

U.S. Coast Guard

Marine Casualty Investigation Report

Fire on Board *Port Imperial Manhattan*

Date of Report October 9, 2001

(17 pages total including this cover)

CASE NUMBER../ MC00016168 INV INIT/ DJF PORT/ NYCM LAST UPDATE/ 09OCT01  
 CASUALTY TYPE: VESSEL/ X PERSONNEL/ FACILITY/ POLLUTION/ MARPOL/  
 INCIDENT DATE/ 17NOV00 TIME/ 1852 KNOWN/ X ESTIMATED/ REF CASE/  
 NOTIFY DATE../ 17NOV00 TIME/ 1900 REPORTER TYPE/ RESP PARTY  
 SUBJECT...../ PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN/FIRE LOCAL FILE REFERENCE/  
 LOCATION...../ OFF 38TH STREET PIER LOCAL CODE/  
 INCIDENT STATUS: VERIFIED/ X NOT VERIFIED/ VERIFIED, NOT REPORTABLE/  
 NOTIFY/ ACTION: CTF/ RETURN/ (TO IAPR)

--- VALIDATION AND ENDORSEMENT ---

END/FWD	END/CLS	RETURN	USER-ID	NAME	DATE
INVESTIGATOR: X			FITZGERALD LTJG D	FITZGERALD	09OCT01
UNIT COMMAND: X			KPOST	LCDR K POST	09OCT01
DIST REQ? :					
HQ REQ? Y :					

--- GENERAL INFORMATION ---

CITY/ WEEHAWKEN ST/ NJ WATERBODY/ HUDSON RIVER(BATTERY-41 00N)  
 RIVER MILE/ LATITUDE/ N 40-46.0 LONGITUDE/ W 74- 1.0  
 CAS SUMMARY:TYPE/ FIRE CLASS/ MAJOR  
 POSSIBLE DRUG INVOLVEMENT?/ Y PUBLIC VESSEL/ BOATING/  
 DEATHS/ 0 MISSING/ 0 INJURED/ 0 TOTAL DAMAGE/ 1200000  
 ENV IMPACT: MODE/ SEVERITY CATEGORY/ MATERIAL CATEGORY/  
 OSC/ EPA REGION/ CLEANUP REQ?/  
 RESPONSE BY NSF?/ NSF TIME TO RESPOND/ HOURS  
 NOTIFICATION FROM NRC?../ NRC CASE../  
 NOTIFICATION FROM APHIS?/ N APHIS PORT/

--- INCIDENT BRIEF ---

A US Inspected passenger ferry sustained a fire while bound for Lincoln Harbor, NJ. After losing steering and propulsion capabilities, crewmembers detected a fire in the aft corner of the engine room. The fire could not be contained and all 8 passengers and crewmembers abandoned ship. Apparent Cause: Improper electrical connections. Contributing Causes: Undersized wiring, oversized fuses, poor training & the lack of a fixed fire fighting system.

--- ACTIONS REPORTED ---

SEL	CASE SUPPLEMENTS	SEL	EVENT SUPPLEMENTS
1	WITNESS LIST.....(IAWL)/ X	14	COLLISION OR GROUNDING.(MCCG)/ 0
2	COMDT RECOMMENDATION.(MCCR)/ X	15	EQUIP FAILURE.....(MCDR)/ 0
3	CASUALTY DETAILS.....(MCDD)/ X	16	FLOOD,CAPSIZE,SINKING..(MCFC)/ 0
4	NARRATIVE SUPPLEMENT.(MCNS)/ X	17	FIRE,EXPLOSION.....(MCFE)/ 1
5	PERS ACTION RECOMMEND(MCPA)/ 1	18	HUMAN FACTORS SUPP.....(MCHF)/ 1
6	POLLUTANT DETAILS....(MCPD)/ 0	19	HAZ MAT INVOLVEMENT....(MCHM)/ 0
7	MARPOL DETAIL SUP....(MCMD)/ 0	20	LIFESAVING SUPPLEMENT..(MCLS)/ 0
8	OPERATIONAL CONTROLS (PSOC)/ 0	21	PERSONNEL CASUALTY.....(MCPC)/ 0
9	PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT(MCPI)/ 1	22	STRUCTURAL FAILURE.....(MCSF)/ 0
10	SMI SUPPLEMENT.....(MCSI)/ 1		
11	TOWING SUPPLEMENT....(MCTS)/ 0		
12	SUBJECT SUPPLEMENT... (MCSS)/		
13	WEATHER FACTORS.....(MCWX)/		

-SUPPLEMENTS-

VESSELS INVOLVED/ 1 P M F P P S TOW  
 VIN NAME FLAG SERVICE D D R A I I REF DMG  
 D916221 PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN US PASSENGER X X X NSEA  
 ENF ACTIONS: REQ LOU/ REQ SURETY BOND/ NONE/ X  
 (ENTER HERE IF ASSOCIATED WITH AN MC CASE, OTHERWISE RECORD IN PSAR)

FACILITIES INVOLVED/ 0

--- INVESTIGATION RESOURCES UTILIZED ---

CASE NUMBER/ MC00016168

ARE ALL SUPPLEMENTS COMPLETED?/ Y

REF VIN --- SUBJECT REFERENCE MAP --- CONTROL  
 1. D916221 PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN NAME SERV OPERATION STATUS  
 COMMENT/ PASS TRAH UNDERWAY

--- CASUALTY PROLOGUE ---  
 VESSEL LOST THROTTLE AND STEERING CAPABILITIES AND A FIRE WAS DISCOVERED IN THE ENGINE ROOM. FIRE COULD NOT BE EXTINGUISHED.

--- CASUALTY EVENT SEQUENCE ---

EV	SUBJ'S	TYPE	EVENT CLASS	STATE	CAUSAL EVENTS
1	1	FIRE	UNCONTROLLED	NEC	

----- CAUSAL/ENABLING FACTORS -----

CAT	SUBJ	CLASS/ STATE/	ELECTRICAL IMPROPER	SUBCLASS/ PARTY/	OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CAUSAL EVENT(S) /
EF	1	CLASS/ STATE/	ELECTRICAL IMPROPER	SUBCLASS/ PARTY/	OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CAUSAL EVENT(S) /
HF	1	CLASS/ STATE/	CONT STRATEGY NOT SECURED	SUBCLASS/ PARTY/	REMEDIAL/EMER ACTION MST CAUSAL EVENT(S) /

EV	SUBJ'S	TYPE	EVENT CLASS	STATE	CAUSAL EVENTS
2	1	LOSS VES CNTRL	PROPULSION/STEERING	TOTAL	1

ACTIVITY CATEGORY	TOTAL HC	RESOURCE CATEGORY			
		REGULAR	RESERVE	CIVILIAN	OTHER

UNIT/ NYCFI	TOTAL HC	REGULAR	RESERVE	CIVILIAN	OTHER
POLLUTION INVEST	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
CASUALTY INVEST	30.0	22.0	8.0	.0	.0
ADMIN	53.5	45.5	.0	8.0	.0
TRAVEL	8.0	8.0	.0	.0	.0
TRAINING	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0

--- RELATED CASES ---

SEL	CASE	PORT	DATE	PARAMETERS	STATUS
23	PA01001014	NYCFI	17NOV00	S&R	CLOSED
24	MI00036781	NYCFI	12DEC00	OTHER DAMAGE SURVEY	CLOSED

CASE/ MC00016168

REPORTING PARTY/ X

LAST NAME...../ SIOZON  
 FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INIT.../ DUKE T.  
 ADDRESS - LINE 1...../ PORT IMPERIAL FERRY CORP  
 ADDRESS - LINE 2...../ PERSHING ROAD  
 CITY...../ WEEHAWKEN  
 UNITED STATES:  
 STATE...../ NJ ZIP/ [REDACTED]  
 PHONE NUMBER...../ EXT/  
 RELATIONSHIP TO CASE...../ CAPTAIN  
 PLACE ON POL. VIO. WITNESS LIST/

LAST NAME...../ GONZALEZ  
 FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INIT.../ FELIPE  
 ADDRESS - LINE 1...../ [REDACTED]  
 ADDRESS - LINE 2...../ [REDACTED]  
 CITY...../ [REDACTED]  
 UNITED STATES:  
 STATE...../ NJ ZIP/ [REDACTED]  
 PHONE NUMBER...../ EXT/  
 RELATIONSHIP TO CASE...../ SENIOR DECKHAND  
 PLACE ON POL. VIO. WITNESS LIST/

LAST NAME...../ SOSA  
 FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INIT.../ CARLOS  
 ADDRESS - LINE 1...../ [REDACTED]  
 ADDRESS - LINE 2...../ [REDACTED]  
 CITY...../ LEONIA  
 UNITED STATES:  
 STATE...../ NJ ZIP/ [REDACTED]  
 PHONE NUMBER...../ EXT/  
 RELATIONSHIP TO CASE...../ DECKHAND  
 PLACE ON POL. VIO. WITNESS LIST/

LAST NAME...../ SILECCIA  
 FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INIT.../ JAMES  
 ADDRESS - LINE 1...../ PERSHING ROAD  
 ADDRESS - LINE 2...../ [REDACTED]  
 CITY...../ WEEHAWKEN  
 UNITED STATES:  
 STATE...../ NJ ZIP/ [REDACTED]  
 PHONE NUMBER...../ [REDACTED]  
 RELATIONSHIP TO CASE...../ PORT ENGINEER  
 PLACE ON POL. VIO. WITNESS LIST/

LAST NAME...../ TYRRELL  
 FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INIT.../ DONALD  
 ADDRESS - LINE 1...../ 490 L'ENFANT PLAZA EAST  
 ADDRESS - LINE 2...../ [REDACTED]  
 CITY...../ WASHINGTON  
 UNITED STATES:  
 STATE...../ DC ZIP/ [REDACTED]  
 PHONE NUMBER...../ [REDACTED]  
 RELATIONSHIP TO CASE...../ NTSB INVESTIGATOR  
 PLACE ON POL. VIO. WITNESS LIST/

CASE/ MC00016168 PORT/ NYCM1 SUBJECT/ PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN/FIR DATE/ 17NOV00

--- COMMENTS ---

Note: 46 U.S.C. 6308 prohibits a Marine Casualty Investigation report from being admissible as evidence or subject to discovery in any civil or administrative proceedings, other than administrative proceedings initiated by the United States. It also prohibits an employee, investigating the casualty, from being subjected to deposition without permission from SECDOT."

Summary:

On November 17, 2000, at approximately 1852, the vessel Port Imperial Manhattan departed from pier 78 (38th street) bound for Lincoln Harbor terminal in Weehawkin, New Jersey. The vessel had eight passengers on board and was equipped with a Coast Guard licensed captain and two crewmembers. Shortly after leaving the dock the vessel lost propulsion and steering controls. At the same time, the Captain saw smoke coming from an engine room vent which was in view of the wheelhouse. Shortly thereafter, a crewmember discovered a fire in the engine room. The crew attempted to put out the fire with two portable fire extinguishers. The crew could not put out the fire and all passengers and crew abandoned the vessel. The passengers and crew were transported to another company vessel, the George Washington, which had positioned itself off the bow. No injuries were reported.

Findings of Fact:

(1) Crewmembers Involved:

(a) Master: Duke Anthony Siozon, license serial number #851253 issued on 23Jun99. 30 years old. Has worked in the marine industry for approximately six years. Has been a NY Waterway employee since January 2000. Recently promoted to Captain position in May 2000.

(b) Senior Deckhand: Felipe Gonzalez, 20 years of age, had been working for the company for the past 19 months. Mr. Gonzalez did not hold, nor was he required to hold any merchant mariner credentials.

(c) Deckhand: Carlos Sosa, 27 years of age had been worked for the company the past 18 months and did not hold any merchant mariner credentials.

(2) Vessel Particulars:

(a) Built by Gulf Craft, Inc., (year 1987)

(b) Aluminum hull

(c) Length: 87.2 feet

(d) Breadth: 24.4 feet

(e) Gross tonnage: 94

(f) Propulsion: 2 750 HP Caterpillar Diesel engines

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--- COMMENTS ---

(3) The vessel had a valid Certificate of Inspection (COI), issued on 07Jul99. The vessel was found to be operating in compliance with that certificate while carrying the eight passengers on the Hudson River. Under these conditions, the vessel was required to have one licensed captain and two deckhands.

(4) The crew assumed their duties some time after 1400 for the evening operations. No problems were reported to Captain Siozon from the off going crew. The boat continued to make its midtown runs until the vessel suffered a loss of propulsion at approximately 1852. The senior deckhand was driving the boat and reported to the Captain (who was eating his dinner in the wheelhouse) that the throttle was losing air. Captain Siozon directed the senior deckhand to the engine room to investigate. During this time, Captain Siozon saw black smoke coming from the port ventilator that led to the engine room. Captain Siozon radio another company vessel to request assistance. Immediately after this transmission, Captain Siozon indicated that he had lost all propulsion, steering and VHF capabilities.

(5) The deckhands attempted to enter the engine room through an access door located inside the main cabin. Both deckhands reported that they had "been-shocked" after touching the door. Subsequent investigations discovered that an electrical harness had collapsed and charged the surrounding metal. Both deckhands reported that they could not enter the engine space due to the smoke and "shooting" flames. The deckhands reported that they had "propped" the engine room access door open with a lifejacket to avoid touching the door while they discharged CO2 into the space.

(6) After losing VHF radio capabilities, a crewmember used Captain Siozon's personal cell phone to reach 911 and the NY Waterway operations manager. Mr. Warren directed the George Washington to proceed to the Port Imperial Manhattan.

(7) The passengers were directed by the crew to proceed to the bow. The Captain then proceeded to distribute lifejackets to the eight passengers. One adult passenger received a child size lifejacket. Many passengers reported that they had a difficult time donning the lifejackets. The deckhands then brought the buoyant apparatus down from the top deck. The deckhands indicated that the poor lighting conditions and weight of the apparatus made this task quite difficult to accomplish without the assistance of passengers. One passenger needed to be restrained after one of the empty CO2 cylinders exploded near the stern.

(8) Shortly thereafter, the George Washington came bow to bow and disembarked all passengers and crew while the fire engulfed the entire main deck area. Several passengers reported that the fire had spread to the bow within minutes of their disembarkation. The New York City Fire Department pushed the vessel to pier 42 where the fire was eventually extinguished. Coast Guard Inspectors were detached from Activities New York to verify that the vessel was fit to be towed back to the Port Imperial ferry terminal in Weehawken, NJ. The vessel docked at Port Imperial at approximately midnight.

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## --- COMMENTS ---

(9) Alan Warren (NY Waterway operations Department) met the crewmembers and passengers as they returned to the NY Waterway terminal. Mr. Warren directed the crew to Palisades General Hospital for drug and alcohol tests. The test results were negative but had to be repeated since the tests were not done in accordance with DOT chemical testing requirements. The following morning the three crewmembers submitted urine samples to Medical Compliance Services (DOT approved). These results confirmed the earlier test performed by the hospital.

(10) On February 22, 2000, CDR Mark Bobal had determined that any NY Waterway vessel with a voyage duration of less than 15 minutes could dispense with the safety orientation announcements provided that they met the placarding requirements in 46 CFR 122.506 (c) and 46 CFR 185.506 (c). The Port Imperial Manhattan had dispensed with the announcements since the vessel was operating on a voyage of less than 15 minutes and had previously established compliance with the placarding requirements.

(11) The subject vessel is not equipped with any fixed fire fighting system. The only fire-fighting equipment on board was (4) 15lb CO2; (1) 10lb ABC dry chemical and (1) 2-1/2lb ABC dry chemical. Under current applicable regulations found in Subchapter T, there is no requirement that the vessel have a fixed fire-fighting system. Both deckhands had attempted to extinguish the fire with the two 15lb CO2 extinguishers. These attempts were unsuccessful, as the crewmembers could not locate the source of the fire from the deck above.

(12) At the time of the fire no crewmember on board had received any formal fire-fighting training. Under NY Waterway policy, Captains were notified when they were required to conduct a fire or man overboard drill. At the completion of the drill Captains were directed to complete a training assignment form with comments. Prior to the fire Captain Siozon had completed 2 fire and 2 man overboard drills with various deckhands

(13) All portable fire-fighting equipment onboard was last serviced on June 5th, 2000 by Sea Safety International. All equipment appeared to be in good working order at the time of the fire.

(14) The Port Imperial Manhattan had emergency instructions posted on the vessel. These instructions contained the actions to be taken in the event of a fire or man overboard condition. In addition, the New York Waterway's Operations Manual contained additional procedures in the event of an emergency situation. Both direct the crew to cut off the air supply to the fire and to close any openings such as hatches, ports and doors. In addition, it directs the crew to secure the fuel, any electrical systems supplying the effected compartment and ventilation. Subsequent investigations determined that the fuel line was secured. However, access doors, ventilation and electrical systems were never secured.

(15) The fire started in the aft port corner of the engine room near the steering gear hydraulic oil reservoir. The heat was so intense that the

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--- COMMENTS ---

aluminum deck had melted away in areas. A "V" shaped pattern on the shell had developed in the vicinity of a junction box in the engine room. The junction box was installed during a conversion in 1992 when the batteries were relocated to the after part of the engine room. The existing cables were not long enough to reach the new battery location so a junction box was installed to extend the cable. Coast Guard approval was not sought for modification and no electrical plans were submitted.

(16) Subsequent investigations determined that the 12-volt DC cables were found to have sustained heavy damage. The wires to this system showed beading indicating the presence of a short. The wire had been completely burned through where a junction box should have been located. A lug (bolt) was identified as the connection for the 12-volt system to the wheelhouse. A more intense search identified a second lug nut directly underneath the junction box's location. Waterway's engineers could not conclusively indicate the wire size. Fire inspector's believed the wire to be #2 (AWG) size wire.

(17) Some time in 1992 the Port Imperial Manhattan's electrical system was modified from a 32-volt system to a 12-volt system. However, many of the connections and fuses were never updated for the change in amperage. Coast Guard and company engineers suspected that many of the fuses were oversized.

Conclusions

(1) Apparent Cause: The cause of the fire appears to be attributed to an incorrect electrical connection within the junction box. The two lug bolts were identified as the positive and negative lead. Overtime, one lug became loose and disconnected. This resulted in a high amperage draw that created intense heat. The heat burned through an electrical harness that subsequently dropped onto a hydraulic tank for the steering system.

(2) Contributing Cause: The electrical wiring appears to be undersized. In addition, many fuses were oversized. The fuses were believed to be 100 amps for a system that had a load of 67 amps.

(3) Contributing Cause: Captain Siozon and his crew were unprepared to handle a catastrophic fire. Prior drills did not adequately prepare the crew to respond in these emergency situations. In addition, Captain Siozon himself was unequipped to evaluate the effectiveness of his crew's performance. Lastly, Captain Siozon and his crew committed acts of misconduct by failing to follow the emergency procedures. By failing to secure the engine room access door and ventilation system, Captain Siozon and his crew accelerated/encouraged the fire to spread into the main cabin area.

(4) Contributing Cause: The lack of a fixed fire fighting system impaired the crew's ability to fight the fire. The intense smoke and flames did not allow for a direct attack of the fire. Absent a fixed system, the crew was afforded little opportunity to extinguish the fire.

(5) Contributing Cause: The electrical modifications should have been subject

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## --- COMMENTS ---

to a review by the Coast Guard. By failing to provide notice of the intended changes NY Waterway precluded the Coast Guard from identifying any deficiencies. Had plan approval been sought it is highly likely that the local Coast Guard office would have identified the undersized wiring and oversized fuses.

## Enclosures:

- (1) Report of Marine Accident, CGform-2692
- (2) Channel 16 VTC recordings 17Nov00 (1850-1950hrs)
- (3) Transcripts of Interviews from NTSB (disk format)
- (4) Videocassette tape of Fire Analysis from NTSB
- (5) Letter from James Sileccia dtd 31MAY01
- (6) NY Waterway Marine Operational Manual Emergency Procedures
- (7) PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN's Emergency Instructions
- (8) CDR M. Bobal letter dtd 22FEB00
- (9) CDR J. Cameron letter dtd 22NOV00
- (10) Capt Allan Warren statement dtd 17NOV00
- (11) SITREP ONE, Major Marine Casualty
- (12) SITREP ONE, Fire Onboard PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN
- (13) Repair Order History for the PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN
- (14) Chemical screening results for Siozon, Gonzalez, and Sosa
- (15) Business card of NTSB Investigator
- (16) NY Waterway drills and Training Assignment forms
- (17) Computer matrix of drills performed for NY Waterway Captains
- (18) Logbook records dated 30OCT00 and 17NOV00
- (19) Passenger List and Notes
- (20) Sea-Safety Inspection Certificates
- (21) Mr. Johansen's letter dtd 20NOV00
- (22) Photos of PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN and NEW JERSEY

CASE NUMBER/ MC00016168

UNIT/ NYCFI

## --- RECOMMENDATION ---

## 1. BRIEF/ FIRE SAFETY TRAINING

ACTION PORT/ GMMI

That the Coast Guard reevaluate the need for formal fire safety training with respect to applicants seeking a 100 GT Masters license. Currently, applicants can receive a license without completing any formal fire safety training or its equivalent. Despite this, T-Boat masters are routinely called upon to conduct drills and direct crew members during the course of emergency situations. Furthermore, the public has been increasingly relying upon these "commuter ferries" as their mode of transportation. Incidents like the Port Imperial Manhattan fire clearly depict the volatility within the small passenger vessel community.

## --- UNIT ENDORSEMENT ---

ENDORSEMENT COMPLETE/ X STATUS/ FORWARDED LAST UPDATE/ 09OCT01  
 Concur. The New York Waterway Ferry vessels carry more than 10 million passengers a year. With reduced crews and the lack of help from licensed Engineers and/or Mates, T-boat Masters in many ways need to know more about firefighting than Masters on larger vessels. Additionally, "New" Subchapter T requires all vessels built after 1996, and many existing vessels to have an installed fixed engine room fire fighting system. Many vessels that are not required to have a fixed system have one voluntarily. These systems are more complex than anything required by the regulations on T-boats prior to 1996. Without assurance that the crews know how to operate the systems, they could just be expensive additions that do not increase safety. Also, many T-boats have installed fixed CO2 systems, which could be deadly to crew or passengers if misused. Our inspectors routinely stress the proper use of, and hazards involved with fixed engine room fire fighting systems during inspections, but added training for licensed individuals could only help.

CASE NUMBER/ MC00016168

UNIT/ NYCFI

## --- RECOMMENDATION ---

## 2. BRIEF/ SISTER VESSELS

ACTION PORT/ NYCFI

Closely inspect any New York Waterway sister vessels to PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN to determine whether they have similar electrical problems that could cause another fire. Take appropriate action if any such problems are located.

## --- UNIT ENDORSEMENT ---

ENDORSEMENT COMPLETE/ X STATUS/ COMPLETE LAST UPDATE/ 09OCT01  
 Concur with IO. Recommendation was completed.

MCCR

MARINE CASUALTY CASE RECOMMENDATION

09OCT01

CASE NUMBER/ MC00016168

UNIT/ NYCFI

--- RECOMMENDATION ---

3. BRIEF/ UNAPPROVED ALTERATIONS

ACTION PORT/ NYCFI

Require New York Waterway to conduct thorough audits of each of their vessel's electrical system to determine whether non-Coast Guard approved alterations have been made. If such unapproved alterations are located, require immediate actions to mitigate risk and allow the Coast Guard to review plans for alterations.,

--- UNIT ENDORSEMENT ---

ENDORSEMENT COMPLETE/ X  
Concur with IO. Planned audits are in place.

STATUS/ COMPLETE

LAST UPDATE/ 09OCT01

MCCR

MARINE CASUALTY CASE RECOMMENDATION

09OCT01

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UNIT/ NYCFI

--- RECOMMENDATION ---

4. BRIEF/ NY WATERWAY MEETING

ACTION PORT/ NYCFI

Meet with NY Waterway officials to stress the importance of working closely with the Coast Guard and following the plan review process any time they plan to make alterations to one of their inspected vessels.

--- UNIT ENDORSEMENT ---

ENDORSEMENT COMPLETE/ C

STATUS/ COMPLETE

LAST UPDATE/ 09OCT01

Concur with IO. Inspectors and IO's have meet with New York Waterways officials several times following this particular casualty and have strongly emphasized the importance of involving the CG in the plan review process for vessel alterations.

(11)

CASE NUMBER...../ MC00016103

DELETED/

1. VESSEL NAME/ PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN

VIN/ D916221

SIG EVENT	TYPE	CLASS	STATE
X 1	FIRE	UNCONTROLLED	NEC

## --- FIRE/EXPLOSION ELEMENTS ---

LOCATION/ ENGINE ROOM

SOURCES:

IGNITION/ ELECTRICAL CABLE

FUEL...../ HYDRAULIC OIL

## --- FIRE/EXPLOSION DEFENSES ---

FIRE INITIALLY DETECTED BY/ VISUAL

FIXED FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT INSTALLATIONS:

IN IMMEDIATE AREA/ N/A

IN ADJACENT AREAS/ N/A

EQUIPMENT USED:

FIXED.../

PORTABLE/ TWO "B2"

## --- EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUIPMENT ---

EQUIPMENT USED WAS INEFFECTIVE SINCE PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS COULD NOT REACH FIRE SOURCE FROM THE ENGINE ROOM ACCESS.

## --- EFFECTIVENESS OF CREW ---

CREW MEMBERS'S EFFORTS HAD NO EFFECT ON THE FIRE.

## --- SMOKE ---

WAS SMOKE A FACTOR IN ANY WAY?/ Y

PROBABLE CAUSE OF SMOKE:

BURNING ELECTRICAL CABLES, INSULATION AND HYDRAULIC OIL.

EXTENT OF SMOKE SPREAD (INCLUDING HOW IT SPREAD):

SMOKE SPREAD FROM FORCED AIR SUPPLY VENTS AND TWO NATURAL SUPPLY VENTS. IN ADDITION, CREWMEMBERS HAD "PROPPED" THE ENGINE ROOM ACCESS DOOR OPEN.

IMPACT OF SMOKE ON FIREFIGHTING EFFORTS:

HEAVY SMOKE RESTRICTED CREWMEMBERS ACCESS TO THE ENGINE ROOM.

## --- DESCRIPTION ---

CASE/ MC00016168

PARTY, MST

1. VESSEL NAME/ PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN

VIN/ D916221

--- PERSONNEL PROFILE ---

AGE...../ 30 HEIGHT/ 64 SEX/ M WEIGHT/ 143

EDUCATION/ UG2 ATTENDED MARITIME ACADEMY?../ N

TYPE OF LICENSE OR DOCUMENT HELD/ CAPT 100GT

TIME IN GRADE...../ 1 YRS 6 MONTHS

TIME ON BOARD PRESENT VESSEL..../ YRS 1 MONTHS

TIME IN INDUSTRY...../ 5 YRS MONTHS

TIME ON WATCH/ 4.0 HRS LENGTH OF WATCH/ 8 HRS NO. OF WATCHES PER DAY/ 1

ADDITIONAL OFF-WATCH DUTIES ASSIGNED?/ N

TIME SPENT PERFORMING OFF-WATCH DUTIES..../ HRS

AMOUNT OF SLEEP IN PREVIOUS 24 HOUR PERIOD/ 8.0 HRS

--- ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL PROFILE INFORMATION ---

Prior to the fire, Captain Siozon had not completed any formal firefighting training. However, current regulations do not require any formalized training as a prerequisite to attaining a captain's license.

--- EVENT FACTORS ---

EVENT/	1	TYPE	CLASS	STATE
		FIRE	UNCONTROLLED	NEC
		CLASS	SUBCLASS	STATE
		CLASS	SUBCLASS	STATE
HUMAN FACTOR./		CONT STRATEGY	REMEDIAL/EMER ACTION	NOT SECURED
PERS ELEMENT/		KNOWLEDGE/PROF	EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	DISREGARDED

MCPA

MARINE CASUALTY PERSONNEL ACTION RECOMMENDATION

03OCT01

CASE/ MC00016168 SUBJECT REF: PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN

D916221

1. NAME/ SIOZON  
COMPANY/

DUKE T.

DELETE/

IPN/ IP01016835

SSN./

MMD/

ISSUE PORT/

LIC/

ISSUE PORT/

ISSUE DATE/

SUBJECT..../ MISCONDUCT

EXP DATE../

DISPOSITION: PREPARE IAPR/ PA01001014

RECOMMENDED ACTION: S&R/ X CP/

DESCRIPTION:

13

MCSI

MARINE CASUALTY SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT SUPPLEMENT

03OCT01

CASE/ MC00016168 SUBJECT REL: PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN

D916221

DELETE/

--- PERSONNEL INFORMATION ---

NAME (LAST, FIRST)	CG LIC	CG MMD	NEITHER	DRUG TEST		--- ALCOHOL TESTS ---		
				URINE SPEC TAKEN	BLOOD TAKEN	BREATH TAKEN	BREATH RESULTS	
SIZON, DUKE	Y	N		Y		Y		NEGATIVE
SOSA, CARLOS	N	N		Y		Y		NEGATIVE
GONZALEZ, FELIPE	N	N		Y		Y		NEGATIVE

MCPI

MARINE CASUALTY PERSONNEL INVOLVEMENT SUPPLEMENT

03OCT01

CASE/ MC00016168 SUBJECT REL: PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN

D916221

SEL	IPN	NAME	ROLE	NATURE
1.	IP92016582	PORT IMPERIAL FERRY CORP	OWNER	MANAGEMENT
2.	IP92016582	PORT IMPERIAL FERRY CORP	OPERATOR	MANAGEMENT
3.	IP01016835	SIOZON DUKE T.	MASTER	CREW

MCNS

MARINE CASUALTY NARRATIVE SUPPLEMENT

03OCT01

CASE/ MC00016168 PORT/ NYCL SUBJECT/ PORT IMPERIAL MANHATTAN/FIR DATE/ 17NOV00

--- COMMENTS ---

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May 31, 2001

VIA TELEFAX AND MAIL  
(718) 354-4224

LT Dan Fitzgerald  
U.S. Coast Guard  
212 Coast Guard Drive  
Staten Island, NY 10305

**RE: MANHATTAN FIRE QUESTIONS**

Dear LT Fitzgerald:

In answer to your questions about the MV Manhattan fire I am providing the following quote from the fire inspector hired by NY Waterway:

**Quote**

After reconstruction of the scene and sifting through the rubble, a pair of 12 volt DC cables was found to have sustained heavy damage. A lug (bolt) was found and identified as a connection for the 12 volt DC power cable that supplied DC power to the wheelhouse. The lug had four wires of the same size, and one smaller wire. Additional investigation found a metal attaching nut that is used to secure wires within an electrical junction box. This nut was still ringed around the 12 volt DC supply cable when found. The DC cables found appeared to be #2 (AWG) size wire.

The DC wires were traced in both directions to identify the supply and the load sides. The supply side of the cable (wires running aft) came from a 100 amp fuse box located across from the step leading into the engine room on the aft bulkhead, centerline. A 12 volt DC knife switch located directly under the steps supplied this fuse box with what appeared to be #2 wire, but was not fused. These knife switches were supplied by the 12 volt DC batteries located directly under the knife switches and were not fused to protect the knife switches. The knife switch and the fuse box were in the "ON" position and the paper fuses after the knife switches were blown apart. The fuses appeared to be 60 to 100 amp rated. Both supply and load wires leading to the fuse box from the knife switch appeared to be #2 wire, as were wires between the fuse box and the junction boxes.

**ENCLOSURE ( 5 )**

PERSHING ROAD, WEEHAWKEN, NEW JERSEY 07087  
INQUIRIES: 1.800.53.FERRY CORPORATE OFFICES: 201.902.8700 FAX: 201.348.9384  
www.nywaterway.com

(15)


The wires running forward from the junction box were traced into the forward bulkhead watertight wire thimble that went to the wheelhouse to power 12 volt DC panels under the bridge. These wires were severed and were located in the rubble. Once reconstructed, they were married up to the 12 volt DC wires that ran aft and had the lug with the connectors on them. These wires also showed signs of shorting and beading.

A more intense search was conducted to find the second lug that would have been in this junction box. The bilges were screened for this lug and wire. After some time, it was located directly under the hydraulic oil tank and directly under where the two wires were originally connected. This was the junction box connection.

Unquote

If you have any additional questions, please contact me at 201-902-8815.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'James Sileccia', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

James Sileccia  
Port Engineer

**NY WATERWAY**

November 27, 2000

**VIA TELEFAX AND MAIL  
(718) 354-4297****CDR J.E. Cameron  
U.S. Coast Guard  
212 Coast Guard Drive  
Staten Island, NY 10305****RE: UNAPPROVED ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS****Dear CDR Cameron:**

We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated November 22, 2000 regarding possible unapproved electrical modifications on our vessels. We share your concern and have engaged the services of Seaworthy Systems of Essex, CT to perform an independent assessment of the safety of our vessels.

As soon as their survey is complete, we will provide you with an action plan to comply with your requirements as stipulated in your letter.

Thank you very much for your ongoing assistance to NY Waterway.

Very truly yours,

**Peter C Johansen  
Senior Director of Marine Operations**

**CC: Andy Kenopensky, Bill Bouffard, Arthur Imperatore, Jr.**

**ENCLOSURE ( 21 )**