

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

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Major Marine Accident :
Interviews of Investigation: :
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JAPANESE FISHERIES TRAINING VESSEL, :
  EHIME MARU :
: DCA 01 MM 022
  AND :
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U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE, :
  USS GREENEVILLE :
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Wednesday, February 21, 2001

**INTERVIEW OF LT KEITH ANTHONY SLOAN**

INTERVIEWING PANEL:

National Transportation Safety Board

TOM ROTH-ROFFY, Accident Investigator  
BILL WOODY, Accident Investigator  
BARRY STRAUCH, Human Performance Specialist

United States Navy

CDR JOHN CACCIVIO, SUBPAC  
LCDR RICH SANTOMAURO, SUBPAC  
CAPT TOM KYLE, SUBPAC  
LT DOUG HEDRICK, SUBPAC

United States Coast Guard

LT CHARLIE JOHNSON  
LTJG KEN KUSANO

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

## P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We are here to interview  
3 Lieutenant Sloan, the navigator for the USS  
4 Greeneville.

5 Good afternoon, sir.

6 LT SLOAN: Good afternoon.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: My name is Tom Roth-Roffy,  
8 and I am an accident investigator with the National  
9 Transportation Safety Board. I and several other  
10 investigators are here to investigate the accident that  
11 occurred between the USS Greeneville and the fishing  
12 vessel, Ehime Maru, that occurred on February 9th,  
13 2001.

14 For your information, the National  
15 Transportation Safety Board is a Federal Government  
16 agency responsible for investigating transportation  
17 accidents in the United States. The purpose of the  
18 Safety Board's investigation is to determine the cause  
19 of the accident and then to make recommendations aimed  
20 at preventing the future occurrence of similar  
21 accidents. In our investigation, we make no effort to  
22 assign blame to the accident, nor do we have authority  
23 to penalize any person involved in an accident. Our  
24 investigation is strictly a safety investigation and  
25 not a legal investigation.

26 If you desire, you may have another person  
27 here to assist you with the interview. Do you believe  
28 you will need somebody to help you, or do you feel you  
29 can make it through on your own?

30 LT SLOAN: No. I will do it myself.

31 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Very good.

32 Also joining me in the interview will be  
33 representatives from the United States Coast Guard and  
34 from the United States Navy, and I would ask that each  
35 of them introduce themselves at this time.

36 MR. WOODY: I am Bill Woody, NTSB.

37 LT JOHNSON: Lieutenant Charlie Johnson,  
38 United States Coast Guard.

39 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Lieutenant Commander  
40 Santomauro, United States Navy.

41 LTJG KUSANO: Lieutenant JG Ken Kusano,  
42 United States Coast Guard.

43 CDR CACCIVIO: Well, I have an issue. If we  
44 are not going to identify ourselves, why are we here?

45 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Well, he is not going to  
46 interview.

47 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Just introduce yourself,  
48 Ash.

49 MR. CHATTERJEE: Ash Chatterjee, National  
50 Transportation Safety Board.

51 CDR CACCIVIO: Commander Caccivio, U.S. Navy.

52 CAPT KYLE: Captain Tom Kyle, United States  
53 Navy.

54 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Thank you.

55 What I would like to do to start off is for  
56 you to think back to what you were doing on the day of

1 February 9th in the morning, starting, say, from when  
2 you reported to the sub for underway, for preparations  
3 for getting underway, and then please just kind of lead  
4 us through what your activities were during underway,  
5 you know, maneuvering out of the harbor, anything you  
6 can remember, and if you could, although it is not  
7 absolutely essential, try to do it in a sequential kind  
8 of an order.

9 LT SLOAN: Okay.

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And, again, take your time.  
11 We would like you to go through from start to finish  
12 without interruption, providing as much detail as you  
13 can.

14 So, often, we tell people to try to visualize  
15 it and kind of speak from your memory. I don't know if  
16 that helps or not --

17 LT SLOAN: Okay.

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- because it has been a  
19 number of days.

20 LT SLOAN: Right.

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You might be able to recall  
22 something by visualizing. So, please, when you are  
23 ready, just go ahead and start.

24 LT SLOAN: Okay. I guess I'll start with I  
25 showed up at the boat about 0500 that morning. That's  
26 when the liberty expired for the crew, and I usually  
27 show up about the same time.

28 Really, the day of underway, I really don't  
29 do a lot directly until the station maneuvering watch.  
30 That was about 0700, 0715, somewhere right in that  
31 time frame.

32 At that point, I went up into Control,  
33 supervised the piloting -- my primary job in getting  
34 underway is supervising the piloting party, actually  
35 going out, transiting out of the harbor into open  
36 ocean.

37 The primary thing I do initially in the  
38 morning, at that morning and like any other morning  
39 when we'd be getting underway is to ensure that the  
40 correct charts are set out, all the equipment that  
41 we're going to need is set up, have things like course  
42 cards that are distributed to let all the key players  
43 know what courses we are going to take as we drive out  
44 of the harbor, and they are just standard laminated  
45 cards.

46 One thing of interest that might have bearing  
47 on this is as I was one of the first persons in  
48 control, I walk around the Control Room and make sure  
49 everything is set up the way I like it, if we are  
50 getting underway, making sure that the -- I made sure  
51 the bridge-to-bridge was turned on, bridge-to-bridge  
52 monitoring Channel 16 and Channel 69, 16 obviously for  
53 all call and then 69 is Harbor Control.

54 I also noticed that the dimmer switch on the  
55 WLR-9 which is the early warning receiver, acoustic  
56 receiver, was turned down. I turned that up so you can

1 actually see it, and I noticed that the ASVDU display,  
2 the sonar display and control, was also turned down. I  
3 turned that up and noticed that it wasn't working.

4 It looked to me like the horizontal scan on  
5 it was not working. There was like a green glow on the  
6 right side of the screen. I stuck my head in the sonar  
7 and informed -- I don't recall specifically who I told.  
8 It was whoever the senior person in sonar was. It may  
9 have been Petty Officer Reyes or Petty Officer Holmes,  
10 one of those two. I'm not sure exactly who. Informed  
11 them that it wasn't working correctly and then walked  
12 to the Captain's State Room, stuck my head in there and  
13 informed him.

14 Normally, I just tell the weapons officer and  
15 let him do it, but he was going to be in port that day.  
16 So I just went ahead and told the captain myself.

17 That was pretty much my sole involvement with  
18 it. I watched this -- a couple of sonar techs come out  
19 and look at it, and I went back to prepping the pilot  
20 out.

21 We got underway pretty close to right on time  
22 at 0800, maybe plus or minus a minute or two, but  
23 pretty much right on time. Piloted out like we  
24 normally do. That takes about an hour to get out of  
25 Pearl Harbor, a little less, give or take -- consists  
26 -- I pretty much focused fully on piloting at that  
27 point, passing GPS and visual positions to the bridge.  
28 I spend most of my time -- we'll take a position every  
29 3 minutes. I'll monitor that, make sure that the  
30 positions are good, compare them to sounding data,  
31 check it on our charts, compare the visual, the GPS,  
32 make sure that they look good, standard stuff going in  
33 and out of here. It's very easy pulling out of Pearl  
34 Harbor. Did that for, like I said, about an hour, and  
35 then we got to open ocean and started heading out.

36 There was a little bit of a gap of time  
37 there. I am trying to remember exactly what I did.  
38 After -- once we -- once we're out away from land,  
39 about a mile or two from land heading outbound, we will  
40 secure the piloting party, the full piloting party, the  
41 station modified piloting party. Modified piloting  
42 party for -- normally for operations in Hawaiian  
43 waters, we'll do a minimal -- a minimal load out of  
44 people for that which will include a fathometer  
45 operator, a quarter master of the watch, and a  
46 navigation supervisor.

47 Navigation supervisor for most of the day was  
48 the assistant navigator, and that was largely due to  
49 the fact that I knew I was going to be standing officer  
50 of the deck in a little while. So I let him take it,  
51 and plus, it was going to be a short underway. It  
52 would be no problem for him to take most of it, and I'd  
53 give him a break when he needed one, when I wasn't on  
54 watch myself.

55 Normally, our navigation supervisor is either  
56 somebody who is qualified assistant navigator which is

1 a specific qualification or myself, the navigator. The  
2 XO can do it if he wants to, but, normally, in  
3 practice, he does not. It will be basically someone --  
4 senior navigation person.

5 The navigation supervisor modified piloting  
6 party was stationed the entire time that we were out,  
7 pretty much got that station on time, because we knew  
8 we were going to be operating not really close to land,  
9 but within 10 miles or so of Penguin Bank which you  
10 would consider hazard to navigation due to the shallow  
11 water. So we keep it station the whole time.

12 After -- after we piloted out, I assumed the  
13 duties as the contact coordinator, and that was after  
14 the maneuvering watch had been secured, kind of in  
15 parallel with securing the piloting party. Those get  
16 done about the same time, not exactly the same time,  
17 but within a minute or two.

18 Secured that. I went and relieved the  
19 contact coordinator, and my primary functions became --  
20 went from -- shifted from navigation to correlating and  
21 contacts, essentially keeping track of them, any  
22 surface contacts that were in our area to assist the  
23 officer of the deck who was still on the bridge at this  
24 point.

25 Most of the time, we were shuttling groups of  
26 VIPs or visitors, whatever you want to call them, up to  
27 the bridge and giving them an opportunity to be up on  
28 the bridge while we were transiting out.

29 Some relevant stuff that I noticed as contact  
30 coordinator that I remember was that the visibility  
31 that day was -- in terms of distance, it was good. I  
32 could see the skyline of Honolulu dimly for quite a  
33 ways out, at least 10 miles out. I could still see the  
34 tops of the buildings, but it was not normal Hawaiian  
35 weather in the sense that it was fully overcast and  
36 hazy. Not hazy -- it's not hazy very often around  
37 here. It was very hazy that day.

38 I don't want to say white-out conditions. I  
39 have heard some people use that expression, but it was  
40 something along those lines where everywhere you look,  
41 it was very hazy, very hard to -- there was no contrast  
42 in the sky, just a dull, almost like smog color. It  
43 was kind of off white, very blah color.

44 Something that I remember specifically of  
45 that or an effect of that, as I remember, two trawlers  
46 that I was keeping an eye on, as they were heading  
47 towards Honolulu, they looked like they were working.  
48 It is kind of hard to tell. Thinking about it in  
49 hindsight, I think they were probably 6- to 8,000 yards  
50 away. There was two of them together, almost the exact  
51 same range, very close to each other. One was dark  
52 color, and every time I looked out with this periscope,  
53 had no trouble seeing the guy. He stood right out of  
54 that whitish background. He stood right out.

55 And there was a second trawler that was  
56 light-colored, like white color, something -- something

1 very pale. I had a great deal of trouble seeing him.  
2 Every time I -- I knew where he was relative to the  
3 other trawlers, just to the right of him, maybe 5 or 10  
4 degrees, and as I would sweep, I would see the dark guy  
5 every time, but the light-colored guy, I did have a lot  
6 of trouble seeing.

7 I did not see him every time I swept the  
8 periscope around. When I would make a really dedicated  
9 search to make sure he was still where I thought he  
10 was, most often I would find him. I would see a mast  
11 sticking above the horizon, just a little below the  
12 horizon. I would see a mast just a little bit darker  
13 in the horizon. I could pick that. It was very hard  
14 to see, but that would give me an idea of where he was,  
15 and I could really just concentrate and I would see  
16 him. It was very difficult, though.

17 Other than that, as far as contact situation  
18 heading out, I would call it normal, that meaning at  
19 any one time we would have one or two, sometimes more,  
20 small contacts, usually either trawlers-type fishing  
21 boats or a sport fisherman. They're out a little  
22 further doing trawling and sport fishing.

23 When we actually -- we drove out for a while.

24 I forgot what time exactly we dove the ship, but,  
25 eventually, we got to a point where we secured the  
26 officer of the deck on the bridge. I relieved the  
27 officer of the deck, which is the normal practice. The  
28 contact coordinator relieves him below decks, allows  
29 the officer of the deck to rig the bridge for dive and  
30 then heads below decks. Obviously, by this point, we  
31 have got all of the visitors down below decks.

32 A number of them in control for submerging  
33 the ship. We had them on all the significant -- all  
34 the main control stations, the chief of the watch, the  
35 dive, the helms and plains, and also I had one on the  
36 periscope with me that I instructed her what to say as  
37 we submerged the ship.

38 Submerged the ship, and about -- I want to  
39 say it was about 10:00. It was -- the deck logs would  
40 have the specifics on that. I don't remember exactly.  
41 Submerged the ship with the VIPs in the key positions  
42 and submerged 150 feet which is the standard practice.

43 Nothing unusual on the dive. There was no --  
44 no contacts, no visual contacts anywhere close to us at  
45 the time, just dove out to 150 feet and got a trim.

46 I think right before we dove -- I should  
47 probably throw this in -- that we passed rig for deep  
48 submergence. The intention was as soon as we got down,  
49 got a trim, we were going to go down to maximum  
50 operating depth, and that was -- the purpose of that  
51 was to basically tell the guests on board, hey, we are  
52 as deep as we can go, and we had also opened the  
53 equalizing line on the torpedo tubes, filled up some  
54 small glass jars [inaudible].

55 We did that. We dove 150 feet, trimmed the  
56 sheet. Then we proceeded to 700 feet, checked

1 conditions on the dive at 700 feet. About this time,  
2 we were sitting down. The first sitting for lunch was  
3 occurring, and the captain was down with the first  
4 group of guests having lunch.

5 Reported to him. Once I reported conditions  
6 were normal at 700 feet, we proceeded down all the way  
7 to our maximum operating depth and stayed there for  
8 about at least a half an hour. I'm not sure exactly  
9 how long. And we used that time to check conditions on  
10 the dive again at that depth, make sure that everything  
11 was okay, and do the equalizing lines.

12 I think we also did -- sometimes we do  
13 styrofoam cups like these, put them in the torpedo  
14 tube, and when they come out, they are like this tall,  
15 very small. We did that, let them -- I think we did  
16 that. I never actually saw the cups. So I'm not sure,  
17 but I think I heard somebody mention that we did that.

18 Once we were done with that, we completed  
19 getting -- taking the water samples, everything else.  
20 We came back up to above 700 feet. I think we came up  
21 to 650 feet, 600 feet, something like that, and secured  
22 from deep submergence.

23 About this time, it was getting to be about  
24 11:30, 11:40, somewhere in that time frame, and Mr.  
25 Coen came to relieve me. He did his -- he was doing a  
26 normal prewatch tour, he was eating lunch in the crew's  
27 mess, vice the Ward Room. He walked through control on  
28 his way, went into sonar which is the normal part of  
29 the routine for a prewatch tour, check -- go into  
30 sonar, talk to the sonar supervisor, get an idea what  
31 the contacts are.

32 I don't recall the contact situation at the  
33 time. It was fairly light, one or two contacts,  
34 nothing close. Distant fishermen, probably, small  
35 craft, something like that.

36 I also watched him come out. He came out,  
37 observed -- I saw him on the fire control system for a  
38 little while looking at stuff. I wasn't really paying  
39 too much attention what he -- specifically what he was  
40 looking at.

41 Once he was done with that, he checked the  
42 chart position, just another part of the prewatch tour,  
43 usually one of the last things the officer of the decks  
44 will do -- or walking officer of the deck will do.

45 Verified the chart of position based on our  
46 inertial navigation system, check-plotted it, make sure  
47 that we are in the appropriate area where we should be,  
48 reviewed the chart.

49 In this case, we were operating in a set,  
50 essentially a big box. So we didn't have any specific  
51 track to follow. We were just essentially loitering in  
52 one little area, just driving north-south legs. Didn't  
53 want to get too far away from Pearl. We knew we  
54 weren't going to have a lot of time. Usually, the  
55 schedules on these things are fairly tight. We don't  
56 have a lot of time to mess around.

1           Turned it over with Mr. Coen. Gave him  
2 basically a data dump on what was going on, told them  
3 that prior at some point we were going to do angles and  
4 dangles after he relieved, sometime after lunch, and  
5 that was the gist of what I told him, and whatever the  
6 contact situation. Just a brief discussion of that. I  
7 don't remember any specifics of that. Like I said, it  
8 was fairly light contact situation.

9           Turned over to Mr. Coen. He relieved me as  
10 the officer of the deck, and I immediately turned to  
11 him and got permission to relieve the navigation  
12 supervisor, and that was to allow him to go out and  
13 have some lunch.

14           I relieved as navigation supervisor and stood  
15 that for 20 minutes or so, just enough time to allow  
16 the assistant navigator to go down, have some food. He  
17 came back up and relieved me.

18           At that point, the chief of staff who was on  
19 board just wanted to chit-chat with me, just general  
20 submarine stuff, how is the command going, how are you  
21 enjoying your tour, that sort of thing, just kind of a  
22 get-to-know-you sort of informal chat.

23           He took me to the XO Stay Room. We talked  
24 for about 15, 20 minutes, nothing really specific, just  
25 like I said general chit-chat.

26           Once he was done with that, I went down to  
27 the crew's mess and had lunch. About this time, it was  
28 getting on towards 1:00. After I talked to the chief  
29 of staff, had some lunch, I used the head, relaxed for  
30 a few minutes, like 5 or 10 minutes, and then I walked  
31 back up to control.

32           I walked in the aft end of control, just to  
33 take a look at the chart and see where we're going. I  
34 knew our PH time, which is our time to pass, point PH.

35           You probably heard a lot about already. It was 1400,  
36 and I wanted to see how far away we were.

37           I came up and noticed that we were -- it must  
38 have been 10 or 12 miles away from PH, which is doable  
39 even surfacing the ship and driving in that general  
40 direction, and we would be able to make it on time, but  
41 our time was starting to run out and we hadn't started  
42 angles and dangles, which I know the captain wanted to  
43 do.

44           The XO was in control talking to one of the  
45 guests. He was -- to put it politely, he was being  
46 pretty long-winded, talking to the XO, talking his ear  
47 off. So I waited a couple of minutes, stood there, you  
48 know, trying to interject without being rude, but  
49 eventually got the XO's attention and informed him that  
50 we -- we wanted to get going, we had about an hour and  
51 a fair distance to go, and we wanted to get going.

52           XO acknowledged me and left control, and I  
53 did the same. I talked to the same guy. He grabbed me  
54 for minute, talked to me until I could escape him, and  
55 left control at the aft end of control and transited  
56 basically to the middle-level passageway all the way

1 forward, came back up around, down the command  
2 passageway, looking for the captain.

3 Found the captain in his state room, looks  
4 like he just got in there from somewhere, maybe from  
5 the meal, talking to another group of guests or  
6 something like that. I'm not sure. Probably not  
7 relevant.

8 Informed the captain. I said, "Sir, we're  
9 running late. We need to get going. Otherwise, we are  
10 going to be late to PH."

11 PH -- being on time, the PH is defined in, I  
12 believe, it is [inaudible] 205. It's a Navy pub -- as  
13 plus or minus 15 minutes is considered on time, and  
14 that's -- if you're 15 minutes -- 14 minutes late, it's  
15 okay. It's not a big deal.

16 In the back of my mind, I knew that if we  
17 were 20 minutes late, no one was really going to care.  
18 It's not a big deal.

19 Told the captain that, that I thought we  
20 should get going. The captain acknowledged that, yes,  
21 he did, and walked from his stateroom directly into  
22 control and started talking to the officer of the deck.

23 The gist was he was trying to get him to -- let's get  
24 going. I don't the -- I don't recall the specifics of  
25 what he said. I think they were more interested -- he  
26 was trying to get reactor coolant pump shift going.  
27 I'm not sure what the delay in the reactor coolant pump  
28 shift was, but he wanted to shift to 3-slow, 3-slow,  
29 which would allow us a greater amount of reactor power  
30 and allow us to go faster, which you would want to do  
31 for doing angles and dangles and high-speed turns,  
32 things like that.

33 I left the CO Stay Room at the same time he  
34 went to control. I went back down the command  
35 passageway, and this was due to the number of people in  
36 control. It was hard to get back and forth, and more  
37 of the guests -- I guess lunch had just let off and  
38 they were starting to collect in the control room  
39 probably for want of anywhere else to go. They wanted  
40 to see what was going.

41 So I went back the long way, all the way down  
42 the middle level, came back into control using the aft  
43 ladder and the aft door into the Control Room.

44 I knew that the captain was going to want to  
45 do angles and dangles, and he was going to probably  
46 start driving in a northerly direction back towards PH  
47 doing the high-speed turns and things like that,  
48 basically working his way at high speed north, which  
49 would help us out getting there on time.

50 My concern was our water space. We did not  
51 own submerged water all the way to PH. Our water space  
52 was something to the south of that. I don't remember  
53 how many miles it ended. It's considered a fairly  
54 serious incident to leave your water space as a  
55 submarine, obviously, due to collision risk. Somebody  
56 else owns that water, we could run into somebody, or

1 because if something were to happen to us and we're not  
2 in our water, SUBPAC or somebody tried to go looking  
3 for us, we would not be where we were supposed to be.  
4 Various reasons for that.

5 But I was concerned that if -- I shouldn't  
6 say I was very concerned, but I usually keep an eye on  
7 things in the Control Room. If we're doing high-speed  
8 turns or something like that in the vicinity of our  
9 upper area boundary, I will put myself in control just  
10 to keep an eye on things, make sure everything is okay.

11 The assistant navigator was still the  
12 navigation supervisor, and he has primary  
13 responsibilities to make sure we didn't go out of area.

14 So -- but I wanted to be up there just in case. So I  
15 never relieved him as navigation supervisor. I  
16 basically stationed myself in control, stood there, and  
17 watched what happened, and I was there all the way up  
18 until the collision from this point on.

19 I put myself between the port and starboard  
20 plotting tables. I guess you guys have been down on  
21 our boat or some boat. I'm sure -- you were on ours.  
22 I was in the very aft end of control, along the aft  
23 bulkhead, all the way back where I could see both  
24 plotting tables. We have the chart that is on the  
25 starboard plotter. So I could see that from where I  
26 was standing.

27 Because of the number of people in control, I  
28 really couldn't go up any further. I -- normally, I  
29 wouldn't have, anyways. I would have been fine right  
30 where I was. That way, I could keep an eye on how  
31 close we were to our upper area boundary to make sure  
32 we didn't get too close.

33 As it turns out, we never got that close to  
34 it. I don't think we were ever more than 4 or 5 miles  
35 -- or closer than 4 or 5 miles from it. So there was  
36 never any real concern as far as going out of area or  
37 anything like that, but just the standard precaution  
38 for me to be there.

39 Once -- about this time, the reactor coolant  
40 pump shift -- it was either right before this or right  
41 after this -- I don't recall -- the shift was made, and  
42 we commenced doing our angles and dangles. Initially  
43 consisted of doing some like down 10 degrees, up 15,  
44 down 20, up 30, a couple things like that. I don't  
45 remember the exact sequence, driving from depth --  
46 different depth stratums, anywhere from 150 feet down  
47 to about 650 feet, and we used that -- that calm of  
48 water, just up and down and doing different things.

49 The way that that worked is basically the  
50 captain would -- the captain usually controlled that  
51 fairly closely with specific -- specifics to the  
52 officer of the deck, you know, "I want this angle this  
53 speed," things like that, and these are usually done at  
54 fairly moderate -- anywhere from a standard bell which  
55 is about 15 knots up to 20, 25 knots, depending on the  
56 angle. Usually, you don't want to -- you want to do it

1 with some speed to get the angle on quickly, but you  
2 don't want to do it so fast that by the time you get  
3 the desired angle, you are already at the depth you  
4 want. So you kind of balance those two out.

5 Once those were complete, we started doing  
6 large rudder angle turns, which consist of speeding up  
7 to a full bell. Usually, we were doing 25 knot -- in  
8 excess of 25 knots, right around that range, and the  
9 captain would direct the officer of the deck, come  
10 right to this course or left to this course using  
11 whatever rudder, usually a large rudder angle, and  
12 usually the turns were anywhere from 90 to 120 degrees.

13 The purpose of that is you do those turns --  
14 we would do them for practice for torpedo evasion, to  
15 evade a torpedo, practice for the -- for the plainsman  
16 to maintain depth. You do that in a shallow water  
17 environment. You want to be able to make very rapid  
18 turns at high speed without changing depth. So we  
19 practiced that periodically. We practiced it quite a  
20 bit, actually, more than any other submarine I've seen.

21 We also do it because it looks really neat  
22 for the guests. You get a really large rocking left to  
23 right, depending on which way you turn. It is pretty  
24 impressive, and usually little books and things fall  
25 out of lockers and it makes a lot of noise, and  
26 everyone gets all excited.

27 We did a couple of those turns, generally  
28 working our way to the north, back towards PH. Like I  
29 said, we never got all that way to our upper area  
30 boundary.

31 I get to some specifics -- I think we ended  
32 up on a course of about roughly north. That course, I  
33 don't remember specifically. It was either north 340,  
34 something like that, basically a northerly course.

35 We came up to 150 feet. All during this  
36 time, the captain was pretty much directing the officer  
37 of the deck how we wanted the ship to be driven, fairly  
38 specifically.

39 Came up to 150 feet. At this point, I knew  
40 we were getting ready to come to the periscope depth.  
41 Previously in the day, actually before we had actually  
42 got underway, the captain had mentioned that he was not  
43 intending to do an emergency blow, but, apparently, he  
44 had changed his mind and decided to do one at some  
45 point during the day.

46 He came up to -- it became fairly obvious to  
47 me we came to periscope depth, and instead of preparing  
48 to surface, we came up to periscope depth on a course  
49 of 120. The officer of the deck did his initially  
50 three low-power searches. Then the captain took the  
51 scope.

52 A normal -- a normal periscope routine is  
53 three low-power searches, 360 degrees, very rapid. It  
54 just turns in a matter of seconds, 5, 6, 7, 8 seconds,  
55 somewhere in that range. The immediate --

56 CDR CACCIVIO: This is Commander Caccivio.

1           Could we just stick to generics about the  
2 periscope search? We have already discussed --  
3           LT SLOAN: You've already --  
4           CDR CACCIVIO: -- [inaudible]. You are  
5 moving into classified material areas now.  
6           LT SLOAN: Okay.  
7           The officer of the deck conducted his initial  
8 periscope search. The captain took the scope, did an  
9 additional search. I saw at least one full 360, but I  
10 wasn't watching what he was doing that carefully.  
11           I had tried to watch the peraview monitor and  
12 control, but based on where I was standing, where it's  
13 located, and the number of people between me and it, I  
14 had a very hard time seeing it, and I actually saw very  
15 little on it. It was more of trying to bob my head  
16 around looking over people to see it, and also the  
17 plotting -- there is a large stand behind the plotting  
18 table which blocks my view. So I had to try to look  
19 around it. Couldn't see very well. So I was -- I  
20 didn't really get a good look at that.  
21           Once we completed the periscope searches, the  
22 captain was apparently satisfied. He called the  
23 emergency deep. Immediately came to a full bell,  
24 starting driving down. Normally, you would go to 150  
25 feet for emergency deep. The captain ordered proceed  
26 to 400 feet, and that was to speed up the process of  
27 getting set up for the emergency blow, the idea being  
28 look around, make sure there is nobody close to you,  
29 get down as quickly as you can and get up as quickly as  
30 you can, to preclude anybody from closing in on you.  
31           At about the same time -- right immediately  
32 after the emergency deep, as we started to proceed  
33 down, the captain ordered the officer of the deck to  
34 come left to course of north. I don't know what rudder  
35 angle. I think he specified a rudder angle, but I  
36 don't recall.  
37           So, as we came down, we were at a course of  
38 120 -- thank you -- coming down to 400 feet and turning  
39 to the left, towards a northerly course.  
40           We actually reached 400 feet pretty quickly,  
41 which you would on an emergency deep, just do the speed  
42 and the ship's angle, and bringing on water.  
43           At some point -- I don't recall the specific  
44 course, but we had not come all the way to around the  
45 course north. The captain directed the officer of the  
46 deck to come to rudder of amidships. At that point,  
47 the ship will continue to swing just due to momentum,  
48 but once you zero the rate of change of the ship's  
49 course is decreasing, but we were -- I would -- not  
50 specifically having looked at it, but I think we were  
51 still -- I would imagine we had to have been still  
52 pivoting as we commenced emergency blow.  
53           The officer -- or correction. The captain  
54 directed the officer of the deck to emergency blow the  
55 surface, a 10-second blow, and the officer of the deck  
56 gave that order.

1           One of the civilians was operating the  
2 emergency blow actuation levers, chicken switches, and  
3 he -- I actually watched him do that just because it  
4 makes a very loud noise in control and I wanted to know  
5 when to plug my ears which is what I usually do --  
6 plugged my ears during the time that the emergency blow  
7 occurred. The guy -- I could see him counting,  
8 counting down what he did, put my fingers in his ears,  
9 didn't actually hear him. Lots of dust flies through  
10 control, just it shoots up a lot of air inside control  
11 and just agitates everything.

12           Felt the ship starting to take an angle,  
13 heading -- proceeding up to -- towards the surface. We  
14 got up to about a 20-degree angle, which is standard  
15 for that. I happened to look at the OSDS, on-ship data  
16 display system, and I was looking at the -- initially,  
17 I looked at the angle, and this point, we were only  
18 like 10 degrees angle, still coming up, but I also  
19 looked at the depth and the speed. So I watched the  
20 depth coming up, and I also saw the speed.

21           When we had come down from the emergency  
22 deep, we had dropped from a full bell to a standard  
23 bell, but we didn't actually come all the way up in  
24 speed. So we were still increasing in speed, I  
25 believe.

26           I remember noticing that we were about 13-1/2  
27 knots at some point during the ascent, just before we  
28 broached. So I think our peak speed was right in the  
29 13 -- 13, 14-knot range. That was probably pretty  
30 close.

31           The -- I also noticed that the depth sensor  
32 or the depth indication froze up at about 90 feet,  
33 which it normally doesn't freeze up like that, but not  
34 that it really matters. There's nothing you can do  
35 about it, anyways.

36           Felt the ship -- it seemed like a long time.  
37 It always seems like a long time. I felt the ship.  
38 The ship comes out of the water, and once it's -- the  
39 momentum suddenly slows, you can feel the slowdown and  
40 you can feel the ship start to come down.

41           About that same time, probably seconds later,  
42 a second later, right around that time -- I don't  
43 remember exactly how close it was -- I heard a bang  
44 above my head. My immediate reaction was -- we had  
45 just had a lot of maintenance done on our ventilation  
46 valves that were in the sail, which are also right  
47 above my head. I thought maybe one of those had failed  
48 or something had happened to one. It sounded like a  
49 pop or something, like something exploded. It didn't  
50 sound like something smacked us. That's not what my  
51 initial impression was.

52           A couple seconds later, there was another  
53 bang or a slap, something like that, some kind of sound  
54 that was not as loud, but different, you know,  
55 somewhere further behind me. In looking at the damage,  
56 it makes sense.

1           At that point -- the first pop, you knew  
2 something was not right, something was not normal.  
3 That sound was -- I never heard a sound like that  
4 before, and then the second sound definitely made it --  
5 there was initially some obvious confusion in control.  
6 The captain yelled to raise number-two periscope. I  
7 yelled out to him that our current speed at that time  
8 was about 13 or 14 knots. The scope has a speed limit  
9 associated with it of 10 knots. If you raise it above  
10 10 knots, you can have the danger of actually peening  
11 it over and damaging it, which would not do us any  
12 good.

13           So the captain ordered, I believe, an  
14 all-stop bell to let the speed drop off. The speed  
15 dropped off fairly quickly, and once it hit 10.0 knots,  
16 as on the display, I yelled that out, 10 knots  
17 decreasing, and the captain raised number-two  
18 periscope. I believe it was the captain who raised it.  
19 It wasn't the officer of the deck.

20           The captain reported seeing a vessel. There  
21 was damage, taking on water, yelled out the name, and  
22 my first reaction was I -- I have a PERIN-6 [ph] which  
23 is a GPS unit, which is right in front of my face, and  
24 when it's not -- when we don't have a GPS signal, it  
25 will give back the inertial navigation position, which  
26 is usually accurate to within half-a-mile or a mile  
27 depending on -- I don't know what it was exactly that  
28 day. Probably, about a half-a-mile is normal.

29           I wrote that -- I didn't even look to see if  
30 -- there is a little letter on there that will tell me  
31 if it's -- if it's inertial or if it's GPS. I didn't  
32 even look to see what it was. Wrote down the position.

33           The XO came over at the same time and asked  
34 for the position. I gave that to him. Then I took the  
35 position that I had, went into radio, and went to my  
36 senior chief radio man who happened to be in radio at  
37 the time, and at this point, the captain started  
38 calling out, "A ship is sinking." He called out and  
39 gave -- called out a name. He called out "Uwa Jima  
40 Fishery High School," which I think at first he thought  
41 that was the name or that was the only thing he saw.  
42 So he called that out. So, apparently, the ship was  
43 broad so he could see the name.

44           Called that out. I walked into -- or went  
45 into radio. I didn't really walk. Looked at my senior  
46 chief and said, "OPREP-3 Navy Blue," which is a code  
47 reporting message for a major incident of Navy  
48 interest. He said, "Yes." I handed him the position  
49 on a little piece of paper, and I waited there for  
50 about 2 minutes as we tried to -- we got a mast -- our  
51 antenna raised. Called out the control, they raised  
52 the antenna for us, and watched him try to establish  
53 communications on SATHICOM which is our primary voice  
54 communication circuit.

55           He established communications with SUBPAC and  
56 passed the initial OPREP-3 Navy Blue voice report with

1 the position.

2 I waited that, watched him do that, passed  
3 that report, make sure everything went correctly. Then  
4 I returned back to the control room.

5 This is all -- this is -- about this time,  
6 this is maybe 5 minutes after the collision occurred.  
7 This all happened in a very short space of time.

8 Went back out to control. Someone had turned  
9 on the bridge-to-bridge. That was the first thing I  
10 checked, to make sure it was on, and I don't know if  
11 anybody contacted the Coast Guard right away. The next  
12 thing I did is Mr. Coen was on the number-one -- had  
13 already raised number-one periscope and was on that. I  
14 took the scope from him. Particularly, I was a little  
15 more senior than him. It would probably be better to,  
16 you know, put some senior people on. The captain was  
17 on the other scope still.

18 Proceeded to look through. I could see the  
19 debris field already. The ship had already sunk at  
20 this point. I never actually saw the ship.

21 I could see a number of life rafts. I can't  
22 remember the number whether it was 8, 6, something like  
23 that. I don't remember exactly now.

24 Saw a number of people in the life rafts, all  
25 sitting fairly quietly, didn't look like they were all  
26 doing anything, just sitting there. Saw a debris  
27 field, you know, usual junk in the water, fishing  
28 floats, stuff like that, and started sweeping with the  
29 scope I was on. I think the captain was doing the same  
30 thing from one end of the debris field to the other  
31 looking for people in the water.

32 At the same time, they were -- we were going  
33 through this -- finishing the surfacing procedure,  
34 getting the bridge -- getting the bridge manned. The  
35 engineer was going to go to the bridge as the -- he was  
36 going to go up and relieve the officer of the deck. He  
37 would relieve Mr. Coen. That way, he could drive from  
38 the bridge.

39 The captain had taken the CON at some point  
40 during this, and I don't remember if it was before I  
41 left control or after. He was directing the ship,  
42 since we're trying to drive the ship back into the  
43 debris -- towards the debris field and position  
44 ourselves for our search and rescue.

45 About the same time, I had a couple of junior  
46 officers that came up to control. We had them set up a  
47 go -- a geographic plot on the other plotter that  
48 wasn't being used, just threw down some tracing paper  
49 and started marking bearings. It has a -- what we call  
50 a bug, a little light that will move as the ship moves,  
51 and you can use that to plot stuff that we saw in the  
52 water. So we were plotting life -- positions of life  
53 rafts and things like that, getting that down on a  
54 piece of paper so we could use that for -- keep track  
55 of where everything was as it started to disperse.

56 I stayed on the scope for a little while,

1 matter of minutes. Someone relieved me on the scope.  
2 I don't recall who. And I saw absolutely no one in the  
3 water. So this was only a few minutes after the ship  
4 sank. I never saw anybody in the water. I don't think  
5 anybody else did either.

6 I shifted back modes again, back to -- as  
7 navigator, we don't have a communicator on board. Most  
8 ships do. We don't except for times we're deploying.  
9 We have all our junior officers -- tend to be  
10 engineering -- in engineering-related jobs. So I was  
11 also the communicator. So that's one of the reasons I  
12 was focusing on it so much.

13 After I got off the scope, after a few  
14 minutes, I shifted focus to working on the OPREP of the  
15 3 Navy blue text report which is required to go off  
16 within 20 minutes. So I was working on writing that,  
17 getting that worked out with my senior chief,  
18 collecting details of what we saw, the name of the  
19 ship, life rafts in water, things like that, getting  
20 every bit of detail I could for that initial report to  
21 let the world know, hey, something just happened.

22 So I worked on that for a while, and we got  
23 that report off. Then I came back out to control. At  
24 this point, I kind of shifted to supervising the junior  
25 officers that were keeping the geographic plot, which I  
26 don't think we ended up using. It didn't prove to be  
27 all that useful. It does not take into account sudden  
28 drifts. So, at very low speeds, we're all essentially  
29 dead in the water and everything is drifting around.  
30 It's almost useless, but we kept it up anyways just in  
31 case it might -- it might be helpful.

32 About this point, I think the engineer had  
33 relieved on the bridge as the officer of the deck, and  
34 the captain had gone to the bridge with him and they  
35 were directing what was going on from there.

36 The executive officer stayed in control and  
37 was essentially directing efforts there. He was on the  
38 scope, and we always kept another officer on the other  
39 scope. One of the officers that was doing the geo plot  
40 went to that. Mr. Coen was there at various times on  
41 the scope, and then I took the other -- one of the  
42 scopes from time to time, too, just to help out.

43 Kept putting different -- you know, we didn't  
44 want to leave any -- kind of an unwritten rule, you  
45 don't want to leave somebody on the scope too long.  
46 They get -- it's just good to get a fresh eye on there  
47 every -- every few minutes, every -- just normal  
48 routine operations, every 15 minutes is a good round  
49 number, but I think we were probably swapping people  
50 more often than that.

51 But at this point, I could hear the Coast  
52 Guard reporting on bridge-to-bridge. I believe the  
53 officer of the deck in the bridge was doing most of the  
54 talking in the ship on a hand-held. We were monitoring  
55 in the control room was they were passing. Most of the  
56 information, they shifted over to Channel 22 and

1 shifted that, to monitor that also in control. So, now  
2 at this point, we're monitoring 16 and 22, and we had  
3 69 on, also, just never took it off, left it on there.

4 Let's see. After that, there are various  
5 levels of confusion. There was the -- the bridge  
6 reported down that they were trying to hail the  
7 survivors once we came around towards the debris field,  
8 and they were having troubles communicating with them.

9 Initially, they passed it. They were not  
10 Japanese-speaking. They said that specifically. I  
11 don't know if there was a question asked and said they  
12 believed they were Chinese-speaking. We were trying to  
13 find if anybody on board spoke Chinese, but had some  
14 trouble with the language barrier trying to sort out,  
15 you know, how many people, are there people that are  
16 injured, trying to communicate with them, do you  
17 require immediate assistance, have you accounted for  
18 everybody, that sort of thing. That's what I imagine  
19 they were saying, but that was the bridge directly.

20 I think they have a megaphone on the bridge  
21 they were using to talk. I think that's how they were  
22 talking to them.

23 Most of the rest of my involvement was  
24 supervising the other officers in control, helping out  
25 the executive officer, and also starting to write the  
26 first follow-up message. We wanted to do a detailed  
27 follow-up message and get that off as quickly as we  
28 could, basically laying out all the details up to that  
29 point and everything that we had.

30 As it turns out, I quickly hand-wrote that  
31 message, showed it to the XO, made sure he agreed with  
32 it, went to radio, got the radio man working on typing  
33 it up, and then kind of went through a ping-pong  
34 process. I'd write it, get it typed up, bring it out  
35 to control. That took a few minutes, you know, 5 or 10  
36 minutes to get it typed up. Then they -- something --  
37 an additional little detail would have come out and  
38 they wanted to add it, going back and forth. There was  
39 a lot of that.

40 Delayed getting that message off for a while,  
41 but it -- in hindsight, that message wasn't -- it was  
42 more follow-up detail. It wasn't any immediate value  
43 in hindsight.

44 A few little tidbits I remember. I remember  
45 the Coast Guard reporting the ETAs for the HELO and for  
46 their surface ship. Their ETA for the HELO was  
47 something like 20 minutes, 30 minutes, something like  
48 that. I don't remember exactly.

49 I remember looking out the scope. The sea --  
50 the visibility was still poor like it had been  
51 previously in the day, like I had mentioned earlier,  
52 and the -

53 The visibility was still pretty poor. Sea  
54 state was still a little bit rougher. I want to say it  
55 was 2 to 4 foot. I don't remember trying to measure it  
56 exactly, but it was somewhere in that range, a couple

1 feet, definitely choppy. We were rolling quite a bit.  
2 Most of the efforts at this point were being  
3 run by the bridge from the officer of the deck, the  
4 engineer, and the captain on the bridge, and below  
5 decks, we were just making sure we had the rescue  
6 swimmers ready to go. Emergency equipment was broken  
7 out. We had -- I guess we originally were going to  
8 open the forward escape trunk, but we were taking water  
9 over the hull. So we would not have been able to do  
10 that without taking water down to the ship. So we had  
11 shifted using the bridge so the rope ladder, go to the  
12 bridge, and then after that, the -- our divers, rescue  
13 swimmers, whatever you want to call them, were  
14 stationed in the command passageway standing by for  
15 when we were going to be needed. As it turns out, of  
16 course, we didn't actually send anybody in the water.  
17 That really covers my -- I guess I don't know  
18 how much further you want me to go. Everything after  
19 that is just -- I was more of on the sidelines than  
20 sticking with the messy stuff.  
21 Thanks.  
22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yeah, I think that's  
23 probably far enough.  
24 LT SLOAN: Okay.  
25 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What we would like to do now  
26 is ask a series of more detailed questions --  
27 LT SLOAN: Okay.  
28 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- of what happened or any  
29 other information we might want to get from you.  
30 Normally, the way we've been doing it is each  
31 interviewer will ask a series of questions and then  
32 pass it on to the next one --  
33 LT SLOAN: Okay.  
34 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- and then we'll just go  
35 around the table. We might make two passes of  
36 questions.  
37 LT SLOAN: Okay.  
38 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So I'll go ahead and lead  
39 off with mine.  
40 Prior to the ascent to periscope depth, where  
41 were you located?  
42 LT SLOAN: The initial ascent, I was -- like  
43 I mentioned previously, I was located in the Control  
44 Room on the very aft bulkhead between the port plotter,  
45 essentially center line of the ship all the way back,  
46 not a great place to observe, but in the Control Room,  
47 yes.  
48 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And to your recollection,  
49 was there some kind of a brief or a safety brief that  
50 sometimes happens? Can you give us more information  
51 about that?  
52 LT SLOAN: A normal periscope depth  
53 evolution, the officer of the deck will conduct a  
54 brief. He will call the primary supervisors, the ESM  
55 watch, the radio man watch, and the sonar supervisor to  
56 the CON, huddle with them, and the dive will be

1 involved in this, also, and the chief of the watch,  
2 conduct a brief -- FT of the watch -- excuse me -- also  
3 have -- conduct a brief, say we're going to go to  
4 periscope depth, and we are going to perform the  
5 following functions, whether it is get a GPS position,  
6 which is kind of an automatic one, catch a satellite  
7 broadcast, shoot trash, ventilate the ship. There is a  
8 lot of different things you can do. It's like a  
9 laundry list of things. You just go down the list  
10 mentally, hey, do I want to do this, this, this.

11 To my -- that would be a normal periscope  
12 depth evolution. To my mind or to my recollection, I  
13 do not remember such a brief in this case. It was --  
14 everything was very -- it occurred very rapidly.  
15 Finished the high-speed turns. Immediately made a --  
16 came 150 feet, made a baffle clear, and then went right  
17 out. There was no -- there was no brief beforehand  
18 that I'm aware of.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did it strike you at the  
20 time as unusual that that had not been done, or is it  
21 something that is sometimes done, sometimes not?

22 LT SLOAN: I would say that 95 percent of the  
23 time, it's done. It would not necessarily be done in a  
24 hurry. I've had occasions where sometimes for training  
25 while we are transiting the captain, we'll say go to  
26 PDB there in X amount of minutes, and you've got to go  
27 fast. There is no time for a brief.

28 The brief -- really, what the brief serves to  
29 do is just to make sure that the key players know what  
30 evolutions you want to do. It is to make the  
31 evolutions go smoothly, minimize your time at PD. It's  
32 -- it's not so much a safety brief in the sense of  
33 you're briefing and what contacts are out there. That  
34 will be something that will be between the sonar  
35 supervisor, the fire control man on the watch and the  
36 officer of the deck. That is kind of a separate  
37 subset, and they'll -- usually what will happen, the  
38 way I would do it -- and I think most of the officers  
39 of the deck are the same -- I'll conduct a brief and  
40 then I'll conduct my TMA to figure out what the exact  
41 situation -- contact situation is immediately before I  
42 go up.

43 The brief is something, hey, we're going to  
44 ventilate the ship, okay, just a heads up. Hey, we're  
45 going to shoot trash, get somebody on station to shoot  
46 the trash. We're going to transmit these three  
47 message, you know, just to make sure that those people  
48 know what's coming up.

49 Once the brief is done, I'll tell everyone to  
50 go back, to back to your stations. Then we'll start  
51 the TMA. Usually, I'll start -- I'll do the brief when  
52 I'm running 150 feet, which is where we do our TMA at.

53 It is a balance between you want to be as shallow as  
54 possible, but you don't want to be so shallow that a  
55 deep draft tanker is going to run into you. So 150  
56 feet means you have a 100 feet between the top of the

1 sail and the surface. So that should be enough room  
2 for just about any ship that is out there, and that is  
3 where that comes from.

4 The heart of doing the ascent to periscope  
5 depth is doing a baffle clear maneuver. A good OD or  
6 most any OD, you want to minimize the number of  
7 maneuvers that you have to do based on the contact  
8 situation. What you'll do is -- depending on where the  
9 contacts are is how you are going to choose, how you  
10 are going to do your baffle clear. Baffle is  
11 considered to be 120 degrees. It is actually a little  
12 bit less than that, but 120 degrees is conservative,  
13 and that's a good round number. So you'll -- a classic  
14 baffle clear would be 120-degree turn right or left,  
15 and then you go to PD right there.

16 Transiting open ocean, no contacts. That's  
17 not at all unusual. If you have a contact, that will  
18 help you -- that will make you think about how you want  
19 to do your baffle clear. If you have a contact that's  
20 somewhere over to, say, 30 degrees off the bow, you  
21 don't want to turn 120 degrees away from the guy  
22 because you will put him in your baffles and now you  
23 don't know where the guy is and you're not getting any  
24 useful information. So you will typically turn towards  
25 the contact, bring him through your line of sight, pass  
26 like this, and you'll get another leg on the guy.

27 Sonar. Pass the sonar requires you to make  
28 course changes to get really accurate solutions.  
29 Ideally, you want to put as much speed across the line  
30 of sight in either direction. That will give you an  
31 accurate idea what that guy's range is, and it will  
32 give you a pretty good feel for exactly what he's  
33 doing, and usually it's pretty accurate. That's all  
34 you need to do.

35 Sometimes if you've got a lot of contacts or  
36 if you gain a contact when you turn and come out of  
37 your baffles, then you may need to do extra maneuvers  
38 to make sure you know what those guys are doing. It is  
39 never the same twice. The only one that is the same  
40 twice is that there is nobody there at all. Then it is  
41 easy, but if there is different contacts, you may have  
42 to maneuver.

43 I have done full circles before, just keep  
44 going in circles, keep getting new contacts. New  
45 contacts, trying to get legs on them, also, you go in  
46 the circle.

47 When it comes time to decide on a course to  
48 go up, you take the best information -- you take what  
49 information you have, figure out who you think is a  
50 bigger threat, who is less of a threat, and that can be  
51 based on a lot of things, on -- if you can't drive this  
52 bearing rate, if I drive this way at 10 knots and the  
53 baffle clears are usually done at 10 knots, and then it  
54 comes 180 degrees and drive this way and I can't change  
55 this bearing rate, you know he's distant, definitely.  
56 There's no doubt about it.

1           If you come this way and all of a sudden he  
2 is drawing right pretty hard, then you come the other  
3 way, and all of a sudden, he's drawing left pretty  
4 hard, you know he's close, and it gives you -- one, it  
5 gives you a qualitative feel and you can use the fire  
6 control system to give you a good quantitative feel for  
7 how far away he is. So there is a lot of that.

8           Then the -- the final thing you try to set up  
9 is the ideal situation is contacts that are drawing  
10 right or on your right side, contacts that are drawing  
11 left or on your left side, nobody in the baffles and  
12 nobody dead ahead of you. That's an idea setup. If  
13 the guy is on the right drawing right, you know you're  
14 probably pretty safe that he's going to draw behind  
15 you. If he's on the left drawing left, he is going to  
16 draw behind you.

17           The guys you worry about is the guy on the  
18 other side on the left, say drawing right. You know  
19 he's drawing in front of you. That's when you get a  
20 little bit more concerned.

21           So, ideally, you get everybody on the left  
22 drawing left, everybody on the right drawing right.  
23 You get a good feel for the ranges, all -- hopefully,  
24 they're not too close. There is no set. If it is less  
25 than -- if you think he is less than this range, don't  
26 go to PD. There is no set number. It's -- it's  
27 situational. It's how comfortable you are, how  
28 comfortable the captain is that's letting you do that.

29           Typically, this captain, once he seen the  
30 officer of the decks go to periscope depth a few times  
31 after they're qualified, he will not come to control.  
32 He will take a report over the phone in which the  
33 report will be something like, "Captain, officer of the  
34 deck, ship at 150 feet on course 200, 150 feet. Hold  
35 the following contacts," and then you'll give the --  
36 give the contact, what the classification, like if it's  
37 a merchant or trawler, a war ship something like that,  
38 its bearing, its range, and which way it is drawing.  
39 So it's on the left, drawing left with a  
40 .5-degree-per-minute bearing rate, 4 on the right  
41 drawing right, whatever.

42           If there's more than about three contacts,  
43 the captain will usually -- will come to control to  
44 take a look himself and get a feel for how things are  
45 going, what it looks like, so he can know for -- he can  
46 visualize. With a couple of contacts, it's pretty easy  
47 to -- he's training -- the captain is -- even more  
48 junior officers are trained to visualize it in their  
49 head, build a mental picture of where everybody is  
50 based on that information. If there's more than about  
51 three contacts, it gets really hard to do that. So  
52 he'll come out, look for yourself.

53           This -- obviously, this case was different.  
54 The captain was in the control the whole time. There  
55 is never a time he wasn't in control. I would assume  
56 he probably had as good an idea of the contact

1 situation as the officer of the deck.

2 Once you get all the contacts where you want  
3 them or as best you can -- sometimes the contact is  
4 very distant and you know he is distant. He may have  
5 close to a zero bearing which is -- a zero bearing  
6 rate, you've got to be very careful of. It could mean  
7 very distant, which 99 percent of the time that's what  
8 it means, but it could also mean a constant bearing  
9 decreasing range situation. So you've got to be  
10 careful of that.

11 Usually, a maneuver will tell you that. If  
12 you maneuver and this bearing rate jumps from zero to  
13 some other bearing rate, then you know he's close, but  
14 if it just stays zero, he's distant.

15 Get the -- you figure out the best course you  
16 can based on the guy's right drawing right, guy's left  
17 drawing left. It doesn't always work that way.  
18 Occasionally, you will have a guy that is on the right  
19 drawing left, but you got to kind of balance that, if  
20 you think he's a long way away or he's just going very  
21 fast out there somewhere, do that sometimes.

22 Once you do that, then you'll actually make  
23 the ascent to periscope depth.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You said that typically the  
25 officer of the deck would huddle with the sonar man and  
26 the fire control man separately from the typical safety  
27 brief or pre-periscope depth brief.

28 LT SLOAN: I call it an evolution brief.

29 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Evolution brief. Did you  
30 see that happen before they went to PD?

31 LT SLOAN: I saw the officer of the deck look  
32 at the fire control system. I don't know -- I just  
33 happened to see him kind of head that way. I don't  
34 know what he looked at. I didn't really have a good  
35 line of sight.

36 At this point, there was a layer of guests  
37 between me and the CON. So there was a lot of people  
38 right there. People over by the fire control side,  
39 there's people on the port side, there's people ahead  
40 -- in front of the CON. So kind of people everywhere.  
41 So I didn't really have a great view.

42 I do seem to recall him heading over that  
43 way, but I don't really know what he looked at. I  
44 imagine he would -- I would look at the time bearing  
45 display to give you an idea of where the bearing rates  
46 are, so after you have done your maneuvers, you can see  
47 if the bearing rates have changed, but, like I said,  
48 that's what I would look at. I can't say for sure what  
49 he would look at.

50 I've seen Mr. Coen go to periscope depth  
51 before, and that's how he would normally do it, but, in  
52 this case, I can't say as a fact that's what he did.

53 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Now, did you see him go into  
54 the sonar room at any time?

55 LT SLOAN: I did not see him go into sonar.  
56 I did see the executive officer step into sonar. I

1 don't know if he was prompted to go into sonar.  
2 Normally, the ASVDU display would probably be  
3 good enough unless you had some questions. Then you  
4 could go directly to the sonar supervisor and ask him,  
5 and I'll do that sometimes. If I'm a little confused  
6 by something or I'm not sure or I see new traces  
7 appearing, I'll walk in there and say, "Hey, what's  
8 this?" Oh, that's a biologic or a sea state or  
9 something like that. Sometimes you can't tell just by  
10 looking. You've got to walk in there and ask them what  
11 they're hearing. They're supposed to report it, and  
12 usually they do, but --

13 I don't recall Mr. Coen stepping into sonar  
14 in this case. Like I said, the executive officer did.

15 Normally, 9 times out of 10, I just use the  
16 ASVDU display which in this case was not working.  
17 Stepping into sonar would serve the same function as  
18 looking at that display.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So you did see the executive  
20 officer step in. You recall about how long he was in  
21 there?

22 LT SLOAN: It wasn't very long because this  
23 whole evolution didn't take -- didn't seem like it took  
24 all that long. It couldn't have been more than about a  
25 minute. That's kind of a rough guess. I wasn't really  
26 -- I just happened to notice him heading that way, and,  
27 you know, mental click, ASVDU is not working. So I  
28 said he's going to see -- just going to double-check  
29 since it's not working.

30 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And around this time, did  
31 you see the captain step into sonar?

32 LT SLOAN: I do not recall seeing the captain  
33 step into sonar. He may have, but I don't remember  
34 seeing him do that.

35 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You mentioned that  
36 originally the captain just did not intend to conduct  
37 an EMBT blow and at some point he changed his mind.  
38 Could you talk a little bit more about that and whether  
39 or not it was on the plan of the day, the EMBT blow?

40 LT SLOAN: I don't recall if it was in the  
41 plan of the day or not.

42 My guess -- and I don't know this for a fact.  
43 My -- I would think that his reason for not wanting to  
44 do an EMBT blow is it puts a pretty good shock on the  
45 system to do that. I mean, we do it. We do them  
46 fairly often. It's not that unusual, but every once in  
47 a while, a boat will do one and one of their check --  
48 they have -- called parker check valves will fail and  
49 it will stick, something like that. It's not something  
50 that's going to endanger the ship or anything like  
51 that, but it causes the maintenance -- requires  
52 maintenance afterwards.

53 We were scheduled on that following Monday to  
54 get an away for our operational reactor safeguards  
55 exam, and my -- my thought on that was that he didn't  
56 want to do the EMBT blow because he didn't want to

1 cause damage to something that would maybe delay us  
2 getting underway to go out and do our ORSE workup.  
3 That was our big thing that we had in front of us was  
4 getting ready for that exam. We only had a work of  
5 workup left out at sea. So he may not have wanted to  
6 risk, you know, losing a couple of those days.

7 As to why he changed his mind, I don't know.  
8 Didn't discuss it with him.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So when did he --  
10 when did you learn that he did not want to do it, and  
11 when did you learn when he decided to do it?

12 LT SLOAN: Before we got underway is when he  
13 mentioned that. I had -- that morning, I brought the  
14 charts -- to get the chart reviewed and approved right  
15 before we got underway, actually about an hour or two  
16 before we got underway, and I just in passing  
17 mentioned, "Yeah, this is good. They give us pretty  
18 good water. There is a good area here. We can run.  
19 We can do high-speed runs and then do the emergency  
20 blow." He goes, "We're not going to do an emergency  
21 blow." And that was -- I said okay, and that was --  
22 that was the only discussion on it.

23 Typically, we did do emergency blows for VIP  
24 cruises, the Independence cruises. I think we've done  
25 one pretty much every other one we've done, I seem to  
26 recall. I think we've done a couple with midshipmen on  
27 board also, last summer, if I remember right, but him  
28 saying he didn't want to do one didn't really affect me  
29 or I didn't even care one way or the other because I've  
30 done them enough. It doesn't thrill me anymore.

31 I can't tell you exactly when I learned that  
32 he just changed his mind. I think it was when he was  
33 getting ready to go periscope depth. I realized that  
34 was what we were going to do. It wasn't I am going to  
35 go up to do the emergency blow.

36 He may have done IMC announcement saying  
37 we're kind of -- for the guests' sake, to say, hey, we  
38 just did these high-speed turns and next we're going to  
39 do an emergency blow. It may have been that. He may  
40 have said that, now that I'm thinking about it, because  
41 he was doing a lot of announcing. He likes to talk to  
42 everyone, let all the guests know what's going on, even  
43 though I think most of them were in control, anyways.  
44 There's probably a few that were not, that were doing  
45 tours or whatever, elsewhere.

46 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And did it surprise you when  
47 you heard about the EMBT blow?

48 LT SLOAN: No, not particularly. I mean, he  
49 -- granted, he had said he didn't want to do one  
50 earlier, but just figured he changed his mind. Wasn't  
51 anything. Didn't stick one way or the other with me.

52 In some ways, it's actually quicker.  
53 Emergency blow, you get to the surface very quickly and  
54 you're already driving in.

55 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And did you consider when  
56 you -- when you learned that he was going to do the

1 EMBT blow that it might affect your PH time?

2 LT SLOAN: No. It crossed my mind that it  
3 may actually speed it up a little bit, but, really, it  
4 doesn't make a lot of difference. Surfacing, a normal  
5 surface and an emergency blow is not a huge difference.  
6 You just come up a little bit faster on the emergency  
7 blow. You've already got more air in the valves tank  
8 and you're already driving in faster. So it might have  
9 saved a -- it might have saved 2 or 3 minutes or  
10 something, but nothing significant.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And tell me about your PH.  
12 You said you went back and talked to the captain that  
13 you were concerned that you needed to get moving along  
14 towards -- heading back towards Pearl Harbor.

15 LT SLOAN: Mm-hmm.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: By your calculations, were  
17 you going to be late? Did you have to change any  
18 preparations for entering port?

19 LT SLOAN: As we -- initially, when I told  
20 him that, I thought if we got going right away, we  
21 would probably be really close. It would be very  
22 close.

23 I figured if I told him, let him know, that  
24 was probably good enough. He knew that we wanted to  
25 get going. He would push that in that direction. I  
26 didn't see anything to be gained from continuously  
27 reminding him, hey, we're going to be 3 minutes late, 4  
28 minutes late, 5 minutes late, or anything like that.

29 As we did the angles and the high-speed  
30 turns, I realized that we were probably going to be a  
31 little bit late. We had been late before on VIP-type  
32 cruises, not real late, but 10, 20 minutes, here and  
33 there, and I realized that I knew that it wasn't going  
34 to be that big of deal. Our tugs would be waiting for  
35 us. They would get us in.

36 There's also some time that can be made up.  
37 PH is out a couple miles outside of Pearl Harbor. You  
38 can actually get to PH a little late, keep the bell on,  
39 keep like a full bell on until you get to the buoy  
40 chain. We always slow down once we get into the buoy  
41 chain, but we can -- an extra knot or two here and  
42 there all the way in, we could make up most of that  
43 time, anyway. So I wasn't too concerned. A few  
44 minutes late here and there wasn't a big deal.

45 Like I said, other than the first mentioning  
46 of it to him, I never reminded him again at that point.

47 I think he was -- I got the impression that he really  
48 did want to get in on time, though. He was pushing the  
49 officer of the deck to get the pump shifted,  
50 [inaudible] pump shifted and then was trying to get the  
51 angles and dangles and all that going.

52 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I'm sorry. I misunderstand  
53 it. You got the impression that he did not want to --

54 LT SLOAN: No, he did want to get in. He did  
55 not want to be late. He wanted to get going. Mr. Coen  
56 is not the fastest guy in the world sometimes. He

1 likes to be very methodical, and I think the captain  
2 was trying to let's go, let's go, let's go.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So do you think maybe  
4 Lieutenant Coen was a little bit pressured by the  
5 captain, pushing him along?

6 LT SLOAN: It was -- I won't say pressured so  
7 much as he was being directed to let's go. So there  
8 was probably some pressure there to go faster,  
9 especially with the pump shift. The pump -- until the  
10 pumps were shifted, we were pretty much just tooting  
11 along. We weren't going that fast.

12 The pump shift was kind of the -- we could  
13 have done angles and dangles without doing the pump  
14 shifts, but I think the captain had in his mind he  
15 wanted to do the pump shift and then we would start,  
16 and he wanted that done.

17 I guess that something was delaying the pump  
18 shift, and I'm not really sure what. I'm sure somebody  
19 else might have a better question -- a better answer  
20 for that than I do, maybe the [inaudible] watch.

21 But it couldn't have been a delay of more  
22 than a couple minutes, though. So I don't think in --  
23 big picture, I don't think that should have been a big  
24 deal, concern.

25 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. How are you feeling?  
26 Do you want to take a break?

27 LT SLOAN: I'll keep on rolling. I have no  
28 problem.

29 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Okay. Please try and  
30 think back when the ship went up to periscope depth.  
31 You say initially the officer of the deck had the  
32 scope.

33 LT SLOAN: Mm-hmm.

34 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: He made some quick sweeps,  
35 and the captain took the scope. Could you please try  
36 to recall as much as you can about what the captain  
37 did, how he made his search, and whether or not he was  
38 interfacing with anybody as he made his search?

39 LT SLOAN: To the best of my recollection, he  
40 did at least one 360. I don't know what power he was  
41 in. I don't know if he was in high power or low power.  
42 He may have done more than one because I wasn't  
43 focused on him. I was more -- still continuing to just  
44 kind of keep in track of where we were position-wise.

45 I did not hear him talk to anybody other than  
46 the officer of the deck when he took the scope from him  
47 as far as looking down bearing. The normal thing to do  
48 is you would do the low power sweeps and then you do a  
49 little bit slower sweeps and then high power, more  
50 thorough search, and I don't think all that was done.

51 But another thing that is pretty common is  
52 you'll look down the bearing of contacts that you have,  
53 and he may have looked down those bearings, but I don't  
54 recall him using the -- what I would normally do is I  
55 would say fire control, put me on the bearing to  
56 whatever contact because I am looking out the scope.

1 The fire control man will have an indication of what  
2 bearing my scope is on.

3 Just by knowing what course I'm on, I can  
4 roughly get in that area, but I'll have him fine-tune  
5 it for me and make sure I'm in the right bearing, and  
6 plus I don't -- the bearings are changing. So I don't  
7 know exactly what it is that second. So I'll ask him  
8 to put me on the bearing. He'll say train right or  
9 left X degrees. Then he'll turn and then fine-tune a  
10 little bit and look down that bearing.

11 I'll initially look probably low power,  
12 switch to high power, switch to 12 power, look. Either  
13 I'll say I don't hold that contact visually or I do  
14 hold that contact visually, it's this, you know, and  
15 depending -- it's situational.

16 That interplay, I did not see. I don't think  
17 that occurred.

18 That being said, it is possible that the  
19 captain knew in his mind where the contacts were and  
20 was doing that, too. I'll do that once in a while, not  
21 usually for an initial search, but later on, if I'm  
22 like keeping tabs on a contact, I know roughly where  
23 its bearing is, or a sonar calls out a new -- I have a  
24 new contact on a bearing or whatever. Sometimes I'll  
25 look at the display and I'll spin the scope, look, then  
26 I'll look for it because that's less of an immediate  
27 thing whereas your initial periscope search when you're  
28 first coming up, you know, you want to find them  
29 quickly. That's something that you know they just  
30 picked the guy up. I've just looked that direction  
31 recently, have been going circles continuously. Now I  
32 know the guy is not close. I'm not really worried  
33 about him. It's just more of a, hey, what's out there.

34 That's a different situation.

35 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And by your recollection,  
36 you said you don't recall that interplay between the  
37 sonar tech and the captain?

38 LT SLOAN: No, I don't. It would be between  
39 the fire control.

40 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Fire control. I'm sorry.

41 And from your past experience with the  
42 captain looking through the scope at PD, would he  
43 typically talk to the fire control tech or not?

44 LT SLOAN: Sometimes. He didn't do that all  
45 that often where he would jump on the scope and look  
46 around, but when he did do it, I think there are times  
47 that he would just look. He would know where the guy  
48 was roughly, and he just looked for himself and not say  
49 anything. So, yes, I think he had done that.

50 And there are other times when he said --  
51 when he would ask to be put on the bearing of contact.

52 I think it really depends on if he had the picture in  
53 his mind of where the guy was. If he knew where the  
54 guy was, he would do it himself. If he wasn't sure,  
55 then he would ask to be put on the bearing.

56 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you remember if he

1 lingered at any particular bearings or any direction as  
2 he was making his search?

3 LT SLOAN: I think he did. I seem to recall  
4 him like look, stop, look, stop. I don't -- like I  
5 said, I wasn't paying that careful attention to it, but  
6 what I seem to remember is that, yeah, I think he did  
7 stop. I don't -- I think he may have changed powers or  
8 something. I'm not really sure. I'm not sure. But I  
9 think he probably did, now that I think about it, now  
10 that you've asked that question.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And you -- can you visualize  
12 what direction he was looking when he was stopped?

13 LT SLOAN: Let's see if I can picture it in  
14 my mind. Maybe off the starboard side, I seem to -- or  
15 starboard bow. Starboard beam, starboard bow,  
16 somewhere in that area. That's just kind of a -- that  
17 may not be right, but I seem to recall that now that --  
18 now that you're asking me the question, it's kind of  
19 jogging something, but -- but like I said, I did it --  
20 I remember him going in a circle. So he may have  
21 stopped more than once.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And the length of time that  
23 he made his search, do you think it was typical or  
24 average, more -- can you speak to that a little bit?

25 LT SLOAN: Without going into the specifics  
26 of what's required or what's -- I guess it is required  
27 [inaudible] recommended. Normally, you would do a more  
28 thorough low-power search, do a 360-degree for -- as an  
29 officer of the deck, do the fast sweeps, do airborne  
30 sweeps, look for helicopters which are a major threat  
31 for us, and then a low-power -- a 360 low-power sweep,  
32 a much slower one where you're trying to get a good  
33 look around.

34 I would also -- at that time, I would do the  
35 high-power bearings of contacts as I did that. Once I  
36 did that sweep, I would call the captain and report  
37 what I had. The ship is at periscope depth, hold no  
38 contacts or hold one visual contact, a merchant, or  
39 something like that, depending on whatever I had.

40 Nine times out of 10, I didn't have anybody.  
41 So I'd just so hold no visual contacts, and that was  
42 my way of letting the captain know, okay, we are at  
43 periscope depth, we're safe, everything is okay.  
44 That's standard procedure.

45 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And the initial periscope  
46 depth was -- do you recall what that was?

47 LT SLOAN: Sixty feet.

48 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you recall -- I'm sorry.

49 LT SLOAN: I'm sorry. I jumped that one out.  
50 Sixty feet. The initial periscope depth -- ordered  
51 depth was 60 feet. When the captain took the scope, he  
52 directed the officer of the deck to come at 58 feet.  
53 That all happened pretty quickly. So I don't know what  
54 the actual depth we ended up on was. It takes a few  
55 seconds to change the depth.

56 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And do you have any idea why

1 he might have ordered 58?

2 LT SLOAN: My immediate thought, and it  
3 hasn't changed, was that he wanted to get a little bit  
4 better eye-to-eye for looking around. A couple feet  
5 makes a big difference.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And do you recall either the  
7 officer of the deck or the commanding officer say  
8 anything about a wave slap or visibility conditions or  
9 report of any contacts --

10 LT SLOAN: No, not at all.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- when they were doing  
12 their searches?

13 LT SLOAN: Not at all. Like I said, I didn't  
14 get a good look at the ASVDU or the PERIVU. I'm not  
15 sure if the weather -- from what I saw later, the  
16 weather looked about the same as what I had seen  
17 earlier in the day, pretty poor as far as visibility  
18 goes.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you tell me a little  
20 bit about the -- some kind of a plotting arrangement  
21 that the fire control man maintains and whether, you  
22 know -- any recollection about that? Were you able to  
23 see that?

24 LT SLOAN: The contact evaluation plot?

25 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yeah. Were you able to see  
26 that from the --

27 LT SLOAN: There were people between me and  
28 it, at least two or three layers of people. So I  
29 couldn't physically see it, and I don't recall if the  
30 fire control man actually went to it and updated it or  
31 not.

32 Typically, he would. Obviously, normal watch  
33 routine, he keeps it up, and that is another tool for  
34 the officer of the deck had a long-term analysis tool  
35 for him. It kind of backs up what's on the fire  
36 control screen. It has a little more information.

37 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. What I'd like to do  
38 is go ahead and pass it. These other interviewers are  
39 getting impatient with me. I can tell. So I will pass  
40 it on to Mr. Bill Woody.

41 LT SLOAN: They're going to pounce. Okay.

42 MR. WOODY: You mentioned that the captain  
43 may have looked down the bearing.

44 Bill Woody, NTSB.

45 That the captain may have looked down the  
46 bearings or he stopped at different times. Do you have  
47 any recollection of the sonar bearing situation at that  
48 time?

49 LT SLOAN: I personally had no information or  
50 no knowledge of what the contact situation was at all,  
51 and that was largely due to the fact of where I was  
52 located in the aft end of control. I have no -- I  
53 could not see the fire control system, and with the  
54 AZVDU down, I couldn't see that.

55 Like I said, my primary focus was on  
56 navigation issues remaining in area. So I did not --

1 one, I couldn't -- I didn't overhear anything about the  
2 contact situation, and I certainly didn't have any  
3 information on it. Just based on where I was at and  
4 the fact that there was VIPs between me and what was  
5 going on.

6 MR. WOODY: Do you have an ESM warning  
7 speaker in the control room?

8 LT SLOAN: Yes.

9 MR. WOODY: Could you tell us what happened  
10 to that, that day, what was done to it?

11 LT SLOAN: We were heading toward the  
12 periscope depth. I thought I saw Mr. Coen bend down.  
13 Usually, a couple of things that we set up prior to  
14 proceeding to periscope depth is the ESM early warning  
15 receiver, which is on the very top of the periscope, to  
16 detect radar, you'll actually get that before the  
17 optics of the scope come out of the water.

18 Speakers is right in the center of the CON in  
19 the overhead, right between both periscopes, really  
20 sensitive little volume speaker. Usually you'll turn  
21 that up, and he must have turned it up because I  
22 believe he did an ES -- let me start from the beginning  
23 to make sure I get all of this.

24 You'll set that. You'll set the volume.  
25 What I'll do is I'll turn it to where we can just hear  
26 a little bit of background noise, you know, white  
27 noise, set that up.

28 Another thing that I kind of relate -- I  
29 relayed in my mind is the underwater telephone which is  
30 essentially a set of hydrophones. You can talk  
31 underwater, ship to ship. You'll turn that microphone  
32 -- or that speaker up a little bit, too, because it has  
33 different transition. You select the sail transition  
34 so it is listening up.

35 If there is a ship above you and its  
36 machinery is going, you'll hear it, and it's pretty  
37 sensitive. You'll definitely hear it if it's really  
38 close. It's not the best defense in the world, but  
39 it's kind of an additional backup system.

40 When you raise the scope prior to proceeding  
41 to periscope depth, you'll report to ESM. You'll say  
42 ESM CON stand by for video test. What that is, is when  
43 the scope comes up, on the left side of the scope  
44 looking forward, there is the control system for the  
45 early warning receiver. You select what band -- you  
46 can listen to specific bands so you can filter out  
47 garbage if you got a lot of signals.

48 Normally, if we're going to PD, you'll select  
49 all so you get all signals, and it also can be  
50 directional for direction finding. You select omni  
51 directional. So it's easier for safety essentially.  
52 You can use it in a tactical sense to try to find where  
53 a guy is. It's not real accurate, but you can use it  
54 in a tactical means, but this instance, going to  
55 periscope depth, it's a safety feature. So you have  
56 omni directional antenna selected for all bands. So

1 any radar signals it will detect, and there is a test  
2 button. You push the test button and it gives you a  
3 tone. The other is -- it's a calibrated tone. There  
4 is tactical reasons for it. It doesn't matter, but  
5 what it does is you hear it on the speaker. So you  
6 know the speaker works. You know you can hear it, and  
7 you know the ESM guy gets it, too, and then he'll say  
8 the test of the early warning receiver satisfactory.  
9 I'm pretty sure -- I would say 99-percent  
10 sure that Mr. Coen did that when he went up because I  
11 remember -- I seem to recall hearing it.  
12 MR. WOODY: You seem to recall hearing that?  
13 LT SLOAN: Yeah.  
14 MR. WOODY: Okay.  
15 LT SLOAN: And that's standard procedure when  
16 you go to PD. You should do that very time.  
17 MR. WOODY: Is there any way to miss-set the  
18 settings and go up and not hear, say, X band or what we  
19 call a 3-centimeter radar?  
20 LT SLOAN: It is possible, yes. Normally, it  
21 stays on omni and all and you never change it. We  
22 never change it.  
23 MR. WOODY: You never change it.  
24 LT SLOAN: The only time I've ever changed it  
25 is a situation like if you're near land in a busy port  
26 like say near San Diego and you are swamped with  
27 radars. This is something what you'll do, if you are  
28 just continuously barraged with radars, it is just  
29 noise and it is just -- you can't make any sense of it.  
30 You can hear distinctive radars. I can  
31 actually pick out a P-3 radar which I know is a threat  
32 -- not a real threat, but a potential threat. He can  
33 find us. Surface search radars. There's a couple of  
34 different radars I can pick out. Most of them, I  
35 can't, but I can at least get a rough idea is this a  
36 good radar or bad radar, that kind of thing.  
37 So, if you are swamped with so much signals,  
38 alls it is, is noise and you can't tell is the guy  
39 getting louder, is he a threat or whatever, we will  
40 shift to IJT band which is the band for most surface  
41 search radars.  
42 MR. WOODY: I see.  
43 LT SLOAN: That is what we are most concerned  
44 about. Do we really care about air navigation radars,  
45 land-based radar? No. We are for safety ship -- you  
46 know, surface search radar is what we really care  
47 about.  
48 MR. WOODY: And with this band you just  
49 mentioned, the surface ship radar, would that pick up a  
50 commercial ship radar?  
51 LT SLOAN: Yes. I believe it would. That is  
52 only something you would do, like I said, in a specific  
53 situation. I don't remember doing this for several  
54 months. We haven't had it since last time we were on  
55 our previous EASTPAC [ph], last year.  
56 MR. WOODY: I see.

1           LT SLOAN: I remember shifting it once or  
2 twice, but pretty much all the time, it was left on  
3 omni and all, and I know it was when he raised the  
4 scope because, when I lowered the scope, it was --  
5           MR. WOODY: Omni and all.  
6           LT SLOAN: -- omni and all.  
7           MR. WOODY: Okay. Do you recall seeing him  
8 reduce the volume on the speaker at any time?  
9           LT SLOAN: No, I don't. He may have, but I  
10 don't recall seeing that.  
11          MR. WOODY: Because that is something that  
12 might happen, a routine --  
13          LT SLOAN: Typically, we will leave the  
14 volume where it is the whole time. It is annoying, but  
15 it is one of those -- it is like something you do. You  
16 just leave it on even though it is annoying background  
17 noise. You leave it on.  
18          The only volume I will turn down is I will  
19 turn the underwater telephone volume down once I am at  
20 PD because I figure that's not really doing me any  
21 good. I will turn that down just to reduce some of the  
22 background noise.  
23          MR. WOODY: Can you recall hearing anything  
24 out of the underwater telephone when you went to  
25 periscope depth?  
26          LT SLOAN: No.  
27          MR. WOODY: Was it enough --  
28          LT SLOAN: It was far enough away from me, if  
29 it was something quiet that was not real loud on it, I  
30 wouldn't have heard it, anyways.  
31          MR. WOODY: I guess I should have asked the  
32 question. Was it high enough that you could have heard  
33 it to know that the volume was up?  
34          LT SLOAN: I could not hear it.  
35          MR. WOODY: You could not hear it.  
36          LT SLOAN: No. Normally, the background  
37 noise on that is not real loud, especially with the  
38 extra noise in control from guests, not that they were  
39 being all that loud, but even quiet talk in the small  
40 space, you know.  
41          MR. WOODY: Do you have any recollection of  
42 seeing the OD do anything to the underwater telephone?  
43          LT SLOAN: Underwater telephone, I remember  
44 seeing him bend down. I seem to recall him bending  
45 down.  
46          MR. WOODY: Bending down?  
47          LT SLOAN: Yeah. I assume he set it up  
48 correctly. He knows how to do it. He's done it a  
49 million times.  
50          Like I said, I don't remember seeing him set  
51 the volume on the early warning receiver, but I seem to  
52 remember hearing it. So I think he must have done that  
53 as well.  
54          MR. WOODY: You mentioned a while ago that  
55 whenever there is a sonar bearing that the fire control  
56 man will put you on the bearing so you can check it.

1 Do you recall anything like that happening? I think  
2 you said you didn't recall the --

3 LT SLOAN: No, no. When we were PD -- you  
4 don't do that for the initial sweeps.

5 MR. WOODY: Okay.

6 LT SLOAN: The way it works, there is  
7 absolute silence in control as the -- when the scope  
8 comes out of the water, no one talks unless it is an  
9 emergency. The officer of the deck just sweeps, and he  
10 is going to say one or two things. He is either going  
11 to say "emergency deep" because that means there is a  
12 collision threat or something he thinks is a collision  
13 threat or "no close contacts" which means there is no  
14 collision threat. There is no in between there.

15 MR. WOODY: With that background, the  
16 question would be, is there any kind of a procedure on  
17 your ship whereby the captain makes the sweep that the  
18 fire control man steps forward sometime and says,  
19 "Captain, we have two contacts. Would you check this  
20 bearing? Would you check that bearing?" Is there  
21 anything like that done?

22 LT SLOAN: Yes. I wouldn't say it is a  
23 procedure. I would call it a watchstanding practice.  
24 I don't know if it is written anywhere. I'm sure maybe  
25 it is, but my experience is mostly the fire control man  
26 will say, "Officer of the deck, request you look down  
27 this bearing." They will prompt you to make sure that  
28 the officer of the decks are doing it.

29 I didn't actually hear that in this case,  
30 but, in normal practice, yes, they would do that, and  
31 they do that to me all the time if they do not think I  
32 am looking at something, or if I look at something and  
33 I didn't tell them I was looking here, just didn't  
34 think about telling him and I looked, nobody there to  
35 look on, they will request me to -- oh, I already  
36 looked there [inaudible] there. Normally, they will  
37 prompt you if they don't hear anything.

38 MR. WOODY: You mentioned that the captain  
39 prompted the OD regarding the shifting of this pump.  
40 Was that something that the OD could have speeded up?

41 LT SLOAN: Realistically, all he could do is  
42 do the same thing, call back to the engine [inaudible]  
43 watch and say hurry up, hurry up. I mean, he has no  
44 physical control on it. It is all controlled from  
45 maneuvering. So he has no --

46 MR. WOODY: Is there any reason to believe  
47 that the OD calling back would have caused the crew to  
48 speed up in any way being faster?

49 LT SLOAN: If they were not knowing why they  
50 were taking so long, I am not really sure, but it could  
51 -- if it was a situation where they were doing  
52 something else and they were taking their time and  
53 didn't realize that, hey, we want this shifted --  
54 normally, you order a pump shift, the pumps get shifted  
55 and that is the end of it. There is no delay normally.  
56 That is something I don't understand why that --

1 MR. WOODY: You mentioned that the captain  
2 when you checked the scope or checked the chart  
3 together with the captain that he mentioned something  
4 to the effect that it's a good area or you mentioned  
5 that.

6 LT SLOAN: Actually, I mentioned that to him.

7 MR. WOODY: Okay. Could you tell us what  
8 makes this area a good area?

9 LT SLOAN: We had -- one, it was a good  
10 distance from land. We were at least 10 miles south of  
11 -- about 10 miles south of any land, which means that  
12 there is probably less contacts typically. I mean, not  
13 that there is no contact.

14 I didn't go through this list with him, but I  
15 will tell you why I thought it was good reason, good  
16 land, good water. We had plenty of room, north, south,  
17 and pretty good east-west distance as well to do  
18 high-speed turns and angles and dangles, things like  
19 that.

20 The only hazard to navigation I was really  
21 concerned about was Penguin Bank, number one, and that  
22 is just because it is so shallow, but we never got  
23 close to it at all.

24 The other hazard that I would be concerned  
25 about is a FAD buoy, a ways to the south of where we  
26 were operating. We never actually got that close to  
27 it.

28 MR. WOODY: A FAD buoy, what is that?

29 LT SLOAN: FAD stands for fish aggregating  
30 device. It is privately maintained buoys in Hawaiian  
31 waters that they basically put out there, and for  
32 whatever reason, the fish like them. They hang out  
33 there. So you will see sport fishermen in those areas.

34 MR. WOODY: FAD, fish --

35 LT SLOAN: -- aggregating device.

36 MR. WOODY: Aggregating.

37 LT SLOAN: I don't make these things up.

38 There is a lot of them in Hawaiian waters.  
39 They are fairly deep-water buoys. They are all over  
40 the place, all around all the islands.

41 We never actually got within 10 miles of that  
42 one. So it had nothing to do with what we were doing.

43 Really, Penguin Bank was my number-one thing.

44 I don't like that place. It is too shallow.

45 MR. WOODY: Is there any deep-sea commercial  
46 traffic that comes through this area?

47 LT SLOAN: There is some, but most of it will  
48 either come down the Molokai Channel, heading to  
49 Honolulu from the United States or even from the Panama  
50 Canal, will come around the north of Molokai down and  
51 in, and that would have no effect. It will come where  
52 that says Aloha there. It will come down in that  
53 general direction, and that will have no effect on us.

54 There is inner-island traffic that will  
55 proceed from Honolulu over to Maui, Molokai, Hawaii,  
56 down that way, but that tends to stay -- it will go out

1 along Diamondhead towards Cocoahead [ph], and it will  
2 hug that part of the coastline. So that was pretty far  
3 north of us and not really a concern.

4 Don't really see any -- you will see some big  
5 stuff also heading off to Asia, but that heads out same  
6 kind -- the opposite direction along the southern coast  
7 of Oahu, not down where we were. Basically, there is  
8 nothing due south of Honolulu. So there is not any  
9 real traffic except for fishing. Fishing is about all  
10 you will see down there, maybe an occasional sailboard.

11 MR. WOODY: Let the record show that  
12 Lieutenant Sloan has pointed to the safety lane on  
13 Chart 1902. The six lanes is labeled Aloha, a-l-o-h-a.  
14 19-00-2. Thank you.

15 LT SLOAN: I was going to say something.  
16 That is the navigator in me.

17 MR. WOODY: Thank you.

18 You mentioned about the XO going to sonar.  
19 Can you remember what time or perhaps what --

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Needs to break.

21 MR. WOODY: Okay.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We will take a -- [audio  
23 break].

24 MR. WOODY: [In progress] -- went to the  
25 sonar. Do you remember how long he was there? You  
26 said not very long, but what events was this associated  
27 with? Was it before one thing and after another?

28 LT SLOAN: Preparation for periscope depth, I  
29 believe, is when he went in there.

30 Normally, the officer of the deck would  
31 evaluate the ASVDU screen as part of his contact  
32 management to make sure he had a good idea where the  
33 contact situation was.

34 The ASVDU out of commission, my assumption --  
35 I do not know if this is the case, but I assume the XO  
36 decided to provide some additional backup and went to  
37 sonar himself to take a look.

38 MR. WOODY: Was this before a baffle clear or  
39 after a baffle clear? Can you recall?

40 LT SLOAN: I think it was during or  
41 immediately before the baffle clear until after the  
42 baffle clear.

43 MR. WOODY: Okay.

44 LT SLOAN: But I am not 100-percent sure  
45 about that.

46 MR. WOODY: Did the exec return to the  
47 control area before the ship went to periscope depth?

48 LT SLOAN: Prior to periscope depth, he  
49 stepped out and I don't think he went back into sonar  
50 after that.

51 MR. WOODY: Was there any kind of exchange of  
52 information between him and the captain or him and the  
53 OD?

54 LT SLOAN: I don't know. I am not sure.

55 MR. WOODY: You mentioned an assistant  
56 navigator. Is that another officer?

1 LT SLOAN: No. That is, in this case -- my  
2 assistant navigator is a first class petty officer.  
3 MR. WOODY: Could I have his name, please?  
4 LT SLOAN: His name is Petty Officer Anthony  
5 Thomas, ET1 Anthony Thomas.  
6 MR. WOODY: ET?  
7 LT SLOAN: ET, electronics technician.  
8 MR. WOODY: Is his background one of that of  
9 an ET or a quartermaster?  
10 LT SLOAN: Quartermaster. He has a quarter  
11 master background. I see you got that subtlety -- not  
12 so subtle subtlety.  
13 MR. WOODY: Just recently heard about that.  
14 I was just curious about the PH time. With  
15 visitors on board, was there any standard time that you  
16 usually tried to get back in? Was 1400 the normal  
17 actual time for VIP cruises?  
18 LT SLOAN: That was probably a typical time  
19 for VIP-type cruise. The time is specifically put out  
20 in a weekly op sched, put out for the Hawaiian op areas  
21 that will list the times. It will tell you, your time  
22 is this. There is also a harbor movements message that  
23 will list that time, also, but the thing that --  
24 really, the directive that tells us when is the op  
25 sched. That will say you go in at this time.  
26 MR. WOODY: Would some VIP cruises be before  
27 or after this time, or is this typical of most?  
28 LT SLOAN: I think it was a little earlier in  
29 the morning. I think they may be shifted around a  
30 little bit. To be honest, I do not remember for sure,  
31 but it seemed -- it didn't seem all that unusual to me.  
32 Maybe 9:00 in the morning underway instead of 8:00 so  
33 that your VIPs don't have to get up early in the  
34 morning.  
35 MR. WOODY: Okay. You mentioned visibility.  
36 Do you recall the sea state, what it was?  
37 LT SLOAN: I would have called the sea state  
38 between 1 and 2, somewhere in that range.  
39 MR. WOODY: Do you recall which way the wind  
40 -- what the wind velocity was and direction?  
41 LT SLOAN: It was windy. I don't recall the  
42 direction. I did not take a weather report, which I  
43 will do sometimes, you know, usually daily when we are  
44 underway, but that day, I didn't because there is a lot  
45 else going on.  
46 But I would say the winds were probably  
47 around 15 knots. It seemed like a fairly windy day.  
48 That is just kind of a rough feel.  
49 MR. WOODY: Probably 15 knots.  
50 LT SLOAN: Yeah, somewhere in that range. It  
51 was choppy, and I remember that also once we were on  
52 the surface trying to come around for the search and  
53 rescue looking and seeing a whole lot of white caps and  
54 chop. It was pretty bumpy.  
55 MR. WOODY: Do you remember any mention of  
56 the [inaudible]? Did he mention wave slaps or anything

1 like that?

2 LT SLOAN: I did not hear any mention of wave  
3 slaps.

4 MR. WOODY: Was there any prompting to the  
5 diving officer to get me up so I could see or anything  
6 like that?

7 LT SLOAN: I did not hear any prompting like  
8 that.

9 MR. WOODY: Oh, yes. You had mentioned some  
10 instrument that you could watch and look at to see  
11 whether you were getting a fix by GPS or a fix by  
12 inertial navigation. I would just like to get the name  
13 of that.

14 LT SLOAN: That is the WRN-6, W-R-N-6. That  
15 is actually AN/WRN-6, if you want the full -- Army,  
16 Navy. You got to have the AN on there. WRN-6. IT is  
17 a -- it is a standard military GPS receiver. It uses  
18 crypto if there is -- if required to -- you know, if  
19 they encrypt GPS.

20 Also, the submarines are set up to if you are  
21 not receiving a GPS signal which obviously most of the  
22 time we are submerged we won't be, it will display your  
23 master ESGN channel, which is our inertial navigation  
24 system.

25 MR. WOODY: I have heard that term before.  
26 Could I get that --

27 LT SLOAN: ESGN?

28 MR. WOODY: ESGN.

29 LT SLOAN: That stands for electro statically  
30 suspended gyro navigator. It is an inertial system  
31 essentially is what it is. Pretty accurate. Typically  
32 accurate within a mile or less.

33 MR. WOODY: And how many of these do you have  
34 on board?

35 LT SLOAN: Two, two channels.

36 MR. WOODY: Do they agree pretty closely  
37 together?

38 LT SLOAN: They're almost always within about  
39 a half-a-mile of each other. It will vary a little  
40 bit. We had some variance on our EASPAC. You will get  
41 some variance. Sometimes when you transit if you go to  
42 high latitudes, we will kind of skew them a little bit,  
43 not much, talking tenths of a mile here.

44 MR. WOODY: The question I was going to ask  
45 is, how much divergence do you feel like you have to  
46 have a fix to get a reset?

47 LT SLOAN: If I see anything more than a  
48 mile, I get concerned, and I did see that a little bit  
49 on a previous EASPAC in January. I attribute that more  
50 to, one, the latitude and, two, bottom features, large  
51 shelves and jumps in water depth will -- the actual  
52 change in gravity will affect it, and we see that  
53 sometimes, but they are generally staying pretty  
54 accurate, usually within -- both channels within a  
55 half-a-mile of each other and of -- of GPS.

56 MR. WOODY: Right, that is probably good

1 enough.  
2 How long does it take you to get a GPS In  
3 these op areas?  
4 LT SLOAN: Typically, you get it within a  
5 matter of minutes.  
6 MR. WOODY: Three minutes, 2 minutes?  
7 LT SLOAN: Two minutes probably.  
8 Ours seems to be operating a little sluggish.  
9 It is taking -- we were having some trouble. It  
10 seemed to be, once again, at higher latitudes, probably  
11 just due to the fact that the satellites were in polar  
12 orbits, as we were operating in Alaska. It was on the  
13 order of 5, 6 minutes, 7 minutes, much longer, but that  
14 improved as we came back down.  
15 It is still not as quick as I seem to  
16 remember it, but I am not sure if that is a materiel  
17 problem or --  
18 MR. WOODY: In these operations, is it less  
19 than 5 minutes?  
20 LT SLOAN: Usually less than 5 minutes.  
21 Yeah.  
22 I don't think we got a GPS fix when we were  
23 up at periscope depth. I am almost sure we did not.  
24 MR. WOODY: Is it because you weren't there  
25 long enough?  
26 LT SLOAN: We weren't there long enough, no.  
27 MR. WOODY: We have heard that the chief of  
28 staff himself made a report of the accident on Radio B.  
29 LT SLOAN: SATHICOM?  
30 MR. WOODY: SATHICOM, right.  
31 I was just curious why the chief of staff  
32 would feel it necessary for him to get involved in the  
33 communication process.  
34 LT SLOAN: My feel would be he is the chief  
35 of staff of SUBPAC and he was talking to SUBPAC. The  
36 admiral is out of town. That makes him the senior guy  
37 around. That would have -- that was my take -- would  
38 be my take on it. It did not seem unnatural to me at  
39 the time for him to be making reports in talking  
40 directly to SUBPAC. The initial voice report was, like  
41 I said previously, Senior Chief Smith. My senior  
42 radioman made the initial voice report with me  
43 supervising.  
44 MR. WOODY: The senior chief what, please?  
45 LT SLOAN: Smith.  
46 MR. WOODY: Smith.  
47 LT SLOAN: Yeah.  
48 MR. WOODY: He made the first report?  
49 LT SLOAN: He made the initial voice report  
50 to SUBPAC.  
51 MR. WOODY: That was when you were back in  
52 the position to give --  
53 LT SLOAN: Yeah. I provided him the  
54 position. He made the report. I stood there and  
55 watched him make the sure to make sure everything went  
56 okay.

1 MR. WOODY: What was the content of that  
2 report?

3 LT SLOAN: I don't remember the exact  
4 wording, but it was essentially, "This is Greeneville,  
5 suffered a collision, collided with" -- I think we  
6 reported Uwa Jima which is what initially had been told  
7 to us was the name of the ship, talking about lift  
8 rafts in the water, personnel in the water, ship is  
9 sinking, and our position. That's pretty much all that  
10 was to it.

11 MR. WOODY: Do you have any knowledge of the  
12 content of the report made by the chief of staff,  
13 whether he said about the same thing or --

14 LT SLOAN: I think he made his initial report  
15 after I left. So I didn't catch that. I was there for  
16 several of his follow-on reports, and I think it was  
17 basically passing on information we had passed.

18 MR. WOODY: Okay. Are you also the  
19 operations officer on the Greeneville?

20 LT SLOAN: Yes, I am. Operations officer,  
21 navigator and communicator, security manager, and a  
22 half-a-dozen other things.

23 MR. WOODY: I think that's all the questions  
24 I have at this time. Thank you.

25 LT JOHNSON: How are you doing? Lieutenant  
26 Johnson with the U.S. Coast Guard. I just have a few.

27 LT SLOAN: Okay.

28 LT JOHNSON: What is your normal position  
29 when you go to battle stations or general quarters, as  
30 we call it?

31 LT SLOAN: For battle stations, I am the  
32 officer of the deck.

33 LT JOHNSON: That position is located where?

34 LT SLOAN: I would be on the CON. I would  
35 have the deck and the CON, unless the captain as the  
36 approach officer would want the CON. Then he would  
37 take it.

38 LT JOHNSON: How many people are normally in  
39 the control room during a battle station scenario?

40 LT SLOAN: I would start by saying a lot. We  
41 will have all the normal watch standards. The ship's  
42 control party will be the same number as normal, helms  
43 and plains, chief of the watch, diving officer of the  
44 watch. Then you will have an officer of the deck. If  
45 we got everything decked out, the captain will be there  
46 as the approach officer also on the CON. There will be  
47 a junior officer of the deck on the CON. So three  
48 people on the CON. Kind of working my way around  
49 control. We usually station -- I believe we station a  
50 fathometer operator, a navigation supervisor. There  
51 will be a geo plotter. One of the plotters, we'll give  
52 over to a geo plot. There will be a geo plotter, a  
53 plot evaluator. There is also a plot coordinator  
54 keeping track of that. Time frequency plotter, also in  
55 the aft end of control, person on the TAC-3, all four  
56 fire control stacks will be manned, person on the

1 weapons launch consul, CEP Plotter, the weapons officer  
2 will be standing behind the weapons launch operator.  
3 The executive officer will be the fire control  
4 coordinator, also on the fire control side. That side  
5 with fire control, it gets very crowded, a lot of  
6 people there.

7 LT JOHNSON: Yeah.

8 LT SLOAN: I don't think I am missing  
9 anybody. And then there will be additional watch  
10 standards in sonar, but those are only tech control.

11 LT JOHNSON: That is what, about 22, 23  
12 people in there, would you say?

13 LT SLOAN: Yeah.

14 LT JOHNSON: I mean, I'm sitting there trying  
15 to count them as you talk about them.

16 LT SLOAN: Quite a few. I could probably --  
17 I would probably add them up. One, two, three, four,  
18 five -- yeah, 22, 23.

19 LT JOHNSON: 22, 23.

20 LT SLOAN: Somewhere in the range.

21 LT JOHNSON: And how many people are normally  
22 in the control during a normal underway-steaming watch  
23 bill?

24 LT SLOAN: During a normal underway steaming  
25 like a midwatch when you got bare minimum, you will  
26 have the ship's control party which will consist of the  
27 normal guys. There is five for that. Oh, a messenger,  
28 too. Throw that one in. A battle station, normal  
29 steaming. That is six. Officer of the deck, seven.  
30 Fire control man, eight, and a quartermaster is nine.

31 LT JOHNSON: Nine.

32 LT SLOAN: Nine would be a normal underway  
33 watch.

34 LT JOHNSON: So you had 16 guests, I believe,  
35 on board that day?

36 LT SLOAN: Correct.

37 LT JOHNSON: So it ended up with all of them  
38 on the control room?

39 LT SLOAN: I don't know if all of them were  
40 there, but I would say definitely the majority, just  
41 about all of them, if not all of them. I am not sure.

42 LT JOHNSON: More people than normal battle  
43 stations, though. If you just put the guest with the  
44 normal control party -- I know you got the captain, the  
45 XO, and the chief of staff and all that in there. So  
46 --

47 LT SLOAN: Right. I would say -- yeah, it  
48 was more crowded than normal battle stations.

49 LT JOHNSON: Do normal battle stations -- are  
50 the people trained that are in there? What is the  
51 noise level like in a control during a battle station?

52 LT SLOAN: Very quiet.

53 LT JOHNSON: Why is that?

54 LT SLOAN: Well, one, obviously you need to  
55 keep it quiet so the captain can focus on tactical  
56 employment, and he will make sure that it stays quiet.

1 LT JOHNSON: Sure. During normal battle  
2 stations -- and I want to keep referring to that  
3 because that is the most crowded time in a control room  
4 on a submarine, I would assume?  
5 LT SLOAN: Right, under normal -- yeah.  
6 LT JOHNSON: Can you get from the forward end  
7 of the Control Room to the aft end of the Control Room?  
8 LT SLOAN: Yes. It is tight in the aft end  
9 of control where you have got the geo plot and all the  
10 navigation people back there. It gets kind of crowded,  
11 but the forward part is fine.  
12 LT JOHNSON: Okay. Would you say, then, that  
13 in this particular case with all of the civilians in  
14 the Control Room that it was abnormally overcrowded?  
15 LT SLOAN: Yes. I would say for normal --  
16 any steaming normal operation, yes, it would be much  
17 more crowded than normal.  
18 LT JOHNSON: Than even battle stations?  
19 LT SLOAN: Than even battle stations.  
20 LT JOHNSON: More confusing than the ship  
21 when it is at battle stations?  
22 LT SLOAN: Yeah. Battle stations, everyone  
23 is in there. I mean, you have a large number of  
24 people, but they are all focused on specific jobs.  
25 LT JOHNSON: Right.  
26 LT SLOAN: Whereas, with VIPs, you just have  
27 a lot of people milling around.  
28 LT JOHNSON: I noticed -- that I wrote down  
29 what you said that it was so congested that you  
30 couldn't even get through the Control Room. You had to  
31 go down another level --  
32 LT SLOAN: Yeah.  
33 LT JOHNSON: -- go aft to come up another  
34 ladder.  
35 LT SLOAN: That is correct.  
36 LT JOHNSON: In the aft part of the Control  
37 Room.  
38 LT SLOAN: I could have forced my way  
39 through. It wasn't so crowded where it was like, you  
40 know, shoulder to shoulder, impenetrable or anything  
41 like that, but it was just -- it just was easier to go  
42 around than to force my way through.  
43 LT JOHNSON: What were these civilians doing  
44 when they were in the Control Room for the most part?  
45 LT SLOAN: Most of the time, they would talk  
46 to the watch standers, asking questions. They would  
47 stand around small groups talking amongst themselves.  
48 LT JOHNSON: A lot of background chatter  
49 going on?  
50 LT SLOAN: Yeah. I wouldn't say that -- they  
51 weren't loud by any means, but just the sheer number of  
52 it increased the background noise.  
53 LT JOHNSON: Sure. How did that make you  
54 feel being a qualified OD with obviously a lot of  
55 experience? You have got a crowded control room, all  
56 of these conversations going on. Did the -- let me use

1 the term. Did the hair on the back of your neck stand  
2 up just a little bit about --

3 LT SLOAN: I have done enough of these to  
4 where I have gotten used to it. Maybe that is not a  
5 good thing, but it doesn't -- I don't like it when I am  
6 the officer of the deck. I like it quiet in the  
7 control room when I am the officer of the deck. That  
8 is one of my pet peeves. I like it quiet so that when  
9 something happens, I can hear it.

10 Like the helmsmen, some of them -- they don't  
11 talk up as loud as I like or whatever.

12 LT JOHNSON: Right.

13 LT SLOAN: So I like to be able to hear what  
14 is going on.

15 LT JOHNSON: Have you ever had a situation  
16 where you have done one of these cruises where one of  
17 your watch standers has been so engaged with a VIP that  
18 they were -- I don't want to use the term "neglecting  
19 their job," but they were not totally focused on the  
20 watch standing responsibilities that they had?

21 LT SLOAN: I would not say I've never had --  
22 I would not say that, no, but I would point out there  
23 were times when you would have a guest on the helm  
24 where the helm is not exactly -- he is several degrees  
25 off. In normal course of a watch, I would jump all  
26 over the helm to correct himself..

27 LT JOHNSON: Sure.

28 LT SLOAN: But being a VIP and not -- I am  
29 not worried about getting once place to another. I  
30 just let that go.

31 LT JOHNSON: You have never experienced a  
32 case where your quarter master of the watch or your FT  
33 of the watch has been over here talking and explaining  
34 their equipment, what they do, so that they forgot to  
35 do what they normally have to do to support the OOD?

36 LT SLOAN: I see where you are pointing at,  
37 but I would say that personally I have not seen that.  
38 They definitely -- they definitely have watch standers  
39 who are very open to talk to guests, and they would  
40 spend a lot of time talking. I have never seen a case  
41 where I was concerned that a watch stander was not  
42 doing their job, and I would say, "Hey, stop talking.  
43 Do your job." I have never had that happen.

44 LT JOHNSON: About how many of these VIP  
45 cruises have you done in your career?

46 LT SLOAN: I have done none on my previous  
47 ship, which was mostly in the shipyard, so no  
48 opportunity there. We have two dependence cruises  
49 since I have been there, and those were very much the  
50 same thing, large number -- actually, the dependence  
51 cruises, you have to have more people. So they are  
52 spread out a little bit better. So two of those. Done  
53 midshipman operations a few times which can be kind of  
54 the same thing, not quite as many number-wise. They  
55 are much more interested. So they are doing a lot more  
56 talking.

1 LT JOHNSON: Right.  
2 LT SLOAN: So we did 2 weeks of that last  
3 year, and then the year before we did one or two  
4 underways like that.  
5 LT JOHNSON: Do you --  
6 LT SLOAN: And a bunch of VIP cruises.  
7 LT JOHNSON: Do you feel like in your  
8 experience doing these that when you take a ship out  
9 for a 6-hour -- let's just say a 7-hour underway with  
10 some civilian guests on board, and it is all for show.  
11 LT SLOAN: It is.  
12 LT JOHNSON: We are going out there. We are  
13 going to put on a show for these civilians. We do this  
14 all the time. We have never had a problem before. Do  
15 you feel like some watch standers kind of get a little  
16 lax in their duties, kind of sit back and take a more  
17 relaxed attitude than if you are out there doing the  
18 day-to-day business of the Navy?  
19 I guess what I am asking you, do you think  
20 the watch standers approach their duties and  
21 responsibilities with a little bit of a different  
22 mind-set than they do if they are out there doing  
23 normal operations?  
24 LT SLOAN: Possibly. They are definitely a  
25 lot more -- there is a lot more talking going on. So  
26 they are obviously not spending 100 percent of the time  
27 looking at their screens or whatever, and they are  
28 talking to everyone.  
29 LT JOHNSON: Do you think they get  
30 complacent?  
31 LT SLOAN: Some of the junior ones, possibly,  
32 like the helm, the more junior guys, but the little bit  
33 more senior, some of the fire control guys, things like  
34 that, sonar, I would say probably not.  
35 And then the people who really matter, like  
36 the officer of the deck and the captain when he is out  
37 there kind of directing things, I would say that they  
38 stay just as focused as they normally would. It is  
39 kind of a training thing, and in the back of the mind  
40 knowing, hey, I am responsible for what is going on.  
41 At least that is what I feel when I have done these,  
42 and I have been the officer of the deck for quite a few  
43 of them, and it's -- sometimes I get a little -- I get  
44 just a twinge frustrated that I want -- hey, I wish  
45 these people would go away for a minute. Let me drive  
46 for a minute, and then they can come back.  
47 LT JOHNSON: Right.  
48 LT SLOAN: But it has never been -- there has  
49 never been a case where I was really concerned. I have  
50 always been able to do my job like I am supposed to,  
51 going to PD or whatever, and do all the correct  
52 preparations. It is a little harder. I will be  
53 honest. It is a little harder with a lot of people in  
54 there, but I have never not been able to do it.  
55 LT JOHNSON: Did you do anything in this  
56 particular cruise or the evolution that went on in the

1 Control Room -- did you ever feel at any time that we  
2 were cutting any corners trying to get -- okay. Let's  
3 give the civvies the ride of their life and let's get  
4 the hell back home. Did you ever get this feeling  
5 like, come on, let's just get this going, we've got  
6 things to do tonight?

7 LT SLOAN: No. I don't -- I feel like there  
8 may have been -- the captain seemed like he wanted to  
9 get going.

10 LT JOHNSON: Yeah.

11 LT SLOAN: And that is as much for me telling  
12 him, hey, we want to get going, but as far as the other  
13 watch standers go, I didn't notice any urgency. I  
14 mean, granted, it was Friday, you know, but we were  
15 coming back at a fairly early time on a Friday. It  
16 wasn't like, hey, we were going to get in at 6:00 at  
17 night, we're going to be on the boat until 8:00. It  
18 wasn't anything like that.

19 LT JOHNSON: Have you ever had the  
20 opportunity to stand normal watches underway with Petty  
21 Officer Seacrest?

22 LT SLOAN: Not a lot, but, yes, I have had a  
23 few.

24 LT JOHNSON: How would you characterize his  
25 normal watch-standing performance?

26 LT SLOAN: I would say he is a good fire  
27 control man on the watch. He pays attention to what is  
28 going on.

29 LT JOHNSON: Is he proactive in his approach  
30 to his job or duties, or is he more reactive to your  
31 commands and desires?

32 LT SLOAN: Having -- now that I think about  
33 it, I do not think I have stood -- there is a lot of  
34 the other FTs that I have stood much more watch with,  
35 but from what I have seen of him, he seems like he is  
36 fairly proactive. I wouldn't say he is more -- there  
37 are some junior guys that are probably more proactive  
38 than he is, but there is also some that are less, so  
39 middle of the road.

40 LT JOHNSON: How about Petty Officer  
41 McGiboney as the sonar supervisor? I bring these two  
42 gentlemen up because they were on watch at the time.

43 LT SLOAN: They were on watch.

44 McGiboney, I have had a lot more experience  
45 with. I am trying to think back. I have never had a  
46 problem with.

47 LT JOHNSON: Was he pretty proactive in his  
48 duties?

49 LT SLOAN: Pretty proactive. Once again, I  
50 would put him in the middle of the road, middle of the  
51 pack, not one of the -- others better, and I have stood  
52 watch with one or two that are not as good, but I would  
53 put him in the middle of the pack, nothing special, not  
54 a great watch --

55 LT JOHNSON: Do you feel safe and comfortable  
56 with him?

1                   LT SLOAN: I would feel comfortable with him,  
2     yes.  
3                   LT JOHNSON: Both of them?  
4                   LT SLOAN: Yes. But like I said, Seacrest, I  
5     have less experience with than most of the other FTs.  
6                   LT JOHNSON: Do you in your opinion --  
7     because you seem to have been at control throughout  
8     most of this in the back observing -- did you see any  
9     effect that maybe the chief of staff being on board or  
10    being in the Control Room might have had on the crew or  
11    the captain in their urgency being overtly or even  
12    covertly --  
13                  LT SLOAN: There may have been something with  
14    the captain, but I didn't see it. Yeah, the chief of  
15    staff was there, but he was almost invisible to me.  
16                  LT JOHNSON: Sure.  
17                  LT SLOAN: Except for the time he wanted to  
18    talk to me a little bit, but nothing related to any of  
19    this.  
20                  LT JOHNSON: Do you want to go into --  
21                  LT SLOAN: He was almost like he was very --  
22    he was very much trying to fade into the background and  
23    just kind of observe.  
24                  LT JOHNSON: Would you be comfortable going  
25    into the nature of the talk that he had with you?  
26                  LT SLOAN: I could. I don't think it is  
27    relevant.  
28                  LT JOHNSON: It is not relevant?  
29                  LT SLOAN: No. It was more like, hey, how is  
30    your career going kind of stuff, you know, more of a  
31    personal thing. I think he was just trying to talk to  
32    people and get to know the crew, get to know some of  
33    the officers a little bit.  
34                  LT JOHNSON: Right. I had the opportunity to  
35    meet and speak with Lieutenant Coen alone myself, and I  
36    got some of the same impressions that you indicated  
37    earlier, a little bit of tentativeness and slower maybe  
38    in some things.  
39                  LT SLOAN: Yeah. He is methodical to a fault  
40    is how I describe him.  
41                  LT JOHNSON: Do you think that he would be  
42    the type where he could feel like he could speak up to  
43    the captain if he saw something that made him  
44    uncomfortable, or do you think he would succumb to the  
45    captain's experience and just go along with it because  
46    it was the captain, if you had to characterize it?  
47                  LT SLOAN: I have seen him stand up not so  
48    much to the captain. I have seen him stand up to the  
49    XO before and beat his head into a wall when he knows  
50    he is not going to win --  
51                  LT JOHNSON: Right.  
52                  LT SLOAN: -- which I would assume would  
53    translate over to the captain as well. Maybe, maybe  
54    not, but --  
55                  LT JOHNSON: Does the crew feel in your  
56    opinion that they could say something to the captain if

1 they felt like they were getting into hairy situation  
2 without any retribution or --

3 LT SLOAN: I would say yes in general. The  
4 captain preached backup is one of his big -- he called  
5 it one of his tenets, safety, efficiency, and backup.

6 LT JOHNSON: Right.

7 LT SLOAN: And he preached backup, and he  
8 generally lived it.

9 I have seen a number of occasions where he  
10 would do something, he would make a questionable  
11 decision, and someone would say, hey, this is not a  
12 good idea. Usually, the executive officer would be the  
13 one who would say that, and he would listen. He says,  
14 "You're right. That is not a good idea. Let's do  
15 something different."

16 LT JOHNSON: Did this happen often or just  
17 rarely that he would make a decision that the XO  
18 questioned?

19 LT SLOAN: In a lot of things, not -- I am  
20 not talking here like big safety ship-type things, but  
21 small things, yeah. I would say the XO is always  
22 saying, hey -- the captain liked to either make a snap  
23 decision, and the XO would say, "Hey, maybe you should  
24 think about that," kind of steer him a different way.  
25 And he was really usually pretty good about that.

26 There were times when I would go up to him  
27 and say, "I don't think this is right. We should do  
28 this," about something, a personnel issue or whatever,  
29 and sometimes he would say, "Too bad. Do it anyways,"  
30 or sometimes he would say, "Okay, you are right. Let's  
31 do it your way." It just depended on the situation.

32 LT JOHNSON: Right.

33 LT SLOAN: We had a very good working  
34 relationship when it came to that because I knew if it  
35 was really important, I felt he would listen to me. I  
36 really felt that.

37 LT JOHNSON: I don't have any further  
38 questions, Commander.

39 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Lieutenant Commander  
40 Santomauro.

41 I have just got a couple of questions for  
42 you. I guess one of the things I was concerned with,  
43 just taking a look at the chart, we were about 9 miles  
44 from land, and I know that you had a conversation with  
45 the captain. When you were getting the charts  
46 approved, I mean, you said you were talking about  
47 high-speed maneuvers.

48 LT SLOAN: Right.

49 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Did you actually discuss  
50 any specifics as to what you would be doing where?

51 LT SLOAN: No specifics. I knew it was going  
52 to be standard angles and dangles and some high-speed  
53 turns. I mean, we have done it so many times. It was  
54 like the routine for a VIP cruise or a dependence  
55 cruise, something like that.

56 As far as what specific maneuvers he was

1 going to make, I mean, he would use this rudder turn  
2 and this many degrees. I think he just made that up as  
3 he went. I don't think there was any set plan in his  
4 head. It was just okay, I know I am going to do some  
5 full rudder turns at a full bell. I know I am going to  
6 do a 30-degree up and down. I am going to do some  
7 moderate angles, and then I am going to come up to 30  
8 degrees up and down, things like that.

9 He didn't have like a card where he would  
10 write down what he was planning on doing.

11 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So, mostly, just discussing  
12 the actual events as related to the visitors -- he  
13 didn't really talk about --

14 LT SLOAN: Oh, discussion with the chart?  
15 No, no. What I told him is -- I brought him the chart  
16 a couple hours before we got underway, just to get the  
17 chart approved, and looked at it. I just said, "Hey,  
18 Captain, they gave us good water. We got a good area  
19 here where we can operate. We can do high-speed turns  
20 and do an emergency blow." That is when he told me we  
21 were not doing an emergency blow.

22 LCDR SANTOMAURO: How many times have you  
23 done -- have you done an emergency blow at all? How  
24 many times have you done one, and how many times have  
25 you done one in that general area?

26 LT SLOAN: Well, we did one somewhere down in  
27 that area. I can't remember exactly. The sea trials  
28 was just in December. So that wasn't very long ago, a  
29 couple months.

30 Prior to that, we had done some on a previous  
31 EASPAC. I think we did it for a VIP cruise off San  
32 Diego, and we did midship ops that time, too, some  
33 other times, too.

34 LCDR SANTOMAURO: I am trying to get  
35 something in my head. It has been a while since I have  
36 been driving. SO you are going to have to correct me  
37 if I am wrong. I am pretty sure you are near the top  
38 of your box there, right?

39 LT SLOAN: Yeah.

40 LCDR SANTOMAURO: You weren't too far.

41 LT SLOAN: We were about 4 miles south of the  
42 top of the box, something like that.

43 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Four miles south of the  
44 box.

45 LT SLOAN: Four or 5, something like that.

46 LCDR SANTOMAURO: I was trying to get in my  
47 mind how many minutes it was going to take from the  
48 time you were at periscope depth and went down and did  
49 everything that you needed to do and then popped up --

50 LT SLOAN: At this time, I knew we were going  
51 to be running late, if that is what you are looking at.

52 LCDR SANTOMAURO: No, no. That is not what I  
53 am looking at.

54 LCDR SANTOMAURO: In my mind, I am trying to  
55 figure out -- you go up, you do your safety sweep, and  
56 you make sure it is clear. From that point until the

1 time the submarine is at the surface again is about how  
2 many minutes, do you think? I mean, I really don't  
3 know.

4 LT SLOAN: From going down and going up?  
5 Five minutes or less. It doesn't -- when you do the  
6 emergency deep, you put the bell on. You drive down  
7 very quickly. It only takes a minute or two down to  
8 get to 400 feet, to get to 400 feet which is where you  
9 normally do an emergency blow from, and then only  
10 another minute or two to come up. So it is very little  
11 time.

12 I would say in this instance, it was less  
13 than 5 minutes from the time we -- from the time that  
14 the captain called the emergency deep to the time that  
15 he ordered -- until the time we actually broke the  
16 surface, had the collision.

17 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So, basically, when the  
18 ship does the emergency blow, it is like a beach ball,  
19 right? I mean it is going to come up.

20 LT SLOAN: It is going up. There is nothing  
21 you can do about it. It is going.

22 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Okay.

23 LT SLOAN: You just forced 4,500 pounds of  
24 air into the ballast tanks, expelled a lot of water.  
25 Even if you opened the main ballast tank, that is the  
26 amount of time it takes for the air to get out of  
27 there. You would already be on the surface before you  
28 got there.

29 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So what I am thinking is if  
30 I am going to be planning an operation like that and I  
31 know -- how fast do you think you are going? If we are  
32 going to turn and we are going to be heading --  
33 actually, we are heading towards the island, but I am  
34 not sure --

35 LT SLOAN: You mean once we did the emergency  
36 blow? We were already turning to the north, I believe,  
37 was the ordered course or some northerly course. Where  
38 we did the emergency blow, finished the turn, and be  
39 driving right at PH. The emergency blow, we think we  
40 did it at a standard bell.

41 LCDR SANTOMAURO: How man knots is that?

42 LT SLOAN: Fifteen knots would be a normal  
43 standard bell. I don't think we were quite up to speed  
44 when --

45 LCDR SANTOMAURO: You say 15 knots?

46 LT SLOAN: We were about 8 miles, 9 miles  
47 from PH.

48 LCDR SANTOMAURO: How far are you going to go  
49 in 4 minutes?

50 LT SLOAN: In 4 minutes, 15 knots, you will  
51 do about 2,000 yards, about a mile.

52 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Just about a mile?

53 LT SLOAN: Yep, that's it, 3-minute rule.

54 LCDR SANTOMAURO: How far were you away from  
55 land, then, 9?

56 LT SLOAN: Nine or 10. I think we've said 10

1 miles initially. I think everyone says 9 now. I  
2 haven't gone back and measured it.

3 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So, basically, you are not  
4 going to have -- if you are 9 miles from land, that is  
5 18,000 yards or so?

6 LT SLOAN: Yeah. You are concerned about  
7 getting too close to land?

8 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Well, I am just wondering  
9 how far it is to land.

10 LT SLOAN: Yeah. You would only move about  
11 2,000 yards, only about a mile.

12 LCDR SANTOMAURO: You would move 2,000 yards,  
13 and you were 18,000? Is that right?

14 LT SLOAN: Oh, yeah. There was absolutely no  
15 concern about closing land too quickly before we did an  
16 emergency blow.

17 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So you figured you know you  
18 are not going to have any ships at 18,000, but if you  
19 did have some ships, say, at 16 or 14 and you know you  
20 got some fishing buoys out here and you were thinking  
21 in your head, you know, worst-case scenario, a boat  
22 that might be coming out towards you would be doing an  
23 average -- just 10 knots or --

24 LT SLOAN: Say he's doing 10 knots -- if the  
25 guy was -- the idea is you come up and you do a visual  
26 search.

27 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Right.

28 LT SLOAN: If you don't see anybody, the  
29 closest -- the horizon at, say, even 60 feet before we  
30 came up, the horizon is 4- or 5,000 yards away, and  
31 that's -- so, worst case, if you are driving right at  
32 the guy and the guy is driving right at you in 5  
33 minutes, you are not going to hit each other.

34 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So what would be the range  
35 circle that you would put in your mind as safety area  
36 to pop up into --

37 LT SLOAN: You mean if I had contacts and I  
38 thought those people near me? That is the captain's  
39 call, but I don't know what he would use. I would -- I  
40 would not pop up if there is anybody probably within 8-  
41 or 10,000 yards. I am throwing out that number. I  
42 don't know what the captain would think of that.

43 The other thing, too, is if I saw a guy that  
44 was 8,000 yards going away from me and I am going this  
45 way, I am not worried about it. So it is situational.

46 LCDR SANTOMAURO: DO you see a lot of  
47 sailboats out there? I mean, I don't know.

48 LT SLOAN: About that far? Not very many.

49 LCDR SANTOMAURO: No?

50 LT SLOAN: Once in a great while, we'll see  
51 one, but it is almost all fishing boats out that far.  
52 Most of the sailboats stick in close to land. It is a  
53 little too rough that far out most of the time  
54 especially because as soon as you move down south, you  
55 are kind of in line with the Molokai channel, and you  
56 get rough seas that move that way. The channel itself

1 is really bad, but it allows the wave action to go  
2 through and the wind and everything else.

3 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So, basically, I mean, you  
4 can't -- you have to be on the surface if you are going  
5 north at that box to the right?

6 LT SLOAN: That is correct. I could not  
7 leave that box without being on the surface.

8 LCDR SANTOMAURO: And that was 4 miles away.  
9 So you were well within that even when you popped up,  
10 so --

11 LT SLOAN: Right. You have what we call  
12 fixed expansion. It is a circle you draw on the chart  
13 which says I am somewhere within this circle. You base  
14 it around your -- we submerge around your ESGN  
15 position. If I know the accuracy of my ESGN, it is  
16 within a mile of GPS consistently. I know my ESGN  
17 position is within a mile of where I really am. So you  
18 draw a one-mile radius circle around where you are, and  
19 when we actually -- instead of dreading a point when we  
20 are submerged, we will draw a circle and we will move  
21 that circle around and keep that circle in side of the  
22 box. So it is an extra measure of conservatism.

23 The other thing, too, is on all op areas, we  
24 are required to stay within -- there is a one-mile  
25 buffer established there that we don't enter within a  
26 mile of that. So I have my one-mile fixed expansion,  
27 and then my one-mile buffer. So, really, my position  
28 can't be within 2 miles of the line. So you got all of  
29 these extra layers of conservatism built in this  
30 system.

31 LCDR SANTOMAURO: That clears that one in my  
32 mind.

33 Now, another thing that is really a mystery  
34 to me -- and maybe you can maybe answer this -- I heard  
35 you talk about the ESM suite and --

36 LT SLOAN: Right.

37 LCDR SANTOMAURO: I mean, you actually heard  
38 them do the test on ESM. So you actually -- you're  
39 99-percent sure it was in right mode and all that.

40 LT SLOAN: Yeah. One of the things when you  
41 lower the scope is you make sure everything is set up  
42 to go to PD again. So, if the scope goes up, it is  
43 ready to go.

44 I was the last officer of the deck, and I  
45 know that I set everything up correctly. You turn the  
46 gyro off. You turn -- make sure that the ESM suite --  
47 make sure you are in omni directional modes, all bands.

48 LCDR SANTOMAURO: We know when the ship came  
49 up the thing was well out of the water, the top scope  
50 for this thing to receive signals? It is up there,  
51 right?

52 LT SLOAN: When you do the emergency blow,  
53 the scope is still lowered because you got too much  
54 speed on it to put the scope --

55 LCDR SANTOMAURO: I am talking during the  
56 search.

1                   LT SLOAN: Oh, during the PD search? Oh,  
2 yeah, it is on top. If the optics are out of the water  
3 --  
4                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: Tell me in your opinion why  
5 if a ship was, say, a mile away, operating in high  
6 power, you wouldn't get any kind of early warning. I  
7 would think you would get a steady, steady 5, right?  
8                   LT SLOAN: If his radar is on -- if his radar  
9 was on, you should have heard something. It may or may  
10 not have been a signal strength of 5, but you should  
11 have heard something.  
12                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: Would you think it would  
13 have been a 4 or a 5? I mean --  
14                   LT SLOAN: Probably, if it was 2,000 yards,  
15 yeah, it would be 4 or 5.  
16                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: So you would think a 4 or  
17 5, so --  
18                   LT SLOAN: I would expect that, yeah.  
19                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: So, if you didn't get that,  
20 are you saying that you think -- what do you think  
21 would cause it not to be picked up by the ESM. We know  
22 it was working.  
23                   LT SLOAN: Either -- either -- yeah, I know  
24 it's working. So either, one, the guy didn't have a  
25 radar on, which he probably did. I mean no reason not  
26 to operate a radar when you are transiting or maybe it  
27 was in a low-power mode or something. I don't know. I  
28 don't know a lot -- I am not an expert on commercial  
29 radars by any means. Those are -- I could what if, but  
30 I really don't know the answer to that. I'm not sure.  
31 That's a good question, though, but I don't know.  
32                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: I mean, that's one of the  
33 three sensors we are looking at, sonar, visual, and --  
34                   LT SLOAN: Right, I understand.  
35                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: This was a total mystery to  
36 me.  
37                   LT SLOAN: Yeah.  
38                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: It's really going against  
39 physics actually to not be able to pick it up at all.  
40                   LT SLOAN: The only other thing is that the  
41 radar -- if the other radar was shadowed somehow, it --  
42 depending on physically where it is located on the  
43 other ship, if there is something a mass in the way  
44 that it just happened to be in line, you could get some  
45 shadowing.  
46                   We see that with our radar when we operate  
47 our ship's radar looking astern when you got the  
48 periscope up. You get -- you get weird shadow zones,  
49 the accuracy goes down. It just does strange things.  
50 So --  
51                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: So, basically, these are  
52 [inaudible] --  
53                   LT SLOAN: I don't -- no, I really don't.  
54                   LCDR SANTOMAURO: -- except maybe it really  
55 wasn't transmitting or something like that.  
56                   LT SLOAN: Possibly, yeah. I don't know. I

1 haven't gone around and tried to do my personal  
2 reconstruction. I kind of avoided doing that, but --  
3 LCDR SANTOMAURO: You said there was a  
4 fisherman's buoy or some kind of fishing area.  
5 LT SLOAN: FAD buoy.  
6 LCDR SANTOMAURO: FAD buoy?  
7 LT SLOAN: Yeah.  
8 LCDR SANTOMAURO: How far away was that from  
9 where you were at?  
10 LT SLOAN: At least 10 miles. I could point  
11 -- I'll point it on a chart if you want.  
12 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Yeah. Can I see it?  
13 LT SLOAN: It's right here.  
14 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So southeast of you?  
15 LT SLOAN: Due south almost.  
16 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So south of you.  
17 LT SLOAN: Yeah.  
18 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So, if any fishermen were  
19 going to -- why is that there, actually? Is that there  
20 because that is a good place to fish?  
21 LT SLOAN: They're -- I don't know where they  
22 get the idea of where to put the FAD buoys. Basically,  
23 what they are is they are just big buoys. They have a  
24 light on them, and they have a chain down at the  
25 bottom. That's it. They don't do anything. They  
26 don't put anything in the water. They don't make any  
27 specific sounds. They don't put a scent in the water.  
28 They are just there.  
29 Little fish come up next to them. They like  
30 the shade, you know. It gives them an idea it is a  
31 sheltered spot. Bigger fish come along to eat those  
32 fish, and they all just get a little echo system that  
33 forms around them.  
34 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So that would probably be a  
35 good place to fish, then, right?  
36 LT SLOAN: It would be a very good place to  
37 fish which is why one of the reasons we stay away from  
38 them, one, because we don't want to run into them.  
39 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Right.  
40 LT SLOAN: And two, because there tend to be  
41 more contacts around them.  
42 LCDR SANTOMAURO: If there was a fisherman  
43 going to that buoy, wouldn't they be probably going  
44 right through the area that you were at?  
45 LT SLOAN: Possibly, but if you look on the  
46 chart there, there is probably 30 buoys -- 30, 40 --  
47 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Is that right?  
48 LT SLOAN: Ninety percent of the time if you  
49 see one -- more than that even, there is no one around  
50 us.  
51 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So there's a whole bunch of  
52 buoys.  
53 LT SLOAN: They're all around all the  
54 islands. All the islands have them, and they're just  
55 -- you don't -- I mean, they are used for fishing, but,  
56 I mean, on a typical day, we will drive up if we are

1 like on the surface heading towards [inaudible] for  
2 instance, there is a couple on the west coast of Oahu.

3 There is like three or four. You drive by and you  
4 won't see anybody near any of them. They are just  
5 there, but sometimes they get used, sometimes they  
6 don't. Mostly sports fishermen. They will use the  
7 ones closer to land, it seems like, to me.

8 I know I've done that. I have gone sport  
9 fishing before, and that is where they went. They went  
10 to the FAD buoy and drove around it for a while.

11 LCDR SANTOMAURO: I just got a question.  
12 Earlier, you said that -- when we were talking about --  
13 I think Lieutenant Johnson was talking about watch  
14 standers being complacent, and you said that you didn't  
15 think that that would occur with more senior guys, and  
16 the FT1 Seacrest, he is a pretty senior guy, isn't he?

17 LT SLOAN: Yes, he is. He is the senior fire  
18 control, below the chief, obviously, but --

19 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So you wouldn't expect him  
20 to be complacent?

21 LT SLOAN: No. I would not expect him to be  
22 complacent. I have no reason -- I would have no reason  
23 to expect that he would be.

24 LCDR SANTOMAURO: If there were some guys in  
25 the way of him doing his job, what would you expect him  
26 to do?

27 LT SLOAN: Politely ask them to move.

28 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Right. Any idea why in  
29 this case he didn't do that?

30 LT SLOAN: I don't know. I didn't actually  
31 see that. So I can't answer the question. I don't  
32 know. I have no answer to that.

33 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Okay. Tell me about the  
34 CEP plot. Are there any times that the CEP plot would  
35 be manned continuously by a dedicated watch stander,  
36 not the FT of the watch doing it under a collateral  
37 duty? Any other condition? Can you explain to us?

38 LT SLOAN: There are two conditions that I  
39 can think of off the top of my head that you would do  
40 that. One is section-tracking party, and that is, you  
41 know -- for whatever reason, you decide a station  
42 tracking party, you are tracking your contact over a  
43 long period of time or you are in a high-contact  
44 density environment. You might station the section  
45 tracking party. Another time would be battle stations.

46 You see it manned during battle stations. Those two  
47 are the only two I can think of off the top of my head.

48 LCDR SANTOMAURO: In this particular case  
49 with all the people that were in the Control Room, is  
50 there any reason why -- is the CEP plot manned all the  
51 time now on your ship? Is it a requirement?

52 LT SLOAN: No, no. It's not. It is  
53 maintained 24 hours. I wouldn't say it is manned.  
54 Manned implies to me that you have a CEP watch, that is  
55 his sole function.

56 LCDR SANTOMAURO: So it is maintained 24

1 hours a day?

2 LT SLOAN: It is maintained 24-7 when we are  
3 underway. There is different -- the level of  
4 maintenance on it can vary a little bit as in what time  
5 scale to use. That really kind of determines it. If  
6 you are in open ocean transit, you might do 10 minutes  
7 for every inch. In a higher density, you might do 5  
8 minutes or 2 minutes for an inch.

9 LCDR SANTOMAURO: As probably the senior OD  
10 on board besides the captain and maybe the XO, how  
11 would you rate the various displays that are available  
12 to use as far as usefulness, the ASVDU, the CEP plot,  
13 and the firecontrolman's screen?

14 LT SLOAN: I would rate the ASVDU number one,  
15 and the reason for that is in a tactical sense, I can  
16 drive the ship off the ASVDU just by looking with no  
17 one talking to me. I can drive up the ASVDU if there  
18 is a bad guy out there, and I can just look at it and  
19 know what he is doing, and I can use that. I can  
20 analyze it and process that faster than the computer  
21 can, and then the guy who figures it, tweaks a knob,  
22 comes up with a solution, and then tries to tell me, I  
23 have already figured out what is going on, and gone on,  
24 and they are time-weighting and I am right on it. That  
25 is an acquired skill you try to teach the ODs. So that  
26 would be my number one.

27 Number two would be fire control, time  
28 bearing mode. Either time bearing mode or the flip  
29 mode, the normal tracking mode, one of those two.

30 If we're going to PD, I like the time bearing  
31 mode because it shows you essentially what the CEP does  
32 except it is right there. I mean, it is just easier,  
33 and you can measure the bearing rate a little easier.  
34 On CEP, you kind of try to figure it out and work it  
35 out, but on there, you just dial a knob and move a bar  
36 and tell me exactly what the bearing rate is.

37 LCDR SANTOMAURO: It sounds to me like you  
38 are kind of telling me the CEP-plus is not a whole lot  
39 of use to you.

40 LT SLOAN: It's there. It is a backup, but  
41 if the time bearing is correct, what I'll mostly get  
42 off CEP is I can -- it will back up the bearing rates,  
43 and it will have additional information on there that  
44 won't be in fire control, like blade rate for a ship.  
45 The CEP or whoever is maintaining it will put the blade  
46 rate like this guy is making 142 turns, two 4-bladed  
47 screws, or this guy is on a 5-bladed screw. That kind  
48 of information is useful. A 5-bladed screw kind of  
49 implies it could be a war ship, things like that. Any  
50 other miscellaneous information that is out there gets  
51 thrown up on the CEP. So the CEP is kind of your  
52 catch-all for miscellaneous things that are out there,  
53 that are potentially very useful.

54 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Just really, I would think,  
55 kind of important to record all of this data for  
56 control reports and things of that nature?

1           LT SLOAN: Right. CEP is good for  
2 historical. Nothing is saved on fire control, and you  
3 can print the screen, but there is no database that  
4 maintains everything. CEP is on a roll of paper. It  
5 is always there. It is always -- in a scenario where  
6 we are tracking a bad guy, CEP would aid you in your  
7 reconstruction, whereas fire control, yeah, you could  
8 print screens out periodically, but it is not quite the  
9 same thing. You don't have that historical database, I  
10 guess.

11           LCDR SANTOMAURO: So what you are saying is  
12 really when it comes right down to it, the CEP plot as  
13 far as a safety ship display doesn't do a heck of a lot  
14 for you compared with some of the other things?

15           LT SLOAN: To be honest, I don't not use it  
16 nearly as much as I use the fire control or the ASVDU.  
17 CEP is definitely third string when it comes to safety  
18 of ship for me.

19           LCDR SANTOMAURO: Is that -- you would --  
20 could you generally say that for all OODs?

21           LT SLOAN: I would say it is probably the  
22 case. I would hate to speak for everyone else, but I  
23 use the -- I think most OODs do. I think they use the  
24 fire control much more heavily than the CEP plot  
25 because all the raw data should be in fire control,  
26 anyways, and it is easier to measure it. You can  
27 manipulate it in fire control.

28           Like, for example, doing an Ekland range  
29 which is based on the changes in the bearing rates when  
30 you make your own maneuvers, I can do it off the CEP.  
31 I can do it in my head off the CEP, but it is quicker  
32 to actually go to the fire control system, turn a few  
33 knobs. It tells me what the range is. It is that much  
34 quicker.

35           LCDR SANTOMAURO: Let me rephrase my  
36 question. The CEP is maintained at all times when you  
37 are underway?

38           LT SLOAN: It is always maintained, correct.

39           LCDR SANTOMAURO: It is just not always  
40 manned by a dedicated watch.

41           LT SLOAN: In section tracking party it is  
42 manned, and in battle stations it is manned. A lot of  
43 times underway, we will have two FTs on watch. We will  
44 call one the OTH database operator. It is kind of he  
45 is secondary to the fire control. The fire control  
46 still has primary function. The database operator, he  
47 can help him by maintaining CEP. He is not stationed  
48 as CEP, but that will be one of his main functions, and  
49 then he'll see some other stuff to help out the fire  
50 control man.

51           LCDR SANTOMAURO: I have a couple more  
52 questions.

53           During the 9th of February, were any still  
54 photos taken by ship's force at all during that  
55 underway before or after the collision?

56           LT SLOAN: Photos of anything in particular?

1 Just in general?

2 LCDR SANTOMAURO: In general, was there a  
3 ship's military photographer?

4 LT SLOAN: Usually, for a VIP cruise, we will  
5 have a photographer running around with a digital  
6 camera. To be honest, I don't recall if there was or  
7 not. I don't remember seeing one.

8 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Can you tell me with the  
9 number-one and number-two scopes what your photo  
10 capability for your particular ship is? I don't know  
11 if you have 70 millimeters --

12 LT SLOAN: We have a 70-millimeter camera  
13 which works half the time. We have problems with it  
14 periodically. We also have a very nice digital camera  
15 for number-one scope that we can basically take the  
16 eyepiece off one, slap it up there, and use that.

17 LCDR SANTOMAURO: That is a special prime  
18 focus mount?

19 LT SLOAN: Right.

20 LCDR SANTOMAURO: It is a PCS-315 camera for  
21 number-one scope, right? So you've got wet film,  
22 70-millimeter, for number-two scope?

23 LT SLOAN: Right. We don't have any digital  
24 upgrades.

25 Another thing I have done in the past, I have  
26 taken one of the small digital cameras. I don't  
27 remember the -- Sony Mavacam [ph], something like that.

28 LCDR SANTOMAURO: 5095.

29 LT SLOAN: Yeah, the little flat ones.

30 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Right.

31 LT SLOAN: I have actually taken the eyepiece  
32 off of number-two scope, held it up there, and been  
33 able to take really good pictures. It is something  
34 that is tough to do. The hard part is actually holding  
35 the camera and being able to move the scope around, but  
36 I've done it before. It is not something -- we didn't  
37 do it that day because that would have taken the scope  
38 away.

39 LCDR SANTOMAURO: And you have Legacy PERIVIS  
40 on board the ship? That is your black-and-white?

41 LT SLOAN: Right. It is Legacy PERIVIS, not  
42 that great, kind of fuzzy, not that good. Yeah, that's  
43 what we have. We are scheduled to get the PERIVU  
44 upgrade. I don't know when that is happening, but we  
45 will see.

46 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Okay. Thanks a lot. I  
47 appreciate it.

48 LT SLOAN: No problem, sir.

49 LT JOHNSON: Can I get a point of  
50 clarification here? This is Lieutenant Johnson with  
51 Coast Guard.

52 Maybe I misunderstood you. Did you say a  
53 while ago that at 15 knots for 4 minutes, you only go  
54 2,000 yards? At 10 knots for 3 minutes, how far do you  
55 go?

56 LT SLOAN: 1,000 yards.

1 LT JOHNSON: 1,000 yards.  
2 LT SLOAN: 1,000 yards, 3-minute rules.  
3 LT JOHNSON: 3-minute rule is 1,000 yards for  
4 every --  
5 LT SLOAN: Well, it is 100 yards for every  
6 knot for every 3 minutes. So, 15 knots is 1,500 yards  
7 in 3 minutes, add another third for 4 minutes, 2,000  
8 yards.  
9 LT JOHNSON: Okay, fine. I just wanted to  
10 make sure. Thanks.  
11 LT SLOAN: Mm-hmm.  
12 LT JOHNSON: I don't know how to do math.  
13 That is why I am with the Coast Guard.  
14 LT SLOAN: I do all of this math in my head.  
15 It makes my head run sometimes.  
16 LTJG KUSANO: This is LTJG Kusano. Just one  
17 quick question based on Lieutenant Johnson's question.  
18 You mentioned that Lieutenant Coen is  
19 methodical, and then during the incident, the CO was  
20 kind of in the move, let's go, kind of directing the  
21 OD. Do you remember what his attitude was? Did you  
22 see like blowing, sighing, or rolling his eyes -- I  
23 mean -- because as an OOD, that is one of the --  
24 LT SLOAN: You don't like it.  
25 LTJG KUSANO: Yes, exactly.  
26 LT SLOAN: I have been in the situation where  
27 I have been direct like that. I don't like it. And  
28 I'm sure he didn't like it. I mean, I didn't ask him,  
29 but I didn't see any overt sign that he was unhappy  
30 with it, right?  
31 My instinct is that he was, but that is just  
32 on thinking that I would be, too. You get frustrated  
33 sometimes when you are being very -- things are very  
34 directive.  
35 My experience is the captain was always  
36 directive when we were doing angles and dangles and  
37 high-speed turns and things like that. He was always  
38 very close control about it. That was normal operating  
39 procedure for him. That is the way he did it.  
40 He does that, and sometimes if he was in  
41 control and he was in a hurry to go to PD, it would be  
42 the same thing. He would be very direct on how he went  
43 to PD, not because he doesn't trust the officer of the  
44 deck as much as he just -- he wants it done quickly.  
45 He wants it done his way.  
46 LTJG KUSANO: Do you guys ever talk about in  
47 the Ward Room, "Hey, Captain, today was kind of" --  
48 LT SLOAN: There was occasionally some  
49 discussion on some things like that, a little bit of  
50 frustration that, hey, I couldn't drive the ship, I  
51 wanted to be able to drive it, but the captain wanted  
52 me to do this, that kind of thing.  
53 Never really bad discussion like everyone was  
54 very disgruntled, but --  
55 LTJG KUSANO: Do you -- so would you say he  
56 does it more for inexperienced OD or experienced OD or

1 generally just everybody?  
2 LT SLOAN: For those situations, it wouldn't  
3 matter.  
4 LTJG KUSANO: It wouldn't matter.  
5 LT SLOAN: I have been the OOD theoretically  
6 -- most senior OODs, and I got the same thing, the same  
7 -- we call it treatment, but he did things the same  
8 way. So I don't think it was specific to Mr. Coen or  
9 anybody else.  
10 LTJG KUSANO: That's all I have.  
11 LT HEDRICK: I am Lieutenant Hedrick.  
12 You said that you expressed concern to the  
13 captain about your PH time. Do you remember about when  
14 that was during the day?  
15 LT SLOAN: That would have been about 1300, a  
16 few minutes before, few minutes after. We had about an  
17 hour, and we were about 8, 9, 10, somewhere in there,  
18 miles away.  
19 LT HEDRICK: Do you remember where you had  
20 that discussion?  
21 LT SLOAN: In the State Room.  
22 LT HEDRICK: All right. You talked a lot  
23 about stuff that you saw or were not able to recall in  
24 the Control Room. Why were you in the Control Room  
25 during the preps for PD and PD?  
26 LT SLOAN: I had mentioned before, I knew we  
27 were going to be doing high-speed angles and dangles,  
28 high-speed runs. My primary concern was not going out  
29 of area because I knew we were going to be generally  
30 moving to the north and our water space ran out a  
31 little ways north of where we were. So I wanted to be  
32 in control just to make sure we didn't go out of area.  
33 That was the sole thing in my mind, not for being  
34 there for angles and dangles, but for water space  
35 concern. If we're doing a full bell ---I didn't want  
36 to --- drive out of area without thinking.  
37 LT HEDRICK: You said the CEP is maintained  
38 at all times underway?  
39 LT SLOAN: Correct.  
40 LT HEDRICK: Normal underway steaming has  
41 that maintained?  
42 LT SLOAN: The firecontrolman of the watch  
43 will maintain it, depending on the situation. It would  
44 probably be in a 10-minute scale, normal transit. We  
45 are going from here to wherever.  
46 LT HEDRICK: Is that normally one FTOW doing  
47 that or did you say you normally have two or  
48 sometimes?  
49 LT SLOAN: That -- on like the day in  
50 question, it was just one, and fairly often, we just do  
51 one local ops. When we are transiting somewhere doing  
52 a long underway when we have everyone on board, a lot  
53 more people, there would typically be two FTs on watch.  
54 One is the FT of the watch and the one is over the  
55 horizon. Database operators is what they call them.  
56 Basically, he is kind of the assistant FT. That's how

1 I would look at it.  
2 LT HEDRICK: So you will have a second FT  
3 even in transiting mode, not necessarily on station,  
4 but just transiting?  
5 LT SLOAN: Yeah. I seem to remember doing  
6 that. It may not have even been every section, too.  
7 We may have had something like four FTs and one section  
8 had two and some had one, something like that.  
9 LT HEDRICK: Who does -- I'm sorry.  
10 LT SLOAN: I was just going to say it is not  
11 anything that you have to have two that's not normal or  
12 not required.  
13 LT HEDRICK: Who does the majority of the  
14 training for the JOs as far as teaching them how to  
15 drive?  
16 LT SLOAN: Majority would be --  
17 LT HEDRICK: Maybe it is better to say how is  
18 that accomplished on your ship or who works with that.  
19 LT SLOAN: Hands-on training, it is catch as  
20 catch can. I mean the captain --  
21 LT HEDRICK: I am trying to catch the  
22 difference between getting a sig on a qual card and who  
23 is actually teaching --  
24 LT SLOAN: Teaching the guy stuff.  
25 LT HEDRICK: Teaching the guy how to drive  
26 the boat.  
27 LT SLOAN: Generally, I would say the  
28 department heads.  
29 LT HEDRICK: Department heads?  
30 LT SLOAN: Yeah. I have a big chunk of the  
31 -- especially the lecture kind of training, sit in the  
32 Ward Room, give a lecture, that is more heavily on me.  
33 The XO does a lot of it, too, though. It is  
34 kind of a group effort, the senior guys helping out the  
35 junior guys. The XO is good about going into control  
36 and watching people do things and critiquing things and  
37 things like that. The captain would, too, to some  
38 extent.  
39 LT HEDRICK: I think you already talked about  
40 it a little bit. There wasn't a written agenda, but  
41 who had the plan for the underway as far as we're going  
42 to do --  
43 LT SLOAN: Usually the XO kind of -- the  
44 captain, I am sure, had his own -- in his mind what he  
45 wanted to do, but the XO usually runs the scheduling  
46 and, hey, we're going to do this, this, and this.  
47 So, originally, he had the day before  
48 mentioned about doing an EMT blow as he was reviewing  
49 the charts, and that's what put it in my head. I  
50 mentioned it to the captain the next day, "Hey, this is  
51 a good area for doing all this stuff." Then he had  
52 said, "No, I don't want to do it."  
53 Generally, the XO -- I don't know if the XO  
54 talked to him and changed his mind about that because  
55 the XO was intending for us to do an emergency blow.  
56 LT HEDRICK: So who seemed to be driving the

1 agenda that day, the XO or the captain?  
2 LT SLOAN: It seemed to me the captain drove  
3 it more. Typically, it would seem like the XO would  
4 drive it more, but now that I think about it, I don't  
5 remember -- it may just be because I didn't see what  
6 was going on, but I definitely think the captain was  
7 pushing to get things going, at least late into the  
8 afternoon, right before the collision.  
9 LT HEDRICK: During periscope depth and the  
10 visual search and going back down for the blow, the  
11 period of time that you were in control, mainly to  
12 monitor your water space to make sure you didn't run  
13 out --  
14 LT SLOAN: Right.  
15 LT HEDRICK: -- once you realized you weren't  
16 running out, you slowed down to the direction you were  
17 pointing whatever, you said you got a pretty good  
18 degree of confidence right about to do it.  
19 LT SLOAN: Mm-hmm.  
20 LT HEDRICK: What would you say your focus  
21 was? Were you prepping night orders? Were you looking  
22 at the chart for the next underway? Were you just kind  
23 of hanging out and watching control without -- you  
24 know, not doing a monitor watch, but -- yeah. What  
25 would be a fair assessment?  
26 LT SLOAN: Well, I continue to be focused  
27 most heavily on the -- on the water space issue just  
28 because -- I mean, right up to the very end, we were  
29 still -- still -- until right before we went to  
30 periscope depth, we were -- I was still keeping an eye  
31 on not going out of area.  
32 LT HEDRICK: Okay.  
33 LT SLOAN: And the whole periscope depth  
34 evolution followed by the emergency deep, followed by  
35 the emergency blow, was only a short -- relatively  
36 short period of time.  
37 LT HEDRICK: One more --  
38 LT SLOAN: The rest -- oh, I'm sorry.  
39 LT HEDRICK: Go ahead.  
40 LT SLOAN: I was just going to say the rest  
41 -- when I wasn't paying attention exactly every second  
42 where we were on the chart, I believe if I remember  
43 correctly -- and it's kind of just faded out of my mind  
44 -- Petty Officer Carpenter off watch quarter master was  
45 looking at some charts for the next week's underway,  
46 and I was kind of casually looking at that. I hadn't  
47 planned on reviewing them yet or anything, but I was  
48 just kind of watching what he was doing as he was  
49 prepping those.  
50 LT HEDRICK: Okay.  
51 LT SLOAN: That was not something I was  
52 intensely doing, just kind of casually, I guess I'd  
53 say.  
54 LT HEDRICK: So, with that in mind,  
55 definitely not paying strict attention to what was  
56 going on in the control, but hearing it in the

1 background --  
2 LT SLOAN: Mm-hmm.  
3 LT HEDRICK: -- is there anything that was  
4 said or done or -- that you were kind of waiting to  
5 clue into that was not said or done that at any point  
6 gave you any concern for safety of ship?  
7 LT SLOAN: Nothing that jumped out at me, no.  
8 I would say no.  
9 LT HEDRICK: Thank you. That is all I got.  
10 LT SLOAN: Okay.  
11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, sir. We are ready for  
12 round two.  
13 LT SLOAN: Okay.  
14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Would you like to take a  
15 break?  
16 LT SLOAN: I am ready to keep going.  
17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I am probably certain this  
18 second round would be much shorter than the first one.  
19 LT SLOAN: Okay, whatever you need.  
20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe the  
21 modified piloting party that you said was set after  
22 some point when it was set and who would be on that and  
23 what their duties would be?  
24 LT SLOAN: Okay. Once we -- typically  
25 leaving Pearl Harbor, I would recommend station to  
26 modify piloting party. It requires captain's  
27 permission to do so. Normally, we would do that after  
28 we had passed PH, that area, and we are heading  
29 outbound.  
30 At that point, I knew we were heading away  
31 from land. I was -- my concern of running aground or  
32 anything like that was greatly diminished. I  
33 recommended to the captain that we get permission to  
34 station to modify piloting party.  
35 There is a minimum level of people that are  
36 required for that, and that is what we would typically  
37 use in Hawaiian waters. There is no need to do  
38 exterior. This is our home waters, and we knew it  
39 pretty well.  
40 The minimum people in that would include a  
41 fathometer operator, and while we were on the surface,  
42 I just let him -- typically, we would just keep it  
43 continuous, just no reason not to. We are not trying  
44 to be stealthy or anything.  
45 A second person would be the quartermaster of  
46 the watch, whoever the normal on-watch quartermaster  
47 would fill that role.  
48 There would also be a navigation supervisor.  
49 I believe I mentioned earlier the navigation  
50 supervisor was required to be either [inaudible]  
51 qualified, which on Greeneville was either ET1 Thomas  
52 or Senior Chief -- ETCS Crist [ph] who is [inaudible]  
53 from ELA, and he was also -- he is qualified at nav on  
54 Greeneville, so either of those two. He wasn't on the  
55 underway that day. So it was Thomas.  
56 The other person it could be would be myself

1 or the XO, and if the captain, I suppose, wanted to, he  
2 could just by virtue of being the captain say I am the  
3 NAVSU [ph], but he has never done that and I wouldn't  
4 expect ever do that.

5 Depending on the situation, we can add people  
6 to the modified piloting party. I could add  
7 essentially anybody I want all the way up to a full  
8 piloting party. Usually, there would be some I would  
9 recommend to the captain and he would buy off on.

10 Typical example would be maybe I would station a scope  
11 operator if we were doing visual piloting of some sort  
12 or maybe a second plot or a bearing recorder to help  
13 out the quarter master, something like that, but  
14 operating off Hawaii, just do the minimum. There has  
15 never been any reason to have more than that, and  
16 requirement for modified piloting party is if we are  
17 within 10 miles of land while we are on the surface or  
18 10 miles of shoal water if we are submerged, we want to  
19 keep the modified piloting party stationed.

20 Based on where we were operating, the  
21 vicinity of Penguin Bank, we just kept stationed the  
22 whole time.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Earlier, I slid this piece  
24 of paper towards you, and I am sorry it distracted.

25 LT SLOAN: Oh, that's okay.

26 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What I would like you to do,  
27 if you could --

28 LT SLOAN: Uh-huh.

29 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- is draw a schematic plan  
30 view diagram of the Control Room showing major pieces  
31 of equipment, just kind of orient where we are, and if  
32 you could indicate where the various key players were.

33 For example, what area was -- the guests were standing  
34 where the captain was and different watch standers?

35 LT SLOAN: Where the -- okay. I'll do that  
36 real quick. It will just take me a minute.

37 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I am rating you on your  
38 artistic abilities as well.

39 LT SLOAN: Well, I am going to fail  
40 miserably, but that's okay.

41 [Laughter.]

42 LT SLOAN: This drawing is not to scale.

43 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. What we will do is  
44 while you draw that, we will take a break on the tape  
45 to save a little tape.

46 LT SLOAN: Okay.

47 [Off the record.]

48 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We are back on the  
49 record after a couple-minutes break to allow time for  
50 Lieutenant Sloan to make his sketch.

51 LT SLOAN: Okay. Do you want me to walk  
52 through it?

53 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

54 LT SLOAN: Okay. This is looking forward,  
55 this direction. I will start in the forward port  
56 corner. I have the ship's control panel and three

1 watch standers. You have the helmsman. You have the  
2 stern plainsman, and you have the diving officer of the  
3 watch. You have the ship's control panel, and then  
4 that V configuration.

5 In the corner is the chief of the watch at  
6 the ballast control panel along the port side. A bench  
7 locker there. It's pretty common to see the messenger  
8 in that area.

9 Following behind that, HS sonar stack, behind  
10 that the radar, and then the fathometer, and then back  
11 in control you have the door to the MEES, which is  
12 miscellaneous equipment space -- electrical equipment  
13 space.

14 Moving around port plotter, space in there --  
15 actually it is much smaller than that. Not very good  
16 scale. But you're still back there. I put that in  
17 there because that is where I was, sitting there,  
18 standing back there.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you indicate that,  
20 please?

21 LT SLOAN: Yeah. I was not -- I was either  
22 sitting on the stool or standing up. I kind of moved  
23 back and forth a little bit, but basically stayed right  
24 in that area.

25 There is a starboard plotter, and there is a  
26 rack of equipment right here that is pretty much all  
27 the way to the overhead which kind of blocks the view  
28 in this direction which is one of the reasons I  
29 couldn't see the PERIVU monitor which is right here.  
30 So right in this area, PERIVU.

31 Back corner is the TAC-3. Forward of that is  
32 the weapons launch consul. Four stacks of fire  
33 control. CEP plot just between the door to sonar and  
34 the door to the command passageway.

35 Jumping over the CON, you have this desk  
36 here. It's got -- we've got two flat screens built  
37 into the desk. Also, you can put your books there,  
38 things like that.

39 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe --

40 LT SLOAN: Sure.

41 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sorry to interrupt.

42 -- the purpose of those flat screens?

43 LT SLOAN: That is kind of a  
44 Greeneville-specific thing that we have installed. It  
45 is kind of a tactical -- called a tactical video land.

46 There is a lot of different words for it, nothing  
47 official. Basically, what it is, it's -- a lot of  
48 displays on different parts of the ships are linked  
49 together, and you can call up different displays in  
50 different locations.

51 Some of the things we can put on there is you  
52 could have drops for specific laptop computers. So, if  
53 a guy has a laptop, he is doing something on it like a  
54 training presentation, you can actually watch it in  
55 different places and select it.

56 Another thing you can watch on there is the

1 ARCI, the COT sonar system that we have. You can also  
2 call up the screens for that in different places, not  
3 really a factor in any of this because it was all  
4 secured. It is more -- the system we have now is for  
5 the Towed Array, not for the spherical array. So it  
6 wasn't really involved in this. Things like that.  
7 Nothing really relevant. The PERIVU is the one you --  
8 you can select the PERIVU on there.

9 It basically blows up the -- instead of a  
10 small black-and-white screen, you have a much larger  
11 screen, but, unfortunately, it is very fuzzy. It is  
12 somewhat useful, but not the greatest in the world.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Was that selected at PD?

14 LT SLOAN: I don't know. Probably, yes, but  
15 I don't know that for sure. I don't know.

16 Last is the CON, slightly raised area in the  
17 center of control. The main thing there number-one and  
18 number-two periscopes in the center of that. The  
19 underwater telephone, WQC, is right there in the front  
20 down on the deck level. Up above the desk in the  
21 overhead, in this area here, is the WLR-9. That is the  
22 acoustic receiver I mentioned, and between the scopes  
23 and the overhead is the speaker for the early warning  
24 receiver.

25 I think that covers all the big stuff, unless  
26 you've got any other questions.

27 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did you indicate the ASVDU  
28 there?

29 LT SLOAN: No, I did not. The ASVDU is in  
30 the overhead also above the desk, pretty much in line  
31 with the WQC, also in the overhead, basically just  
32 above head level.

33 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, sir. Now, if you  
34 could just indicate in some way the area that the  
35 guests were located.

36 LT SLOAN: I'll do the best I can remember.  
37 There was a -- I guess I would call it a layer of  
38 guests. I will just kind of circle it with X's,  
39 somewhere in this area, and there was a line. That was  
40 the primary thing that blocked my view from seeing what  
41 was -- you know, getting good detail of what was going  
42 on up there, these people in here.

43 I remember there being some guests over here  
44 in the vicinity of the ship's control panel, the  
45 ballast control panel. I don't know how many. I  
46 wasn't -- I never really paid much attention at the  
47 time.

48 There was a couple in the front of control in  
49 this area. Basically, they were filling spots where  
50 there was no one else. They just kind of naturally, I  
51 guess, migrated into the empty areas, spending time  
52 there.

53 There were some in the vicinity of fire  
54 control over in this way. I don't remember exactly how  
55 many or where they were located. I think they moved  
56 around a little bit, too.

1           So you kind of get the idea they were looking  
2 at it this way. They are kind of a circle around the  
3 conn almost, now that I am thinking about it.

4           Don't recall. I think there might have --  
5 the ones that were on the aft part of the CON, they  
6 kind of migrated back and forth into this area. This  
7 is a little bit of open space there.

8           The [inaudible] was here, quartermaster was  
9 kind of next to him, and then the off watch  
10 quartermaster was over here. So they kind of had a  
11 little space in there. They kind of moved around a  
12 little bit, especially when we were talking angles.  
13 They would step back a little bit to brace themselves  
14 on the plotters just to help keep their feet.

15           And the further you go away from this area,  
16 the less of a feel I have for where people were and  
17 what they were doing.

18           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you have a recollection  
19 of where the officer of the deck and the commanding  
20 officer were located?

21           LT SLOAN: The CO and the XO are -- or excuse  
22 me. The CO and the officer of the deck were pretty  
23 much right in this area until they went to PD, and then  
24 the officer of the deck moved back behind the scope. I  
25 think the captain moved back as well if I remember  
26 correctly.

27           But, initially, they were in front of the  
28 scope, which is normally where you probably stand  
29 getting ready to go to PD. Up here, you got to look at  
30 the ASVDU which in this case doesn't apply, but you  
31 would also have a straight shot looking over at fire  
32 control. You could talk to fire control. Then you  
33 would have a good view of the ship's control party  
34 because we just finished doing angles and dangles and  
35 we were getting ready to go to PD, into all that.

36           This is where I would stand. This is where  
37 he stood. There is where any OOD would stand because  
38 you are right in the middle of everything. You've got  
39 ship's controls right here. You got the fireman --  
40 fire control right there. You have sonar right here.  
41 Everything is right there. You don't have to move.  
42 You just turn your head.

43           Only after you were ready to go to periscope  
44 depth, you would step back behind the scope, raise the  
45 scope and go up from there for a PD trip, and I think  
46 they stood -- for the emergency deep, I don't remember  
47 if they were behind the scope or in front of the scope,  
48 but right in that area. I don't remember exactly.

49           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Any other officers that you  
50 can recall and where they might have been?

51           LT SLOAN: I glimpsed Lieutenant Pritchett in  
52 control, I believe, earlier in this. He was up in here  
53 somewhere. I think he was a tour guide. So he was  
54 with some of the guests up in the front part of  
55 control.

56           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Just for the record, you are

1 indicating near the area of the CEP.  
2 LT SLOAN: I believe so. Like I said, I just  
3 glimpsed him. He may have been moving around. I don't  
4 know. I honestly don't know.  
5 The XO was also in control. I saw him on the  
6 CON and basically in the vicinity of the captain and  
7 the officer of the deck prior to proceeding up. Like I  
8 had mentioned earlier, I saw him go to sonar at some  
9 point. Don't remember when he came back.  
10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: How long did he remain there  
11 at the CON with the captain?  
12 LT SLOAN: Before or after he went to sonar?  
13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: After.  
14 LT SLOAN: After? I think he was in control  
15 and on the CON or right around the CON the whole time,  
16 not sure exactly, but pretty much in that area.  
17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: While we are on this  
18 subject, does anybody have any questions regarding this  
19 sketch that he has drawn?  
20 Oh, I'm sorry. There is one more person I am  
21 curious to know where was, the chief of staff. Do you  
22 recall where he might have been located?  
23 LT SLOAN: He was, I believe, on the port  
24 side of control, if I remember correctly, just --  
25 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you indicate?  
26 LT SLOAN: I could indicate. Right in that  
27 area, maybe a little bit further forward, kind of  
28 watching what was going on, but off to the side.  
29 I honestly don't remember if he stayed there.  
30 I just remember seeing him there, but I don't remember  
31 if he stayed there or not. I don't recall.  
32 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.  
33 LT SLOAN: Right in that area somewhere.  
34 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And that is COS?  
35 LT SLOAN: COS is for chief of staff, yeah.  
36 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I am curious about the  
37 emergency deep and the EMBT blow.  
38 LT SLOAN: Mm-hmm.  
39 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Particularly the course  
40 steer. Did everybody know or did anybody know what the  
41 captain intended to do during the emergency deep as  
42 course changes or what heading he intended to perform  
43 the emergency main ballast tank blow?  
44 LT SLOAN: He did not give any -- any  
45 direction that I'm aware of as far as what he want --  
46 what he was intending to do was all officer of the deck  
47 do this, officer of the deck come to this course, that  
48 sort of thing. So, as soon as he gave the order,  
49 obviously everyone knew what the intention was, but  
50 there was no discussion beforehand that I am aware of  
51 on any specifics on course of speeds, depths, anything  
52 like that.  
53 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: believe you stated that  
54 before he reached 400, he had initiated a course change  
55 to the left?  
56 LT SLOAN: He started turning to the left to

1 a northerly course. It may have been north to 340,  
2 somewhere in that range. Turned as we were going down.  
3 I don't remember exactly what point he put the -- he  
4 directed the officer of the deck to make the turn.

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Right.

6 LT SLOAN: But we were already going down  
7 when he did that.

8 It was probably about the same time he said  
9 proceed to 400 feet instead of stopping at 150 feet,  
10 which would be normal. And it was about the time we got  
11 down to 400 feet, we were still doing the turn that he  
12 directed the officer of the deck to order rudder  
13 midships.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: That particular maneuver,  
15 did that in any way seem unusual to do a course change  
16 during descent and prior to performing the emergency  
17 blow?

18 LT SLOAN: Nothing unusual about doing a  
19 course change while changing depth at all. Do that all  
20 the time.

21 As far as doing it before the emergency blow,  
22 at the time, I just assumed he knew the area, was clear  
23 to the north, and wanted to get pointed in the right  
24 direction, so, as soon as we came up, we were driving  
25 in the right direction. I think that was the  
26 intention.

27 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You mentioned when you  
28 looked out the periscope, I believe during -- leaving  
29 Pearl Harbor that you noticed it was kind of hazy and  
30 you saw these two contacts, the darker one was easier  
31 to see. Did you discuss that with anybody, or did you  
32 consider that to be a concern of yours or just  
33 something that you noted?

34 LT SLOAN: I was concerned in the sense that  
35 I knew it was harder to see the guy, but I also -- I  
36 saw him well enough. I knew he was there, and I could  
37 keep an eye on him.

38 He kind of made me be a little more careful  
39 searching if there was another small light-colored guy  
40 that would be hard to see, but I mentioned it to the  
41 XO. I said, "Hey, this guy is hard to see," because  
42 the XO at one time, I believe, took the scope just to  
43 do a quick look-around, and I mentioned, hey, this guy  
44 over here -- I've got -- I was kind of just telling  
45 him, we've got these contacts, like the guy over here  
46 is hard to see just because he is light-colored, but it  
47 wasn't a discussion like, hey, we got a problem here.  
48 It wasn't that sort of discussion. It was more just  
49 mentioned in passing.

50 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe the  
51 training you received in looking through the scope in  
52 terms of distinguishing targets and cautions that you  
53 need to take when searching in reduced visibility? Is  
54 that part of submarine training at some point, and how  
55 much of that would you do?

56 LT SLOAN: I would say I learned most of it

1 as a junior officer on my previous boat. So the  
2 specifics of it, I don't remember spending years, but  
3 there is publications that tell you basically how to  
4 search, this is how you do a visual search. There is  
5 some -- and there is some guidance on if there is  
6 reduced visibility, basically things like, you know,  
7 the visibility is very poor like in fog, don't do a  
8 high-powered search because you are not going to see  
9 anything a long way, anyways. Do a low-powered search  
10 because you get a better field of view, and you are  
11 more likely to see what you are looking for because it  
12 is going to be close, anyways, things like that, just  
13 general guidance.

14 A lot of it is OJT. You learn it as you go,  
15 but the general search routine doesn't change.

16 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: The coordinates of the op  
17 area, I believe, is -- to your recollection, would that  
18 be the marked area there?

19 LT SLOAN: That looks correct, yes. I'd have  
20 to look at the op schedule that was in effect and  
21 verify it, but that looks right.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So the op sched is where  
23 those coordinates would be --

24 LT SLOAN: Yes.

25 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- described?

26 LT SLOAN: Yes. That is put out weekly.

27 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I am going to pass it  
28 to Mr. Woody.

29 LT SLOAN: Okay.

30 MR. WOODY: Bill Woody.

31 On other VIP cruises, do you recall whether  
32 the captain or the exec or the OD took a longer time at  
33 the scope?

34 LT SLOAN: I honestly don't remember. It has  
35 been a while. Our last VIP cruise was -- I think it  
36 was June of last year, June 30th. I seem to remember  
37 right before we went to Santa Barbara, right  
38 afterwards. So, yeah, I think it was June 30th.

39 I don't think we've done one since then  
40 except for the one the other day, obviously.

41 MR. WOODY: Okay. June 2nd of 2000?

42 LT SLOAN: June 30th.

43 MR. WOODY: The 30th. I'm sorry.

44 Could you just briefly tell us the training  
45 you have? Just take the time you came into the Navy,  
46 when you were commissioned, and what training you have  
47 had to prepare you for your present position.

48 LT SLOAN: Okay. Initial training was  
49 obviously I was ROTC. So 4 years of ROTC classes while  
50 I was in college. The pipeline training when I came in  
51 as a submariner started with nuclear power school, 6  
52 months. This is pretty much has not changed. It is  
53 all the same for everybody. Six months of nuclear  
54 power school, 6 months of prototype training, 3 months  
55 of submarine officer basic course, which covers just  
56 general submarine-type things.

1 I reported my first boat in '93. Yeah,  
2 beginning of '93. The normal qualification process --  
3 MR. WOODY: What was that?  
4 LT SLOAN: USS Memphis.  
5 MR. WOODY: Okay.  
6 LT SLOAN: Reported on that boat, started the  
7 normal qualification process, you know, a couple months  
8 to qualify engineer watch, followed closely by contact  
9 coordinator, diving officer of the watch, and pretty  
10 much this order, if I remember right. Officer of the  
11 deck, surface and submerged, in that order, and then  
12 finally submarine qualification.  
13 Part of that was junior -- they have junior  
14 officer courses that they try to send all the officers  
15 to. There is five 1-week courses covering different  
16 areas, things like -- there is one in sonar, sonar  
17 employment, one is missile, missile employment, strike,  
18 whatever you want to call it. What else? Ones on fire  
19 control, ones on sensors, like sensor being an ESM COM,  
20 navigation-type issues, things, and there is a CAP  
21 stone [ph] course that they call tactics which is kind  
22 of put everything together and go out and drive the  
23 ship and sink people.  
24 MR. WOODY: This tactics is also like a  
25 one-week course?  
26 LT SLOAN: Yeah. They're all one-week  
27 courses.  
28 MR. WOODY: All one-week courses.  
29 LT SLOAN: They are all one-week courses.  
30 I did not attend all of those. I am trying  
31 to remember which ones I didn't. I tried to attend all  
32 officers to all of them, but schedules and things don't  
33 always work out. So you don't always get them all. I  
34 am trying to remember which ones I went to or not.  
35 I think I did not go to fire control and  
36 missile. I may be wrong, though. I can't remember.  
37 MR. WOODY: All right.  
38 LT SLOAN: It has been a while. I don't  
39 remember.  
40 So the rest of my training was like a million  
41 little things, but nothing that I would throw out  
42 there.  
43 MR. WOODY: That's all right. What was the  
44 date of your being commissioned?  
45 LT SLOAN: I got commissioned 25 May 1991.  
46 MR. WOODY: Okay.  
47 LT SLOAN: Other big school -- last big one,  
48 big one, is submarine officer advance course, and that  
49 was '98 when I finished that.  
50 MR. WOODY: Okay.  
51 LT SLOAN: That is a 6-month school, and  
52 that's all tactics and ship employment, weapons, all  
53 that kind of stuff.  
54 MR. WOODY: About what year would that have  
55 been?  
56 LT SLOAN: That was '98, '98 to -- summer of

1 '98 to basically the end of '98. That was immediately  
2 before I came out to this boat.  
3 MR. WOODY: And you came to the Greeneville  
4 when?  
5 LT SLOAN: In January of '99.  
6 MR. WOODY: One more question.  
7 LT SLOAN: Mm-hmm.  
8 MR. WOODY: Do you recall anything about the  
9 heading at collision?  
10 LT SLOAN: Only that we were turning to a  
11 northerly course and that the rudder was midships. I  
12 didn't happen -- I saw the depth. Unfortunately, I saw  
13 the depth. I watched the depth. I watched the speed,  
14 but I did not watch the course. So I can't help you  
15 there.  
16 MR. WOODY: Okay. Do you recall what heading  
17 was at rudder mid ships?  
18 LT SLOAN: No, I did not.  
19 MR. WOODY: Okay. That's all I have except  
20 for those last personal questions.  
21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Anybody else? Commander?  
22 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Lieutenant Commander  
23 Santomauro. I have one question only.  
24 The periscope gyrostabilizer, are you  
25 familiar with that?  
26 LT SLOAN: Yes.  
27 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Do you normally have that  
28 energized?  
29 LT SLOAN: I normally do not. I don't really  
30 have any need for it. To be honest, I don't turn it on  
31 because I figure I am going to forget to turn off  
32 because it is not something you use very often. So I  
33 just leave it off, and I don't typically use it.  
34 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Do you remember if the  
35 gyrostabilizer was used on 9 February?  
36 LT SLOAN: I am not sure. I do not know. It  
37 was off. It was one of the things I checked. It was  
38 off when I lowered the scope. Mr. Coen may have turned  
39 it on, but I did not see him turn it on, and  
40 afterwards, I didn't look.  
41 LCDR SANTOMAURO: You are at periscope depth  
42 and you are doing a search in low power and it was on  
43 and you were turning the periscope in either direction  
44 and you either had an elevation or a drop, say, 5  
45 degrees at the head prism. Would that be significant?  
46 LT SLOAN: If it just like dropped really  
47 fast or sort of fluctuated?  
48 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Depending on how fast you  
49 are turning periscope. I guess if you are turning it  
50 very hard, you could have, say, a 5-degree drop or an  
51 elevation of the head prism. Would you consider that  
52 to be significant in low power?  
53 LT SLOAN: In low power, probably not. Your  
54 field of view is -- I forgot exactly the number of  
55 degrees up and down, but 20-some degrees, you should be  
56 able to -- I'm not sure exactly what it is in low

1 power, up and down, but it shouldn't -- as long as you  
2 can see the horizon, there shouldn't be a problem.  
3 That is what I would do. I wouldn't even worry about  
4 degrees or anything like that. As I'm turning, I put  
5 the horizon more or less in the middle.  
6 I mean, yeah, ideally you want the horizon in  
7 the lower half and all that. Put the horizon somewhere  
8 in the middle and I'm turning because if there is a  
9 collision threat, he is going to be right there and I  
10 am going to see him.  
11 LCDR SANTOMAURO: A lot of times a ship is  
12 rocking and rolling anyway, and the cross arrows are  
13 going to be going up and down, anyway.  
14 LT SLOAN: Yeah. They'll be going up and  
15 down, and if it is really bad, I'll be adjusting the  
16 elevation manually as I'm turning if I need to, if the  
17 ship is rolling really bad, which doesn't happen that  
18 often, but it does happen sometimes.  
19 LCDR SANTOMAURO: And were you able to see  
20 the horizon pretty clearly that day?  
21 LT SLOAN: I could see the horizon, yes, when  
22 I was the officer of the deck. Like I said, it was  
23 really poor visibility, hazy and everything else, but I  
24 could distinguish the horizon.  
25 LCDR SANTOMAURO: That's all I have. Thank  
26 you.  
27 CAPT KYLE: I have a question. This is  
28 Captain Kyle, SUBPAC.  
29 How far was the horizon, do you think?  
30 LT SLOAN: At which point, sir?  
31 CAPT KYLE: Well, you were contact  
32 coordinator?  
33 LT SLOAN: When I was on the surface?  
34 CAPT KYLE: Yes.  
35 LT SLOAN: When I was on the surface, it  
36 would be -- normally, it would be about 8, 9 miles,  
37 somewhere in that range.  
38 CAPT KYLE: With the visibility as it was?  
39 LT SLOAN: Yes, sir. I could see the  
40 horizon.  
41 I mentioned earlier, I could see even where  
42 -- still before we dove the ship 10 miles out. I could  
43 see the buildings in Honolulu, very faint, very hard to  
44 see, but I could still see them.  
45 CAPT KYLE: Then after you submerged?  
46 LT SLOAN: After submerged, I didn't look out  
47 of the periscope until after the collision. So I don't  
48 know.  
49 CAPT KYLE: Okay. During the submerging  
50 process, you were officer of the deck?  
51 LT SLOAN: Yes, sir.  
52 CAPT KYLE: But had a guest on there?  
53 LT SLOAN: I had guests on all control  
54 stations, helms, plains, dive, chief of the watch, and  
55 the scope.  
56 CAPT KYLE: Did the guests -- did the guests

1 lower the scope or --  
2 LT SLOAN: I lowered the scope.  
3 CAPT KYLE: And --  
4 LT SLOAN: I had the guest look out to  
5 actually --  
6 CAPT KYLE: Check venting?  
7 LT SLOAN: Yeah, just to check the venting.  
8 I had her look out the scope like okay, here is what  
9 you are going to see, saw it on the PERIVU monitor,  
10 okay, now you are looking around here. Then she called  
11 -- I had her call decks awash, and then I just took the  
12 scope back.  
13 CAPT KYLE: Okay, good. So when the -- when  
14 the boat submerged, did you do a depth correlation  
15 check by marking the [inaudible]?  
16 LT SLOAN: I did not, and that was largely  
17 due to the fact that I -- our mark scope was under, but  
18 I don't think the dive marked it, and that may be, I  
19 think, because he had the guest there. I'm not sure,  
20 though, but I always just out of habit just say scope  
21 is under lowering the scope.  
22 CAPT KYLE: Okay. Who was the dive?  
23 LT SLOAN: Dive, I believe, was Senior Chief  
24 Smith, if I remember correctly.  
25 CAPT KYLE: Okay. The diving dive?  
26 LT SLOAN: The diving dive, the real dive.  
27 There's a lot of people on there, though.  
28 CAPT KYLE: That's all I have.  
29 MR. WOODY: Lieutenant Sloan, we always ask a  
30 few personal questions of everyone we interview.  
31 First of all, we noticed that your initials  
32 are K.A. Could you give us your full name?  
33 LT SLOAN: Keith Anthony Sloan.  
34 MR. WOODY: Is that K-e-i-t-h?  
35 LT SLOAN: Yes.  
36 MR. WOODY: And your age, sir?  
37 LT SLOAN: I am 32.  
38 MR. WOODY: Height and weight?  
39 LT SLOAN: I am 6'2", and I weigh 178, last I  
40 checked.  
41 MR. WOODY: And would you say that your  
42 health -- how would you characterize your health?  
43 LT SLOAN: Health is good.  
44 MR. WOODY: Are you taking any medications  
45 prescribed by a physician?  
46 LT SLOAN: No.  
47 MR. WOODY: Are you taking any  
48 over-the-counter medications such as for sinuses or  
49 anything like that?  
50 LT SLOAN: No. I took some aspirin after I  
51 got home after we got back from underway. That's about  
52 it.  
53 MR. WOODY: Okay. Do you wear glasses?  
54 LT SLOAN: No. I wear contacts.  
55 MR. WOODY: Are they correctable? Are you  
56 eyes corrected to 20/20 or --

1           LT SLOAN: 20/15 last I checked. They're  
2 pretty good contacts.  
3           MR. WOODY: Have there been any events in  
4 your life of a depressing nature, any sadness, or on  
5 the other hand, have there been anything of an  
6 exhilarating nature, anything like any good news or bad  
7 news, any highs or lows?  
8           LT SLOAN: Kind of a combination one. My  
9 father was diagnosed with lung cancer last fall. I  
10 found out about it a little before Christmas. He just  
11 had surgery, and he has like bounced back amazingly  
12 well.  
13           MR. WOODY: Is that right?  
14           LT SLOAN: Yeah. So it's kind of a bad news  
15 and turned into good news. He is actually doing very  
16 well. He is in trouble. My mom is visiting, and he  
17 just mowed the lawn today. So he is in big trouble  
18 because he is not supposed to be doing that. So,  
19 apparently, he is doing very well.  
20           MR. WOODY: Okay. Very good. I think that's  
21 all the questions we have.  
22           LT SLOAN: Okay.  
23           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Just a couple more  
24 questions. Could we get your address ----  
25           LT SLOAN: Certainly. Address is -----  
26 [Redacted]  
27           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. One final question.  
28           LT SLOAN: Sure.  
29           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Is there anything that you  
30 can think of that could have been done differently that  
31 might have changed the outcome?  
32           LT SLOAN: I could think of a lot of things  
33 that would change the outcome, but it's in the nature  
34 of hindsight. If we hadn't changed course, if we  
35 hadn't done the emergency blow at all, if we --  
36           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Actually, I am speaking more  
37 in terms of things that maybe were done wrong or  
38 procedural or --  
39           LT SLOAN: Oh, like a procedural thing that  
40 --  
41           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- policy guidance or, you  
42 know -- because, as I mentioned at the beginning, the  
43 intent of our investigation is to, first, find out what  
44 happened, why it happened, and then to try to make  
45 recommendations to prevent it from happening again.  
46 So, if there is anything along those lines that would  
47 come to mind, we would certainly appreciate if you  
48 could come up with anything.  
49           LT SLOAN: I actually cannot. I think the  
50 way the procedure works is probably right. You go up,  
51 you look around, and then you do the blow. I have done  
52 it numerous times. It has never been an issue before.  
53           I can't think of anything specific that would  
54 -- how you would change procedure and still allow you  
55 to do it.  
56           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I appreciate that

1 thought.

2 I think with that, the time being 1610, it  
3 brings our interview with Lieutenant Sloan to a close.

4 Thank you very much.

5 [End of interview of Lieutenant Keith Anthony  
6 Sloan.]

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