 maintenance records. I don't recall any.

1 And on other submarines, the failure, or --
2 or on Greeneville, failure to detect a contact, it --
3 it's kind of a gray area. Do -- it shouldn't --
4 doesn't necessarily detect every contact out there.
5 But I don't recall one having a problem that -- that it
6 was close and it didn't detect it.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you have any thoughts on
8 -- on why the Ehime Maru radar was not detected by the
9 ES -- ESM system on Greeneville on the day of the
10 accident?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I don't.

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: No thoughts at all maybe
13 why?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Did you discuss the
16 Greeneville's policy on the use of the BQS 15, which I
17 believe is an active sonar, high-frequency sonar, if
18 you by policy or procedure used that prior to going to
19 periscope depth, what the commanding officer's
20 guidelines were regarding its use?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, that is something that
22 on Greeneville we didn't use and -- and nor or any
23 submarine that -- that I've been on.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, it's -- it was not ever

1 used or --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, --

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- infrequently or --

4 LCDR PFEIFER: It was used for other purposes
5 rather than to go to periscope depth.

6 CAPTAIN MULLOY: This is Captain Mulloy
7 again. I guess I'll call it a technical correction.
8 The submarine Greeneville does not have a B -- BQS 15
9 system. It's all part of its BSY-1. It has an HF
10 mode, which is High Frequency mode, used in the
11 transition in the front. So, it -- it really is part
12 of its system but can be called up in any screen in
13 sonar but not on the console in the control room
14 because that's only in the under-ice mode.

15 Other ships do use it, sometimes where
16 there's a large number of sailboats or other parts.
17 The issue also is the limited range on it, one or two
18 thousand yards only. It's not going to go out to 15-
19 or 20,000 yards. And as all active sonar is based upon
20 the sound velocity profile, just because you ping up
21 does not mean your ping goes up. In many cases based
22 upon the sound velocity profile, as you discover when
23 you use it under ice, you may ping up and get a bottom
24 reflection. It's called Bottom Resurface Ring. And

1 you actually change the angle of the ship in shallow
2 water, you actually see the bottom go out when you go
3 up at up-angle and that may mean your -- all -- your
4 only return you're getting is the bottom around you.
5 And I have personally seen that on a deployment on USS
6 Puffer, that you have to constantly check do you have
7 surface or bottom ring. And it's always based upon the
8 sound velocity of the couple hundreds yards of water in
9 front of the ship. There is no variety to know that
10 that is going out like radar and coming straight back
11 to you.

12 So, many ships may use the system. Mostly
13 they use it for mine-hunting or -- or in close tactical
14 training just to be able to say it is something within
15 a thousand yards if used there. Typically, it's mostly
16 used for under-ice detection on submarines and we don't
17 normally use it because it is -- it can be a -- it's a
18 transient but it really is not a security issue here.
19 It's just a matter of reliability and use. But some
20 ships in Hawaii do use it, primarily not for motor
21 vessels but because of, some cases, sonar -- I mean of
22 sailing vessels. But it's infrequent use, but some
23 ships do use it because it may be their only chance to
24 detect a sailing vessel when it's really close that you

1 may not see from the periscope.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Pfeifer. It also can have a
3 detrimental effect to your passive display.

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Play, right.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: So --

6 CAPTAIN MULLOY: That's right. And --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: -- and my submarines, it
8 wasn't a practice.

9 CAPTAIN MULLOY: One other point from Mulloy
10 again is on the BSY-1, since it's integrated, is use of
11 the BSY1 HF loads down your system in terms of computer
12 timing. Sometimes going active on it will -- it will
13 go active, one or two pings, and stop. And then it
14 doesn't -- it'll -- it'll make straight -- may really
15 interfere with your sonar passive display but certainly
16 your operator loading.

17 And the other part is it will then ping and
18 then freeze up some of your assets because it's all an
19 integrated computer system. Typically it doesn't
20 affect the rest of the system but it may hang it up.
21 That's the risk you take when you turn on some other
22 integrated system is it may put a load on the system.
23 That doesn't normally play in your mind set but
24 sometimes it does with some people. Or the -- the

1 system variability. I don't know on Greeneville
2 specifically.

3 But being that it's an integrated system,
4 that's one thing you have to call up. You have to drop
5 screens in sonar and affect your operators because you
6 can't put a person on a separate console. But as we
7 move to -- that's just the way the system is on
8 Greeneville, so.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Continuing with that
10 same question, were there any guidelines, either from
11 the commanding officer or other documents, which
12 provided guidance on -- on the use of that particular
13 system that you recall? Either the use of it or not
14 use of it.

15 LCDR PFEIFER: The procedure for proceeding
16 to periscope depth was in the CO's standing order. And
17 I don't recall any mention of active sonar there. I do
18 know it required the CO's specific permission to go
19 active.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. How would you
21 describe the CO's -- speaking of Commander Waddle's --
22 attention to written policies, rules, and procedures
23 relative to that of other commanding officers with whom
24 you have worked?

1 (Pause)

2 LCDR PFEIFER: It's not my intention to --
3 answer your questions, I don't want to criticize
4 someone unnecessarily. Can you explain that further,
5 what you're asking?

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Well, we're just -- you
7 know, on the particular day of the accident Commander
8 Waddle had, you know, from what we've read in the --
9 the court of inquiry transcript, had basically varied a
10 little bit from his own policies on, for example, going
11 to periscope depth and the number of legs, the timing
12 of the legs. And we were just curious if -- if that
13 was something that he did occasionally, almost never,
14 and -- and kind of compare that to your prior
15 experience with other commanding officers. That's
16 really what we're getting at here.

17 LCDR PFEIFER: We have in the Navy volumes of
18 rules. And to -- to generalize based on -- on that
19 day, I think it's unfair. I think in some areas he was
20 much stricter following the rules than -- than my other
21 COs, so I -- I don't think it's fair to -- to say that
22 he's -- he was less stringent in the rules in general,
23 so.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So --

1 LCDR PFEIFER: So --

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- so, in general, you have
3 a lot of rules that you -- you have and you follow
4 some, you follow -- don't follow others?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, you --

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You kind of pick and choose
7 the ones --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: You --

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: How does that work?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: You follow them all. There
11 are times that -- just to memorize all the --

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: -- the -- the rules you'd
14 need, you know, a career to do that. So, you focus on
15 the ones that are important. And we all try to follow
16 all of them but if you're -- if you don't constantly
17 refresh yourself in certain areas then you may not be
18 as familiar with some of the rules or standing orders
19 that -- that -- that are out there. You focus on the
20 things that are important.

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Please describe your
22 working relationship with the commanding officer before
23 the collision? Did you have any occasion to advise him
24 on operational matters while underway? So, please

1 discuss and -- how did he respond to your -- your --
2 your feedback, so to speak?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. As the executive
4 officer, that -- you -- in this -- the submarine your
5 state rooms are adjacent to each other and you share a
6 restroom, and I think that's by design. And I think
7 command must be a lonely -- lonely job where you need
8 to be the captain to everybody. And -- and that room
9 affords you proximity to the captain that you can
10 provide him some private criticism or feedback that
11 wouldn't be appropriate publicly in some cases. So,
12 that's better -- those are some of the things that have
13 -- that have happened over the course of -- of our time
14 together.

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: In general, how was
16 Commander Waddle in accepting your -- your comments or
17 criticism or suggestions?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Receptive.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And how would you compare
20 that to other COs you've worked with in the past? I
21 know you -- you've never served as XO.

22 LCDR PFEIFER: To be honest, I -- I -- I
23 haven't served under -- exclusively. I've had short
24 periods of COs where they -- but -- but as an engineer,

1 when I would confront or whatever you want to call it,
2 correct a CO, it was a different relationship, engineer
3 to CO to -- to XO to CO. So I think I'd be comparing
4 apples and oranges if I compared him to some other CO,
5 whether he was more or less receptive. But I would say
6 he was receptive.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Along the same vein,
8 how would you characterize Commander Waddle's
9 relationship with his junior officers? Was he easy to
10 get along with them or was he -- or how would you
11 characterize him I guess is the question?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, I -- I think you'd have
13 to look at our retention statistics for a good
14 indication. And I'll -- when I arrived, it was shortly
15 after he had arrived to the -- to the Greeneville. And
16 a number of the JOs were -- were determined to -- to
17 leave the Navy and seek civilian employment. They
18 weren't happy, and he turned that around. He invested
19 a lot of his personal interest in them, their careers,
20 and their futures, and built a legacy of -- of a
21 hundred percent officer retention. And even today I --
22 through all the things that we've been through I don't
23 know of any of the junior officers who are leaving the
24 Navy. They're all staying around and continuing, at

1 least for shore duty. I attribute a large part of that
2 to -- to his personal investment in them.

3 So, I think that's an indication that they
4 had a positive relationship with him.

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I have a number of
6 other questions but I -- what I'd like to do now is go
7 ahead and turn it over to -- to the next interviewer.

8 Bill, if you'd like to?

9 MR. WOODY: I'd like to go back and just
10 visit a couple things that Tom touched on.

11 In the ESM you mentioned steps -- oh, it's
12 Bill -- Bill Woody.

13 Going back to the ESM just for a minute, you
14 mentioned that there was a number of steps that the --
15 the person -- the conning officer or OOD would -- would
16 execute. Were these steps -- was it easy to omit any
17 of these steps?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Is it easy? Yes, but it's
19 something that it would be very unusual to do that
20 because it's a pattern that you -- you know, even now
21 as I'm describing, I'm using my hands because I know
22 where this knob has to be and this knob is. I know
23 where the button is.

24 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: It's something that you do so
2 often that it becomes second nature and it takes -- you
3 know, it's not something that you need to pull a book
4 out and -- oh, I need to look at the book every time I
5 do it. It's -- it's something that you become very
6 accustomed to. I think it'd be unusual to miss steps.

7 MR. WOODY: So, it's a matter of memory and
8 habit and doing certain mechanical things that you do
9 automatically, then?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, yeah. But -- but you
11 know what -- you know --

12 MR. WOODY: What you're doing.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: -- you know why you're looking
14 at the red dot. You know why you're listening to it.
15 You know what you're doing. I guess -- does that
16 answer your question?

17 MR. WOODY: Were you present when the -- when
18 the OOD LT Coen made those checks? Did you happen to
19 see him?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall for sure. I
21 know I've -- I've seen him do it. You know, I
22 supervise the officers a lot and I'm sure I've seen him
23 do it -- do it right.

24 MR. WOODY: Are any of the devices that the

1 OOD would -- would operate, say that we give him any
2 type of early warning of close -- close contacts?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. There's the -- there's
4 another sonar system, the WQC. It's -- it's called
5 "Racks." The WQC is a more common submarine term for
6 it. And that's a -- that's a sonar system that we use
7 for underwater communications, voice. But there's --
8 there's a close contact. You can hear that. Before an
9 officer would take the ship to periscope depth he would
10 turn that up and it raises the -- an elevated
11 background noise with underwater sound that you can
12 hear.

13 MR. WOODY: Now, was -- somebody asked you
14 what -- to periscope depth, you were in sonar, were
15 you, at that time?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I guess you'd have to say
17 exactly when.

18 MR. WOODY: Well, there comes a time -- we --
19 we've heard that when the submarine gets the scope up
20 and takes a quick look around that one of the things
21 the OOD does is to reduce the volume on certain --
22 certain speakers in -- in the conn. Did you see him do
23 that? Were you aware that he reduced the volume?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh. I'll have to -- are you

1 asking did I see him make his preparations and turn the
2 knobs and --

3 MR. WOODY: Right. I was asking that
4 originally, yes.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I don't recall--

6 MR. WOODY: And after you got to periscope
7 depth, did he make any changes in the adjustments to
8 the ESM or Racks or --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: In preparing to go or -- or
10 once he was there?

11 MR. WOODY: Well, take them both ways.
12 What'd --

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. I --

14 MR. WOODY: -- what'd you see?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't -- from what I
16 remember, I don't think I would have been in a position
17 to see him make the tests and things, so I can't tell
18 you. I think I was in sonar then. Once up there I
19 don't -- I don't recall him adjusting any volumes or
20 anything.

21 MR. WOODY: Now, you might know this. Were
22 there -- was there any post-accident testing of the ESM
23 equipment?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, there was.

1 MR. WOODY: Do you -- I realize that some of
2 that might be classified, but did -- did it all check
3 out all right? Was there anything found to be wrong
4 with the system?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Not that I know of.

6 MR. WOODY: If it had been, would you know
7 about it? Would you have learned that --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, if it was significant I
9 would have remembered it right now. But if it was some
10 -- there's -- if there was some minor glitch in it that
11 came and cleared I don't -- I don't remember that.
12 But I mean you -- the record's available. If I could
13 see them I think I'd remember what you're talking
14 about.

15 MR. WOODY: All right.

16 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Captain Mulloy again, and
17 one objection. I think everything tested outside, but
18 I can confirm with Tom Kyle.

19 Just for explanation, when we say "ESM,"
20 there's really two systems when you guys got your tour.
21 There's the early warning receiver, which is the
22 amplifier and which you're testing. And all you're
23 doing is that's a audio -- basically a superhetradine
24 of radar PRF to frequency, so beep, beep, beep. It'd

1 be like a real high PRF radar. Then you have a burp,
2 burp, burp for a low frequency maritime radar. So it
3 doesn't really equate to the frequency but it's really
4 the PRF, although, you know, the repeating rate may,
5 you know, relate to -- to that. I'm sure you've seen
6 on maritime radars.

7 That is -- no operator other than testing it
8 and turning it on. If the volume is down, then it
9 won't work. But there's -- if you turn it up real
10 loud, it's so -- it's go so much amplification the
11 minute you turn it up a little bit it'll -- it'll like
12 -- almost like reverb on you up there. You'll know
13 whether it's too high with any -- any kind of ESM data.

14 Now, typically, the ship's adjusted up so
15 they can hear the background buzz and down a hair and
16 then do their test, and that sets the volume.

17 Now, that's the early warning receiver.

18 MR. WOODY: Right.

19 CAPTAIN MULLOY: It is a totally separate,
20 fully automated. All it does is, like, a radar
21 detector for a police thing. Okay. No operator
22 action.

23 The ESM system requires a petty officer in
24 there to look at a radar screen to look on a -- to look

1 for pulses of radar data and energy. And now he's
2 listening to early warning and he's listening to his
3 system and he's looking at a screen. I will check. I
4 think everything tested out sat. And about your idea
5 of testing is the one thing about the equipment is the
6 periscope is the only piece of equipment officers
7 operate on the submarine, so that is why he says it's a
8 recurring thing. It'd be like you starting your car.
9 Do you adjust your volume, do you -- do you look at
10 your mirrors? You have a series of things you do every
11 time you get in your car. That's what an officer does
12 with a periscope because it is the only thing officers
13 routinely operate on a submarine because they're the
14 ones who operate is that.

15 So, yes, steps could be missed but generally
16 it's like starting your own car. It's the one thing
17 you do in your own seat. It's the one thing they do on
18 a periscope. But -- and typically, the only volume
19 that comes down is not usually the OD off the scope
20 would be another officer if it's too loud. You hear
21 "brrrrr." That's interfering. The dynamics would be
22 the volume comes down on it. Typically, though, people
23 don't play with that till you hear a "no close
24 contacts" or some other thing when the scope breaks,

1 for a typical submarine control room.

2 MR. WOODY: Was there any practical test run?

3 Did the submarine go past a merchant ship and -- and
4 detect its radar to determine whether the type of radar
5 that you might find on the Ehime Maru would give you a
6 strong signal --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any further
8 testing that you're describing.

9 MR. WOODY: Now, skipping to the -- the CO
10 and his orders, the CO makes the standing orders. Of
11 course, they're based on complete instructions.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Right.

13 MR. WOODY: Which are standard. And -- but
14 since he does make the orders, can you think of
15 occasions when the CO might -- in this case, Commander
16 Waddle -- he might modify or decide not to follow an
17 order at a certain time? Is that something he might do
18 or -- any -- any examples of that?

19 You know, for example, we heard a lot of --
20 in the transcript from the court of inquiry that he
21 didn't have the legs for the TMA that his orders
22 specified. And they're his orders, and do you have
23 anything you could comment on whether he always obeyed
24 by his standing orders or whether he sometimes chose

1 not to for reasons that might be good and sound?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm -- I'm trying to
3 understand your question. And -- and I --

4 MR. WOODY: Right. It's a little convoluted.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I don't want to --

6 MR. WOODY: Yeah.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: -- you would like an example
8 of where he didn't obey his orders for a good reason?

9 MR. WOODY: Right. Let's do it that way.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

11 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm. Yes.

12 (Pause)

13 LCDR PFEIFER: It's a whole book. That's --
14 several, maybe, hundred pages.

15 (Pause)

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I guess I'll answer it as I
17 don't recall a -- a good example of differing from the
18 CO standing orders that you're talking about.

19 MR. WOODY: Well, asking the other side of
20 the question. Were there times when he didn't
21 apparently obey the -- or follow his standing orders
22 and the -- the reason was not clear to other people,
23 like for yourself?

24 (Pause)

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Is there a time where I
2 remember seeing him deviate from his standing orders --

3 MR. WOODY: Right. Mm-hmm.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: -- where --

5 MR. WOODY: Put it that way.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: -- and -- and I wasn't sure
7 why he was doing it?

8 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

9 (Pause)

10 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any -- I'm not
11 sure. I don't recall any --

12 MR. WOODY: All right.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: -- situations that you're
14 talking about.

15 MR. WOODY: Okay -- in general, how specific
16 are the standing orders with regard to many watch
17 stations? And let's just take the watch stations. How
18 specific are they?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Specifically watch stations, I
20 -- well, I'm not sure they're that -- I think we follow
21 other rules on -- on --

22 (Simultaneous speaking)

23 MR. WOODY: -- rules --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: -- in general, yeah. Like,

1 how watch standards --

2 MR. WOODY: Yes.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: -- carry out their duties?

4 MR. WOODY: Well, I think the -- referring to
5 manning, I mean the -- the manning of the watch station
6 with a qualified person and having backup and those
7 sorts of things. Do -- was that all covered in the
8 standing orders or some other instruction?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: They were covered by
10 instructions. Not necessarily the standing -- CO
11 standing orders. Other instructions.

12 MR. WOODY: Were these pretty specific as to
13 what -- what the watch was supposed to be and what --
14 who's supposed to be there and how many? This all --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Are -- can you give me a
16 specific --

17 MR. WOODY: Sure.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: -- example? Are you --

19 MR. WOODY: Yes. We -- we -- we've heard --

20 LCDR PFEIFER: -- referring to sonar?

21 MR. WOODY: -- a lot about the fact that
22 there was an unqualified watch on one of the seats in
23 sonar.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

1 MR. WOODY: Apparently on Greeneville there
2 was -- this was a common practice on Greeneville and
3 some of the submarines where you didn't have enough
4 people to always have a qualified person. We just
5 wondered how specific the -- the instructions were on
6 something like that.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, I -- I --

8 MR. WOODY: As an example.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- the manning of sonar
10 watch standing wasn't very specific. And it took
11 several weeks for the type commander to put out
12 specific requirements once our collision happened
13 because a lot of the guidance was somewhat vague and
14 they didn't want to make it overly restrictive but on
15 the other hand they wanted to meet all the
16 requirements. So, the configuration of the sonar
17 system on -- on submarines varied throughout the fleet.
18 So, we -- the guidance was confusing and -- and even -
19 - and I'll go as far as saying open to interpretation.
20 And so, the type commander after reviewing it
21 clarified that for everyone, but it -- but it took some
22 effort.

23 MR. WOODY: Let me clarify. He -- did he
24 make it -- give you some leeway in who you could assign

1 safely to sonar watch? Did he give the ship some
2 leeway?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Not on -- saying leeway. He
4 clarified and said this is what -- if the ship is
5 operating in a -- in this type of situation this is how
6 sonar will be manned. This is what the -- the message
7 said.

8 MR. WOODY: Was there any kind of feedback,
9 say up the chain of command from Greeneville, since we
10 don't have enough watch standers, we occasionally find
11 that we need to use an unqualified watch stander with
12 -- with, you know, a qualified supervisor and one
13 qualified person on the other sat?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: There wasn't any official
15 correspondence that -- that I'm aware of.

16 MR. WOODY: -- I've got to use an unqualified
17 person temporarily till he's qualified. Any -- any
18 kind of feedback up to --

19 LCDR PFEIFER: We didn't give any feed -- the
20 -- nothing official that went through the ship's office
21 that I knew about.

22 MR. WOODY: Okay. Was there any passive
23 agreement or permission to use an unqualified person on
24 the sat? In other words --

1 LCDR PFEIFER: After the collision --

2 MR. WOODY: -- collision --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: -- the --

4 MR. WOODY: Then there --

5 LCDR PFEIFER: -- some of this came out.

6 Disappointing to me that anybody in their right mind
7 would think that you could have an unqualified guy on a
8 -- on a station and -- and not have him directly
9 supervised by somebody else.

10 MR. WOODY: In that regard, we noticed that
11 the sonar officer was also the quality assurance
12 officer. We asked a lot of questions as to what he
13 knew about the watch standing of sonar. Can you tell
14 us what his duties as sonar -- as sonar officer were,
15 for example -- got into this area.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. He's the division
17 officer in charge of sonar and so he'll assist with the
18 qualification, he'll assist with the training --

19 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: -- and prepare some of our
21 lineups and -- and approve the sonar search plan, the -
22 - the equipment lineup that we go -- that we use while
23 we're at sea.

24 MR. WOODY: Okay. I know of the questions --

1 we weren't quite familiar with his duties. One of the
2 things that he -- he did mention that he had not been
3 involved in the qualification of the sonar supervisor
4 ever. Would that -- was that an unusual thing for a --
5 for a sonar officer? Was it just the fact there were
6 nobody qualified here in his tenure? Does that strike
7 a bell with you?

8 LCDR PFEIFER: That -- is it unusual that we
9 won't qualify a sonar supervisor for --

10 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: -- a few months?

12 MR. WOODY: Yes.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: No, that's not that unusual.
14 There's -- it's a very senior watch station and it just
15 depends on the manning. And when -- when somebody --
16 I'm trying to think. I think after the collision there
17 -- there were -- there were several guys that were
18 getting real close and they -- they have since
19 qualified as sonar supervisor. It just happened they
20 weren't quite ready or hadn't finished their quals yet.

21 MR. WOODY: Was the sonar officer -- I
22 believe his name was Lieutenant Mahoney --

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

24 MR. WOODY: -- was he involved in the

1 qualification boards?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, the -- after?

3 MR. WOODY: Afterwards, yes.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: I couldn't tell you. And I --
5 I'm not sure I can even remember when he left. I know
6 he's since gone and -- and some -- my immediate memory
7 is of him being gone for a long time, so I'm not sure.

8 MR. WOODY: Could you give us a brief
9 description of what his duties were as quality
10 assurance officer? I think that's the term that he
11 was.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. The quality assurance
13 officer assists in the maintenance of the submarine.
14 We -- we'd already discussed the Thresher and that --
15 that built the program called quality assurance. And
16 it's a -- it's a method to improve -- improve the
17 quality of our workmanship. And it has several
18 aspects, but some of it is administrative practices
19 that make sure the material that's being put in the
20 submarine is of the right caliber, it's been properly
21 tested, and if the people installing or -- or working
22 equipment put it in right, and then it's tested right.

23 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: All the tests and

1 administration that goes along with the things I just
2 described would be something that would come under his
3 purview.

4 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: And he would work with
6 department heads and the captain, and before the ship
7 went to sea he would be one of the people that advised
8 the captain whether all the maintenance is completed
9 and all the administration is satisfactory to go to
10 sea.

11 MR. WOODY: Now, we noticed also from the --
12 that he was not involved in the -- the approval of the
13 watch bill that took place in sonar. Is that a
14 standard, normal thing for -- for a division officer
15 not to be involved in checking the watch bill or having
16 some idea what the -- what's on watch?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: That would be standard that he
18 wouldn't approve the watch bill. From my experience on
19 submarines.

20 MR. WOODY: Would he be expected to know
21 whether a qualified person were on the seat or not? Is
22 that a normal thing he would -- that a division officer
23 would be expected to understand or know?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: I would think so.

1 MR. WOODY: He was standing in during
2 watches. Did he -- were any of his watches in the --
3 in the control room at that time?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: On the day that you're
5 specifically referring to I don't --

6 MR. WOODY: In general.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I don't -- yes, they were.
8 He -- there's a -- there's a requirement to stand a
9 watch for proficiency. At a minimum I'm sure he would
10 -- would have stood watch what we call forward as
11 officer of the deck.

12 MR. WOODY: So, he stands some minimum -- a
13 number of watches forward to keep his qualification --

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. In general. I don't --
15 I don't have the records in front of me. That was --

16 MR. WOODY: His primary duty, that was in --
17 in journey watch --

18 LCDR PFEIFER: No, no. Not at all. I -- I'm
19 not sure why -- why you have the impression that he
20 mostly stood watch aft. I -- I don't think that may
21 have been the case. I don't have -- it's -- he was a
22 more senior officer of the junior officers, so I -- I
23 would think he would spend quite a bit of time forward.

24 MR. WOODY: And going back to the orders --

1 standing orders for a minute, are they pretty specific
2 about the -- the equivalent has to be -- equivalent
3 configurations and what -- how they're supposed to be
4 set and manned and so forth? Not manned but -- you
5 know, they're supposed to be turned on and what scales
6 and -- I think you earlier said that the -- the
7 practical screens, for example, are the choice of the -
8 - on watch.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: To my memory. And then there
10 may be something in the standing orders that I'm not
11 aware of, but that's -- that's how I recall.

12 MR. WOODY: But how about direction of
13 equipment on the ship? Does the sonar's fathometer and
14 --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: They'll each -- the CO's
16 standing orders are -- are somewhat specific in -- in
17 certain areas, but -- and there's other operating
18 guidelines that would tell people how to operate the
19 equipment. I would say in general you wouldn't operate
20 equipment by reading the CO standing orders. You would
21 follow other technical manuals --

22 MR. WOODY: -- technical manuals.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: -- more dedicated to that
24 specific equipment.

1 MR. WOODY: When the ship was making
2 preparations to go up to periscope depth, do you have
3 any particular duties that you do as -- as executive
4 officer? Do you have a station?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

6 MR. WOODY: Would you normally come -- every
7 other -- going to periscope depth or would it be okay
8 for you to be doing paperwork in your office or --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: As XO I put my -- I try to
10 keep a standard of I go where my -- my time was most
11 effectively used. And often that meant standing in
12 control and watching them and coaching the junior
13 officer deck in preparation to come to periscope depth
14 and come up. But there are other times where I felt my
15 efforts would be better suited spent somewhere else,
16 so. I -- I wasn't ever assigned. It wasn't a -- it
17 wasn't a watch that, okay, now the XO has to go to
18 control while we're making preparations to come
19 periscope. It wasn't like that at all.

20 MR. WOODY: I think the reason we're asking
21 questions, you have kind of duties to run the internal
22 organization of the ship and then you also have to be
23 observing the commanding officer's role because that's
24 what you're -- you'd be aspiring to, and I just

1 wondered if you could give us any kind of an idea how
2 you split your time and -- from taking care of the
3 running of the internal ship and say -- let's say
4 preparing yourself for -- by observing the commanding
5 officer and being present in -- in control situations?

6 Can you talk about that just for a minute? Tell us
7 how you would be one place and when you'd be in
8 another.

9 (Pause)

10 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I guess, can I ask you to
11 -- to make it more specific?

12 MR. WOODY: Sure.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm trying to answer a
14 question and I'm not sure what you --

15 MR. WOODY: In other words, how -- how much
16 of the time would you -- would you say under
17 circumstances be involved in strictly running the
18 internal part of the ship? You know, the paperwork,
19 the administration, solving any kind of internal
20 problems. And what part of the time would you be,
21 let's say, CO striker, for example?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. That would -- that
23 would depend on the operations that we were doing. In
24 a uneventful transit across the Pacific I would spend

1 more of my time during the day training the crew and
2 performing the administrative tasks while in a highly
3 stressful tactical situation a lot of that stuff would
4 be put on the back burner and I would be involved with
5 doing what you said, watching the CO and learning from
6 him.

7 MR. WOODY: The -- the -- we mentioned that,
8 he only had one leg of data on the sonar contact S-14,
9 and we were wondering in other cases where
10 Greeneville's been operating, say, independently
11 without need to meet a schedule, were there ever any
12 other cases you can think of where the ship went to
13 periscope depth without -- only one leg of analysis
14 from a target?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any.

16 MR. WOODY: Were you aware that there was
17 only one leg of data on the S-14?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think so. I -- I know
19 when that came out I was -- I was surprised and -- to
20 this day I mean I -- I don't -- I don't know why we did
21 that.

22 MR. WOODY: But you were aware that there was
23 just one leg of data on -- on the S-14?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I don't think I was.

1 MR. WOODY: You were not aware --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

3 MR. WOODY: -- at the time that there was
4 only one leg?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't -- I don't -- I can't
6 say. I -- if I knew that, I'm -- I would have brought
7 it up to the CO.

8 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: So, I -- I don't know, you
10 know.

11 MR. WOODY: We were just wondering --

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

13 MR. WOODY: -- that -- I think you were
14 answering a question for us.

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

16 MR. WOODY: We were just wondering if the --
17 and again, like you say, you can't think of any other
18 times when the captain -- Captain Waddle proceeded to
19 periscope depth with just one leg of target motion
20 data?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I don't recall --

22 MR. WOODY: Don't recall any --

23 LCDR PFEIFER: -- no, sir, I don't.

24 MR. WOODY: All this has come up, when you

1 went into sonar, and we're getting kind of out of --
2 out of sync here, do you -- what contacts you did have?

3 Did you have S-14?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I -- just reviewing what
5 I -- what I had known at the time, this was -- this was
6 written on February 9th at 16:41, some -- shortly after
7 our accident. I -- I look at the broadband screen at
8 three contacts to the northwest. This is at -- this is
9 when I focus in on the sonar screen and --

10 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: -- we're on Course 1-2-0. I
12 entered sonar shortly before this, so we're -- we're on
13 what turns out to be the second leg. And --

14 MR. WOODY: What course would that have been?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: I have written down here our
16 ship was on Course 1-2-0.

17 MR. WOODY: 1-2-0.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: So, earlier we had been on
19 this course, and at this time as I'm focusing on the
20 sonar screen we're on Course 1-2-0. The center of the
21 three, which is the three traces, has a slight left
22 bearing rate. The rest have a low bearing rate but
23 none were left, and I clarified that. That's -- none
24 were on the left drawing right. And the CO -- okay. I

1 guess that's what it is. That's -- that's what I had
2 written down at the time.

3 MR. WOODY: Okay.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: So, I do remember those three
5 traces, or I did shortly afterwards, clearly.

6 MR. WOODY: Well, and this is something the
7 fire control man said, and do you have any -- any
8 conversation with the fire control man at that time,
9 the time you were in sonar? Did you come out and talk
10 to him?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any.

12 MR. WOODY: Do you recall any of the sonar
13 men going out to talk to the fire control man?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: No. I remember just -- this
15 came up at the court of inquiry. I remember talking to
16 sonar men many minutes before this, but I don't recall
17 as we're making these final preps to go to periscope
18 depth the sonar men and fire control men and me talking
19 a whole lot. So, I -- I remember it a little
20 differently and I -- and I -- I think perhaps they may
21 have been mistaken on exactly when they -- they had
22 their conversations.

23 MR. WOODY: The question here is -- perhaps
24 jumps around a little bit, but going to fire control

1 just for a minute, the -- we know that there was a fire
2 control man next to the fire control man in -- in the
3 control room sitting in the vicinity of the TAC 3 as
4 you're preparing to go to periscope depth. If you had
5 to assign him duties, what would you -- what would you
6 have had him do, if anything, for preparation to go to
7 periscope depth? Is there any need for him to do
8 anything? Manning the CP? Manning the TAC 3?
9 Anything would -- that would obviously come to mind
10 that he should have been doing to be more productive or
11 for -- for safety of the ship?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: You had a couple real good
13 suggestions of a couple things he could have been
14 doing. Or sitting alongside the unwatched fire control
15 technician on the watch and assisting him in analyzing
16 contacts.

17 MR. WOODY: But none of these sort of things
18 came to mind for the -- should have come to mind for
19 the OOD or for the captain himself?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't notice it in -- I
21 don't -- I don't remember him. I'm not sure. You'd
22 have to ask the CO and the OOD why -- why they didn't
23 utilize him.

24 MR. SCHEFFER: This is Jim Scheffer here.

1 We're going to just take a break here, Bill, and we're
2 going to shut off the tape recording devices, and that
3 will be the end of Side 1 of Tape A.

4 So, I'll be shutting this off at 10:23.

5 (Pause)

6 MR. SCHEFFER: Okay. Resuming Segment 2 of
7 our interview with Lieutenant Commander Gerald Pfeifer,
8 and the time is now 10:54. And this is Tape -- Tape 1,
9 Side B. And we're going to resume where we left off
10 with Mr. Bill Woody.

11 MR. WOODY: Yes. Would you comment on the --
12 the -- the importance of the CEP plot? We're aware
13 that it was not being plotted during the time that the
14 visitors were in the control before going to periscope
15 depth. And could you give us some comments on how
16 important the CEP plot is to the OOD, particularly in
17 view of the fact he did not have an -- to look at?

18 (Pause)

19 LCDR PFEIFER: With -- with contacts it would
20 be something that he would look at, normally.

21 MR. WOODY: But the fact he didn't have a CEP
22 plot that day, could you discuss what kind of a gap
23 that was in his information that he might need to go to
24 periscope depth, where there are sources of places that

1 he could go to get it and steps he might --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

3 MR. WOODY: -- have taken to get it?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: He -- he could have gotten the
5 same information from one of the fire control screens.

6 It -- it -- I think the mode is time-bearing when you
7 -- you put the same information up there in a
8 different format. It may be a little different, but
9 essentially it's -- give you the bearing to the
10 contacts that sonar's trackers on.

11 MR. WOODY: And we're aware that in the CEP
12 plot that there's a long history of what -- of contact,
13 for example. Would the time-bearing screen on the fire
14 control system, would they give -- what kind of a time
15 frame would that give him -- give you, I mean?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Many minutes. It can be
17 adjusted. It can be -- I'm -- you're asking me a
18 question that I don't know the technical answer to, but
19 my recollection is in the -- like, an hour.

20 MR. WOODY: Like an hour?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

22 MR. WOODY: Would it typically --

23 LCDR PFEIFER: We could look it up and -- and
24 give you an exact answer. I don't --

1 MR. WOODY: Would it typically be set to give
2 an hour's worth of data?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: When I operate it I adjust it,
4 so I couldn't say typically what it is.

5 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm. What is your choice of
6 time for -- for the time-bearing clock?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: It depends. If -- if I'm
8 trying to get the bearing rate on a -- on a leg, I'll
9 look at a very short --

10 MR. WOODY: Short --

11 LCDR PFEIFER: -- time scale. And if I'm
12 looking at analyzing over the long haul to see if a
13 contact is changing its true bearing over a long period
14 of time, I'll look at it for, you know, upwards of an
15 hour or so. As I recall, that's about how -- you can
16 put quite a long history on it.

17 MR. WOODY: The fire control man said that he
18 didn't have the -- the bearing scale at 3 -- 360 -- 360
19 degrees. He had it at a scale that would get all the
20 contacts that were there that were tracking -- being
21 tracked by sonar at that time. What kind of a -- of a
22 picture would -- would we see on the time-bearing
23 clock? Would it be 20 degrees or would it be 60
24 degrees or --

1 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- it depends on how far
2 away -- how far in bearing the -- the three contacts
3 were.

4 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm. Okay. The contacts you
5 had that day, what kind of a scale -- bearing scale
6 would he be using --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Perhaps 180 degrees --

8 MR. WOODY: 180 degrees.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: -- or plus or minus 90. I'm
10 not sure how --

11 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: -- how -- if it's a -- I think
13 it's a thing that can be adjusted very finely, so it
14 just depends on where the dots fly or where the dots
15 are appearing and -- and you'd adjust it. So, it could
16 be as narrow as the width of the -- the -- the bearing
17 spectrum or -- or whatever. I -- I can't answer your
18 question, really.

19 MR. WOODY: And going to periscope depth with
20 those three contacts, do you have any kind of a feel
21 for what kind of a -- a time axis would have been set
22 on that -- on that screen? I've asked the same
23 question --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

1 MR. WOODY: -- thinking about it specifically
2 going to periscope depth --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: I can't tell you what the
4 preference -- there's a preference that everyone has in
5 how they -- they've gained their experience and what
6 they've learned and -- and what they're comfortable
7 with. But -- so, maybe -- for -- it's something you --
8 you can adjust it continuously, but if you're --
9 probably when you started making your first leg, that
10 would be where you started the time to the current
11 time.

12 MR. WOODY: Okay. Now, the -- the ship had
13 been on a course 3-4-0, then it came to 1-2-0, if I
14 recall correctly. Would it --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: That's --

16 MR. WOODY: -- would he have had a time scale
17 that would have had both that -- both those legs? That
18 would include both those legs? I mean -- I mean both
19 of the -- the courses.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: If it was me, I would have.

21 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

22 LCDR PFEIFER: I can't tell you what he had.

23 MR. WOODY: What he did. Would that be a
24 typical, normal thing to do?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, it would be.

2 MR. WOODY: Would be.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, let me clarify that. It
4 would -- adjusting it would be very common, too, if you
5 were to look for the long -- long time and go up while
6 you're specifically measuring the bearing rates, which
7 gives you a range.

8 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: You -- you might -- you'd
10 probably adjust it to maybe just that leg that you're
11 looking at. You can look at a past leg and just blow
12 it up, look at that little area, and then you'd
13 probably, while you're measuring the bearing rate,
14 exaggerate that part of the scale so you're looking at
15 it --

16 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

17 LCDR PFEIFER: -- and if -- and you're going
18 to feel over a long period of time adjust it. So, I
19 think you're -- you're asking me a submarine question
20 that's based on individuals, not -- not what -- what I
21 would do --

22 MR. WOODY: I was --

23 LCDR PFEIFER: -- and I'm not sure what --

24 MR. WOODY: -- I was just wondering if there

1 might be some document that says that as a minimum
2 you'd want to have the -- the last two course changes
3 the ship was on if you were doing, say, TMA.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: That doesn't -- I don't recall
5 that doctrine.

6 MR. WOODY: There wasn't any -- document like
7 that? You see the -- the question that I would be
8 asking next is would you have any -- would it be
9 reasonable to expect the fire control man to see that
10 high bearing rate that -- that occurred on 3-4-0, that
11 we understand occurred from the slogger
12 reconstructions?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I --

14 MR. WOODY: Would that be obvious?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I'm -- I'm speaking from
16 having looked at all this --

17 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: -- information. And I don't
19 think so. I think the leg, in hindsight, looking at
20 everything, I think it's reasonable that he didn't
21 notice a high bearing rate for those -- for that short
22 period of time.

23 MR. WOODY: Based on the fact it was a short
24 period of time?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. And also there --
2 there's a difference between slogger data and FIDUs in
3 the fire control system and the time scale -- the
4 slogger data comes out every 15 seconds and the -- the
5 FIDUs are generally 20 seconds. That can be adjusted
6 and I'm not sure what the system was set at at the
7 time. But the FIDU is averaged over 20 seconds, so
8 that would be less frequent dots or less information
9 that he would have at his disposal than -- than the
10 slogger data.

11 MR. WOODY: Okay. On past cruises with lots
12 of people on board and the control room is crowded, has
13 the CEP been allowed to not be kept on -- when it's
14 crowded before? Is that something you're aware of?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: That -- that's something that
16 shouldn't have happened and that wouldn't be something
17 that I would have, if I'd noticed it, allowed to
18 happen.

19 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm. I think the way the --
20 the fire control man characterized it, he was -- to get
21 to the -- the plot he was interrupting the -- the
22 passengers who were having -- you know, having this
23 hang-on during the high-speed evolutions. And so, as
24 one of perhaps safety considerations that he didn't

1 bump them to get to the plot. Was -- background, that
2 possibility, has any thought been given to, say,
3 stationing a person there during crowded conditions to
4 make that plot -- keep that plot current?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. And the -- the Navy's
6 actually gone one further, and -- and on the
7 Greeneville now is an automatic electronic flat screen,
8 so it -- it doesn't require constant manual attention.
9 It's something that's updated automatically.

10 MR. WOODY: But I think the answer you gave
11 on -- on previous cruises, you weren't aware of whether
12 it was or not kept, the CEP was kept or not?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: It's -- the CEP is something
14 that --

15 MR. WOODY: When I say --

16 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I would look at and if it
17 wasn't being maintained frequently enough I would
18 prompt the fire control technician to watch to -- to
19 maintain it or whoever we had doing it. It's not
20 uncommon to have a guy specifically dedicated to the
21 CEP in certain tactical situations so we secure another
22 watch, and that -- that guy stations himself there.

23 MR. WOODY: What other crew members on the
24 ship do you have that are capable of plotting the CEP?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: There are many, but the most
2 common would be the auxiliary electrician forward, who
3 is normally a roving watch stander. And we combined
4 his duties with another watch stander, the auxiliary
5 man of the watch. So, the auxiliary man of the watch
6 does the roving for both guys, maintaining both their
7 logs, and the auxiliary electrician forward will
8 station himself at the CEP and manually update it.

9 MR. WOODY: Okay. When the CO's using the
10 scope, what does the -- the policy or the -- what's
11 standing practice on Greeneville? Does the captain
12 expect the -- the fire control man to give him --
13 complete one bearing automatically or it does -- does
14 it happen only when he asks?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: I recall Commander Waddle
16 would -- I would -- in general he would communicate
17 with the fire control technician.

18 MR. WOODY: When he wanted help?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Put me on the bearing to
20 whatever.

21 MR. WOODY: So, in other words, --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: S-13.

23 MR. WOODY: So, in other words, he would be -
24 - Commander Waddle would ask for it and the fire

1 control man wouldn't do it automatically?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: No, in general. And sometimes
3 the fire control man would -- would, as he's analyzing
4 the FIDUs, would prompt the officer of the deck and
5 say, you know, "Officer of the Deck, I have a -- you
6 know, do you have anybody at 3-4-5?"

7 And -- and then, the officer on the deck --
8 this is just a common dialogue. "Line me up to 3-4-5,
9 left, left, left." And he'd be looking at the -- the
10 bearing repeater and is he on 3-4-5 and he'll say,
11 "Yeah, I'm looking. I don't have anything." Or, "Yeah,
12 there is a contact there."

13 MR. WOODY: The -- the fire control man said
14 that he didn't cue the captain because the captain knew
15 where -- where to look. Is that something that
16 Commander Waddle would know where to look with sonar
17 bearings? He would position the scope without the
18 assistance of the --

19 LCDR PFEIFER: It's something he certainly
20 could have. I -- he looked -- I know he was looking at
21 the sonar screen and he looked at the fire control
22 screen, so he --

23 MR. WOODY: He knew what -- in your --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: He could have.

1 MR. WOODY: -- in your experience as CDO or
2 senior captain, if the ship is on Course 1-2-0 and
3 you're standing with a periscope and you see the BCP at
4 your shoulder, do you know what bearing the periscope
5 is looking on?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

7 MR. WOODY: If you're looking and you know
8 that you have your left shoulder to the CEP plot, do
9 you know what bearing the scope is looking at?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: To -- to within five or 10
11 degrees.

12 MR. WOODY: Okay. Within five or 10 degrees?

13 Capt Malloy: Yeah. Typically an officer by
14 the time he's -- finishes junior officer tour can
15 recognize if you tell him what the heading of the ship
16 is on, the moment he just orients it -- orientates
17 himself, my ass is pointing at the CEP plot, I must be
18 looking at -- at 0-0-5. So, it means some cases --
19 typically you ask to be put on a bearing for exact
20 part, but if you ask does an officer need to be told,
21 does he know roughly where he's looking, the reason he
22 gets disoriented if he's been going round and round
23 quicker or stops suddenly and doesn't know where he's
24 at. But typically, most people know where you are in

1 the control room and therefore your mind is -- your --
2 the control room orients you to where the head of the
3 ship is, unless they change course on you.

4 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: So, most people can tell where
6 they're at. But typically, when you look for a contact
7 you're told, "Put me on the bearing of S-14," because
8 you may not know he's 3-4-7 versus 3-4-8. So, that's
9 where you time you onto a bearing. But if he wants to
10 look north, he'll always know where north is.

11 MR. WOODY: Within how many degrees would you
12 say the -- Commander Waddle -- you said five or 10
13 degrees? Was that considered --

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Without testing him, you know,
15 I would -- that's -- you know. That would be -- maybe
16 a CO, you know, a proficiency -- maybe a little even
17 better than five.

18 MR. WOODY: And how close do you think you'd
19 get to a bearing let's say that was on your port bow?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Right now I could be within
21 10.

22 MR. WOODY: 10?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Now. In the middle of the
24 deployment I could be within two. It's -- it's not a

1 skill you learn as a junior officer and you keep it.
2 It's something that you -- you kind of have to work at.
3 And you -- you hit a low point but you can get very
4 good when you do it a lot.

5 MR. WOODY: Did the -- the fire control man
6 of the watch, typically Petty Officer Seacrest, do you
7 have any recollection of him ever asking for an
8 additional leg for a TMA?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't talk to him or hear
10 him say anything

11 MR. WOODY: I don't mean on the day of the
12 accident. I mean in the past. Did he or other fire
13 control men ever ask for an extra leg TMA?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Specifically an extra leg, no
15 specific instance. But the dialogue between officer of
16 the deck and the FTO watch is common and happens almost
17 every time. It's a very common thing that as you're
18 watching the leg develop and you're getting the
19 information on the screen you'll notice these -- the
20 FIDUs, the dots that I'm talking about, and as -- one
21 of the things you need before you turn is to be -- to
22 develop a bearing rate.

23 And then it would -- I'm -- you know, for me,
24 when I'm officer of the deck I'll have the conversation

1 with the guy. "Okay. It's coming in pretty good. You
2 feel comfortable with the bearing rate?" "Yeah, I feel
3 comfortable." "Okay. Well, we'll turn the ship now."

4 MR. WOODY: Okay. Now, that'd be the kind of
5 dialogue you'd have during a -- an approach situation
6 for an exercise or -- but on a -- a day when you have
7 passengers on board would that kind of a conversation
8 be taking place?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, it certainly would.

10 MR. WOODY: It would be?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. That -- yeah, that's
12 not a --

13 MR. WOODY: Not a --

14 LCDR PFEIFER: -- that's not a only special
15 thing. As officer of the deck, you know.

16 MR. WOODY: As --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: And our guys, it was a common
18 thing for them.

19 MR. WOODY: Did the -- can you ever recall
20 the sonar supervisor or other -- other someone ask for
21 another leg? They say they also --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, --

23 MR. WOODY: -- some -- some TMAs.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: -- you keep saying "ask for

1 another leg." I don't recall, but -- but that dialogue
2 that I'm talking about may -- you know, it happened
3 frequently.

4 MR. WOODY: I see. So --

5 LCDR PFEIFER: You know.

6 MR. WOODY: In the case of dialogue, how
7 would they -- how would they phrase the need for
8 another leg?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, okay. Well, I'll give
10 you an example of a dialogue and maybe that'll help
11 you. With --

12 MR. WOODY: I think so.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: -- with -- with a -- with a
14 submarine, the submarine has a towed array, which
15 requires the ship to be steady for it -- it to be
16 straight, to get good information. And so, this --
17 this change in ship's course to determine another leg
18 is something that you don't want to do it before you're
19 ready. And so, you -- you would check with the sonar
20 man, sonar supe, officer of the deck, "You ready to --
21 for the next leg?" And that would -- that would let
22 you know that he's not investigating any traces or
23 anything and he's ready to maneuver the ship. And that
24 dialogue would be a little more predominant during

1 towed array operations.

2 MR. WOODY: Okay.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: But that's kind of the
4 conversation that goes on. And if -- if he wanted --
5 the sonar supe didn't -- oh, like -- like, for example,
6 S-14.

7 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

8 LCDR PFEIFER: "Okay. I'll give you that."

9 MR. WOODY: Right.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: So, you know, you're going to
11 say, "Okay, sonar. I have one leg on S-14. Recommend
12 coming back to the north to get a second leg."

13 MR. WOODY: Would there be any less
14 likelihood that -- to have that kind of a dialogue when
15 you had a lot of people on board and a schedule to
16 keep?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: From the sonar supe
18 perspective, he shouldn't.

19 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm. And from the fire
20 control man's perspective?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Really shouldn't. I mean it's
22 -- "Okay. Yeah. Let's just be unsafe now." It's not
23 like that at all. It's -- shouldn't.

24 MR. WOODY: Well, I was just wondering. The

1 -- we know that the fire control man said that he was
2 apparently comforted by the fact that the captain said
3 he had a good feel for the contacts. And I think
4 that's when the board pressed him about S-14 having one
5 leg.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

7 MR. WOODY: But an experienced fire control
8 man, would he know as much as the captain of the vessel
9 about what would be known, what physically could be
10 known? For example, he's got one leg. He knows that's
11 not enough. And the captain's been in -- in sonar.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, let me just tell you
13 that -- that -- the captain had been in sonar, so when
14 trace appears on the sonar screen there -- there is a
15 time that it's on sonar screen that's not in the fire
16 control system. There's a -- a thing called a tracker.
17 And it's -- this is a --

18 MR. WOODY: Right.

19 LCDR PFEIFER: -- a signal bearing sensor
20 that -- or sensor repeater that gets into the fire
21 control system. So -- so anyone has to recognize it,
22 put a tracker on it, it goes in the fire control, and
23 then the FTOW, the fire control man of the watch,
24 starts to analyze that data. Now, the captain had the

1 benefit of looking -- being in sonar on the 3-4-0 leg,
2 and so then he went into control, and so he may have a
3 little bit more feel for the trace and the bearing rate
4 of the contact before -- that the FTOW didn't have.

5 So, --

6 MR. WOODY: But the -- okay.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: -- trying to help you there.
8 But that -- that may be what he's referring to.

9 MR. WOODY: Very similar to what I was trying
10 to get to. I think you've helps -- helped.

11 The fire control man had one leg of data. He
12 knows from a lot of experience that one leg is not
13 enough to -- to nail down the -- the ranges of who the
14 contact is and, of course, the speed. Here's the
15 captain come out and say, "I'm satisfied with the --
16 the things." Does -- does the -- does he have enough
17 knowledge that the captain can look at the sonar and
18 know that those contacts are at a safe distance? To
19 compare one contact with one --

20 LCDR PFEIFER: It depends. And it depends on
21 --

22 MR. WOODY: Okay.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: -- how long you look at it.

24 Now, go back a little bit. Okay. You have

1 to -- when you go to periscope depth there's never a
2 guarantee that you have a complete picture of what
3 everyone's doing. As the -- the TMA that we're using,
4 that acronym, we know what that means. That -- that
5 has some assumptions in it, and one of them is that the
6 contact doesn't maneuver. So I want to describe two
7 zero-bearing-rate legs. And if after two legs the
8 contact has zero bearing rate on both legs, that would
9 be an indication that the contact is far away. Now, is
10 it necessarily? It most certainly -- most likely is,
11 but there's a chance that just as you maneuver to a new
12 leg it did the same, matched your speed across line of
13 sight, and it appeared as far away than it wasn't.

14 So, if you could state your question again,
15 I'll try. But I -- I think you were -- you were making
16 a generalization that you know based on this how far
17 away a contact is and you -- it's kind of a guess.

18 MR. WOODY: Right. I think -- I think -- I
19 think you've characterized it correctly. I just
20 wondered if the fire control man has a right to be
21 satisfied that the contact is at a safe range based on
22 the captain's being in sonar for just a couple minutes
23 or so. Would he know when the -- the fire control man
24 knows that he only has one leg on a new contact.

1 Of course, I --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, we all --

3 MR. WOODY: -- the root of the question is --

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

5 MR. WOODY: -- should the fire control man
6 have sounded off or not?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I would expect some dialogue
8 between the CO and the -- and the fire control man of
9 the watch.

10 MR. WOODY: What would you --

11 LCDR PFEIFER: And I'm not sure we --

12 MR. WOODY: -- the fire control man to say?
13 The captain comes out and says, "I'm -- I'm -- I have a
14 good feel for the contacts." He has one leg.

15 LCDR PFEIFER: "Captain, I have one leg on
16 this contact. Recommend we get another leg?" or -- or
17 just some question on -- "What range do you have on
18 this guy?"

19 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Would you expect the -- now,
20 see, I don't want to put words in Waddle's name. In
21 some case the captain would say, "I've seen it and that
22 may be enough," or he could so in -- in some dialogue.

23 Or mentally the FT of the watch could have had a
24 conversation such as, "Did you ever hear the captain

1 say his -- in bottom -- in -- in angles of, you know,
2 basically bottom bounce, I saw the contact at a DD or
3 -- range" or more typically is, "Sonar had that
4 contact three or four minutes faster than they put in
5 ATF. I've looked at the trace before we turned. It's
6 on the sonar screen in there." You know, is that -- an
7 implication the captain could tell him, "I have seen
8 this contact. It's actually on sonar six or seven
9 minutes longer than you have dots for." Have you ever
10 seen that or anything like that?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, that's what I was trying
12 to describe to you with my -- my example that maybe
13 there's -- you don't always assume sonar has the chance
14 to get a tracker on it and gives you all the
15 information. So, can you ask your question again?
16 I'll try again.

17 MR. WOODY: Well, I think -- I think we've
18 probably got as much of an answer we -- as we can get.

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

20 MR. WOODY: How do you feel, Barry? You see
21 what I'm trying to get at?

22 DR. STRAUCH: Yeah. No, I -- I think so.

23 MR. WOODY: I think we've explored it pretty
24 well and I think --

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

2 MR. WOODY: -- we've got some real --

3 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Now, did -- you did not have
4 ARCI Phase 4 for high frequency, right?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: We did not.

6 CAPTAIN MULLOY: On your towed array system,
7 if you had a trace that existed in the past could you
8 go back and mark that data and send it? I don't know
9 if you ever used it that much for that.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I don't -- I can't --

11 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- I believe you could but
13 I --

14 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- there was technical --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: -- tell you for sure.

16 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Some of the -- as we
17 continue to improve is you saw that the ship has this
18 slogger data and the sonar towed system was different
19 than their ship's hull-mounted, right? Exists the
20 capability to go back and mark previous time history on
21 traces and then send that to fire control. On this
22 ship was only narrow band. On ships now being designed
23 is we put this improvement on. You could actually go
24 back and say to sonar, "Hey, that's S-14. And oh, by

1 the way, you started marking him here. He actually
2 existed down here." And if I go up with a track ball
3 and tag it, I can mark dit, dit, dit, dit, mark that
4 time into that.

5 That's a human improvement that the systems
6 are now being installed is I can mark all data, which
7 used to only be in the minds of commander officers and
8 officer decks is to visually integrate in all trace
9 data but the fire control system would never have it
10 except under newer systems because until you start the
11 time of the fire control and create the contact, S-14
12 only existed from 00011 seconds. But now I can go back
13 in the past. But that -- that is the mental framework
14 sometimes people have when you look at the fidelity of
15 sonar data is sonar men and officers can look at it and
16 say he's been there a lot longer and I've seen him
17 through two legs. We just didn't recognize him because
18 it looked like rain, it wasn't identified, we didn't
19 see his gear tones or hear it, but there's a white
20 trace that's probably him. And you can mentally
21 integrate that in and say, hey, we've given that
22 bearing right. That guy's been out there off Hawaii or
23 off Japan for 20 minutes and I know that through my
24 maneuvers he's there.

1 That's the kind of mental understanding that
2 a petty officer will sometimes discuss with the captain
3 or a senior officer but doesn't -- it may be an
4 understood -- understanding or may be a virtual
5 disclaimer. Every crew has a different -- how much
6 should be taken verbally and I can't attest to what was
7 on this ship versus others.

8 MR. WOODY: So, based on what you've said,
9 Captain Mulloy, the -- I think this -- the fire control
10 man may have a right to believe that the captain had
11 some information that he didn't have --

12 CAPTAIN MULLOY: He -- right.

13 MR. WOODY: -- therefore had a right to
14 accept the captain's --

15 CAPTAIN MULLOY: He has a right to accept it.
16 He also has a right to --

17 MR. WOODY: To question.

18 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- to ask what was the data
19 or the fidelity of it. And that's the discussion
20 sometimes between people. Or it may be time, part of
21 it may be attitude, part of it may be personality, part
22 of it may be that the people and the personalities and
23 that's beyond what I know here. Everyone has a right
24 to discuss things on a submarine or a small bridge.

1 But given the time constraints and not being rushing
2 there but it may be, you know, what does the ship have
3 to do.

4 MR. WOODY: But on the day of the accident
5 all of -- with the -- with the -- the control room full
6 of distinguished visitors, is this the sort of thing
7 you -- the fire control man would have -- would --
8 would have felt inclined to do or inclined not to do,
9 to have a dialogue with the captain about the
10 background for his -- his rationale that he had a good
11 feel for the contacts?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: It wouldn't matter if they
13 were there or not.

14 MR. WOODY: It wouldn't matter if they were
15 there or not?

16 CAPTAIN MULLOY: My experience is most of the
17 times people watching enjoy watching a discussion
18 between professionals. Most ships don't mind at all.
19 In fact, most of the crew is enthralled to watch a
20 discussion of what would be considered technical speech
21 if the captain talked about have a bottom-bounce range
22 or not. It might invoke other questions.

23 But I've never, running a lot of VIP cruises,
24 ever had where that -- having people on board detracted

1 from what you would talk about and, too, was would be
2 considered a distraction to the VIPs as it's not
3 someone questioning the captain so much as a healthy
4 discussion between professionals.

5 And especially in the submarine force, we
6 treat our petty officers as professionals. They're
7 experts in their rate. Him questioning the captain
8 would not be abnormal and typically wouldn't be, on
9 most ships anyway. And the captain responding would
10 provide -- I wouldn't call it entertainment so much as
11 education for the guests as what is a healthy
12 discussion between people that do this business.

13 That's -- so that -- so there shouldn't be --
14 there should not have been any interruptions to that,
15 and typically in my experiences, VIPs don't drive that.

16 MR. WOODY: Okay. Now going to -- test
17 depth, Commander Waddle stated that he had gone to test
18 depth and exceeded classified speed -- he didn't say
19 classified speed, I don't believe, the exact words in
20 the past, with DVs on board. How many DV cruises have
21 you made with Commander Waddle where this occurred,
22 either exceeding classified speed or -- or classified
23 depth?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: The exact number I don't know.

1 I know there was at least one other one.

2 MR. WOODY: Was it depth or speed or both?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: I know for sure it was depth.

4 MR. WOODY: Depth. This being the case, were
5 they --

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Probably speed as well.

7 MR. WOODY: Probably speed as well. There
8 would have been angles and dangles on that cruise as
9 well?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

11 MR. WOODY: Okay. Did -- do you know what
12 the -- the -- the policy on -- I shouldn't say the
13 "policy." The practice on other -- other boats taking
14 the -- having DV cruises. Were they also likely to
15 exceed classified depth?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I know -- I know -- well,
17 other submarines -- I couldn't tell you for sure. I --
18 I don't -- I don't think it would have been that
19 uncommon --

20 MR. WOODY: Okay.

21 LCDR PFEIFER: -- before this.

22 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: But -- but I -- I -- I didn't
24 think that the Greeneville was doing something that it

1 was that out -- out of the norm.

2 MR. WOODY: I see. Was there any discussion
3 -- anybody say anything to Commander Waddle on those
4 other occasions? And for example, were there any
5 division -- commanders or other high-ranking naval --
6 Navy guests on board at the same time?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Not -- not that one that I
8 remember specifically.

9 (Pause)

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Before you go on, Bill, this
11 is Tom Roth-Roffy. Just to -- to clarify that last
12 question, on the occasion that you recall, did anybody
13 say anything to Commander Waddle about the fact that he
14 had exceeded classified depths and speeds that you
15 recall?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I guess -- and your
17 question is that -- that they had a concern that he was
18 doing that?

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Correct.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: And I'm not privy to all his
21 conversations, but I don't recall overhearing any.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Was it a concern of
23 yours that -- that he had done this on that occasion or
24 on -- on the accident occasion?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: I can't tell you for sure.
2 And I'm -- I'm probably -- like, the first time we did
3 one it may have -- you know, I may have said, "Hey, is
4 this really -- are we going to do this or is this what
5 your intentions are?" And then it became the norm and
6 -- and I -- I kind of accepted it as that's how we're
7 going to do it.

8 But -- but I don't -- I can't recall any
9 specific -- I can't even -- I just remember one other
10 time that we -- that we did it. We probably did it
11 more than -- more than once, probably several times.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. WOODY: -- look at 17. I think we may
14 have covered 17 in our discussions.

15 (Pause)

16 MR. WOODY: The -- the court of inquiry noted
17 there were many discrepancies between the watch bill
18 listing watch assignments and those actually on the
19 watch on February 9th. Could you comment on the
20 differences between what was -- what the watch bill
21 said and what actually occurred on the -- on the watch?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. Now, I forget the exact
23 number that the court said that -- they had said there
24 was nine guys. And they -- they kept saying nine out

1 of 13, but there's -- there's really, like, 30 guys on
2 watch at any one time, and I'm not sure why they --
3 they -- I think they may have used the smaller number
4 to make it look worse.

5 It -- but those -- those nine people, when --
6 when you look at -- at what they were doing --

7 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Some -- some switching of the
9 watches weren't that unusual. Like, the helmsman and
10 -- and the sternplanesman. Those were assigned by
11 the captain verbally, "I want you here and you here
12 because we're doing angles and dangles." Now, that's
13 one extreme that wouldn't be that unusual.

14 Another extreme would be the quartermaster
15 who said, "Oh, I'll just -- I -- I want to work on the
16 charts. Why don't you do -- do the watch?" That was
17 UNSAT, and I -- there's no excuse for that.

18 And then in the middle somewhere are the
19 sonar supes that decided to switch watch. And -- and I
20 do want to -- do want to comment on that. If -- if --
21 if you can follow me, a ship gets underway at a -- and
22 we're supposed to be at Papa Hotel at 1400 and we get
23 back at 1500, that's -- that's about a seven-hour
24 period, okay? Now, the maneuvering watch is usually

1 about an hour, so that would be from eight to nine, a
2 maneuvering watch, and then from 14 to 1500. So, those
3 are two one-hour maneuvering watches. And to prevent
4 yourself from making a bunch of watch bills, you assign
5 one sonar supe to each one of those -- two -- one sonar
6 supe that's going to cover the maneuvering watch, so
7 that's -- call that Sonar Supe A. So he's got those
8 two.

9 That day we had two sonar supes, so I have to
10 put one sonar supe in the morning or the -- the guy
11 preparing the watch bill. One -- one sonar supe in the
12 morning and one in the afternoon. So, A is going to
13 have to go -- since A's got the maneuvering watch, he's
14 going to have to also do from, let's say 10 to noon and
15 noon to 13 or noon to 14.

16 So, what happened was A had the maneuvering
17 watch and these two times and then he had to have
18 either the morning or the afternoon, a couple hours.
19 So, he had A and then Sonar Supe B had -- had the
20 afternoon period. And A and B for some unknown reason,
21 they -- they switched. And they gave an excuse which I
22 think is misleading, that they said one guy was going
23 to have to be on watch essentially the whole day. And
24 if you look at it, it -- it's -- that was incorrect.

1 And I -- and I was -- I was bothered by the court of
2 inquiry because they really latched onto that as being
3 poor management and planning of the watch bill in that
4 specific case, and you know, I disagree. So, I
5 appreciate the chance to clear that up here.

6 So, I guess to answer your question, there
7 was, I guess -- some were authorized in one extreme.
8 Some were something that the guys shouldn't have done
9 and they should have known not to do that but -- but
10 they did. So, the switching of people on watch I don't
11 think was as egregious as -- as it was portrayed. But
12 it wasn't --

13 MR. WOODY: Now --

14 LCDR PFEIFER: -- that -- our normal
15 standard.

16 MR. WOODY: When you come in at 2, after the
17 -- after the accident occurred, there had to be some --
18 some crew changes, watch -- watch changes so there
19 could be people to go up and -- themselves and the
20 rescue operation, if one were to take place. Can you
21 comment on how the people arranged their -- their --
22 their release to get people off? For example, the
23 sonar supe became a person that was concerned with
24 helping in the -- any rescue efforts. Can you comment

1 on how those all worked? Was there -- were there any
2 problems involved by unqualified people in watch?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I don't recall of any --

4 MR. WOODY: Were there any problems with
5 watch standing as a result of people coming off watch
6 to go to a -- help search and -- the search and rescue?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not aware of any. I think
8 people responded and filled in and I don't think -- I
9 don't know of any cases where anyone abandoned the
10 watch and waited for somebody to come relieve them.
11 Because, for example, the sonar supe -- I'm not sure
12 which guy you're referring to. I think it -- I think I
13 do. And I'm not aware that he abandoned his station.
14 I think he would wait for the other sonar supe to
15 relieve him and then he would go take --

16 MR. WOODY: Yes, he did. He said he waited
17 for the other person --

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. So, that -- that's what
19 I would expect.

20 MR. WOODY: But he went to a certain duty
21 because he knew that the person who had that duty was
22 in port, as I recall his -- his interview.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. He was probably the
24 acting first lieutenant that day, if that's what you're

1 referring to.

2 MR. WOODY: Yes.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. That's a -- that's a --
4 that's a collateral duty that would be exchanged
5 between -- it's kind of hierarchy with collateral
6 duties that this is the real guy, this is the standby
7 guy. So, if -- if you're not going to be there, you'd
8 coordinate with the guy that you're -- that's going in
9 your place. You tell him, "Okay. I'm going to be
10 gone. You're going to be the first lieutenant this day
11 and here's what I want you to do."

12 MR. WOODY: Were there any problems that you
13 or the -- were involved in solving, any kind of watch
14 standing problems following the -- the accident?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any.

16 MR. WOODY: (Inaudible.)

17 (Pause)

18 MR. WOODY: I just have one more question on
19 the fire control man. I -- one thing just keeps
20 occurring on the fire control man. He had limited
21 opportunity -- opportunity to get data for his fire
22 control system. He had limited opportunity time-wise.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

24 MR. WOODY: Your overall opinion, did he do

1 as well as he could reasonably be expected to do that
2 day as far as tracking the contacts and determining
3 information that was available?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: I think he was really made --
5 he took a lot of public criticism that I think was --
6 was from people that don't understand the -- the
7 challenges of -- of analyzing a lot of data quickly.
8 And I think he did a fairly reasonable job analyzing
9 and getting solutions with the information that he did
10 have. The --

11 MR. WOODY: And the -- all right.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: -- communication with the CO,
13 I didn't observe that and I -- I -- you're kind of
14 referring to things that I'm not even aware of, whether
15 they talked or not and how much they did. But as far
16 as his proficiency at operating his equipment, I think
17 he -- he performed as well as he could with probably as
18 -- you know, better than the average guy being able to
19 analyze that much information in that amount of time.

20 MR. WOODY: I know that -- I remember the
21 captain had good things to say about him at the court
22 of inquiry. We're aware too that he earned the -- was
23 it Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal. Can you
24 comment on the circumstances that led to his receiving

1 that particular award? I think he got it three times.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: You know, I don't -- I don't
3 recall. Did -- did he get it on the Greeneville, the
4 award?

5 MR. WOODY: Yes, he did. At least one time
6 on the Greeneville.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. He had a collateral
8 duty that he was the command crew counselor on the
9 ship, which helps us get -- get our guys to the right
10 shore assignments when it's time to leave and has a big
11 part in the retention. And like I alluded to earlier,
12 our ship retained all our officers, junior officers,
13 and we were very high up on the list overall ship-wise
14 in retention. So, he -- he played a big part in that
15 and that may have been what his recognition is for. I
16 -- the -- but he was also a competent fire control man
17 of the watch.

18 MR. WOODY: Okay. And one last question on
19 his -- on him. How'd his petty officer evaluations
20 compare with other first class petty officers on -- on
21 Greeneville? I presume you would have seen all the --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I -- I'm not sure where
23 that is --

24 MR. WOODY: Do you have a feeling --

1 LCDR PFEIFER: -- privacy act statement and
2 all that kind of stuff. But -- so I'll --

3 MR. WOODY: Well, could -- was he better than
4 most? Equivalent to -- to most petty officer first
5 class or below?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: I would like to say -- because
7 I -- in my opinion he was -- because I don't want to --
8 I don't want to allude to any -- his fitness evals.

9 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Because I think those are
11 between him and the CO --

12 MR. WOODY: Well, there --

13 LCDR PFEIFER: -- so I -- I don't want to
14 divulge stuff that I -- I shouldn't. He -- he's a --
15 somewhere between the middle and the top in -- in --
16 you know, with anyone, you know. He'll have very good
17 days and weeks and relative to the people that I'm
18 comparing him to as they come and go, but over the time
19 I was the XO he was probably between the middle and the
20 top.

21 MR. WOODY: Okay. I think that's --

22 (Pause)

23 MR. WOODY: I can continue -- Barry, are
24 there certain areas you want to get on --

1 (Pause)

2 MR. WOODY: Barry, why don't I defer to you
3 for a while?

4 (Pause)

5 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. This is Barry Strauch.
6 What are your career plans?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure. I'd like to
8 stay in the Navy and complete my career.

9 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. How many COs did you
10 serve under as XO?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: One, two -- four total.

12 DR. STRAUCH: Did that give you enough time
13 to compare different styles, techniques of each one?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Not really. The majority of
15 time as XO was under Commander Waddle. So, the -- the
16 other COs were there for a short period or interim COs.

17 DR. STRAUCH: What was the shortest period
18 that you served as XO to a CO?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Less than a week.

20 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. So, really, there were
21 three that you served under?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: And the other ones for over --
23 just a few months.

24 DR. STRAUCH: How would you compare Commander

1 Waddle to the -- those other COs that you can form an
2 opinion on as -- as a -- let's say his management
3 style?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- the other COs weren't
5 really normal COs. They were there for a short period
6 of time. And -- and the other ones were just -- two of
7 them were there for an interim amount of time. The
8 management style, to answer your question comparing him
9 to other COs, can you give me help -- help define it a
10 little bit? What -- what management styles? I need to
11 know --

12 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Communication. How was
13 his communication as compared to the others?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: He -- he was -- he came -- he
15 was probably a better communicator. And -- and I mean
16 he would speak to a group probably better than the
17 other COs as far as being boisterous and getting their
18 attention and being a likable guy.

19 DR. STRAUCH: Knowledge of technical matters?

20 (Pause)

21 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- two of the COs that I
22 had for an interim time, I don't want to compare them
23 two. But tactical matters he maybe was a little less
24 knowledgeable in tactical matters than the other guy

1 that I spent a few months with.

2 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Adherence to procedures?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: It depends on what procedures,
4 but in general -- it's really not fair to compare them
5 because we did different operations with different guys
6 and -- and, for example, in some situations he'd never
7 really be challenged so it'd be easy to follow all the
8 rules. So, about the same, maybe a little less.

9 DR. STRAUCH: Conduct of DV cruises?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: He's the only one I did one
11 with.

12 DR. STRAUCH: How many did you do with him?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: I couldn't give you an exact
14 number. Several.

15 DR. STRAUCH: Is it fair to say that he
16 seemed to seek out DV cruises?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

18 DR. STRAUCH: Did you ever discuss that with
19 him?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, we discussed DV cruises
21 and when an opportunity presented itself I knew because
22 he enjoyed them and for whatever reason liked having
23 them that we would pursue them.

24 DR. STRAUCH: Why do you think he enjoyed

1 them?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I think he took on board the
3 role as an ambassador for the submarine force. He --
4 he thought that he was good at it and he thought that
5 it was important that the Navy communicate what it's
6 about to the public.

7 DR. STRAUCH: He took on this role
8 voluntarily or do you think somebody said something to
9 him?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: I think his personality was
11 such that he enjoyed -- and also, he was -- he was good
12 at it. He was good at endearing himself to visitors
13 and -- and helping them appreciate the submarine force.

14 DR. STRAUCH: Were you close with Commander
15 Waddle as a friend?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I guess as a friend, we really
17 weren't friends. There was a -- it was a working
18 closeness. But that's probably closer than the -- the
19 stereotypical working-with-your-boss closeness because
20 submarine and we had adjacent rooms. And when we
21 traveled and went -- when the submarine traveled he and
22 I would typically do things together.

23 DR. STRAUCH: And you felt comfortable with
24 Commander Waddle as a person, as a boss?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

2 DR. STRAUCH: It was alleged that on a cruise
3 in San Francisco Bay that Commander Waddle deliberately
4 slowed things up because that would expose him to media
5 coverage and as a result of that water entered the sub.

6 Are you familiar with those allegations?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not.

8 DR. STRAUCH: Are you familiar with the
9 incident?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

11 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Can you tell us what
12 happened in the incident?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: You're -- you're going back
14 probably a lot more than -- than nine months now. But
15 we were leaving San Francisco on the surface and on our
16 way out he was embracing the people of San Francisco.
17 And we had made some contacts with a surface ship that
18 had come in, and I can't remember if it was a Coast
19 Guard or a Navy. They ran a little boat by and
20 exchanged a few things with us on our way out. And
21 also, he was on a cell phone. And he called a radio
22 station and was trying to communicate to people through
23 the radio that, hey, if you're on the Golden Gate --
24 the red one, that hey, we're -- we're down here, take a

1 look at us, and that kind of thing.

2 DR. STRAUCH: Was there a -- his conversation
3 on the cell phone, what was the proximity of that to
4 when the water came in?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, it was before the water
6 came in. That was before we -- I think it was before
7 we went -- went underneath the bridge.

8 DR. STRAUCH: And how soon after he hung up
9 did the water -- did the incident happen?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall.

11 DR. STRAUCH: Do you recall what he did in
12 the interim between the time he hung up and the time
13 the incident occurred?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: I think he came down. I think
15 he came down and we made preparations to get the people
16 off the bridge and shut the hatch.

17 DR. STRAUCH: Did you hear any of the other
18 officers discussing this in terms of the allegations
19 that I have just mentioned?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Other than what I've just --
21 you'd have to refresh my memory of what -- what these
22 allegations are.

23 DR. STRAUCH: The allegations were that he
24 deliberately slowed departure from San Francisco Bay

1 because of something -- I don't -- do you recall what
2 the allegations were, Tom?

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: This is Tom Roth-Roffy. I
4 believe there was a navigation plan which called for
5 you to close the hatch at a certain time and that plan
6 was not adhered to because it was alleged that
7 Commander Waddle was on the cell phone making some
8 arrangements as you described with some radio station.

9 Now, was there any, to your recollection,
10 change to the -- the navigation plan departing San
11 Francisco?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I think the -- the plan
13 changed significantly. And -- and a lot of it -- when
14 this -- the Zodiac came along we slowed and stopped, so
15 I mean that -- that happened. Then -- and we exchanged
16 things. And I could be wrong. That might have been on
17 the way in but I think it was on the way out. I also
18 remember they were communicating up on the bridge with
19 and talking to the pilot and the pilot had given some
20 recommendations on how to proceed out with -- with the
21 captain, which I didn't hear. But -- so that the track
22 was a certain way and we were deviating from that on
23 recommendations from the pilot. So, there was a lot of
24 changes to the plan as it -- as it happened.

1 And that -- leaving San Francisco was -- it
2 was definitely a rough -- very rough seas. And I don't
3 -- I don't think we anticipated it was going to be that
4 rough. It wasn't that rough on the way in. Just on
5 the way out it really -- it got us in trouble because
6 we didn't get the hatch shut in time.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We were told that there was
8 -- it's a known rough area and that was actually
9 specific guidance to submarine vessels while transiting
10 outbound or inbound that the hatch be closed at a
11 certain point. And we were led to believe that, you
12 know, that guidance was not fully adhered to for -- for
13 various reasons. It was in a navigation plan that the
14 hatch be closed at a certain time, before perhaps
15 reaching a certain point on the track line. Do you
16 have any recollection of that?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. Well, I do -- I don't
18 -- I don't recall what our agreement was, but I do
19 know that we had some plans to do certain things at
20 certain times and I don't remember exactly when it was
21 to close the hatch. I know after we took water down
22 the hatch we looked real hard at the books again and
23 found in -- in -- in an instruction, an op order of
24 some sort, that there were some specific rules for San

1 Francisco that we didn't have the hatch shut in time.
2 And that was a hindsight kind of problem, not -- not a
3 -- he didn't knowingly throw that out the window. It
4 was -- it was, yeah, the rule said you should have it
5 shut by this time and -- and perhaps it wasn't, but --

6 CAPTAIN MULLOY: So, your -- your -- this is
7 Captain Mulloy. Your track did not say at a point just
8 prior to the Golden Gate Bridge shut the hatch?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think so. No, I don't
10 think that was on the chart.

11 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay. Do you know what the
12 op order is that requires it?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: I do in hindsight, yeah.

14 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Op Order 201 is the sub
15 guide. Op Order 201 and 2000 --

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I think it's 205 --

17 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay -- 201.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, it is now.

19 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: But that -- that's what got
21 us. It wasn't Op Order 2000 or 201. It's in another
22 op order, 205, that describes restrictions --

23 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Restrictions --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: -- on different ports.

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Right.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: And so I remember as -- it's a
3 little different --

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Does the restriction have
5 anything to do with the time the ship gets underway,
6 early or later? Do you remember in hindsight?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I don't think it did. It
8 -- it did have --

9 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Do you know what it's based
10 on?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- the rules?

12 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Based on a lot of lessons
14 learned of people having troubles in there, sir.

15 DR. STRAUCH: When you reviewed the
16 procedures afterwards, then you -- then you and
17 Commander Waddle, then you found the -- the relevant op
18 order?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes. Well, it was -- I had
20 come in and out of there before and perhaps another --
21 people on board had. And so, you know, it was I
22 remember doing this, I remember doing this. And so, we
23 instituted a lot of safety precautions knowing that
24 that was a hazardous area. Afterwards we found the

1 specific reason behind a lot of the things that we'd
2 done coming in and out.

3 DR. STRAUCH: And then you found in referring
4 to the op order that in fact you were supposed to have
5 had the hatch closed at a certain point in time and --
6 and you hadn't done it?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I can't remember what it
8 -- what it said exactly but that was -- as we were
9 making our plan it was a point -- I don't remember
10 where it was -- but, hey, we want to have the -- get
11 that hatch shut by this time.

12 DR. STRAUCH: Shouldn't the op order have
13 been reviewed before you departed?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, yeah.

15 DR. STRAUCH: Why wasn't it?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: It -- it was -- we were
17 looking at it and just -- just like the captain was --
18 we thought it was in this one Op Order 2000 and 201,
19 and we had combed through it. I -- I -- I personally
20 did. I combed through these other manuals and these
21 Coast Guard pubs looking for all the rules going in and
22 out of San Francisco. I couldn't find it and I -- I
23 had forgot about another op order, 205, in which it was
24 -- it was tucked in there.

1 DR. STRAUCH: You said at one point you were
2 inspector of something?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes. Well, nuclear power
4 plants on surface ships and submarines.

5 DR. STRAUCH: And what were your duties as
6 inspector?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I reviewed administrative
8 records and watched them operate the plant, doing
9 evolutions and casualty drills, and wrote up
10 deficiencies and assigned grades.

11 DR. STRAUCH: And what would happen with
12 those reports after you completed them?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: They were reviewed by our
14 boss, CINCPAC Fleet. He would sign them and then they
15 would be sent off to the ship.

16 DR. STRAUCH: How often would you go out and
17 -- on deployments or other -- evolutions and observe
18 these?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Two or three a month.

20 DR. STRAUCH: How often did people in that
21 position come on board the Greeneville and inspect the
22 operations?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: About every 10 months.

24 DR. STRAUCH: Once every 10 months?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. It -- there's a -- it
2 depends on your operational schedule, but there's a --
3 there's a periodicity that works out to be a little
4 less than a year that SSNs get reviewed.

5 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Presumably, there are
6 more than one inspection of the kind that you did,
7 there are inspections that look at other types of
8 aspects of the sub?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, that's correct.

10 DR. STRAUCH: So, if you -- if you were to
11 estimate how many total inspections there were in
12 Greeneville when you were there as XO in a year, how
13 many -- how many would that come out to be?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: In a year? You'd probably get
15 two.

16 DR. STRAUCH: I --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, there's -- I mean you --
18 you mentioned --

19 (LCDR Pfeifer's response was interrupted by
20 the end of Tape 1, Side B)

21 DR. STRAUCH: The question was to the total
22 number of inspections on board the Greeneville, and you
23 started to answer that --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, --

1 DR. STRAUCH: -- there were different types
2 of inspections.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: -- yeah. There's -- there's
4 -- there's -- there's the gamut of -- you know, it
5 could be an -- inspection could be as -- as minor as a
6 squadron representative coming down and touring the
7 ship in the course of one hour to the nuclear
8 inspection. And they -- they -- they range over that
9 scale. Inspections that we specifically go to sea for,
10 about two a year. And the -- the major two
11 inspections. One would be a propulsion -- either
12 propulsion exam and the other one would be of a
13 tactical format.

14 DR. STRAUCH: There any other techniques that
15 Squadron or CINCPAC would use to assess how well a sub
16 is performing other than these inspections?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I'm not sure how they --
18 they assess different submarines.

19 DR. STRAUCH: Well, how thorough do you think
20 -- would you rate these inspections in terms of what
21 knowledge they gain about the effectiveness of a sub's
22 performance?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- what I'm most familiar
24 with is the nuclear propulsion exam and probably about

1 as thorough as - a look as you can get.

2 DR. STRAUCH: I guess what I'm getting at is
3 I was kind of surprised in reading the court of
4 inquiry's transcripts that they were surprised at some
5 of the things going on on the Greeneville. And it
6 seems to me if these inspections were really thorough
7 that nothing that happened on the Greeneville really
8 should have come as a surprise to admirals whose job it
9 is to oversee how their subs are operating. Is that a
10 fair assessment, do you think, of these inspections and
11 the -- and the oversight of the Navy brass?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I can't tell you what admirals
13 think. I'm just an XO.

14 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Let me rephrase --
15 rephrase that question. What did you think of the
16 court of inquiry's questions on the Greeneville --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: There were a lot of questions
18 asked by a lot of people. I guess you have to narrow
19 that one down for me.

20 DR. STRAUCH: What did you think of the
21 questions they asked Commander Waddle?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: -- did I think of the
23 questions they asked Commander Waddle.

24 (Pause)

1 LCDR PFEIFER: I guess, which question -- I
2 don't even remember too many questions that he got
3 asked.

4 DR. STRAUCH: Well, some people have alleged
5 that the court of inquiry was using Commander Waddle as
6 a scapegoat. You feel that's a fair characterization?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think that's a fair --
8 I don't think they -- I think they did the best they
9 could and -- and found out the facts and when it came
10 down to it, it seemed to me that he kind of admitted he
11 made those mistakes and had these shortcomings and was
12 punished for it.

13 DR. STRAUCH: Did you recognize the
14 shortcomings when you were XO?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- the shortcomings that
16 they punished him for were -- were specific acts on
17 that day.

18 DR. STRAUCH: His performance on that day,
19 was there anything on that that was unusual in his
20 performance any other time that you had seen him as XO?

21 MR. SCHEFFER: Should we take a break now?
22 Why don't we do it to check tapes and everything --

23 SPEAKER: Right.

24 SPEAKER: Sure.

1 MR. SCHEFFER: Want to do that?

2 (Brief recess)

3 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay. We're up and going?

4 SPEAKER: Up and going.

5 DR. STRAUCH: It's now 12 -- about 12:12.

6 This is Barry Strauch and we're continuing the
7 interview with Commander Pfeifer.

8 And the question that we asked before the
9 break -- the question that I had asked before the break
10 was the court of inquiry cited some mistakes that
11 Commander Waddle had made on the day of the accident,
12 and my question was you had observed him making similar
13 mistakes beforehand and I sort of was asking you to
14 compare his performance on that day of the incident --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Can you refresh my memory? I
16 don't -- I don't remember saying that he had made some
17 other mistakes before.

18 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. That's my question to
19 you.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh.

21 DR. STRAUCH: Did you observe him make --
22 making similar mistakes beforehand and was there any
23 difference in his performance that day of the accident
24 with his performance before the accident?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, the -- the major mistake
2 he made was not seeing the Ehime Maru through the
3 periscope when it was one -- one mile away. And I
4 didn't see him do that before.

5 DR. STRAUCH: Miss a fishing vessel or vessel
6 a mile away?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: No. I never saw him operate a
8 scope poorly before.

9 DR. STRAUCH: I think one of the witnesses at
10 the court of inquiry I believe was Admiral Griffiths
11 who testified that the -- that the Ehime Maru would
12 have been very difficult to see through the periscope
13 because of a combination of overcast, its color of
14 hull, and the sea state. Were you aware of those
15 conditions, the overcast and the sea state, at the time
16 of the accident?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I didn't -- I didn't look
18 through the periscope. Mr. Coen did and then the
19 captain. The captain had -- he's the one that took the
20 scope. It's his responsibility to -- you know, if the
21 sea state's too high, to compensate for it by making --
22 making the ship shallower or broaching the ship or for
23 some other reason, and if it's hazy to not -- to
24 realize that he doesn't have a good clear view of the

1 surface and alter the plan.

2 My view -- the -- the video I saw from the
3 Coast Guard helicopter immediately after the collision,
4 it -- it didn't appear to me from that angle that it
5 was that hazy that you couldn't see a ship one mile
6 away. There very may well have been, but I don't --
7 I'm not sure how it happened.

8 DR. STRAUCH: The -- I believe, and I could
9 be wrong, but I believe the court of inquiry brought
10 out that Commander Waddle's periscope search was rapid.
11 Was that characteristic, his periscope search that
12 day, was that characteristic of what you had seen
13 before?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't -- I didn't watch his
15 -- I didn't monitor him while he was on the scope. I
16 was doing other things. But I don't know of -- I don't
17 -- I didn't have an opinion that he did rapid searches.

18 DR. STRAUCH: The court of inquiry also cited
19 him for rushing the TMAs, for not doing an adequate
20 TMA. I believe we covered this in some of the earlier
21 questions. But had you -- had you seen him shorten
22 TMAs before to the extent that he did on the day of the
23 accident?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

1 DR. STRAUCH: How would you characterize the
2 TMAs that he had overseen before this?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, he helped train our
4 junior officers and I don't recall any example of him
5 teaching them incorrect methods.

6 DR. STRAUCH: Did you notice at the time that
7 he was shortening them?

8 LCDR PFEIFER: No. I didn't have a stop
9 watch. I wasn't looking at my watch to see how long
10 they were. The -- the -- I really came into the TMA
11 picture on the 1-2-0 leg and in my opinion that was
12 long enough, and I think when you look at the -- the
13 records, that was a good leg, the 1-2-0 leg.

14 DR. STRAUCH: About an hour or so, and I
15 don't recall exactly the time, you went into Commander
16 Waddle's stateroom and talked to him about the Papa
17 Hotel time?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

19 DR. STRAUCH: Could you describe that
20 conversation to us?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I can see what I wrote
22 down here. Help me remember some of it.

23 (Pause)

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Let's see here. It looks like

1 13:06, reported to the CO in the CO stateroom and found
2 him writing words on photos for the VIPs. It's a gift
3 we give them and the CO would sign a picture of the
4 ship and -- and give it to them. And I let him know
5 that we needed to get going because we had a Papa Hotel
6 time in less than an hour. I'm paraphrasing. He noted
7 the -- the hurry and said we'd be late and -- and
8 finished the photos. This was from my notes that I --
9 that I wrote that day, that afternoon.

10 DR. STRAUCH: So, he didn't -- he was aware
11 that -- that -- that you were going to be late, "you"
12 being the vessel?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. That's what I say here.
14 We'd be late.

15 DR. STRAUCH: He testified that he was not in
16 a rush coming back, but yet the errors that he appears
17 to have made are characteristic of somebody who's
18 trying to shorten things. Do you believe he was
19 rushing through, trying to get back to port?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: That's a good question for
21 him.

22 DR. STRAUCH: You were the XO.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes. At the time I didn't
24 think that he was cutting corners. In view of the

1 slogger data and the time that we spent at PD and the
2 length of time on the 3-4-0 leg, I understand the
3 conclusion that he was hurrying things. And the
4 motives -- I don't want to speculate on why -- why he
5 was hurrying or why it appears that he was hurrying.

6 DR. STRAUCH: If you had felt at the time
7 that he was hurrying and cutting corners, you test --
8 you said that you didn't feel that way at that time,
9 but in hindsight, if you saw that the evidence shows
10 that he was doing things quickly, what would you have
11 said to him?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: "Hey, Captain, we need to" --
13 I guess my -- my main issue would have been with him --
14 him kind of driving the problem. I would have helped
15 slow things down by suggesting to him that, "Captain,
16 why don't you back off and let Lieutenant Coen come to
17 this -- complete the preps for periscope depth and
18 we'll keep an eye on things." And that would have kind
19 of taken him out of it and letting -- letting Mr. Coen
20 be officer of the deck, give the orders, which would
21 have helped slow things down.

22 DR. STRAUCH: Why do you feel he was driving
23 Mr. Coen as the officer of the deck?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't know why he was.

1 DR. STRAUCH: Another officer testified -- I
2 believe it was the navigator who testified that
3 Commander Waddle -- that -- that one complaint that he
4 had about Commander Waddle was that he was very
5 directive with some of his officers. And when we
6 talked to Lieutenant Coen I -- I think it's fair to say
7 that -- that in hindsight he feels that way. How would
8 you characterize Commander Waddle's interactions with
9 officers of the deck in your experience?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: With my experience, there
11 would be times where he would be very directive and
12 times where he could be standoffish.

13 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. How was he that morning,
14 the morning of the accident?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- what -- what time in
16 the morning?

17 DR. STRAUCH: Take us through your
18 observations of him that day in the control room.

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

20 DR. STRAUCH: Was he -- was he different from
21 one time to another, and if so, when?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: During -- I have no
23 recollection of him being directive with officer of the
24 decks any time until it came time to come to periscope

1 depth.

2 DR. STRAUCH: And at that point?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Then, when I was in sonar and
4 he left, I could hear him giving direction to Mr. Coen.
5 So, at that time he was becoming directive.

6 DR. STRAUCH: Mr. Coen -- again, we -- in our
7 interviews with him I think stated that if he had to do
8 it over again he would probably have maybe said
9 something to the CO at that time. He -- I think it's
10 fair to say that he -- he blames himself for some of
11 the things that went wrong. Do you -- do you blame him
12 for anything?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: I think I stated earlier that
14 I think the fundamental error was the captain taking
15 the scope and -- and not seeing the ship. And I don't
16 blame Mr. Coen for yielding the scope to the captain.

17 DR. STRAUCH: Do you think that Lieutenant
18 Coen could have done anything differently that day?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

20 DR. STRAUCH: What --

21 LCDR PFEIFER: I mean he -- he -- he could
22 have questioned the length of the 3-4-0 leg. He -- he
23 had the access to the fire control system and saw the
24 number of dots and could have communicated his concerns

1 to the captain that, hey, this leg isn't long enough.
2 And I'm not sure he didn't. I mean I don't -- I don't
3 know what -- what interaction the two of them had.

4 DR. STRAUCH: Do you think you could have
5 done anything different that day?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: With -- with what I knew I
7 think I acted reasonably. If I had chosen other things
8 to look at or if I had concern that maybe the captain
9 wasn't going to do a good look I would have insisted on
10 doing a good look. But I don't -- I didn't have any
11 reason to think that he wasn't going to look through
12 the scope responsibly.

13 DR. STRAUCH: In the questions about the
14 watch bill you said that there was some aspects of this
15 -- correct me if I'm -- if I'm paraphrasing this
16 incorrectly, but I believe you said that some aspects
17 of switching the watch bill were -- were nothing --
18 were not unusual but some were unsat. I think that was
19 your word. What was unsat?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, the -- the example I
21 gave was -- was the quartermaster who decided to
22 arrange with another quartermaster that you stand my
23 watch and I'll prepare charts that -- and the
24 administrative tasks that he should do off watch. He -

1 - those two between themselves decided to switch.

2 DR. STRAUCH: And how should it have been
3 done properly?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: He should have stood his own
5 watch. And if they would ask permission to -- to swap,
6 it probably would have been turned down. There's --
7 there's not a need to -- to do your administrative
8 things during your watch time. He should just stand
9 his watch. The other guy had stood watch already so he
10 didn't need to -- to stand his other watch. Did the
11 quartermaster of the watch swapping have anything to do
12 with this? I don't think so.

13 DR. STRAUCH: What about the sonar supervisor
14 switching? Was that --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think that had any
16 effect on it.

17 DR. STRAUCH: How should that have been done?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: They should have stood the
19 watch that they were assigned. I showed here on the
20 piece of paper that there was nothing wrong with the
21 plan that -- that the watch bill as -- as written and
22 approved by the captain and they should have followed
23 the plan.

24 DR. STRAUCH: And if they had asked your

1 permission?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I would have asked them why
3 they wanted to switch and probably would have explained
4 to them just like I did here that, you know, it's
5 really not unfair to either one of them.

6 DR. STRAUCH: The -- the captain himself
7 switched the helmsman. Was that proper?

8 LCDR PFEIFER: I think that would be an
9 appropriate thing to do.

10 DR. STRAUCH: Inappropriate?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: No, appropriate.

12 DR. STRAUCH: Okay.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: And I don't recall who the
14 guys were on the time, but the high speed angles that
15 the captain ran the ship through required somebody that
16 had gained experience and been trained on doing that
17 particular maneuver. And the ship was -- had a lot
18 better margin, you know, of safety by -- by picking the
19 right guy to do that.

20 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. So, you would have
21 concurred with that had he asked you?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, certainly.

23 DR. STRAUCH: The court of inquiry, the line
24 of questions that they asked I interpreted as critical

1 of the Greeneville because of -- of their lack of
2 adherence to the watch bill and I think -- at least I
3 read an implication there that it was kind of sloppy
4 management. Do you -- do you agree with that?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: There were more people -- the
6 watch bill wasn't being adhered to as much as it should
7 have been.

8 DR. STRAUCH: Why wasn't it adhered to?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: I can't explain why the
10 quartermasters thought they could just switch, for
11 example. I -- I can't explain that. I could explain
12 why the helmsmen were -- were swapped down by the
13 captain.

14 DR. STRAUCH: Was this kind of thing unusual
15 in the Greeneville?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I certainly had no idea that
17 anyone would think they could do that, for the
18 quartermasters at that extreme, and watched it very
19 tightly after this and communicated to the crew how
20 unsat that was to do that.

21 DR. STRAUCH: You said you had observed
22 Commander Waddle exceed classified depth and speed
23 limits and that -- and that at some point it didn't --
24 didn't surprise you. Is that -- is that a fair

1 characterization of what you said?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

3 DR. STRAUCH: The court of inquiry had -- had
4 a problem with that, I think it's fair to say, and I
5 guess that raises a question. As someone who's not --
6 has not served in the Navy and in fact has no
7 experience in marine matters, coming from where I sit,
8 it raises the question of why the captain would think
9 it's okay to reveal classified information to people
10 without clearances?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, that's a good question.

12 And -- and I'm glad I got a chance to explain that.
13 The -- when anyone comes on board a submarine underway
14 they're going to be exposed to some things that would
15 normally have a cover over them that we wouldn't let
16 people see. The fire control screen that I can't even
17 show you a picture of right now that we've been talking
18 about all day, I can't show you a picture of it because
19 there's a confidential sticker on -- on -- on -- on the
20 -- on a representation of what that display shows.

21 So, I think what the mentality was is they're
22 going to be exposed to some things and -- and it just
23 kind of went one step further to, well, they're going
24 to be exposed to some things. Now we certainly aren't

1 going to let them see anything that really is critical
2 to the national security but they -- but in
3 demonstrating the ship the captain decided to -- to go
4 to a higher speed than -- than what was unclassified
5 and go deeper than what was unclassified.

6 DR. STRAUCH: So, if I understand what you're
7 saying, it's -- it's they're going to be exposed to
8 certain classified information anyway so if they're
9 going to see a little bit more it's no big deal?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, that was -- that was the
11 mentality, and it's not -- it's not right. You should
12 minimize what they do see. But to even -- to look into
13 the sonar room and see some of the things on the
14 screens would -- would be something that would be
15 classified. But to go on a submarine and not get to
16 see sonar would really diminish the value of the tour.

17 So, there's -- there's kind of this one extreme and in
18 between somewhere is where the draw -- the line is
19 drawn and you should minimize with -- within prudent
20 judgement where you draw the line. And it got taken
21 past the line of maximum operating speed and test
22 depth.

23 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Is this line a firm line
24 that's written somewhere or it's up to somebody's

1 discretion?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I couldn't tell you.

3 DR. STRAUCH: Are there any procedures that
4 refer specifically to conducting DV tours? Or DV
5 cruises, I should say.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: There -- in the hindsight of
7 the court of inquiry, they produced some instructions.

8 I think some of them were even superseded and
9 outdated. And as I continued to serve on Greeneville a
10 rough DV cruise policy or instruction came out that was
11 -- wasn't approved yet but it was something that we had
12 access to that made it real -- some of these issues
13 that weren't real clear real clear.

14 DR. STRAUCH: At -- but this was after the
15 accident?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

17 DR. STRAUCH: Before the accident were you
18 aware of any limitations in the CO's authority in
19 maneuvers or evolutions he could select with
20 distinguished visitors?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: No specific limitations.

22 DR. STRAUCH: And now?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Now I -- what I expressed to
24 you was there's a -- a rough instruction that's going

1 around that I -- I think people are adhering to.

2 DR. STRAUCH: What kinds of things today
3 would Commander Waddle have been forbidden from doing
4 with the distinguished visitors on board because of
5 this new order that's out?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall what the order
7 had. I -- I do know that and I think it was even in
8 the paper that specifically they're not going to do
9 emergency blows with distinguished visitors on board.

10 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. What about speed and
11 depth? Any limitations on that?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm sure that's in there, too.

13 DR. STRAUCH: So, as you -- to the best of
14 your recollection, the only change that's come about as
15 a result of this accident is that no emergency blows
16 will be --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I can't attest to what the
18 changes were. I -- I glanced at the instruction. I
19 know I didn't read it all the way through. Greeneville
20 wasn't about to do any DV cruises so I gave it back to
21 the captain and knew -- knew that we had to follow some
22 rules next time we did one.

23 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Did you and Commander
24 Waddle discuss what evolutions you would perform that

1 day?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

3 DR. STRAUCH: And who suggested the
4 evolution?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: I followed a standard pattern
6 that we had followed.

7 DR. STRAUCH: So there was nothing unusual of
8 the list that you selected for -- to give to Commander
9 Waddle to show what evolutions you would do?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: No, not that unusual.

11 DR. STRAUCH: What was the standard list of
12 evolutions you perform for distinguished visitors?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, I -- I can't recall the
14 standard list, but I don't think it was -- well, what
15 had we done in the past or what -- what had the ship
16 done before I got there and et cetera and formulated
17 some things that I like -- I know he liked to do and I
18 know he liked to dedicate a good bit of time for lunch.
19 He liked to sit down with the group and he liked to
20 have a number of people sit in the ward room, and we
21 had two settings so that people could enjoy lunch, a
22 tour of the ship. And he liked to do an emergency blow
23 and he liked to do high speed angles and dangles, spend
24 some time on the surface.

1 DR. STRAUCH: So, emergency blow he would do
2 pretty much when there were DVs on board?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

4 DR. STRAUCH: And the high speed angles and
5 dangles?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

7 DR. STRAUCH: Was there anything that -- any
8 evolution that he did on that day that was not on that
9 list that you gave him?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any.

11 DR. STRAUCH: Was there anything that he did
12 -- anything that he selected that surprised you? I'm
13 referring to evolutions, any evolution that he selected
14 --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. Can you help me
16 remember something? I'm not -- nothing comes to mind
17 that --

18 DR. STRAUCH: Well, it doesn't --

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

20 (Pause)

21 DR. STRAUCH: You said that there were -- he
22 had to write down the standing orders. It could go up
23 to 100 pages or something to that effect.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure how many --

1 DR. STRAUCH: Right.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: -- the CO's standing orders,
3 it's a package, thick, two-sided.

4 DR. STRAUCH: The court of inquiry was
5 critical of Commander Waddle for adhering to some and
6 not adhering to the others. Yet, the sense I get from
7 you is that not following standing orders was routine
8 on -- on the Greeneville. Is that a fair assessment?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: No. I'm not sure why -- I
10 didn't mean to say that or give that impression.

11 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. How would you
12 characterize the adherence to standing orders?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, we follow the CO's
14 standing orders.

15 DR. STRAUCH: If you can give a percentage on
16 standing orders he -- that he followed, how many --
17 what percentage would that be?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Very high. I mean I -- he --
19 I -- I don't have a recollection of him just violating
20 standing orders. I --

21 DR. STRAUCH: Well, to give you an example, I
22 mean he had a standing order about the length of the --
23 of the TMA leg and how many legs would be done. And
24 that was violated on -- on --

1 LCDR PFEIFER: That -- and can you refresh my
2 memory, then?

3 DR. STRAUCH: I believe -- help me if I'm
4 wrong here. I believe it called for what? At least
5 two legs of three to five minutes each. And I think
6 the data shows that there was one leg and it was less
7 than three minutes.

8 LCDR PFEIFER: We'll have to look at that. I
9 think -- I think you're wrong, but -- I think the 1-2-0
10 leg was a legitimate, good leg.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You're talking about for S-
12 14? For 13.

13 DR. STRAUCH: I -- I'm not -- I couldn't say.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We'll get to sonar later.

15 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. The -- it was also
16 testified that the AVSDU was unreliable. Is that -- is
17 that a fair assessment?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. It was out of
19 commission that day.

20 DR. STRAUCH: Was it out of commission a lot
21 before that?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

23 DR. STRAUCH: So was -- that was not a common
24 occurrence?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

2 DR. STRAUCH: What would you -- what would
3 you have expected Commander Waddle to have done to
4 compensate for the AVSDU being out of commission?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: On that particular day?

6 DR. STRAUCH: Yes.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure what he did to
8 compensate. But he would, you know, make a decision
9 whether he wanted to get it replaced that day or not or
10 fixed that day or not based on the tactical situation
11 that we're in.

12 DR. STRAUCH: Well, he made the decision to
13 proceed and not replace it. And he made the decision
14 to complete the various evolutions that -- that -- that
15 were selected. Having made that decision, what would
16 you have expected him to do to compensate for the lack
17 of the AVSDU in performing those evolutions?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, one thing is while
19 you're preparing to come to periscope depth I think
20 it'd be reasonable to put your head in the sonar. You
21 can see the exact same thing in there, which I saw him
22 do.

23 DR. STRAUCH: Mm-hmm.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Could have had that

1 conversation with the OODs, told them this is -- "When
2 it comes time to periscope depth this is what I want
3 you to do" or -- or probably a better way is, "Officer
4 of the Deck, how do you plan on operating your watch
5 without this available?" And -- and make sure that the
6 OODs were operating the ship safely without it.

7 DR. STRAUCH: In your experience, how
8 critical is the AVSDU to seeing the surface situation
9 while --

10 LCDR PFEIFER: It depends on the individual
11 how critical it is. There will -- there will be some
12 guys with the -- the school of thought as, you know, I
13 drive off the AVSDUs, I turn the -- you might hear his
14 -- you know, I stare at that thing and that's how I
15 drive the ship. And there are other people that have
16 grown up -- grown up. Had their whole career with this
17 fire control system of FIDUs which we used to not have
18 who are more comfortable stacking those dots and -- and
19 it doesn't mean you should ever turn that off or
20 neglect the AVSDU, but they're -- they focus more
21 attention on the fire control system than the AVSDU.

22 So, I would -- if I had to generalize the --
23 the old school, the old -- the older guys who weren't
24 used to the -- the digital fire control system are --

1 look at the AVSDU more than they -- they would the fire
2 control, and the newer -- the younger guys would look
3 at the fire control system. As a guy kind of in the
4 middle, I've kind of migrated more to the AVSDU as I've
5 gained more experience. So, it depends on who you are.

6 DR. STRAUCH: Well, one thing I'm kind of
7 curious about is that the AVSDU was out of commission
8 and the -- the CEP plot wasn't maintained. Given that
9 the AVSDU was out of commission, shouldn't Commander
10 Waddle have been more sensitive to the maintenance of
11 the CEP? I mean wouldn't that put more -- make the CEP
12 that much more critical with the AVSDU being out of
13 commission?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes. It -- I explained
15 before, there are other ways to get the -- essentially
16 the same information, and the -- the CEP wasn't not
17 maintained the whole day. I think that's the way it's
18 characterized sometimes. It was -- it was a period of
19 time and, you know, it should have been maintained but
20 it wasn't for the few minutes before coming to
21 periscope depth.

22 DR. STRAUCH: The fire control technician
23 testified that it was because the visitors were
24 crowding his immediate area in the control room that

1 prevented him from easily accessing the CEP. In other
2 words, they were in his way. Do you think that that's
3 a fair reason not to -- not to complete the CEP?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: I think if you asked him today
5 he would say "no." And I think even at the time he
6 said it he knew that wasn't a good reason. It's fairly
7 easy to, "Excuse me, please," and ask them to step
8 aside.

9 DR. STRAUCH: What do you think the real
10 reason was?

11 (Pause)

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Perhaps this is getting --
13 it's a little more difficult than it usually is and it
14 would be an excuse not to do it.

15 DR. STRAUCH: Do you think that -- well,
16 what's your impression of putting all those people in a
17 small area like the control room when there are a lot
18 of pretty critical evolutions being performed when the
19 people clearly are not going to help anybody who need
20 to perform critical tasks and will only serve at best
21 to get in their way? Is there a better way to do
22 things?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, we -- we were doing the
24 evolution primarily as a demonstration to these people.

1 It's not that uncommon to have that many or more in
2 the control room. They're engaged in other tasks at
3 battle stations, but we know how to function with that
4 many people in there. So, it -- it wasn't -- when you
5 put 16 visitors in the control room, in hindsight
6 that's high, but looking around the control room and
7 you see that many people, it wasn't that -- that many
8 different people than -- than we do at battle stations.

9 DR. STRAUCH: Now, if this was a battle --
10 battle station let's say in a real -- real-time
11 environment and these 16 people were there, what would
12 you have done with them?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: They all have different
14 assignments there. I think -- go into five minutes and
15 tell you what each of them does, but there's people
16 looking at frequency information, two of them in the
17 back --

18 DR. STRAUCH: I guess --

19 LCDR PFEIFER: -- guy looking at TAC 3.

20 DR. STRAUCH: I guess my question is that you
21 would not put distinguished visitors in a -- in a real-
22 time tactical environment in the control room? They
23 would get in the way, is that -- is that a fair
24 assessment?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. It'd be a lot more
2 people that we have on equipment that, yeah, it would
3 be -- it would, like, double that.

4 DR. STRAUCH: Right. And the people who were
5 there would be -- would be having -- functioning and
6 performing in the control room and not standing and
7 observing others' work. Is that a fair assessment? In
8 other words, you would not have visitors who -- who
9 would not -- who would just be observing? The people
10 in the control room in a real -- real tactical
11 environment --

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, they're --

13 DR. STRAUCH: -- would be doing something?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: -- doing stuff. That's a fair
15 statement.

16 DR. STRAUCH: You gave a number of reasons
17 why active sonar would not be used. When would you use
18 active sonar?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: When -- I don't want to get
20 into classified stuff, but in a tactical situation for
21 a deployer.

22 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. But it would not be used
23 in a -- in a non-tactical situation in your experience?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: The definition of tactical

1 situation, I mean engaging a hostile guy and you would
2 for training. And --

3 DR. STRAUCH: But --

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: You know, I mean I guess for
5 training purposes -- this is Captain Mulloy again.
6 Some occasions on the surface going in or out, you want
7 to have people practice get a range. When you have a
8 visual and intermitant radar you can go active. And
9 then in some cases you attempt to steer this DE angle
10 to go out and your mainframe active can go out 30-,
11 40,000 yards. Once you get an HF, it only goes one to
12 two thousand yards out. So, sometimes you run it for
13 training when you're out there when there aren't, and
14 you -- you're a PD and you turn it on. You have PMS
15 that gets turned on and operated.

16 But routinely, because of the difficulty with
17 it, you use it a lot in training but there's no -- I
18 guess it's like how do you know -- it's like if you say
19 I have a very good nose, I can walk in a room, I can
20 smell every flower but now I'll go look at them. You
21 come in and say there's begonias in the corner. But
22 you're not always sure your nose is right and if the
23 wind is going to blow it at you, but I can see them.
24 So, you go in and train yourself to recognize things

1 but you're never guaranteed -- when you go active on
2 sonar you will never know if you're going to get a
3 return till you get it.

4 So, I mean it's not like your eyes. You can
5 say, if I can calibrate my eyes. I can't calibrate --
6 I can't calibrate the sonar till I ping and see what I
7 get back and then say is that the bottom or not?
8 Because until I turn it on and then go -- and then even
9 that I may not know that it's going to go which path.
10 I predict it, I model it, but there's no guarantee it's
11 going to go out and come back that range.

12 So that's why you use it a lot in training
13 sometimes, but every time you turn it on it's a
14 tradeoff of will I get a return and what will I get for
15 it? And given the range constraints of HF or MF or the
16 modes -- in some modes when you go omni it always pings
17 minus five, you know. In DE this -- this is on -- is
18 not classified but there's certain -- where it's only
19 fixed D. It can turn on and plunk all you want. You
20 may do it for people to watch and listen or train your
21 guys, but all I'm going to get is a constant, you know,
22 DE angle to the bottom. It's a variation on the
23 fathometer because all I'm going to get is the bottom,
24 the bottom, the bottom.

1 Sometimes for a brand new sonar man who's 19
2 years old that's all I want him to get is just listen
3 to it, cue it up, pinging, and get training. Watch you
4 go propagate through the water, listen to it. Hey,
5 that's a mushy. That's the bottom. And then you may
6 find a contact or you may not. That's training value
7 for that but it's not of any tactical value.

8 DR. STRAUCH: All right. Thank you.

9 Have you talked to Commander Waddle since the
10 accident?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, I have.

12 DR. STRAUCH: How many different times have
13 you talked to him?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: During the court I think we
15 bumped into each other in the restroom and afterwards
16 the ward room had a dinner for him that I attended.

17 DR. STRAUCH: Is it fair to say -- because he
18 -- he has made some statements to the press since he --
19 since the court of inquiry and I think since he -- he
20 left the Navy, is it fair to say that -- that if there
21 are things he'd -- he'd like to say that he didn't have
22 a chance to say at the court of inquiry or -- or -- or
23 for whatever reason didn't say at the court of inquiry?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't get that impression

1 from him.

2 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. What impression did you
3 get from -- from what he said?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: We didn't really discuss the
5 details of it. He was -- this is kind of personal but
6 I'll tell you. He was -- he was -- told me and the
7 group what a -- a respect he had for me and he really
8 regretted what this had done to my ability to go to
9 command. I think he said he'd never served with a
10 finer submariner.

11 DR. STRAUCH: When the new CO came on board,
12 how long did it take for the -- for the crew to feel
13 comfortable with him? Not the interim CO but the one
14 after -- he was assigned to CO of the Greenville?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, the -- the interim one
16 was actually there for several weeks, maybe even a
17 couple months, so they got used to him right away. And
18 then got used to the next guy right away.

19 DR. STRAUCH: Okay.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Looking for a leader and
21 that's what I told them. Just lead them and they'll
22 follow, and they started listening to what he says.
23 That's what submariners do.

24 DR. STRAUCH: How long after the second CO

1 came on board did the grounding occur in Saipan?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Several months.

3 DR. STRAUCH: Now, we -- we don't -- I don't
4 want to get into that because that's a whole other
5 issue that we're not involved -- involved in, but this
6 -- this accident in -- in Saipan raises some questions
7 about how -- how the Navy selects its COs. I mean to
8 select two COs on one vessel would seem to have -- got
9 involved in accidents. I mean that doesn't speak well
10 for the selection process. What is your sense of -- of
11 how well the Navy selects its -- its leaders?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: No comment on that.

13 DR. STRAUCH: Well, if you were -- if you
14 were in charge, how would you select COs? What would
15 you look for?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I haven't really given that
17 much thought.

18 DR. STRAUCH: If you were in charge, how
19 would you oversee subs to make sure that they're --
20 everybody's doing everything they're supposed to be
21 doing and doing it effectively?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm having a hard time
23 understanding what my opinion as a lieutenant commander
24 in the Navy -- what value that is for your

1 investigation of the collision regarding something that
2 happened several months afterwards.

3 DR. STRAUCH: Well, I think that -- I think
4 I'm interested in it because you're an experienced
5 Naval person and experienced submariner and Naval
6 officer and the issues of the oversight selection are
7 some issues that we're looking at in this
8 investigation. That's why I asked those questions.
9 But if you -- if you feel uncomfortable answering --

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, I --

11 DR. STRAUCH: -- or don't feel qualified --

12 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I think our -- our second
13 CO is a very good leader, technically competent, and
14 enjoy working for him and learning under him and really
15 regret that we had the problem in Saipan.

16 DR. STRAUCH: I have one more question on
17 him. You said that under Commander Waddle the
18 retention rate for junior officers turned around and
19 went very high. What did -- what did Commander Waddle
20 do that you observed that would have -- that it would
21 have led to that change in retention rate, an increase
22 in retention rate?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, he showed personal
24 interest in their well-being. He related to them. And

1 the previous CO must not have done that.

2 DR. STRAUCH: Did you precede Commander
3 Waddle onto the -- onto the Greeneville or did you both
4 come on board about the same time?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: I came on after he did.

6 DR. STRAUCH: About how far into his serving
7 CO did you come --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: He had been on board about six
9 months.

10 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. All right. I -- I have
11 no further questions.

12 MR. WOODY: Just if I could clarify a couple
13 things that you did mention.

14 The Op Order 205 that you didn't look at, is
15 this kind of a specialized op order that's kept in the
16 safe most of the time or can you explain why --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: You're embarrassing me. I
18 don't -- I -- I -- it's -- it's one that we have in a
19 -- in a locker that -- and I remember trying to find
20 these rules. I knew there were some other things that
21 -- we were going into San Francisco and I'd ask the
22 navigator, some other of the people, and -- and no one
23 remembered where -- where the things were. It's
24 available.

1 MR. WOODY: We heard about Commander Waddle
2 hurrying. Was this sort of his typical thing to -- to
3 rush people along a bit, like in surfacing? Let's say
4 you're going to get ready to go back to port and the
5 navigator's going to give a course. Was he anxious to
6 get the course --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: You know, I -- I -- you've
8 kind of had this theme in a lot of these questions, and
9 I think --

10 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm. We have.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I think it's reasonable --
12 people -- I think we're all sometimes in a hurry and
13 sometimes we have patience. And I'm trying to -- to
14 communicate that to you --

15 MR. WOODY: Right.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: -- that -- to say that he was
17 always this driving, "I'm going to take the conn and
18 I'm giving all the orders" kind of guy, it wasn't
19 really like that. Now, he certainly stepped into that
20 role late on that day, but -- and maybe he did it more
21 than others. I -- I -- I think he -- he stepped back
22 and -- and was -- was patient with guys a lot, too.

23 MR. WOODY: Well, the -- say the operations
24 had ended and time to go back to port, would he expect

1 a course right away to get back to the port or would he
2 wait for the navigator to plot a fix or --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, that example, it's --

4 MR. WOODY: -- yeah.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: -- it's real easy. The
6 quartermaster will course the Papa Hotel and he turns a
7 little switch and it says a number and he'll say,
8 "Okay. 3-2-0, aye." And then whatever it is, it's --
9 it -- it doesn't take much time and it's really not a
10 big deal for him to ask. It's kind of modern days, I
11 guess, there.

12 MR. WOODY: His turn to 3-4-0 during the time
13 he was going down for the emergency -- for the
14 emergency -- during the emergency, that turn to 3-4-0,
15 does that indicate any -- if he's in a hurry or he was
16 expeditious? What does it indicate, if anything?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't know why he -- we
18 turned that way. I'd never turned that way. Like, I'd
19 never turned around in the middle of -- of doing a blow
20 before, not even with him before. It -- it struck me
21 as unusual.

22 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: And in hindsight I -- I'm not
24 sure it's such a bad thing if -- if you -- pointing the

1 contacts wasn't -- wasn't good, but the fact that -- of
2 looking in one place and you kind of achieve a -- a
3 safety zone that you've looked around --

4 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: -- and if you go down and come
6 up somewhere else, then that safety zone kind of moves.
7 But by reversing course, you kind of came up in -- in
8 essentially the same place that you looked around so
9 that -- that circle of security is kind of --

10 MR. WOODY: You're turning in a circle --

11 LCDR PFEIFER: -- more stationary --

12 MR. WOODY: -- in other words?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, yeah. So, I hadn't seen
14 it before. I didn't -- didn't really know his
15 intentions in doing it, but even Admiral Griffiths in
16 the court of inquiry thought about it. I don't think -
17 - he kind of said that really wasn't such a bad thing
18 to do.

19 MR. WOODY: I remember him -- him discussing
20 that.

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I do, too.

22 MR. WOODY: The -- the five eight feet for
23 taking a look around, we've heard that that's his
24 typical depth he came to for a high look. When you're

1 -- when you have -- any time when you're doing a safety
2 observation with, say, passengers on board, what would
3 you have done?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: I would have broached the
5 ship.

6 MR. WOODY: Would broaching the ship have
7 caused any ship control problems when you'd get ready
8 to go back down?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think so.

10 MR. WOODY: Now, let me ask a couple
11 questions about steps that would be taken to compensate
12 for the AVSFU being out of commission. The -- the CO
13 mentioned that at the court of inquiry that he thought
14 and expected his OODs to know what to do. Is this a
15 reasonable thing that -- with distinct training on
16 Greeneville that he had a right to expect they would
17 know what to do without the AVSDU?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I don't think that's that
19 unreasonable. If you're used to looking at something
20 and it's not there, it should, oh, you know. And --
21 and you should develop ways to work around it and
22 communicate with your other watch standers and say,
23 "Hey, I don't have this thing that I normally look at."

24 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: You know, "Here's how I'm
2 going to work with you to make -- make the ship operate
3 the way it did without that."

4 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: So --

6 MR. WOODY: Were there certain officers on
7 the Greenville that the captain might have felt the
8 need to talk to and ask what they were going to do, as
9 you were mentioning a while ago?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

11 MR. WOODY: And would -- would Lieutenant
12 Coen be the certain person the captain would feel he
13 didn't need to go through the steps that he might
14 follow to compensate? You see what I mean?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I'm not sure how much
16 trust Commander Waddle had in Mr. Coen.

17 MR. WOODY: So you can't -- okay.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. He --

19 MR. WOODY: But there's some officers that he
20 would have -- he would have gone through a discussion
21 about what they're going -- what they should do to
22 compensate for the AVSDU?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure what he would do,
24 but that would be a reasonable thing to do if someone

1 that you qualified and you're really not confident in,
2 you know, "Hey, what are you going to do if that thing"
3 -- and ask them how they're going to compensate for it.

4 MR. WOODY: Well, going back to it
5 specifically, were there officers on the -- on the
6 Greeneville that you would expect the captain to have a
7 question-and-answer session like that and somebody
8 would not --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: That specific day I can't tell
10 you, but there's an officer or two that -- who I can
11 think of that, hey, you know, when he first got
12 qualified I'm sure that that would have been a prudent
13 thing to do is to say, "Hey, what are you going to do
14 about this?" And -- and it really wouldn't be a bad
15 thing even for the most senior guy to say, "Hey, what
16 are you going to do about this?" But all that's in
17 hindsight.

18 MR. WOODY: Okay. Now, you mentioned about
19 people observing. You mentioned that when your battle
20 stations are in a real tactical situation you wouldn't
21 have people on board but you might have observers say,
22 like a fleet exercise or something like that, would you
23 not?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

1 MR. WOODY: And how many observers would you
2 have during the time that, say, battle stations was --
3 are manned?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Like an inspection team?

5 MR. WOODY: Right.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: We would probably have -- I'm
7 recalling another ship. There was probably seven, six
8 or seven.

9 MR. WOODY: Now, you have six or seven people
10 in the control room --

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, with steno pads writing
12 down everything you're doing, in your way, and stuff
13 like that. That -- that's happened before. I don't
14 recall that at Greeneville.

15 MR. WOODY: Okay. Do you want to go to --

16 MR. CRIDER: Yes. I have a -- good
17 afternoon.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Hi.

19 MR. CRIDER: This is Dennis Crider. I have a
20 couple questions. Want to go back to a couple things
21 before proceeding with some other things that we have.

22 We talked a little bit about the CO driving
23 the -- driving the ship through the OOD. And you
24 mentioned -- usually only happened -- let me make sure

1 I've got it right.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

3 MR. CRIDER: When he was going to periscope
4 depth it's kind of -- it's not very often or did you --
5 was it often that this happened?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: That what, now?

7 MR. CRIDER: That the CO drove the ship
8 through the OOD?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, it was unusual.

10 MR. CRIDER: And what -- what was your --
11 what was your opinion of this practice? Specifically,
12 would this provide the backup -- reduce the backup that
13 he would --

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I -- I -- I don't recall
15 specific instances, but I -- I was aware that it -- it
16 reduced our -- the amount of backup we could get when
17 -- when -- instead of standing back and -- and
18 watching things he got in the middle of things, and
19 that's how it is. All submarines you should be a
20 little concerned when the captain has the -- has the
21 conn, you know, with -- for that reason.

22 MR. CRIDER: Very good. Now, we talked a
23 little bit about the CO, you know, changing the course
24 during the dive, and I think you said -- and again,

1 correct me if I'm -- if I heard you wrong, but that was
2 --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

4 MR. CRIDER: -- unusual but didn't concern
5 you because of the --

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

7 MR. CRIDER: -- the circle of safety.

8 LCDR PFEIFER: In hindsight I was thinking
9 about the circle of safety. At the time I was, you
10 know, this is unusual and you go through and -- okay, I
11 guess it's reasonable. I just saw him look through the
12 scope. You know, he obviously has a handle on -- you'd
13 think he had a handle on how close anybody was, if
14 there was anybody. And I focused my attention to other
15 things with these DVs. I was explaining to them here's
16 the guy, he's going to throw this -- the emergency blow
17 switches and talking to them about what to look at and
18 where to stand and there's going to be a loud noise and
19 be ready for it.

20 MR. CRIDER: One of the things that, you
21 know, as far as making the turn during the dive that --
22 maybe you can correct my own thought process, but I
23 thought I understood that it was left bearing left on
24 the target or right bearing right. You'd then say,

1 well, that's -- that's good news. I don't know --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Right.

3 MR. CRIDER: -- if you ever used that on --
4 on the Greeneville and if that --

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, you're familiar with the
6 terms left drawing left and right drawing right?

7 MR. CRIDER: -- that wasn't something that
8 was used. You know, this other -- I was thinking,
9 well, maybe you had a clear path and, you know, would -
10 - would tend towards going straight because of that
11 reason as a normal practice if you would be looking at
12 your sonar --

13 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think we had anybody -
14 -

15 MR. CRIDER: Doing it that way.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: -- to the southeast.

17 MR. CRIDER: Mm-hmm.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- when -- from what I could
19 see on the screen and the information I see the captain
20 looking, I didn't think there was anybody close, so
21 when he turned it didn't --

22 MR. CRIDER: Okay. Great. I'm sorry this is
23 going to be a little eclectic. Saipan. This is just a
24 little thing on the side. We heard I guess ward room

1 rumors you might hear that there were actually two
2 groundings. Was that the case or was it just the one
3 grounding in Saipan that --

4 LCDR PFEIFER: You mean other than in Saipan?

5 MR. CRIDER: Or maybe there were two at the
6 time. That's the ward room rumor.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure what you're --

8 MR. CRIDER: All right. Are you --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: It would get --

10 MR. CRIDER: -- I think we'll call that a --

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Why don't you ask me the
12 question again? Can you --

13 MR. CRIDER: There was a ward room rumor that
14 there might have been more than one grounding incident,
15 you know, after the collision with the Ehime Maru.

16 Whoops, we just lost it.

17 (Pause)

18 MR. CRIDER: I guess I'm really not doing a
19 very good job expressing -- it was just an off-to-the-
20 side question.

21 (Pause)

22 MR. SCHEFFER: We might as well change the
23 tape, so let's take a brief break here.

24 (Pause)

1 MR. CRIDER: All right. It's 1:04. We're
2 resuming our -- our interview with Lieutenant --
3 Lieutenant Commander Pfeifer.

4 I had just asked the question -- this is
5 Dennis Crider speaking. I had asked a question about
6 the ward room rumors that there were two -- two -- two
7 -- two grounding incidences, and I -- and --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I find that question
9 kind of bizarre. I -- there was --

10 MR. CRIDER: Take that as a --

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

12 MR. CRIDER: -- "no."

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Went to Saipan and, yeah, the
14 ship hit the bottom and might have -- might have struck
15 two pieces of coral, but --

16 MR. CRIDER: Yeah.

17 LCDR PFEIFER: -- two different places, but
18 there's -- there's not a lot of, you know, secret
19 coverup or anything like that. I think I would have
20 known about that. That's definitely --

21 MR. CRIDER: Just checking.

22 LCDR PFEIFER: -- not happening.

23 MR. CRIDER: -- just checking a box. Do you
24 -- let's see. Where was the -- where was I?

1 (Pause)

2 MR. CRIDER: Going back to the incident in --
3 incident, again checking -- checking a box, going to
4 the incident in San Francisco Bay, did that happen
5 under the bridge or just after going under the bridge
6 or exactly?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: We took water down the hatch
8 after going under the bridge.

9 MR. CRIDER: Which hatch was that?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: The bridge hatch.

11 MR. CRIDER: Bridge hatch. All right. Very
12 good. Thank you.

13 All right. Again, before we go into the
14 progress and to the -- well, we always -- call our
15 chronological questioning. There was an incident
16 before the collision where the Greenville was in an
17 area -- let's see. I guess there was a depth -- I mean
18 you were supposed to be submerged in an area -- all
19 right. This is a cleared area.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

21 MR. CRIDER: We can be here. And for this
22 amount of time. And as I understand it, there was a --
23 you know, that time ended and there was a, you know,
24 rather quick ascent. And I understand this wasn't --

1 were you -- is that sufficient to help clue you in as
2 to what I'm talking about? And Tom, maybe you can --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I think I know what you're
4 talking about.

5 MR. CRIDER: All right. So, you're familiar
6 with the incident. Was there any TMA done before this
7 -- this -- the EMBT blow was initiated?

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

9 MR. CRIDER: Yes. And -- but there's no
10 visual search in this case?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: We really want to make sure we
12 know what you're talking about. When -- what -- what
13 time frame are you talking about and where are you
14 talking about?

15 MR. CRIDER: I'm not sure. Tom, do you think
16 we have any --

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: It was a period of months
18 before the collision. If you can maybe even help us
19 with the description of the circumstances it would be
20 helpful.

21 (Pause)

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Can we take a break?

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure. Okay. Let's take a
24 brief break.

1 (Pause)

2 MR. CRIDER: All right. It's 1:14 and we're
3 back. Do you need the question restated?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, please.

5 MR. CRIDER: The question was, you know,
6 we've heard there was an incident where the Greeneville
7 was in an area -- area of ocean and it was allowed to
8 be -- you know, allotted to be underneath -- submerged
9 at that time and at -- at the end of the -- that time
10 there was a rush to -- to -- to surface and then
11 proceed out of the area before again submerging and
12 going on safely in the next operational area. And we
13 were wondering if you could tell us about that -- about
14 that incident and expand on the circumstances of that
15 for us?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. This -- this happened
17 maybe a couple weeks or a month after I'd been on
18 board. And we were operating in an area that we're --
19 we usually don't operate in and -- and like -- like you
20 -- you've heard, the water changed and we had one area
21 where we could be submerged in and that changed to
22 another area. And there's a little overlap so that as
23 these water changes you should be in the overlap during
24 that period of time.

1 And it was approaching the time of the shift
2 and I -- I reviewed the chart and noticed that we had a
3 little too far to go than -- than we could get, and
4 this was -- this was about 10 minutes beforehand. So,
5 we didn't manage our navigation as good as we should
6 have. And so, we -- we raced towards where the good
7 water -- where our water wasn't going to run out and
8 determined that we weren't going to make it. And so,
9 the captain took the conn and with just a minute or so
10 to spare did TMA, which we've used that acronym before
11 --

12 MR. CRIDER: Mm-hmm.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: -- from about 150 feet.

14 And then, because there's a potentially
15 dangerous situation underneath the water -- and as --
16 as we're talking about, just understand. If your water
17 runs away, that means some other submarine can be in
18 there. And so -- you're not really safe in the water.
19 That could be a sign of somebody else.

20 So, he -- he blew to the surface at that time
21 and, you know, we -- you know, I talked to him about it
22 later and we resolved, you know, to be a little more
23 prudent with our -- our navigation and make sure that -
24 - that we put procedures in place that that wouldn't

1 happen again.

2 CAPTAIN MULLOY: This is Captain Mulloy. Did
3 you formally critique the incident on board?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, we did.

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Or critique --

6 LCDR PFEIFER: And we -- we had several
7 training sessions with the navigator.

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: The navigator. And the
9 quartermasters?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Right.

11 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Did you -- since that time,
12 for the rest of the time you were on board, have an --
13 incident to where you were not -- not denied of a
14 problem with changing water mass or be sensitive to it?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: No, we didn't. We -- we -- we
16 found out the root cause and fixed it.

17 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And that analysis then --
18 that was presented to the squadron when you came back
19 in, what you were going to do to fix this?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- the captain told me
21 that he discussed this --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Discussed this with the
23 commodore?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: -- with the commodore, which I

1 -- I have a very right -- belief that he did. He
2 explained to the -- the commodore why -- what happened
3 and why we took those actions.

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Very well.

5 MR. CRIDER: Which -- which commodore did you
6 -- do you know which commodore he discussed that with?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, that would have been
8 Captain McCall's time period.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: M-C-C-A-L-L-S.

10 CAPTAIN MULLOY: M-small C-capital C-small A-
11 small L-L. McCall.

12 MR. CRIDER: All right. Thank you,
13 Commander.

14 I guess we're going to proceed some of the
15 chronological questions. We're coming up on sonar.
16 I've been, you know, waiting for that.

17 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm sure you have.

18 (Laughter)

19 MR. CRIDER: Baited breath. But before that
20 wanted to check and make sure we had Question 3 covered
21 all the way. We talked about the consult -- I think we
22 -- we asked you whether the CIO -- CO or -- OD
23 consulted with the FTOW. And I think that we asked
24 that before. And you're nodding affirmative.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I'm -- yeah. I'm
2 affirming that, yeah, you asked me before and I do not
3 know --

4 MR. CRIDER: Right. That's what --

5 LCDR PFEIFER: -- of any conversation that
6 took place --

7 MR. CRIDER: Right.

8 LCDR PFEIFER: -- between those two.

9 MR. CRIDER: And --

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Don't recall any.

11 MR. CRIDER: And I don't know whether we
12 asked you whether we had asked -- whether you had
13 observed the CO or the OOD studying the fire control
14 displays after completion of the high-speed maneuvers.

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. Can you ask that again,
16 please?

17 MR. CRIDER: Did you observe either the CO or
18 the OOD studying the fire control displays after
19 completion of the high-speed maneuvers?

20 (Pause)

21 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't have that recollection
22 for sure. But I think they did.

23 MR. CRIDER: I'm not sure whether we asked
24 you this one either, if you'll forgive me. Did you at

1 any time have any conversation with the CO about the
2 sonar contact situation?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any.

4 MR. CRIDER: Did the OOD communicate with the
5 sonar watch while you were in sonar?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any.

7 MR. CRIDER: Did you at any time communicate
8 with the OOD regarding a sonar picture?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall any.

10 MR. CRIDER: All right. Thank you, sir.

11 Now, let's see if we can get this thing to
12 run.

13 (Visual display)

14 SPEAKER: You want to describe to the
15 transcript what you're showing?

16 MR. CRIDER: Yes. Every -- every page we'll
17 -- we'll mention it.

18 But let me give you a little background of
19 what this is. Of course, this is data taken from the
20 slogger, and you see white noise back there for the --
21 for the ocean. But I think we have the relative
22 strength of the contacts. And this is near the start
23 of the simulation, which is why you see on the longer
24 line, you can tell it's a simulation, you know,

1 simulation started at about five seconds earlier or
2 something like that or before this period. This is at
3 1:25 local -- local time.

4 Now, what I want to do is page through this.

5 Let me just page through this to familiarize you with
6 what -- what we're seeing.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

8 MR. CRIDER: And of course, this is not --
9 this is not quite the display that -- you know, that's
10 on -- on the Greeneville. But --

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I'd agree.

12 MR. CRIDER: But it's not -- but, you know,
13 it is what it is --

14 LCDR PFEIFER: It actually looks better on
15 your flat screen than projected.

16 MR. CRIDER: Would you like me to tilt that
17 in your direction?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I -- actually, let's --
19 I'll look at -- look at both.

20 MR. CRIDER: All right. So, let me -- let me
21 page through this real quick.

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

23 MR. CRIDER: And -- and what I'm going to ask
24 you afterwards, the first thing, of course, is if any

1 of these things jives and would you kind of say about
2 what time you went into sonar?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

4 MR. CRIDER: And about what time you left
5 based on, you know, since you're going to have that
6 history on the lower screen.

7 (Visual display)

8 MR. CRIDER: All right. There's 1:30:42,
9 which was about the completion of the high-speed
10 maneuvers.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

12 (Visual display)

13 MR. CRIDER: 1:32:20. That's about the time
14 of Commander Waddle's second walk-through.

15 And tell me if I'm going too fast or -- you
16 can even take the con if you wish.

17 LCDR PFEIFER: You're just -- you're just
18 flipping through these. This is fine.

19 MR. CRIDER: Right. And when you make
20 comments we'll go to the specific one and mention which
21 --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

23 MR. CRIDER: -- which time we're looking at.

24 (Visual display)

1 MR. CRIDER: 1:25:39.
2 (Pause)
3 (Visual display)
4 MR. CRIDER: 1:37:48. Fire control solution
5 updated.
6 (Pause)
7 (Visual display)
8 MR. CRIDER: And there's the Greeneville at
9 periscope depth. I've got, actually, more but --
10 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.
11 MR. CRIDER: -- I think you're -- let me go
12 through those and then we'll go back to initiation and
13 emergency deep.
14 (Visual display)
15 MR. CRIDER: The EMBT blow, and there's --
16 there's approximate collision time.
17 Now, when you were in sonar -- or do you want
18 -- you can even -- as I say, tell me --
19 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.
20 MR. CRIDER: -- tell me back or forward or
21 whichever. You're getting comfortable with that.
22 (Pause)
23 MR. CRIDER: Now, I --
24 LCDR PFEIFER: Are you asking me for -- to

1 point something out for you?

2 MR. CRIDER: Right. Tell me, you know, if
3 you can -- if any -- if this looks -- if you can
4 recall, I mean you could almost go back on that, you
5 know, and say, well, it was about here because you can
6 see the turns and of course the contact picture.

7 SPEAKER: Dennis, -- what you're seeing there
8 is the short -- short-time average and intermediate
9 time average displays.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. Well, I -- I could draw
11 on a piece of paper what I remember better than -- I --
12 I have a recollection of being able to break out the
13 two or three -- the three contacts better than -- than
14 what they're displayed here on -- on your screen, so I
15 --

16 MR. CRIDER: All right.

17 (LCDR Pfeifer draws on a piece of paper.)

18 LCDR PFEIFER: -- what I -- what I reviewed
19 was something on the 1-2-0 leg with kind of solidier
20 traces here and then one weaker with -- with maybe a
21 slight left bearing rate. That's -- that's what I
22 wrote down, and that's kind of what I remember.

23 MR. CRIDER: Okay.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: So, I think in hindsight this

1 would have been 14, 12, and 13.

2 MR. CRIDER: Anywhere -- this was on 120 at
3 the --

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. On the 120 leg.

5 MR. CRIDER: Now, you know, we'd like to keep
6 this piece of paper as your recollection. Could you
7 put down 120 --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Sure.

9 MR. CRIDER: -- as well?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: 120 leg. Okay.

11 MR. CRIDER: All right -- that really doesn't
12 --

13 (Visual display)

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Is that the 120 leg right
15 there? 120?

16 MR. CRIDER: I've got 12, 13, and let's see.
17 We've got the heading over there at the side.

18 (Pause)

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Is that S-10?

20 MR. CRIDER: No. You're a good spot. That
21 is -- that is not -- that's one problem with the
22 simulation we've noticed that, yes, indeed, it's not S-
23 10.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Based upon the stern marker,
2 that's just coming on to the 120 now, right? The white
3 dots coming from the two minutes to the current time?
4 To the white line there at the left of the contacts is
5 at about --

6 MR. CRIDER: Right.

7 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- 290, right, 300. That's
8 the stern marker.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: So we're just coming on 120.

10 MR. CRIDER: So, this would be about
11 approximately -- approximately it right here.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I'm trying to make --
13 see your three traces. Maybe you need to advance one
14 more so I can -- so you can see what I saw.

15 (Visual display)

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. No, I -- I -- I
17 specifically saw what -- what I drew here, three.

18 MR. CRIDER: Three distinct?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. What I wrote down here
20 right after it happened and what I remember -- let's
21 see what I got here.

22 MR. CRIDER: Yeah. I mean here we have three
23 distinct. The zero --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

1 MR. CRIDER: -- courses.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. Look at the broadband
3 screen and three contacts with something to the
4 northwest, and we're on 1-2-0. And the center of these
5 was the slight left, so.

6 MR. CRIDER: Okay. So, this doesn't really -
7 -

8 LCDR PFEIFER: It looks to me that the traces
9 are a lot broader and that whatever you're using with
10 the data --

11 MR. CRIDER: Mm-hmm.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: -- it would -- on a screen the
13 -- or the BSY-1 screen would -- would -- would be more
14 narrower and defined than -- than what you've got shown
15 there. There's a lot of overlapping.

16 (Pause)

17 MR. CRIDER: All right. Very good. Could
18 you kind of talk us through this a little bit or -- or
19 what -- what -- what we're seeing and maybe what -- you
20 know, we've got specifics, but I would -- maybe the --
21 thought maybe this would be -- we could use this to
22 kind of go through your time in -- in sonar.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. Well, what I --

24 MR. CRIDER: Let's --

1 LCDR PFEIFER: -- what I remember is being on
2 the --

3 MR. CRIDER: -- let's go back to where we
4 were.

5 (Visual display)

6 (Pause)

7 LCDR PFEIFER: What I -- what I wrote and --
8 and what I remembered at the time and what I remember
9 now is focusing on the sonar screen when we're right at
10 the 1-2-0 leg and seeing these three traces. And --

11 (Pause)

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure what else you --
13 you want me to remember.

14 MR. CRIDER: All right. That's -- we're not
15 quite sure either. Well, let me -- let me go through
16 the specific questions.

17 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

18 MR. CRIDER: You just answered one question
19 of what sonar contacts were held and on what bearings
20 that were in when you were -- went into sonar.

21 And let's see. We understand you went into
22 the sonar -- this is a question.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

24 MR. CRIDER: It's our understanding.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

2 MR. CRIDER: To compensate for the -- for the
3 -- the lack of the AVSDU, at least in part?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Partly. And the captain said,
5 "Mr. Coen, I want to be at periscope depth in five
6 minutes," and -- and we had a navigation -- there's
7 Penguin Bank very close, shallow water that we could
8 run aground on. And so, I look at that and I say,
9 there's room but we need to be careful. And then
10 remember that the AVSDU was gone.

11 So, I said, "Hey, Mr. Coen, I'll go to sonar
12 and take a look at that for you." And then -- then I
13 went into sonar and -- and I was pleased because the
14 captain was in there. So, like, oh, good, he's -- he's
15 going to help Mr. Coen get the PD. And then, before
16 you go to periscope depth you get the captain's
17 permission. And so, with him already involved and
18 engaged in -- in the contact situation, it makes it a
19 lot easier, so that's good.

20 MR. CRIDER: So he was in there initially?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: When I walked into sonar the
22 captain was in sonar.

23 MR. CRIDER: And then he left?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

1 MR. CRIDER: How long?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Kind of as I was walking in he
3 was just about to leave.

4 MR. CRIDER: Ah.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: So, we never talked.

6 MR. CRIDER: So, there was really no overlap
7 or minimal overlap between --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Minimal overlap, sure.

9 MR. CRIDER: All right. While you were in
10 sonar did you have any discussions with the sonar
11 supervisor or other people that were -- other watch
12 standers?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I remember some -- some
14 discussion that -- can't recall what we specifically
15 talked about, though. There was -- there was some,
16 "Hey, XO," you know, whatever. What I expect. You
17 know, we talked about what we had on the contacts or
18 something like that.

19 MR. CRIDER: Did you provide feedback to the
20 OOD or the CEO -- CO during the time of your -- time
21 you were in sonar?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall. I think you
23 asked me that before. I don't recall talking to them.

24 MR. CRIDER: Okay. Did you review the sonar

1 log?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall looking at the
3 logs.

4 MR. CRIDER: Did you -- what -- during the
5 time you were there did you notice any increase in the
6 signal-to-noise ratio for S-13?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I did not notice any signal-
8 to-noise ratio.

9 MR. CRIDER: And here's a -- a more broader
10 one. Describe the effects of the high-speed course
11 changes on the sonar display? What do you --

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. When -- when the ship
13 is doing high-speed course changes, that -- that white
14 line on the left there, that's the stern marker.

15 MR. CRIDER: Mm-hmm.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: And that -- that makes it
17 difficult to read traces that go through there. These
18 don't really go through. But what also doesn't show up
19 on your -- sometimes there's like biologics and there's
20 other distant interfering contacts that will kind of
21 weave through your picture as you're -- as you're doing
22 all these course changes, and it makes -- it confuses
23 the sonar picture that -- as you can kind of see there.
24 And it's -- it's really hard to get much good sonar

1 data while you're doing those maneuvers.

2 MR. CRIDER: Just for the record, were you --
3 we're looking at the slide labeled 1:35:39.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I'm speaking in
5 general, not necessarily --

6 MR. CRIDER: Speaking in general but --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: -- because your -- your
8 screens -- I don't want to offend you, but they don't --
9 - they don't really represent --

10 CAPTAIN MULLOY: This is Captain Mulloy.
11 Question for Mr. Crider and then -- and the commander.
12 Does your simulation take into account background
13 ocean noise?

14 MR. CRIDER: No. As I mentioned at the
15 beginning, this is white -- white noise.

16 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Right. Okay. Because
17 typically, there XO or former XO, when ocean noise
18 comes up, what does the BSY-1 and all sonar systems
19 basically do to contacts? Because you have right
20 there, you have dark areas around a bright contact.
21 That is -- to make contact stand out it takes the noise
22 and the adjacent beams to attract it from the main beam
23 in the center, so that's to make the contact stand out.
24 That's the simple data, algorithm using a lot of

1 systems. But what happens when you have increased
2 ocean noise due to speed there, Commander Pfeifer?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. It makes a lot of that
4 stuff.

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Makes it potentially
6 disappear, right? Typically happen as anything over 15
7 or 20 knots, a lot of the quieter contacts will fade
8 out because ocean noise will raise --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: That the ship is generating.

10 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- up by 15 or 20 Db as you
11 have flow over the hull. What that does is that drowns
12 out a contact that was -- you were holding will
13 disappear because it doesn't come above the signal-to-
14 noise ratio of recognition.

15 Like a loud radio, you can't hear a soft
16 conversation. The minute you slow, you turn the radio
17 down, you can hear people. Doesn't affect the people
18 who are making noise and talking in the corner.
19 They're still talking. But if I turn the radio on
20 loud, you wouldn't hear me. The minute I turn the
21 radio down and I keep talking you would hear me.
22 That's what happens when you speed up and slow down is
23 the contact's there.

24 In reality, what I expect to see on a flank

1 run there is you would have had bright at the bottom
2 and then those turns when they go faster, you would
3 have that contact fade away to almost nothing and then
4 would have come blooming back in again, being that he
5 would have been the same loudness the entire time. But
6 it may look like a new contact or in some cases you can
7 say, is this the same contact? But typically, as you
8 speed up or slow down contacts will fade and then
9 brighten, depending upon self -- self noise around you.

10 So, I would not expect the ship to
11 necessarily have those contacts as bright throughout
12 that entire time of flank runs, turning to and from a
13 guy like that.

14 MR. CRIDER: All right. I think at some
15 later time we're probably going to want to go -- do we
16 want to change a tape?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. I will. Just keep
18 going.

19 MR. CRIDER: All right. At some later time
20 we'd like to -- you know, when we have this --

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Right.

22 MR. CRIDER: -- we're going to have to review
23 the whole thing --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Right.

1 MR. CRIDER: -- as you know, we've been
2 working with --

3 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah, I think you can
4 probably see that model at their lab or go to the
5 submarine school again to go look at what happened with
6 --

7 MR. CRIDER: Well, this was done in Manassas.

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah, but they didn't model
9 the background noise, though, right? I mean --

10 MR. CRIDER: Part of that white noise, yeah.

11 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Pardon me?

12 MR. CRIDER: They just put in white noise.

13 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Right. But I mean that's
14 not the right effect. You may need to even -- I don't
15 know whether to say go to CRC or sub school because sub
16 school sometimes has their modeling with the Simmets
17 training, the Naval submarine school. When you speed
18 up, contacts fade and they appear when you slow down.
19 You may find a little better model at the Naval
20 submarine school.

21 MR. CRIDER: Sub school. All right. Thank
22 you.

23 (Pause)

24 MR. CRIDER: Ready to proceed, Commander?

1 All right. Great.

2 Did you at any time observe a high -- you
3 know, did you observe indications of a high bearing
4 rate at any time for S-13?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: I did not.

6 MR. CRIDER: And then actually, a Bill Woody
7 question, I think. What -- what factors could account
8 for the sonar operator not detecting a right 6-degree
9 bearing rate on S-13 while on Course 3-4-0?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: The length of the leg.

11 MR. CRIDER: Length of the leg.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: And the -- also, the bin width
13 that you -- the resolution on the screen. There's a
14 number of degrees that I'm not going to discuss here,
15 but let's say it's X and then you're only looking at it
16 for a short time and it means it doesn't cross into the
17 next bin or only one or two of them. So, that was a
18 factor that -- that made that leg -- you know, the
19 captain turned the ship before it was ready and that --
20 that information wasn't available for people to see.

21 MR. CRIDER: All right. Great. In your
22 written statement you indicated that the bearing from
23 S-13 was nearly steady, slightly left, nearly steady.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I didn't. I said --

1 MR. CRIDER: What is --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: -- S-14.

3 MR. CRIDER: S-14?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: The center one was the weaker
5 of the three and it had a slight left.

6 MR. CRIDER: Ah.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: S-13 was steady.

8 (Pause)

9 MR. CRIDER: Okay.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: And I want to clarify that.
11 Somebody else asked me about S-14 earlier. And that
12 was S-14, not 13.

13 MR. CRIDER: Do you recall the C -- CO -- CO
14 saying that he had a good feel for the sonar contact or
15 words to that effect?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't hear him say that,
17 that I recall.

18 MR. CRIDER: And just going through the list,
19 I think you answered this one, but were you convinced
20 that all sonar contacts were distant? And the second
21 part, of course, if so, why?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: If I had no indication that
23 any of them were closer, I didn't have all the
24 information that I would have had I been the captain,

1 to answer that question. But from the information I
2 had, there was no indications of anyone close.

3 MR. CRIDER: Petty Officer Reyes recalled
4 that you went out of sonar on one occasion and he
5 thought it was to consult with the FTOW about one or
6 more sonar contacts and whether any were closing. Is
7 that --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: I tried to help clarify that
9 earlier. I know -- he's a great guy. I really don't
10 know what he's talking about. I -- I -- I was at the
11 door for a short period of time, I think, on the way up
12 and he and I talked earlier. I know -- I think S-10,
13 an earlier contact, may have come up. I don't -- I'm
14 not sure what he was talking about there in the court
15 of inquiry.

16 MR. CRIDER: Okay. When did you depart sonar
17 and --

18 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- when we ascended to
19 periscope depth. As we started to I think I poked my
20 head out and looked and said, okay, yeah, we're going
21 up. And -- and then I stayed in there and looked at
22 the broadband screen. What you may not know is as you
23 ascend to periscope depth there's often a layer that
24 the ship trails through and the sonar picture may

1 reveal close contacts. And as a -- as a backup I
2 wanted to look at the broadband screen because that
3 would give us -- the captain in the control room
4 wouldn't have an opportunity to look at it. So, I
5 wanted to look at that and make sure that if there was
6 anybody close that we discovered on the way up I could
7 report that.

8 MR. CRIDER: Okay. Very good. Before going
9 to periscope depth did you discuss the PD evolution
10 with the CO -- with the CO or the OOD, and if so, what
11 did you discuss?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I -- I -- we -- the
13 captain said, "Mr. Coen, I want you to be at periscope
14 depth in five minutes," and that's -- I knew it was
15 coming but I don't -- I think that's the only
16 discussion that -- that I recall taking place.

17 MR. CRIDER: Now, we understand that before
18 going to the scope after the collision you were in the
19 doorway of sonar. Is that where you went directly
20 after leaving -- well, I guess leaving sonar?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. And I'll need you to
22 say again when -- when are you asking me?

23 MR. CRIDER: When you -- when you left sonar,
24 you -- you paused -- paused in the doorway for a while.

1 How long did you stay in the doorway, do you think?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I think what you're referring
3 to is we're at periscope depth. The captain looked
4 through the scope. I stepped out or I was at the door,
5 in that area, and when we emergency deep I was right
6 there at the door with maybe one foot in, one foot out,
7 or -- or both feet out.

8 MR. CRIDER: Okay. Did you -- was FT1
9 Seacrest, was he at that first station right next to
10 you?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: I couldn't tell you where he
12 was.

13 MR. CRIDER: And therefore, my next question
14 probably the same answer, you don't recall what --
15 didn't -- don't recall looking at the screen at all.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Which screen?

17 MR. CRIDER: The FT -- the fire --

18 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I --

19 MR. CRIDER: All right.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I don't recall looking at
21 that. I don't think I would have -- that wouldn't have
22 been something for me to do right then.

23 MR. CRIDER: All right. Once you -- so, you
24 were in the -- in the door until -- until the dive.

1 Were you in the door -- or were you -- were you any
2 place else besides in the door between before you went
3 to the periscope after the collision?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: In that little vicinity there.
5 That's -- that's what I remember, being in that little
6 area. Are you referring to, like, maybe I went to the
7 chart or something like that?

8 MR. CRIDER: Whatever. Yeah. Exactly.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: See, no. I was in that little
10 area.

11 MR. CRIDER: All right. Excellent.

12 Okay. You've pretty much -- well, it's
13 broader in a sense -- it sounds like you may already
14 ask it. Did you -- did you consult with the FTO -- TOW
15 about the contact that he was analyzing and the fire
16 control system? And I won't bother with the example.
17 Or -- you know, at any time?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. I don't recall doing
19 it. I -- I don't think I did.

20 MR. CRIDER: Yeah. The example was in the
21 doorway.

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

23 MR. CRIDER: You just answered that.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

1 MR. CRIDER: All right. The FTOW stated that
2 he had all contacts on the time-bearing presentation on
3 his fire control system and that he was not using a
4 360-degree scale but rather a scale that enabled him to
5 show all contacts on the same screen.

6 All right. Well, I'll go through this
7 anyway.

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

9 MR. CRIDER: Do you know what scale he was
10 using?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

12 MR. CRIDER: Do you -- well, what scale --

13 LCDR PFEIFER: You asked me that before and
14 you asked me -- you forced me to guess and I said
15 something -- 180 plus or minus 90. And -- and I don't
16 know. It's -- I think it's a -- there's a -- there's a
17 knob that you can turn that can make it go anything and
18 it could have been anything that got all those bearings
19 on -- on one screen.

20 MR. CRIDER: Okay. Did you have any
21 conversations at any time that day and the next day
22 with Captain Bran-Huber?

23 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Bran-Huber?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. We spoke before and

1 after.

2 MR. CRIDER: Mm-hmm -- in that regard the
3 vessel depth and speeds used, did it involve -- what
4 did it -- generally, what -- what did those
5 conversations involve?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: The ones I remember beforehand
7 were having to do with distinguished visitors. And
8 then afterwards, they involved the upcoming
9 investigation and -- and reminding me of -- of, you
10 know, my job, to collect all the information and -- and
11 he pointed out in the book a reference that said, "This
12 is the investigation that's going to happen, here's all
13 the information that you need to grab," which I really
14 appreciated because it helped me figure out what --
15 what all stuff I needed to get.

16 And what else did we talk about? We -- we
17 had to put up the distinguished visitors overnight, so
18 he -- he helped out a lot with that. Communicate to
19 them here's what's going to happen and here's what
20 we're doing.

21 MR. CRIDER: Did the ship's crew check the
22 setup of the periscope and monitor following the
23 collision? Shall I repeat that?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: No. I -- I think what you're

1 asking is was that checked, like was the periscope
2 working, and I can't tell you for sure what all was
3 checked but I'll tell you I'll bet money it was because
4 the -- the fleet of people that came down checked
5 everything.

6 MR. CRIDER: And I think we've asked you the
7 last question. We've probably beat that one to death.

8 Tom, do you want to continue or do you want
9 --

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Thank you. I can carry on
11 with a few of them. This is Tom Roth-Roffy.

12 We're nearing the end, Commander, and if you
13 need another break we can do that or we can -- we can
14 press on.

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Let's press on.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Do you recall any
17 problems with the sonar equipment during -- during the
18 day of the -- the accident?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Other than the AVSDU, no.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Because apparently
21 some of the distinguished visitors mentioned that they
22 had a rebooting problem that periodically the system
23 had to be rebooted. Now, that's all we have. Do you
24 have any recollection of that happening that day?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: That may have happened.
2 That's not that unusual. That's -- that would -- kind
3 of like your -- your Windows PC, they need to reboot
4 it. That would happen to the BSY-1 system, sonar
5 system. It would do it occasionally.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- not uncommon?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: No, it -- it happens. It
8 wouldn't surprise me if -- if we had done a sonar warm
9 start that day.

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Any -- any idea how often
11 that might happen? Once a week or once a month or
12 every day? Just to give us an idea of the extent of
13 the problem.

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Maybe somewhere between once a
15 day and once a week, somewhere in there.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And after you rebooted it
17 did you reacquire the targets or was it a complete
18 reinitialization of the system?

19 LCDR PFEIFER: There --

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I mean --

21 (Simultaneous speaking)

22 LCDR PFEIFER: -- there are different methods
23 of rebooting.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Uh huh.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: And, you know, like the -- it
2 depends on which -- which -- how extensive of a reboot
3 you had to do, and the one that happened that day, it
4 would be something that I wouldn't even be aware it
5 happened. They wouldn't inform the XO that they
6 rebooted sonar. They would just -- they'd get the CO's
7 permission to do it if it was extensive.

8 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, past history of
9 the sonar contacts, would that be lost on the type of
10 reboot that might have happened on that day?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: I couldn't tell you for sure
12 not knowing what type of reboot. And even if I did,
13 I'm not sure I would be able to answer that question.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: When and how did you become
15 aware that the AVSDU was out of commission on that day?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall the exact time
17 but I do know it was in the morning and I remember I
18 was in the control room, and I think I noticed it and
19 the -- the navigator and I talked about it. And he had
20 let me know the captain knew about it. And it might
21 have been -- it was right before getting underway or
22 shortly after getting underway that morning.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, you and the
24 navigator discussed it. Did you also have any similar

1 discussions with the commanding officer regarding the
2 AVSDU?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall if I did or
4 not.

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I think Bill Woody
6 might have already covered this, but had the AVSDU
7 failed on a DV cruise in the past and if so what steps
8 were done to compensate for its loss?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: That's the first time I recall
10 having the AVSDU out of commission.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: During a DV trip?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Or -- or in -- in all.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

14 LCDR PFEIFER: For me, at the court of
15 inquiry the admirals thought, like, it happened all the
16 time. It never happened on a -- on a ship I'd served
17 before. They didn't say it happened all the time but
18 they had recollection of it happening before and -- and
19 what they did to compensate. And it may have happened
20 on ships that I served on but I don't recall that
21 happening before.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did you notice any other
23 equipment problems during the DV cruise? The fire
24 control, sonar, ESM, ship control, anything that you

1 can recall that -- that -- with the ship's equipment?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Nothing sticks out, but also
3 say I'm sure -- millions of parts on that ship. There
4 were probably some things not working right, but -- but
5 other than the AVSDU, that's the one that sticks out in
6 my mind.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I'm trying to -- to piece
8 together -- as part of our -- our factual report we
9 kind of walk through where each person was and what he
10 did when. And I was just trying to -- to make sure
11 that we had a complete pictures of your activities --

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Uh huh.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- during that morning. You
14 were in the control room, I believe, before the ship
15 went to periscope depth and you had a little, brief
16 interchange with Coen, and then you went into the sonar
17 room. Now, was the curtain closed or is it usually
18 closed while underway, or what's the procedure with
19 that curtain?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: The curtain is usually closed.
21 Doors open, curtain usually closed.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, while you're in
23 sonar the curtain was -- was closed for most of the
24 time or was it open part of the time?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: I can't tell you. I -- I'm
2 sure it was closed but --

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Generally it was closed?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: -- you know, do I -- I don't
5 have a specific recollection that it being -- it was
6 closed at the time.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And at certain parts while
8 you were in sonar you stepped into the doorway just to
9 get an idea what was happening in control. And I
10 believe that was -- if you need to refer to your notes
11 there, it was when I believe you saw Lieutenant Coen
12 making sweeps on -- on the periscope --

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- so you had to be in the
15 doorway at that time, right?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: That -- yeah. That -- the --
17 I would have had to have stuck my head through the
18 curtain.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And then, I believe
20 you lingered at some point in the doorway before going
21 -- or did you step outside into control and re-close
22 the curtain, or do you have any recollection?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: You know, I -- I get asked
24 that and I -- I really don't know the difference, you

1 know.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: One foot in the control room,
4 one head out, it's all within a foot. And it --

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I've been asked this so
7 many times what -- when did I leave sonar? I -- I try
8 to remember what I -- what I had here.

9 (Pause)

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. I guess as -- as we
11 reached PD I looked out from sonar, which -- which
12 makes sense to me. I would have -- as we're ascending
13 I'm going to look at the broadband screen and that's
14 what I remember doing. And then after we get to
15 periscope depth the main sensor is really not sonar,
16 it's now the periscope. And I don't -- seen Mr. Coen,
17 you know, which I guess I remember here. I heard him
18 call "No close contacts" and then saw the CO take the
19 scope, as I'm reading from my statement here.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And we've looked at your
21 statement. I was just trying to see if --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- maybe you had some
24 recollection in addition to what you had written.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: That's -- that's just kind
3 of the reason we're asking that question.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Not trying to -- to browbeat
6 you or anything, but sometimes you write stuff down,
7 you maybe don't write everything that you know.

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, yeah. I -- I appreciate
9 you letting me look at this because if -- if you had a
10 misunderstanding from this I can clarify it. But also,
11 I don't want to try to invent something that really --

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I don't remember.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, I think that's
15 pretty much the -- the rest of the questions are what
16 we call retrospective. We've already asked some of
17 those questions but a number of these are, you know,
18 going back and thinking, you know, how things might
19 have been done differently or any thoughts you might
20 have about what could be done better in the future.

21 In hindsight, was a single fire control
22 technician an adequate watch for fire control station
23 that day, considering all -- all that you know about
24 what was going on? Or would it have been better to

1 have had two fire control men stationed during the
2 watch? If you have any thoughts about that.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, I -- it requires
4 clarification. And one fire control technician was
5 adequate. When preparing to come to periscope depth
6 and then we developed three contacts, it would have
7 been reasonable to have the auxiliary electrician watch
8 -- man a CEP or find another person, if -- if the fire
9 control technician of the watch felt overloaded. The
10 watch section could have done that differently.

11 One additional fire control technician on the
12 watch would have been helpful having the captain drive
13 the ship the way he did, but it -- it -- I don't think
14 that should have happened and one should have been
15 enough.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I know we've kind of asked
17 this different ways and I apologize, but would a
18 properly maintained CEP have helped to determine if the
19 S-13 is close?

20 (Pause)

21 LCDR PFEIFER: My opinion, no. The -- the
22 average Mr. Coen level training and the amount that you
23 get to see, the rest of it would have been below the
24 desk that they wouldn't have seen. You know, in the

1 clear view of hindsight looking at a table-length
2 display that is all spread out, yeah, you can come to
3 that conclusion. But with just the -- the amount that
4 they would have seen over the -- the thing, I don't
5 think honestly that would have really made the
6 difference.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What are the requirements or
8 guidelines for how often the CEP is supposed to be
9 plotted? Is it every five minutes?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, boy. I wish I could
11 remember what the guidance is. I -- I --

12 (Pause)

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I believe you were
14 the training officer on board the submarine. Was that
15 your official title?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: That's one -- no, I'm the
17 executive officer -- one of my -- I got a lot of hats I
18 wear, second-in-command, et cetera. But that's --
19 training is something that the XO drives.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. All right. Regarding
21 training of the sonar technicians, do you believe that
22 in hindsight they have adequate training for them to
23 recognize high bearing rates? Or was this just an
24 unusual circumstance that the high bearing rate on S-13

1 was not recognized?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think there was a high
3 bearing rate on the sonar screen that I saw. So --

4 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, the training you --
5 really was not an issue. It was just it was not there
6 to observe?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: The leg was too short. By the
8 time -- and there's other factors. When you -- you do
9 this reconstruction and -- and the same thing with the
10 court of inquiry and they do it at the attack center,
11 it's -- it's not the same -- the noise isn't the same,
12 the effects of the slowing of the ship and what that
13 does to the -- to the -- the screen is not the same.
14 They haven't been able to -- to see it like that, and
15 that is a good example of how it really -- you can come
16 to that conclusion that, oh, the sonar man missed a
17 high bearing rate, and I didn't see it and I was
18 looking. I don't think it was there.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, would you say that the
20 training is inadequate, the simulations are inadequate,
21 maybe they should be refined to represent more
22 accurately the true picture that you see on submarines?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think that's necessary
24 to -- to continue operating submarines the way we have

1 for 50 years. The -- the -- need to do adequate legs
2 and it wasn't done.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. The fire control
4 technician of the watch testified that he was in a
5 hurry to update his solutions because the ship was
6 going to periscope depth. But he stated that he did
7 not review the solution range, the range of the
8 solution, before entering it as a system solution. Is
9 it plausible, in your opinion, that the FTOW would have
10 entered the solution as a system solution without
11 reviewing it?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I think it's plausible with
13 him trying to figure out a solution to all three
14 contacts in the amount of time that the captain was
15 giving him. He was pushing buttons as fast as he could
16 and, you know, he entered a system. There's another
17 display called Op Summary that the system solution
18 would have been displayed on that would have -- he was
19 doing everything he could to feed the captain
20 information. So, I -- I don't think he was doing
21 everything he could to feed him information. I don't
22 think so. But he was -- he was working his machine as
23 fast as he could to put that information in there, and
24 -- and I think it's reasonable that he -- he didn't

1 notice it.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: And remember the system
4 solution is a guess. He's -- you know, it's not like
5 I'm going to hang my hat and say that's where that guy
6 is. He's -- he's putting his guesses into the machine
7 and -- and -- to display them on a op summary, which is
8 like a GEO PLOT -- a chart with contacts on it to --
9 to help the people that work above him to have a clear
10 picture. So, I think it's reasonable that he was
11 processing the information as fast as he could.

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you believe that a
13 broached look, high look, would have demonstrated that
14 there was sufficient haze to obscure a white-colored
15 vessel?

16 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I couldn't say. I don't
17 think -- I don't know why being higher would help you
18 realize there was a haze out there. Perhaps in some
19 kind of weird situation, but I -- I'm not sure that
20 really -- that would have helped.

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. In retrospect, can
22 you think of any additional safety steps that maybe
23 should be taken prior to doing an emergency main
24 ballast tank blow? Beyond what's -- you know, that you

1 did on the day of the accident.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, the -- the way they did
3 it the day of the accident wasn't good, so when we did
4 it since then I insisted that we drove away from land
5 and after the officer of the deck -- I think the
6 captain did, too, and I insisted on doing a good look
7 while we were broached. And we had both scopes up
8 while we were broached doing a very thorough search of
9 -- of the scene. And if there was a -- somebody that
10 that you can see that has the potential of getting
11 anywhere near you, you don't do it.

12 One time we didn't because there was somebody
13 -- we wouldn't have run into them but, hey, he was
14 close enough that we didn't want to do it. We waited
15 till we could -- we waited until there was a time where
16 there wasn't anybody at all there to --

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, you believe that more
18 emphasis on the visual searches is important as a
19 safety item?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Correct. And I think I've
21 stated before that was the -- the key thing. There
22 were other mistakes made, but I think that's -- when it
23 comes down to it, that was -- that's the one you count
24 on, wasn't done right.

1 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Again, retrospective.

2 Any changes regarding the distinguished visitor
3 program that you would recommend to make it safer, I
4 believe.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: That -- that instruction that
6 I didn't thoroughly read but kind of glanced at, I'm
7 sure that has adequate information in it.

8 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So you didn't --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: That's really not something
10 that I'm an expert on, so.

11 (Pause)

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You mentioned that
13 you believe that the main failure was the visual search
14 and that there were other -- indeed, other less
15 significant errors committed. Can you make any
16 recommendations on what might be done in the future to
17 -- beyond what you've already stated that would prevent
18 a similar accident in the future? Obviously, a longer
19 visual search and requiring the -- the full time
20 lengths on the legs. Anything else that -- that --
21 that might be useful as a safety recommendation that
22 you might have thought of?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: I think that the Navy-trained
24 pipelines have pretty much covered it. And I haven't

1 attended them but I know that the incident is being
2 trained on and at command -- or at training before the
3 -- you guys get -- I know before my relief came he had
4 mentioned that they had studied it.

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What lessons are they
6 teaching in this training sessions? Do you know?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't get to attend it.

8 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You mentioned in your -- in
9 your unsworn statement that you had hoped for a higher
10 look and that you had hoped that there would be a gross
11 look.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm not sure I did.

13 (Pause)

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Maybe it was in the summary
15 of the interview. I'm sorry. I might --

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Maybe it wasn't in your
18 written statement. It might have been a --

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- somewhere else. But I
21 believe --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: On the summary of -- of
23 interview --

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Correct.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: -- what I did submit to the
2 court is that I gathered up the evidence that I -- I'm
3 reading from my statement that I did submit. I thought
4 it would be necessary for the investigation. I looked
5 through the evidence as I gathered it to verify the
6 accuracy of the required hard copy message traffic
7 describing the steps taken prior to the collision. I
8 locked evidence in my safe and on Sunday 11 February
9 Commodore Bias and Lieutenant Commander Harrison, a JAG
10 lawyer, interviewed me and wrote a results of
11 interview, and that's what you're discussing now.

12 My understanding of this interview was to ask
13 me what I thought happened. The answers I gave during
14 that interview were often not what I saw, felt,
15 believed, or wanted at the time it happened but what I
16 felt and believed on Sunday, 11 February. What I knew,
17 felt, and believed on Sunday was based on evaluating
18 both what I saw at the time and what I learned later.

19 So, I guess what I'm saying is it bothers me
20 when the manner in which that summary of interview was
21 written, and in -- in hindsight, yeah, five, eight
22 feet. Even as I stated here, that's not what I would
23 do. But that's what he did.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Somewhere, either in

1 -- it must have been one of the summary sheets that you
2 stated or he recorded you stating that you had hope for
3 a higher level?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

5 SPEAKER: Can you recall reading that to --
6 some -- (inaudible.)

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: The question is why didn't
8 you say something to the commanding officer about --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, what -- what I just
10 tried to explain in the last five minutes was that what
11 you're quoting from is a summary of interview that I'm
12 not sure was in my mind at the time. I don't recall
13 that thing and what -- what I have stated is that on
14 Sunday thinking back and looking at the evidence and
15 knowing that this guy must have been one mile away and
16 the captain missed him, one of the things he should
17 have done is been at higher -- been at a higher look.

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I think that's all I
19 have.

20 Bill, if -- if you --

21 MR. WOODY: If you'd started on what --
22 Course 1-2-0, how long would it take you to change
23 course to 3-4-0, assuming the course was clear?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Depends on what speed and

1 rudder you use. But --

2 MR. WOODY: Rather quickly --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't think that at any time
4 to what we were doing because it was emergency deep --

5 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: About when we got -- you know.
7 But as we're going down, we're turning.

8 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: And then we blew in effect. I
10 don't -- I think he ordered 3-4-0 or some course and we
11 didn't even get that far because we weren't late.
12 Because once you look you want to get right back to up
13 there. So, I don't think the length -- the time of the
14 -- I don't think the term really added time that we
15 were down.

16 MR. WOODY: But --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: -- that help you.

18 MR. WOODY: -- had you gone ahead and
19 surfaced on Course 1-2-0 --

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

21 MR. WOODY: -- I think the court of inquiry
22 said there likely would have been a conclusion with the
23 -- with the service vessel. But how long would it have
24 taken you to turn? You can't exactly --

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I think it was two. You
2 said if he had surfaced on 1-2-0 would there have been
3 --

4 MR. WOODY: Yeah. I don't think it --

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- a collision?

6 MR. WOODY: I don't mean to -- I think the --
7 I think some of the --

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I don't think that's
9 physically possible, is it?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: What -- what --

11 (Inaudible comment by another speaker)

12 LCDR PFEIFER: We're not quizzing because
13 the ship was doing 12 knots and the ship was doing 11,
14 and it would have blown out in front of the ship at a
15 higher speed.

16 MR. WOODY: Okay. I think so. But --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: But --

18 MR. WOODY: -- what happened -- my question,
19 really, is very simple. If you're on 1-2-0 and you
20 come around to 3-4-0, how long would it take you on the
21 surface to do that? Say, you know, ten speed, full
22 rudder.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Two minutes.

24 MR. WOODY: Two minutes?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Is that reasonable? Yeah, you
2 -- yes, sir. Potentially that. I guess your -- your
3 question was if they'd just done that how much time
4 would it have saved you getting to Papa Hotel? I was
5 just --

6 MR. WOODY: Well, --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Go down, blow to the surface,
8 and then turn?

9 MR. WOODY: Yes. Two minutes?

10 LCDR PFEIFER: Something like that, maybe.
11 Get the periscope up, look around, and turn.

12 (Pause)

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, can I get back --

14 (LCDR Pfeifer's response was interrupted by
15 the end of Tape 3, Side 1.)

16 MR. SCHEFFER: We're back in battery.

17 (Pause)

18 MR. WOODY: Do we have another tape we use --
19 one of these opened up, Tom?

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

21 MR. WOODY: You have better fingernails than
22 I have. They confiscated my Swiss army knife at the
23 airport the other day.

24 (Laughter)

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Hey, well, good thing you
2 didn't cause a major incident.

3 MR. WOODY: No, --

4 LCDR PFEIFER: That would have been bad.

5 MR. WOODY: I was going through security,
6 they took my knife, and -- thank you, Tom.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I mean how -- how embarrassing.
8 Senior NTSB inspector taken away in chains.

9 MR. WOODY: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. That would
10 have been bad.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Public affairs nightmare.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. WOODY: Okay. This way here.

14 LCDR PFEIFER: (Inaudible comment)

15 MR. WOODY: Here she goes.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: We were talking about the
17 emergency deep on 1-2-0, had we stayed on 1-2-0, had we
18 collided -- would we have collided. And we kind of
19 agreed that maybe we probably wouldn't have.

20 But what I want to explain is Captain Kyle
21 and his team at Sub Pac when they were doing the
22 reconstruction came to the conclusion that a zero
23 bearing rate contact, if you project the track out
24 ahead they're going to collide. And so, I mean there

1 was no new lesson learned there. It just -- he was --
2 I think their team was -- was suggesting that, you
3 know, if a contact's close don't come to periscope
4 depth on a zero bearing rate leg.

5 MR. WOODY: Okay.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Which -- I mean that's --
7 that's kind of understood.

8 MR. WOODY: Now, kind of working out the time
9 that you went to sonar, did you -- was the ship on 3-4-
10 0 when you went to sonar? Was it on the northwest
11 course when you went to sonar? Can you recall?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I don't. What I do
13 remember, and I can visualize the screen that I'm
14 talking about.

15 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: That's what I remember. Two
17 traces and the one in the middle, which is S-14, 12,
18 and 13. And I do remember as I walked in out of the
19 corner of my eye seeing the captain leaving. And --
20 and what I do remember is the sonar screen on the 1-2-0
21 leg.

22 MR. WOODY: Okay. There -- there would have
23 been enough time history on the -- on the sonar screen
24 to have seen the high bearing rate if -- if it

1 appeared?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. It would have looked
3 like spaghetti.

4 MR. WOODY: It looked like spaghetti because
5 of what?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Because of the -- of the high-
7 speed turns --

8 MR. WOODY: High-speed turns.

9 LCDR PFEIFER: -- and we had talked about how
10 noise at high speeds brings -- and adjust the
11 background.

12 MR. WOODY: Right. Mm-hmm.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: And also, the course change
14 makes the bearings to contacts get mixed up with the
15 stern marker and those ships' noise, which other ships'
16 noise curves through all your turns and the targets
17 don't and the stern marker runs through it. It
18 confuses the picture, makes it very difficult to read.

19 MR. WOODY: Yeah. I know you -- you've said
20 that -- the CEP now. The CEP would not necessarily
21 have been visible to the OOD to look at and see what
22 the overall bearing - S-13, for example, would have
23 been. Is that what you're saying?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: It may have. I really -- I

1 don't remember it -- the question would require how
2 many minutes would Mr. Coen needed to look historically
3 to recognize that S-13 was close, and would that amount
4 of time been visible to him over the desk?

5 MR. WOODY: If you'd looked at the log, do
6 you -- have you looked at a log -- sonar log --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: The sonar log.

8 MR. WOODY: -- S-13. I know that --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, like --

10 MR. WOODY: -- probably didn't do it. Have
11 you looked at it since then?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Like, during the court of
13 inquiry. That's -- I looked at that as evidence.

14 MR. WOODY: Had you looked at the sonar log
15 at the time during the sonar, would you have had
16 anything to report or think about or do differently --

17 LCDR PFEIFER: I think the sonar logs just
18 had a couple number bearings.

19 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: To be honest, I don't think I
21 would have analyzed those numbers. Now, in the -- if
22 you said, "Hey, look at this thing for five minutes and
23 figure out is it close or not by just glancing at it,"
24 it's something I wouldn't normally do and so it'd take

1 me a while to --

2 MR. WOODY: Would -- would the fact that --
3 would you have been able to perceive an overall bearing
4 change to S-13?

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

6 MR. WOODY: Because I think -- was right --

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Just looking at the numbers I
8 would be able to tell.

9 MR. WOODY: Would that have been helpful to
10 you to -- to make any kind of recommendation to conn?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. But to be honest, that
12 would be unlikely. It would -- it would -- what I'm
13 comfortable looking at and what I normally look at is
14 the sonar screen or fire control screen. I mean it
15 would be unusual for me to look at some logs when that
16 -- all that stuff visually is displayed.

17 MR. WOODY: So, the visual display would have
18 a higher priority to look at than -- than to go back
19 into the logs?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

21 MR. WOODY: Is that fair?

22 LCDR PFEIFER: That's probably how the normal
23 -- submarine officer would normally look at the screen.
24 Now, in hindsight, yeah, I guess looking at the logs

1 was also a real good thing to do. I -- I mean I doubt
2 most people would do that.

3 MR. WOODY: It would have showed that there
4 was a right bearing change on the S-13, for example,
5 overall?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. You've got to remember,
7 I mean there's -- there's S-10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 all
8 in there, all that stuff. I mean you're -- there's
9 only -- and then now you're -- you're going to compute
10 the numerical bearing rates looking at some recorded
11 numbers. You know, and the -- the next day you're
12 looking at S-13, oh, yeah, it looks real clear. But
13 processing all those numbers in addition to the visual
14 and reports and all the other things, there's other --
15 I mean you get the DE angles. There's all kinds of
16 information.

17 The -- to expect, you know, realistically, me
18 to pick up the logs and then, would have, oh, I would
19 have saved the day, I don't think that really is
20 reasonable.

21 MR. WOODY: Right. I mean the -- the fact
22 that it was going right, that would have indicated it'd
23 be on the right side, perhaps?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: Over a long -- oh, okay.

1 Yeah.

2 MR. WOODY: -- time.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: On the 1-2-0 leg I -- I don't
4 think it was drawing right. But over the course of a
5 long time you would have, yeah, noticed that its course
6 was generally to the east.

7 MR. WOODY: And you mentioned to one of the
8 questions that you didn't recall the signal-to-noise
9 ratio for S-13 changing or notice it. Did you need the
10 signal-to-noise ratios for the -- for the contacts --
11 three traces? Is that something you'd normally do?
12 Did you do it?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: I have done it before and I
14 really -- I don't know if I was looking at the SNR and
15 I don't remember, you know, "I really feel
16 uncomfortable because of this," and I was right. You
17 know, I don't -- I don't have those memories at all.

18 MR. WOODY: Is it the sort of thing you'd
19 normally do if you -- under the circumstances?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: To be honest, when -- yeah,
21 it's something you -- you look at.

22 MR. WOODY: Yeah.

23 LCDR PFEIFER: And particularly someone
24 you're tracking for a long time. But it's not -SNR

1 can fool you. Propagation path can -- can make a close
2 guy look very quiet. So, it's something more you'd use
3 in -- in tracking bad guys. But it's also an
4 indication of here's a high SNR, maybe this guy's
5 close. So, it's something I look at. I don't recall
6 noticing or not noticing any unusual SNRs at S-13 or 12
7 or 14 or 10, for that matter.

8 MR. WOODY: Okay. We got a very fine
9 education from the Sub Pac folks. One thing I didn't
10 pick up on and I've been asking, the open mike. We
11 keep hearing about it. We think we know what it is.
12 We know that there was a 27MC from sonar that they
13 could use to report fire control in the conn and I
14 think ESM.

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

16 MR. WOODY: But what -- what is open mike?
17 Is that --

18 LCDR PFEIFER: The open mike is a microphone
19 that's on top of the conn to control the platform that
20 the officer of the deck stands at. And it picks up the
21 noise and -- and then it's broadcast in sonar so the
22 sonar men can hear -- if -- you know.

23 MR. WOODY: Is sonar the only station that
24 it's broadcast to?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes. No, excuse me. The CO -
2 - the CO's state room.

3 MR. WOODY: CO state room.

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And -- and -- well, let me
5 -- typically, CO, XO doesn't have to be sonar and
6 ESM. Sonar usually has a control they can turn theirs
7 down, so when you're submerged tracking they may not
8 always hear everything.

9 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

10 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Typically, you tell sonar to
11 turn it on and ESM when they man up because they're --
12 when you're deep they're not manned up.

13 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

14 CAPTAIN MULLOY: It's Conn ESM, Conn Sonar,
15 test Conn open mike. And they come back on a 27 MC
16 because they can't talk to you on that and they
17 acknowledge that it's up and working. Typically, it's
18 only used when you're either periscope depth or up.

19 But usually in the captain and XO state room,
20 in my state room could always hear it and I had an
21 amplifier to turn it up or down. And it's just a
22 little microphone hanging up with a little tiny
23 amplifier in the overhead. And it's just to allow
24 people to hear what's going on so the OOD doesn't have

1 to distract himself to push a push-to-talk microphone
2 or talk on it. Typically deep, though, so you don't
3 bother the sonar men when they're listening, if you're
4 tracking someone, they use the 27 MC. You know, Radio
5 Conn this or -- or Sonar Conn. But when you're PD it
6 allows you to say, "Radio setup to copy a broadcast.
7 Radio setup do this. Sonar, I'm turning left, you're
8 turning right." You eliminate microphones.

9 MR. WOODY: And the ESM's radio?

10 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah, ESM radio is one
11 combined room.

12 MR. WOODY: One combined room.

13 CAPTAIN MULLOY: But there are two different
14 petty officers in there.

15 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

16 CAPTAIN MULLOY: But you can talk to them by
17 saying, "Radio Con" or "ESM Con" or just "Radio ESM."

18 MR. WOODY: Okay.

19 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Like, "One of you guys talk
20 to me in there. I know you're both in there."

21 MR. WOODY: CO, XO, ESM radio, Sonar, which
22 can turn it down.

23 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Right.

24 MR. WOODY: Okay. Just to make sure --

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And then CO, XO can turn it
2 -- I mean most people can turn it down. Usually sonar
3 turns it off --

4 MR. WOODY: Okay.

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- when they're deep. Now,
6 they don't have to, but typically the supe wants to
7 because they might have all that noise in sonar when
8 he's deep trying to track and train and listen to
9 contacts.

10 MR. WOODY: Give me a moment here.

11 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I guess there were some
12 questions. Is it recorded? No. There -- it's not
13 designed as a --

14 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

15 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- recording system. It's
16 merely an amplifier and a microphone and speakers.
17 There is no recording of the conn open mike.

18 Now, sonar runs a work tape sometimes in the
19 background which has come out in your investigation. I
20 don't know if the ship was or not.

21 You guys had a work tape or no work tapes or
22 something?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Wasn't working at the time.

24 MR. WOODY: Right.

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And it wasn't working at the
2 time or something, so that -- that is a listening-to-
3 sonar context. There is no recording of the conn open
4 mike.

5 MR. WOODY: Okay. Just to go back on some of
6 Dennis's questions, you mentioned that -- about the --
7 the emergency surface that was done so you could get up
8 on the surface for the operator, when you said in the
9 overlap period, that's an area that -- the overlap area
10 between the -- the operating areas.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Right.

12 MR. WOODY: That's an area where you have to
13 be on the surface, is it?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: No. It's an area that you can
15 -- I'll use these two pieces of paper and -- and this
16 is, let's say, the 11th and this is the 12th.

17 (LCDR Pfeifer demonstrates his point with two
18 pieces of paper.)

19 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: And so, you own this water on
21 the 11th and this on the 12th. So, at midnight where
22 do you want to be? You want to be right in the overlap
23 area --

24 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: -- because you're good on the
2 11th and instantaneously when it turns into the 12th
3 you're covered.

4 MR. WOODY: I see.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: When this goes away, you're
6 here.

7 CAPTAIN MULLOY: The -- the water's can't --
8 the water areas if they only abut, it's not physically
9 possible to be in water you own at both times. So, you
10 have to, like, a Ven diagram. Water management
11 requires and procedures and computers check is that you
12 provide a path for the submarine on a Ven diagram
13 method to have an area that overlaps from anything from
14 one hour to a whole day. But there has to be some kind
15 of overlap, otherwise it's not physically possible to
16 be in area at the stroke of midnight.

17 MR. WOODY: Okay. And the -- the one thing
18 with this emergency surface that I didn't get was
19 where, the location of it. You mentioned that the
20 operator is but --

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. It was the Pacific
22 Ocean.

23 MR. WOODY: Pacific Ocean. Was it near Pearl
24 Harbor?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

2 MR. WOODY: It was not. Okay.

3 The -- I -- I just had one thing that's
4 always bothered me and -- and, you know, we -- we have
5 sonar that played tapes for the -- for the visitors
6 that day. And then they neglected to put the work tape
7 back in place to record what they would normally be --
8 be happening in sonar. And then there's the CEP plot
9 we -- which we've labored on, and then, of course, the
10 -- when the accident happened, the mylar, what the --
11 the plastic with the ship's track was not maintained by
12 the navigator and the quartermaster watch.

13 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, let me --

14 MR. WOODY: Yeah?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Mylar, I'm not -- I don't
16 fault them at all. We were -- we were trying to save
17 people. I don't -- you know, there is Penguin Bank,
18 there's navigational issues, and we really hadn't tried
19 to rescue people before for real, and so --

20 MR. WOODY: Mm-hmm.

21 LCDR PFEIFER: -- the last thing I'm -- on my
22 mind was worrying about not erasing some lead
23 scratches. I wanted to save people. So, some guy made
24 that decision to -- to keep us off of Penguin Bank and

1 running aground. That's -- that's something -- I think
2 that's a lot of undue criticism unfair to the ship.

3 MR. WOODY: Appreciate your comments. We
4 were just wondering if there's a -- perhaps I was
5 wondering if there's some sort of a -- of a change in
6 mood that they -- the -- with the passengers on board,
7 the visitors. Did the -- was there something that --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: I'd like to say "no," but with
9 -- the thing that makes me think, well, maybe there was
10 the -- the watch standards, those quartermasters that
11 decided to switch and then sonar supes, that's
12 something they normally wouldn't do. Something was
13 different and they thought they could just make those
14 kind of unauthorized swaps. So, that's an indication
15 to me. The mylar, that's not an indication.

16 MR. WOODY: Not an indication.

17 LCDR PFEIFER: The -- the work tape, that's
18 not an indication. That's -- that really had no part
19 in -- in what -- that's for reasons that -- the reason
20 that they actually run that tape is for potentially
21 hostile guys running by who you want a tape of -- that
22 -- that's the real reason for that thing. That's why
23 it was started. It's -- it's unfortunate we didn't do
24 it, but -- and we didn't do it in an area where that is

1 a potential and that would have been running--

2 MR. WOODY: Okay.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: I forgot what other example
4 you brought up, but --

5 MR. WOODY: The CEP plot. I think we've -- I
6 think we've labored that quite a lot.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. WOODY: It only affected --

9 LCDR PFEIFER: It really --

10 MR. WOODY: -- affected the OOD, yourself,
11 and the CO --

12 LCDR PFEIFER: ship-wide in the submarine
13 force, if somebody said on my submarine for the whole
14 time I was on there there was was never a 45-minute
15 period that it wasn't kept up, I would really have
16 doubts that -- that that guy was telling the truth.

17 MR. WOODY: Was the -- was the tape normally
18 run during independent ship operations, when you go out
19 to train or running different exercises? Did you
20 always have it running? I mean --

21 LCDR PFEIFER: -- always. I'm sure it wasn't
22 always and -- but it normally was.

23 MR. WOODY: Normally --

24 LCDR PFEIFER: It was something -- I really

1 wasn't -- it wasn't something I went into sonar and
2 said, "Oh, the tape's running" because it really is not
3 that a significant thing that would require my
4 attention. Now, if we were on station in Indian
5 country, yeah, that'd be something I would make sure
6 was -- was ready to go.

7 MR. WOODY: Okay. I think that's all the
8 questions I have. Thank you very much.

9 DR. STRAUCH: I still have a couple more.
10 This is the last -- when was this incident -- the
11 surfacing and different -- can you recall when that
12 was?

13 LCDR PFEIFER: It was in the fall of '99. It
14 -- can you -- what is --

15 DR. STRAUCH: That's the --

16 LCDR PFEIFER: The emergency blow?

17 DR. STRAUCH: -- what we were just talking
18 about.

19 LCDR PFEIFER: Emergency blow, okay, yeah.
20 Fall of '99.

21 DR. STRAUCH: And you and Commander Waddle
22 discussed it afterwards?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

24 DR. STRAUCH: What was the gist of the

1 discussion?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: We -- we had talked about what
3 we had to do to fix -- to make sure this navigational
4 thing never happened again. And he let me know that he
5 was going to discuss it with the commodore as soon as
6 we got back that it happened.

7 DR. STRAUCH: What were you expecting the
8 commodore to do after this?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: What would the commodore do?
10 I'm pretty low down below that level so I don't know
11 what the commodore would do. I -- what he did, I
12 imagine he listened to what the CO -- how he explained
13 it happened and -- and -- see if it makes sense to him.
14 He's -- he's got a lot of submarine experience. Maybe
15 he had a similar experience and said, you know -- and
16 the two of those guys probably talk on a first-name
17 basis. He'd probably say, "Hey, Scott. You know, hey,
18 you really gotta watch this and that's something that
19 happened to me and let me show you how I fixed it and
20 prevented it from happening again." Kind of a
21 mentoring kind of process.

22 DR. STRAUCH: Did you ever hear of it again?
23 The incident again?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: From who?

1 DR. STRAUCH: From anybody on board the ship.

2 Did it ever come up again other than just --

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, it might have been
4 mentioned, but it -- I'm not sure --

5 DR. STRAUCH: Not in any official way?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, no official way.

7 DR. STRAUCH: All right.

8 MR. CRIDER: One last question, and I assume
9 you're going to do the -- more or less the same last
10 question. But my last question is this: you mentioned
11 a couple times here having an opportunity to correct
12 something in the record or something some way or not.
13 There was a couple occasions this happened today.

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

15 MR. CRIDER: This is an opportunity if
16 there's any other cases to -- (inaudible) -- anywhere
17 that you would like to correct the record and --

18 (Pause)

19 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I think I got it all off
20 my chest. Nothing comes to mind. As -- as -- as you
21 guys are reminding me of it, I -- I appreciate the
22 opportunity to clear it up.

23 MR. CRIDER: All right. That's it.

24 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I've got one quick question.

1 I wanted to go back to the early part about the sonar
2 officer qualifications. Mentioned a couple different
3 things. Your sonar qualifications come from -- do they
4 -- I believe this is true but I'll ask you do you
5 remember this on your ship, the "Combat System
6 Departmental Operation and Regulation Manual," the
7 CSDORM?

8 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

9 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Had a list of qualification
10 cards for passive narrow band, passive broadband
11 operators.

12 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. There is --
13 (Simultaneous speaking)

14 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- class operators --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: I think there's --
16 (Simultaneous speaking)

17 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- qual cards, and based
18 upon the class of ship you install the right cards for
19 your boat and that's what your sonar men qualify?

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

21 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And from those qualification
22 cards the last three signatures is the sonar chief, the
23 sonar officer, and final qualification is done by the
24 weapons officer, the department head?

1 LCDR PFEIFER: The final qual and -- and I
2 was a weapons officer as a junior officer, the -- if I
3 remember right, I -- I qualified everyone up except for
4 the sonar supe.

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Supervisor, which had --

6 LCDR PFEIFER: -- sonar supervisor --

7 (Simultaneous speaking)

8 LCDR PFEIFER: -- went all the way up.

9 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Right. Which is a
10 commanding officer qual because of -- quartermasters on
11 board, all the officer qualifications, sonar supe are
12 done by the commanding officer based upon the
13 importance of the watch station?

14 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. A few aft.

15 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Right. And some of the --
16 (inaudible) -- same thing. So, given your sonar
17 officer, whether he remembers it or not, he's involved
18 in qualifications. He has to bottom line all the qual
19 cards.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: If not bottom line them --

21 CAPTAIN MULLOY: In any audit of the ship --

22 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I mean --

23 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- would have found that the
24 weapons officer would have been -- he had to sign as

1 the sonar officer?

2 LCDR PFEIFER: He must have. I -- I haven't
3 seen those qual cards --

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: That means he may not have
5 done the sonar supe board being that average ship
6 qualifies one or two per year. How long have you been
7 sonar officer?

8 LCDR PFEIFER: I don't recall, sir.

9 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay.

10 LCDR PFEIFER: He --

11 CAPTAIN MULLOY: If this -- if this comes up
12 on your qual you can attest to when the ship -- to qual
13 boards. I'm just -- my pattern of questions go is that
14 a junior officer who says, "I never qualified a sonar
15 supe" could happen if you've been sonar officer for six
16 months and you qualify two or three a year because it's
17 a senior watch and it's somewhat driven by how many
18 times you change out of first-class or chief. That
19 particular officer may not have done that qualification
20 board but he would have had to qualify other people.

21 One last one on the op guidelines.

22 Understand ARCI ships have op guidelines for BSY-1 and
23 op guidelines for ARCI. And sometimes they may say a
24 sonar supe plus one or two, and that's the issue the

1 ship had. But in your understanding of qualified watch
2 standards vis-a-vis that, if it says a sonar supe plus
3 two, that means plus two qualified operators, right?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. There is --

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: -- if you're referring to
7 having a UI being satisfactory, that was --

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I understand. And to the
9 executive officer and to the captain on that day, a
10 supe plus two means two qualified operators?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. And --

12 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And understand whatever the
13 crew may work out without concurrence to put someone in
14 the seat may be a human being issue in that department.

15 That was not the ship's procedures to say a supe plus
16 two is anybody who can walk into sonar?

17 LCDR PFEIFER: Definitely not.

18 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay.

19 LCDR PFEIFER: And -- and I -- I think our
20 new sonar chief may have brought that practice from
21 another boat, and then I find out that some guy said
22 that it's been going on for over two years, and I'm not
23 sure that was -- I just couldn't believe that it was --

24 CAPTAIN MULLOY: That's anecdotes. Jumping

1 back to the broach and seeing haze, you're familiar
2 with the formula for the distance you arise from
3 periscope, correct?

4 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: What is that? Do you
6 remember?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: The square root of the number
8 of feet of the periscope is above the water line times
9 1.14 nautical miles.

10 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Is the range, right. So,
11 given if you only have a foot or so periscope, you may
12 only see about a mile or half a mile, you know, how far
13 you could see. Therefore, haze -- if your ship had
14 broached, would you normally be able to see a "Y" in
15 the background or a -- from where you were operating --

16 LCDR PFEIFER: No, I -- I -- when I went to
17 the bridge later I do remember seeing Diamond Head
18 clearly --

19 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: -- so that was from the bridge
21 --

22 CAPTAIN MULLOY: So --

23 LCDR PFEIFER: -- looking through the scope
24 from --

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: If you broached --

2 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I forget how many. 13

3 miles away.

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah, yeah.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Oh, that's certainly --

6 CAPTAIN MULLOY: If you broached --

7 (Simultaneous speaking)

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- the top of the periscope
9 still would have been able to see it, so given -- given
10 if you come up to 50-something feet or broached or 50
11 feet, you can assess the weather and the haze. I mean
12 the point -- I'm -- I'm not contradicting what
13 happened. I'm just making it clear is that a ship if
14 you come up higher can assess the weather and the
15 impact on visibility as well as in effect your decision
16 calculus if you come up to 50 feet and you still
17 don't see Hawaii when you expect to or you can't see
18 that fuzzy horizon on your eyeball, then you may or may
19 not do an emergency blow.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: I -- I'm not sure I understand
21 completely, but --

22 CAPTAIN MULLOY: When you come up and it's --
23 you come up and you actually come up to 50 feet and you
24 realize my height of eye -- tells me I should be able

1 to see 10 miles and I can only see what looks like a
2 mile or two, would you do an emergency blow?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: No, sir. No.

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: That's what I'm asking. On
5 a clear day.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Right -- yeah.

7 CAPTAIN MULLOY: So, if you come up to 50
8 feet, one is I think the simulation as shown by Captain
9 Kyle would have been -- and I don't know if all the
10 members have seen the computer simulation, but the ship
11 suddenly comes into view, correct? At like 58, 56
12 feet, something like that?

13 MR. CRIDER: I don't remember seeing that
14 part of it, but --

15 CAPTAIN MULLOY: There is a laptop
16 simulation. Captain Kyle --

17 MR. CRIDER: I didn't see that.

18 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- that shows what the ship
19 looks like at various ranges through that. It probably
20 worth for you guys seeing that. It shows what it would
21 like and shows given the periodicity of the waves at 61
22 feet --

23 LCDR PFEIFER: Mm-hmm.

24 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- he's not there. And it's

1 hard to see. But the minute you come up a few more
2 feet without -- you don't need the computer pointing
3 telling you the ship's there. I mean the damn thing's
4 in -- in view, and I think that's part of what comes up
5 in our issue. You don't even have to broach.

6 But that's hard to simulate the weather, but
7 I'm attesting that just asking him was if you come up
8 you can tell with your eyeball where the weather is
9 whether or not you can see far enough to justify
10 speeding up, similar to a person driving. As you come
11 up on heavy rain you slow down. Why? Because you can
12 only see so far ahead as opposed -- same thing with,
13 you know, how far you can see in your ship when you
14 come up to periscope depth.

15 Admittedly, when you're on 61 feet you don't
16 see that far. You may not know what the full extent of
17 visibility would be.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: You do see a color picture.

19 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Right.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: And you --

21 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah.

22 LCDR PFEIFER: -- if you have seen blue --

23 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Blue, right.

24 LCDR PFEIFER: -- you better be careful.

1 CAPTAIN MULLOY: You'd better be careful
2 because you're seeing is it -- is it gray sky or water
3 or whatever, correct.

4 Okay. I don't have any other questions.

5 LCDR PFEIFER: I want --

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yeah?

7 LCDR PFEIFER: He did mention that periscope
8 video, and I don't want to drag this out but I really
9 do want to clear something up on that. If we take a
10 break and I think I can find the -- the file. Or you -
11 - if you can have it, I want to show something on
12 there. I didn't have a chance earlier.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Go ahead and we'll take a
14 break now.

15 (Brief recess)

16 SPEAKER: Let's start with identifying what
17 we're looking at.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah.

19 (Visual display)

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay. So, I must not have had
21 it on yet. So --

22 MR. CRIDER: Okay. We're back on the record.
23 The time is now about 10 minutes to three. Continuing
24 our interview.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: I --

2 MR. CRIDER: What we're looking at is a
3 simulation of the periscope view and, Commander, if you
4 could just describe --

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah. This -- this was used
6 as evidence in the court of inquiry and is provided to
7 you all, and it was mentioned earlier. And I just -- I
8 wanted to point out that I think looking out a
9 periscope is unique, it's different, and people that
10 aren't used to it need help to understand it.

11 But I think this thing provided to you as
12 evidence is very misleading, and -- and my analogy here
13 is if -- if we're trying to show the Ehime Maru and
14 what Commander Waddle was looking at and to show this
15 picture that represents the Perfect Storm, that -- the
16 Ehime Maru, you know, whatever, 75 feet tall or
17 whatever it was. When you look at those -- those --
18 this Mount Everest behind there, and I'm not sure what
19 -- why they chose to make the mountains that gigantic,
20 but that in no way resembles the seas that day, but
21 they did go to lengths to say this is what the Ehime
22 Maru looks like and this and that.

23 And so, I -- I didn't want anybody to be
24 misled and drawn to conclusions by this obvious poor

1 simulation because there's -- there's videotape from
2 periscopes that's available that gets taken all the
3 time. And I'm not sure why they went and used this --
4 this poor model rather than -- than going out and
5 looking at a ship the same size and videotaping it to
6 show people what it looks like.

7 MR. CRIDER: Is that the only inaccuracy, the
8 sea state. Is there anything else about what we're
9 seeing that -- that's inaccurate?

10 CAPTAIN MULLOY: My understanding from Tom
11 Kyle is I don't know about the background sea state.
12 They're trying -- part of it was just to give you an
13 idea of given this height of eye what your range is.
14 There may be some moments where the -- where you line
15 up these laps and the waves go by you could see
16 farther.

17 I do know they took a lot of time into
18 account as given it's 60, 61 feet wave heights and the
19 exact periodicity of the waves they have from the Coast
20 Guard, what would it look like as a series of waves
21 coming to you is you really don't see much. That may
22 not be modeled there, but the point about if you put in
23 regular speed, as you go around every eight seconds and
24 the arrow points out where you would be is you really

1 don't see a whole lot.

2 And then the other part of this is the
3 dramatic -- if you come up to 52 feet or something, all
4 of a sudden now the waves arc, really. Because when
5 you're down deep like that, a wave that's only three
6 feet when you're at 61 feet looks like it's huge. Why?

7 Because that's the height of eye you have. It's three
8 feet. So it's 100 percent. I mean it's 100 percent
9 change in wave height. So, what does that look like to
10 you on the scope is you're sitting here and you're
11 looking at a wave that looks like it's my full height
12 of eye, like a -- you know, if you're a person six feet
13 tall it's going to knock you over and that's what it
14 looks -- and actually crosses your vision, you go blue,
15 and then you come back to a foam and then you come back
16 to visual again.

17 So, what does a three-foot wave look like on
18 61 feet? It looks like 100 percent coverage. It would
19 be like on a boat would be coming up to the bridge.
20 That's what it looks like to your height of eye. So,
21 that's why the model on the right they're showing you
22 is even a four or five-foot wave at 60 feet is going to
23 peak up to start coming -- either covering your screen
24 or coming up very high in it.

1 I don't know about the background wave, but
2 the -- the purpose of it talking to Kyle was to just
3 model that to be what does it look like. And I don't
4 know the specifics about -- they said was modeling the
5 day of the weather and the wind was getting a ship out
6 there to be exactly the same as February 9th would be.

7 You know, I don't know what --

8 LCDR PFEIFER: I believe that. But I think
9 --

10 (Simultaneous speaking)

11 LCDR PFEIFER: I'll tell you, any day would
12 be better than -- than this -- this representation, in
13 -- in my opinion.

14 And the other thing is, there was an issue of
15 whether the waves were coming over the scope and -- and
16 -- and if people weren't seeing waves coming over the
17 scope then the scope was higher than -- than the waves.

18 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And our --

19 LCDR PFEIFER: You know.

20 CAPTAIN MULLOY: -- I don't know what people
21 saw, if the waves were coming over the scope or not.

22 LCDR PFEIFER: -- I heard testimony that they
23 weren't, so -- and I'm just not sure why we're -- we're
24 going down this path --

1 (Simultaneous speaking)

2 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I was going down -- I'm just
3 going down the path of is -- the ship has a range
4 greater than one mile, I calculate the height of eye,
5 whether you can see the damn thing or not. If you can
6 do -- if you go to 60 feet and the ship is more than
7 1.17 times the square root of the height of eye away I
8 don't give a shit who you are, you're not going to see
9 it. It doesn't matter anymore. You just can't see the
10 ship. And it may be if it's on the edge of visibility
11 and you put a one-foot wave in there you may or may not
12 see the ship. That's all my -- my point is it's a
13 physical law of the curvature of the Earth is you can't
14 see farther than 1.17 times the square root of the
15 height of eye.

16 LCDR PFEIFER: Well, you can see the top of a
17 mast.

18 CAPTAIN MULLOY: You might see the top of the
19 mast.

20 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, yeah. I mean --

21 (Simultaneous speaking)

22 CAPTAIN MULLOY: The question would be is as
23 you're going around -- that's right. And then how much
24 of him can you see given that -- given these wave

1 heights.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir.

3 CAPTAIN MULLOY: And I think the
4 representation to this is not to -- when you stop and
5 freeze it -- (inaudible) -- see it, I think you -- the
6 better representational way this was evidenced was --
7 (inaudible) -- as it's going around is if it's a
8 reasonable model is that with the arrow on it you just
9 don't see it anyway because it may be 75 feet tall but
10 when he's a mile away and he is narrow coming at you
11 now, I think people -- my experience with people has
12 been when I -- they say, "How could you miss that?"
13 then I point out something a mile away and say, "Hey,
14 how tall is that building?"

15 "Oh, that's six stories high and it's also
16 this wide."

17 I said, "What if it's -- not as quite as tall
18 and it's only this wide and it's wide? That's what it
19 really looks like," and you point at, like, a crane
20 somewhere.

21 Then they say, "Oh, that's what it would look
22 like?"

23 "Yeah, that's what it would like because a
24 building crane or one of those cranes down over there,

1 that's what that would have looked like through the
2 periscope." Then there's a little bit it gets away
3 from this factor of, you know, it's 60 feet, you know,
4 how come no one else in the con saw it? Well, I don't
5 think it was that obvious. Maybe the captain had gone
6 a slower, probably could have picked it up. But this
7 -- as he points out, there are years of experience
8 looking through a scope as to what it looks like.

9 I just thought you guys -- I mean it's here.
10 You may not agree. I -- I think it was at least a
11 reasonable attempt at trying to give an idea to people
12 that never looked out a periscope what it looks like.

13 MR. CRIDER: But the other aspects that we're
14 looking at, the distant waves and the relative size of
15 the -- how -- how would you characterize the relative
16 accuracy of what we're looking at?

17 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I don't know in terms of the
18 distant waves what -- whether that was looking at how
19 much water would be beyond it. Is it -- is it really
20 peak -- because, remember, you're looking at something
21 that is two-dimensional modeling something three. A
22 ship that's in closer has water behind it doesn't mean
23 it's higher than it, right? You look at anything, I
24 can look at something beyond it. Doesn't mean it's

1 higher. The road may be lower but I still see it
2 beyond it because it's ranges beyond it. Doesn't mean
3 those waves are higher than the ship.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: This is back to Pfeifer. But
5 if it's behind it and it's higher, then it's taller.

6 CAPTAIN MULLOY: No.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. It's --

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: If it's behind it and it's
9 perfectly flat, the ocean's not -- is not in the range.
10 It may be behind my eye or something like that, right?

11 I get -- if you're saying if you look at it from where
12 you're at on a curve of the Earth where would it be?
13 I'm going to have to look at this. Yeah, I guess I see
14 what you're saying is --

15 LCDR PFEIFER: If I'm looking at something
16 and it's higher in the back, then it's taller.

17 CAPTAIN MULLOY: That's why I don't know why
18 it -- it -- depends upon what you're saying, your
19 height of eye, yeah.

20 (Simultaneous speaking)

21 MR. CRIDER: -- the -- the distance of the
22 ship? Do you have -- height of eye -- (inaudible)

23 LCDR PFEIFER: A little estimating on that.
24 That's --

1 SPEAKER: I mean if you want to --

2 CAPTAIN MULLOY: There are thumb rules on it.

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, sir. I will -- I can
4 come up with that, but I'm not -- I'm not going to --

5 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Yeah.

6 LCDR PFEIFER: -- justify this -- this thing
7 which -- which I have a real issue with.

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I'll -- I'll -- I'll
9 withdraw it. I just wanted to draw attention to people
10 is there's something to look at in this. He may not
11 agree with it. I don't know in terms of that -- that
12 geometric -- I have not stopped it to look at that
13 part. The part I've seen was the idea of its eight-
14 second sweeps and shows you can or can't see it, which
15 I thought was a pretty reasonable model. There may be
16 some issues about modeling. Let's see, and Kyle told
17 me the issue they had where they couldn't mimic the
18 days well enough so they put in what they had.

19 And -- but in the end, I think if the ship
20 had come up to 50-something feet I think people in the
21 control room and people would have seen the ship. The
22 -- the Maru being the ship I mean in terms of that. I
23 would have -- in the end, that's the ultimate stop gap
24 for this incident would have been coming up higher and

1 actually doing a better visual search. I don't know.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: I was there, sir. I -- I
3 might not agree with you.

4 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay. I think you said --
5 well, --

6 LCDR PFEIFER: I respect your opinion, but I
7 --

8 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I thought you said that was
9 the bottom line was you didn't do an adequate periscope
10 search?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: I didn't say it wasn't high
12 enough.

13 CAPTAIN MULLOY: Okay. All right. Well,
14 that -- that may be the sonar logger or in -- that was
15 an adequate periscope search. Okay.

16 MR. CRIDER: Okay. Do we want to look at any
17 of these others or are we done?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: I'm done with it.

19 MR. WOODY: You've got periscope -- what are
20 we looking at?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: That was number one, I
22 believe. That you just closed?

23 MR. WOODY: Yes.

24 SPEAKER: Yes.

1 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes.

2 SPEAKER: (Inaudible).

3 MR. CRIDER: Looks like it'd only take a
4 second anyway.

5 (Visual display)

6 DR. STRAUCH: This is a fast sweep of an
7 eight-second sweep also or -- this is the same sweep
8 we've seen before going in a different height?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: It's a different height,
10 right.

11 MR. WOODY: There was something there.

12 MR. CRIDER: You've come by twice.

13 SPEAKER: (Inaudible)

14 (Visual display)

15 MR. CRIDER: That was one. Have we looked at
16 two? Three? (Inaudible) -- the gang's all here, so to
17 speak.

18 (Simultaneous speaking)

19 MR. CRIDER: All right, all right, all right.

20 DR. STRAUCH: This is the slow sweep --

21 MR. CRIDER: Slow sweep high.

22 DR. STRAUCH: How slow is this? Is this
23 three?

24 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I don't know -- (inaudible)

1 -- figure out -- look at the bearing. It's not updated
2 with true bearings. Oh, there it is. Okay. It's --
3 it's -- that was 15 degrees in 15 seconds. One degree
4 is south now.

5 (Visual display)

6 (Pause)

7 MR. CRIDER: -- seen better model than this
8 view.

9 (Visual display)

10 LCDR PFEIFER: The height of eye is --

11 CAPTAIN MULLOY: That's elevated. I don't
12 know what they put in. You'd have to look at the data
13 file -- Kyle --

14 LCDR PFEIFER: I think the captain -- this is
15 Pfeifer. The Captain Kyle's intention here was to show
16 that going slower and going higher makes it obvious,
17 and I'm sure we'll run across that at about 3-4-0 or
18 something this gigantic ship that it'll be, oh, it's
19 obvious. And if he would have just gone slower and
20 higher it would have been very clear. And I would
21 agree with Captain Kyle's conclusion but I take issue
22 with the modeling, which I think proves his point but I
23 don't want to come to any other conclusions based on
24 this --

1 MR. CRIDER: Right.

2 LCDR PFEIFER: -- model, which is, I think,
3 terrible.

4 DR. STRAUCH: What makes it terrible is -- is
5 -- is what? The --

6 LCDR PFEIFER: That they show these gigantic
7 waves in that first view, mountains much -- like five
8 times taller than the Ehime Maru of -- of waves, which
9 doesn't resemble what the real -- the real situation.
10 It -- the waves were, like, six feet tall, one-tenth of
11 the size of the Ehime Maru.

12 (Simultaneous speaking)

13 CAPTAIN MULLOY: No, you went by it -- you
14 just went by it. That was it.

15 LCDR PFEIFER: So, his -- his point was
16 slower, higher, the captain would have seen it, and I
17 -- I won't disagree with that. Just didn't like the
18 -- just wanted to clear that up in case someone says --
19 because you could look at that first one and go you're
20 never safe. It's just too dangerous. You --
21 submarines should all be outlawed. That's not the
22 case. It's just --

23 SPEAKER: Thank you.

24 CAPTAIN MULLOY: I just wanted to point out

1 but typically -- the typical -- typical submarine
2 procedure is to do the fast search because you're only
3 looking for one thing, the contact 500 yards in front
4 of you. And then that only lasts for 24 seconds. Then
5 you shift into that slower mode and that's the kind of
6 stuff that you'd see then as a more slower patent
7 search to be a more careful search around.

8 Okay. I think you had -- you said you had a
9 couple more --

10 MR. WOODY: I think I have one more question.

11 LCDR PFEIFER: Sure.

12 MR. WOODY: And I think that'll be it for me.

13 You had mentioned the things you typically do during a
14 DV cruise. One of the things was a -- the EMBT blow.
15 We've heard that the captain had originally agreed to
16 the EMBT blow and then said "no," changed his mind and
17 said he didn't want to do the EMBT -- and then
18 subsequently had gone back to agreeing to doing it. Do
19 you know anything about that, why he changed his mind
20 --

21 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, I -- I heard that, too,
22 and I'm not sure who he discussed that with. I --

23 MR. WOODY: I believe it was with the
24 navigator when they discussed the -- the -- before they

1 got underway, the plan of the day. Do you have a
2 recollection of that?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: I have no knowledge of that.
4 I -- changing the plan and discussing things is a
5 common, common thing and the captain would -- and he
6 could have changed it back. "No," "yeah," "no,"
7 "yeah," I mean it --

8 MR. WOODY: Okay. I was just wondering if
9 there was any rationale for changing it that you might
10 have been aware of?

11 LCDR PFEIFER: I wasn't at the time that I --
12 and even now I don't -- don't know why he would have
13 gotten rid of it.

14 MR. WOODY: Okay. That's all I have for now.

15 DR. STRAUCH: Anybody else have any
16 questions? I always have some -- some questions that
17 we ask all witnesses. I'm always the last person.

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Okay.

19 DR. STRAUCH: The human performance person is
20 usually the last person.

21 At the time of the accident now, what was
22 your age and weight at the time of the accident?

23 LCDR PFEIFER: I was 37 and 180 pounds.

24 DR. STRAUCH: 180 pounds. And would you

1 characterize your health at that time as good, medium?

2 How would you characterize it?

3 LCDR PFEIFER: Good health.

4 DR. STRAUCH: Good health. We see you wear
5 glasses. Are your eyes correctable to 20/20?

6 LCDR PFEIFER: Yes, they are.

7 DR. STRAUCH: Do you wear other glasses for
8 reading or do you -- or are these your sole glasses?

9 LCDR PFEIFER: This is it.

10 DR. STRAUCH: At that time were you taking
11 any medications prescribed by a physician?

12 LCDR PFEIFER: I was not.

13 DR. STRAUCH: Were you taking any self-
14 medications at that time?

15 LCDR PFEIFER: Any what?

16 DR. STRAUCH: Self-medication. Any over-the-
17 counter -- aspirin or over-the-counter --

18 LCDR PFEIFER: Not that I recall.

19 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. Do you customarily take
20 any self-medications?

21 LCDR PFEIFER: No.

22 DR. STRAUCH: Any aspirins or anything like
23 that?

24 LCDR PFEIFER: No. I gut it out.

1 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. That's it.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I don't -- you've asked the
3 basic question. Is there any other thing that you can
4 think of to say to this case --

5 LCDR PFEIFER: Yeah, he asked that.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: All right. Good. Sorry.

7 LCDR PFEIFER: I'd like to apologize to the
8 person who's going to transcribe this. A lot us got
9 out of our -- saying our name, and I -- I do -- would
10 appreciate a chance to -- to read the transcript over
11 because -- and maybe Captain might want to, too,
12 because some of my words might get transcribed into his
13 -- you know, as someone's guessing who said it because
14 you may not want to claim my words and I may not want
15 to claim his.

16 SPEAKER: Do we have your address to send
17 this to?

18 LCDR PFEIFER: I'll -- I'll write it down
19 right here.

20 MR. WOODY: Okay. Jim, would you like to
21 close this out or anything to say? If not, then the
22 time is now about seven minutes after three and that
23 concludes our interview with Lieutenant Commander
24 Pfeifer. And I'd like to express our appreciation to

1 you, sir, for coming down and speaking to us and your
2 patience in answering these questions. Thank you very
3 much.

4 LCDR PFEIFER: You're welcome.

5 (Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., on November 20,
6 2001, the proceedings were concluded.)

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