

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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In the Matter of: \*  
\*  
"FIRE ON BOARD M/V COLUMBIA" \*  
DOCKET NO. DCA-00-MM030 \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

DATE: June 10, 2000  
Place: Onboard M/V COLUMBIA

INTERVIEW OF:

GLENN SCOTT  
First Assistant Engineer  
M/V COLUMBIA

INTERVIEWED BY:

Mike Jones  
NTSB Human Factors Group Chairman

Tom Roth-Roffy  
NTSB Engineering Group Chairman

Nancy McAtee  
NTSB Fire Group Chairman

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

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MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Today is June,  
Saturday, June 10th about 9:20 a.m.

We are here to interview, introduce yourself.

MR. SCOTT: I am Glenn Scott, first assistant  
engineer.

MR. MIKE JONES: And MR. Scott, what licenses  
do you hold?

MR. SCOTT: Chief engineer, diesel unlimited.

MR. MIKE JONES: And what is your date of  
birth?

MR. SCOTT: December 2, 1947.

MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. When did you report  
aboard the Columbia for this particular rotation?

MR. SCOTT: June 5th.

MR. MIKE JONES: June 5.

MR. SCOTT: Monday.

MR. MIKE JONES: Monday. So you had just  
come on, you had just come onboard really.

MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. How long have you  
been assigned to the Columbia, altogether?

MR. SCOTT: Five years.

MR. MIKE JONES: Five years.

MR. SCOTT: Approximately.

1 MR. MIKE JONES: Have you worked any other  
2 vessels?

3 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

4 MR. MIKE JONES MR. MIKE JONES: For Alaska  
5 Marine?

6 MR. SCOTT: Yes. I have been employed with  
7 the Marine Highway since 1975.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did you come onboard as  
9 a chief engineer?

10 MR. SCOTT: No, I did not. I came on as  
11 dishwasher.

12 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Before that, before  
13 joining Alaska Marine Highway did you work any place  
14 else in the industry?

15 MR. SCOTT: No. Well, yes, I did. As an  
16 ordinary seaman.

17 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. You have to speak  
18 up, please.

19 MR. SCOTT: That was in 1968 and '69, there  
20 were freighters out of San Francisco.

21 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

22 MR. SCOTT: I made three trips, it was while I  
23 was going to college, and --

24 MR. MIKE JONES: What did, how did you serve  
25 onboard those ships? What were you doing?

1 MR. SCOTT: Ordinary seaman.

2 MR. MIKE JONES: Ordinary seaman.

3 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

4 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. I want to get right  
5 to your activities, if you can recall for me your  
6 activities prior to the fire. And I would like you to  
7 walk me either back or forward up to the fire,  
8 whichever is easiest for you to remember, exactly what  
9 your, what your general activities were. And I am  
10 interested in such things as how much sleep you got,  
11 what watches you stood, you know, meals you had, that  
12 sort of thing? That is what is I am interested in.  
13 What would be easier for you, would it be easier for  
14 you to go back a couple of days before the accident and  
15 then work us up to it?

16 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, we could start from when I  
17 boarded.

18 MR. MIKE JONES: When you boarded, okay. Why  
19 don't we do that?

20 MR. SCOTT: I live in Haines, so I have to  
21 deadhead down on one of the other ferries. I come here  
22 and I stay overnight and I come aboard when it arrives  
23 in the morning. And I relieve the watch and get an  
24 idea of what transpired while I was gone.

25 MR. MIKE JONES: About what time do you arrive

1       aboard the ship? Morning, afternoon?

2                   (Pause.)

3                   MR. MIKE JONES: Can you remember whether it  
4       was morning or afternoon?

5                   MR. SCOTT: I am trying to think. It was  
6       morning. It was, I think it arrived around eight  
7       o'clock in the morning.

8                   MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

9                   MR. SCOTT: I came down on Malaspina, it is a  
10      day boat and it leaves here at seven in the morning. I  
11      came down the night before I stayed onboard the  
12      Malaspina.

13                  MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

14                  MR. SCOTT: And then I got off before it  
15      departed on its run of Lynn Canal. And I stayed in the  
16      terminal until the ferry came in. That was about eight  
17      or nine o'clock in the morning.

18                  MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. And so when you come  
19      onboard, you have to sign in or anything?

20                  MR. SCOTT: Yes, we have to sign in, show our  
21      Z card, check with our relief and then we exchange  
22      information. He tells me what is going on.

23                  MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

24                  MR. SCOTT: And then he leaves me a written  
25      note of what happened during the week.

1 MR. MIKE JONES: All right. So, you are  
2 reporting for your watch, it is at this time?

3 MR. SCOTT: I am a day worker.

4 MR. MIKE JONES: Day worker.

5 MR. SCOTT: And I relieve the other first, and  
6 then he is able to leave.

7 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

8 MR. SCOTT: And then I take over the day work.

9 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. So, I am not a  
10 mariner, so you will have to refresh me on what that  
11 means. So do you stand an hourly watch or what is a  
12 day worker?

13 MR. SCOTT: A day worker on here is from six  
14 in the morning until six at night. Work a 12 hour  
15 shift.

16 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

17 MR. SCOTT: And I don't stand a watch.

18 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

19 MR. SCOTT: My duties basically, I work for  
20 the Chief and I am in charge of the engine room, make  
21 sure that maintenance is completed and that the work is  
22 being done in the engine room. I pretty much oversee  
23 it and give advice on it.

24 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Now, you say you work  
25 a 12 hour shift.

1 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

2 MR. MIKE JONES: That is 12 hours on and then  
3 how many hours off?

4 MR. SCOTT: Twelve off.

5 MR. MIKE JONES: Twelve on and 12 off. Okay.

6 And I am going to get back to your duties  
7 there, but tell me a little bit about your sleeping  
8 habits when you are onboard the vessel?

9 MR. SCOTT: I try to stay up until nine or ten  
10 o'clock. And normally I don't sleep more than six  
11 hours.

12 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

13 MR. SCOTT: So, I don't want to get, wake up  
14 at three o'clock in the morning, so I usually try to  
15 stay up as long as I can after six o'clock at night.

16 MR. MIKE JONES: All right. So, six hours of  
17 sleep would be normal for you.

18 MR. SCOTT: That is normal.

19 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Are there any times  
20 when you have gone to sleep and you have gotten  
21 interrupted, you know, you had to go back, you know,  
22 some emergency or something, something needed taken  
23 care of, I mean, has that ever occurred?

24 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

25 MR. MIKE JONES: Is that a frequent event or -

1 MR. SCOTT: No, no, it is not. If they need  
2 me, they will call me any time.

3 MR. MIKE JONES: Did that occur on this trip  
4 before the fire?

5 MR. SCOTT: No. That particular night, I  
6 worked beyond six o'clock, 1800.

7 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

8 MR. SCOTT: Because there was some heating  
9 problem in a state room, one of the heaters not  
10 working, ventilation wasn't working. I had to look at  
11 that and work on it, so I think I worked until about 10  
12 o'clock that night.

13 MR. MIKE JONES: About 10 that night. Okay.  
14 And then what time did you get to sleep that night?

15 MR. SCOTT: I would say 11.

16 MR. MIKE JONES: About 11.

17 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

18 MR. MIKE JONES: And so, the night before the  
19 accident, before the fire, you went to bed about 11,  
20 what time did you get up?

21 MR. SCOTT: About five o'clock.

22 MR. MIKE JONES: About five, okay.

23 And bring me forward. Now, what happened,  
24 what did you do after that, breakfast or anything?

25 MR. SCOTT: Yes, I went down and had

1 breakfast. And I go down to the engine room about  
2 quarter to six, make sure everybody is on watch. We  
3 were having a problem with the freight elevator at that  
4 time. So, that was something we looked at that morning  
5 before the fire. And it wasn't traveling between the  
6 two floors, between this floor and the main deck. So,  
7 we had to try to figure out why. So, we were looking  
8 at that problem up until noon.

9 MR. MIKE JONES: Until noon.

10 MR. SCOTT: Yes. Knocked off for lunch.

11 MR. MIKE JONES: All right. So, that is about  
12 the time of the fire, is that right?

13 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

14 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Where were you then?

15 MR. SCOTT: I was in the mess hall.

16 MR. MIKE JONES: In the mess hall. And how  
17 did you become aware of the fire?

18 MR. SCOTT: We weren't aware of the fire until  
19 we got down there. The lights started to flicker and  
20 go out. So all we knew is that we were losing our  
21 power plant. The generator was going down. And so, we  
22 all jumped up immediately and headed for the engine  
23 room. The emergency generator is on the mess deck,  
24 just around the corner, and we could hear that come on.  
25 And I noticed that the lights were still flickering.

1 And normally when that generator takes over, then the  
2 lights will steady out and that generator takes over  
3 the load. But, I noticed that they just kept dimming  
4 and coming back on and dimming and coming back on. So,  
5 I made a beeline over to the emergency generator room,  
6 to make sure it was working okay. And so, I just  
7 looked inside, everything was running, and I looked at  
8 the gauges and then I went right down to the engine  
9 room. And that is when we were aware that there was  
10 the fire in the control room.

11 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. And what did you do  
12 when you reached the control room?

13 MR. SCOTT: My thoughts on the way down, was  
14 that we had lost power or that we were going to lose  
15 the main engines. I didn't know where our location  
16 was, if we had already entered the narrows and if we  
17 were close to the beach or not. So, my first concern  
18 was to get a main engine up and running again. So, you  
19 have to line up your back up pumps, your cooling pumps,  
20 your diesel oil pump, your jacket water pumps, that,  
21 but when I got down there and realized we had a fire,  
22 then I had looked through the glass window of the door  
23 to see if there was flames, and there wasn't any. Then  
24 that is, that is when we tried the door first, and we  
25 opened it up, we all got down low, and opened the door

1 up.

2 MR. MIKE JONES: When you looked through the  
3 glass, was there a lot of smoke? Could you see into the  
4 room?

5 MR. SCOTT: Not, no. There was, it was just  
6 filled with smoke.

7 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

8 MR. SCOTT: But, I didn't see any orange glow  
9 or anything through that smoke. So, that is when we  
10 decided to crack the door open.

11 MR. MIKE JONES: Right.

12 MR. SCOTT: See if we could see anything.

13 MR. MIKE JONES: Did you see any members of  
14 the engineering watch at that time?

15 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, I think, I know at one  
16 point, I don't know if on my way down I may have seen  
17 somebody up above, but I couldn't say for sure if that  
18 is when I saw them or not. But, I know that within a  
19 short amount of time, that we determined that all the  
20 watch ~~standards~~ were accounted for. That they were  
21 either up at the top of the ladder or there was one guy  
22 that we weren't sure about, and then I saw him shortly  
23 afterwards. So, I knew that all three of those guys  
24 were accounted for.

25 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. You were able to take

1 a head count.

2 MR. SCOTT: Yeah. Yeah.

3 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Let's back up a  
4 little bit, a little bit different, different topic  
5 there. I would like to know a little bit about your  
6 medical history and that sort of thing. Can you tell  
7 me when your last medical physical was, approximately?

8 MR. SCOTT: November of '99, or October.  
9 Probably more like October.

10 MR. MIKE JONES: October.

11 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

12 MR. MIKE JONES: Was this in connection with  
13 licensing or anything?

14 MR. SCOTT: Yes. I was going to sit for my  
15 chief's license.

16 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. So, this was a  
17 physical that goes for that license.

18 MR. SCOTT: Right.

19 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay. Was your vision  
20 checked?

21 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Hearing?

23 MR. SCOTT: They couldn't perform the hearing  
24 test up in Haines, they don't have the equipment to do  
25 it.

1 MR. MIKE JONES: All right.

2 MR. SCOTT: But, I had had my hearing tested.

3 They do hearing test onboard here, on the run, and  
4 that had been done I think in March.

5 MR. MIKE JONES: Did everything check out  
6 okay, everything was normal?

7 MR. SCOTT: On my hearing, high frequency  
8 hearing --

9 MR. MIKE JONES: High frequency, working  
10 around engines maybe.

11 MR. SCOTT: Well, no, probably from, that was,  
12 I knew about that in high school.

13 MR. MIKE JONES: Okay.

14 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

15 MR. MIKE JONES: This is a long term.

16 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, a long term thing.

17 MR. MIKE JONES: Are you currently taking any  
18 medications?

19 MR. SCOTT: No.

20 MR. MIKE JONES: The night before the fire,  
21 were you taking any over the counter stuff, any cold  
22 medications or anything like that?

23 MR. SCOTT: No.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. Anybody have  
25 anything right now?

1 (Pause.)

2 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: I would like to go a  
3 little bit more and get some more details on your  
4 activities immediately before the lights were  
5 flickering and progressing into, you know, what you  
6 did, what you saw, what you heard, who you talked to,  
7 who talked to you? If you could just, you know, think  
8 back and kind of work us through from the time, say you  
9 were sitting here in the mess hall having your lunch,  
10 who was sitting with you, and what the first  
11 indications of a problem were and provide us as much  
12 detail as you can about, again, what you heard and saw?

13 MR. SCOTT: I was sitting at the table with  
14 the chief engineer, Allan Lee, the second engineer, Pat  
15 Watkins, and day third, Stan Jones. I can't remember  
16 what we were talking about, probably all had our mouths  
17 full. It was shortly after, we went up earlier,  
18 normally we just go up there and eat between 12 and  
19 12:30, but we had a scheduled fire and boat drill at  
20 12:30, so we go up about 15 minutes early, allow us  
21 enough time to eat and then go get our jackets and hats  
22 and gloves and life jackets. And I think the official  
23 time was 12:07, that -- well, the official time of the  
24 lights flickering. I don't know, I think the entry log  
25 on the general alarm was 12:07, I am not sure. But, it

1 was shortly after noon that we, the lights started to  
2 flicker and dim quite a bit. And we just automatically  
3 jumped up and head for the engine room. Because we  
4 know that is where the problem coming from. And so, we  
5 just dropped everything and headed that way. And I  
6 just took a quick detour over and checked that  
7 emergency generator, make sure it was okay. We heard  
8 it start up, but the lights continued to burn  
9 erratically. And that wasn't normal. So, I went in  
10 and make sure that the emergency generator stayed on  
11 and it was still running, and I just quickly glanced at  
12 the gauges and then headed down to the engine room.  
13 The chief was already there and the third assistant.  
14 And I am not sure where I run into the watch standards,  
15 if they were up on the car deck or close proximity to  
16 the control booth. But, that is when I was told that  
17 there was a fire in the control booth.

18 And so we took a peek in, and noticed there  
19 was just too smoke to enter. So, we closed the door  
20 back up again. And we took a head count, and everybody  
21 was accounted for. At that time, I believe that we  
22 had, the OBAs were, were available. And it was our  
23 concern to open that emergency bus tie to the generator  
24 and try to kill some of the power to that board. I  
25 know, I went down and we looked at the generator to see

1 what generators were running, I remember walking down  
2 there with the chief, and number one was still on the  
3 line, or was still running, whether the breaker was  
4 still open or closed, we didn't know that. So, we put  
5 on our scott air packs, and entered with, we had a  
6 rechargeable flashlight that was pretty bright. I ran  
7 in and got that because I knew that the flashlights we  
8 had wasn't going to be enough light to see through that  
9 smoke. So, I entered with Stan Jones and the Chief  
10 opened the door for us and we crawled in.

11 And Stan wasn't sure where the breaker was,  
12 so, I know we told somebody that we needed a life line  
13 to go in, and somebody brought us that. And we hooked  
14 that onto Stan's belt. And so, I followed Stan in and  
15 kept a hand on him.

16 Mike, you probably know where that emergency  
17 bus tie is by now, and we made it through the room,  
18 keeping our distance away from the board. And we got  
19 to the approximate location and started shining the  
20 light and it is marked with the yellow strips. So, I  
21 knew that was the one. And I think Stan reached for it  
22 first, but he has told me that he saw some blue spark  
23 that made him pull away from it, with his hand. So, I  
24 reached over with the butt of the flashlight, and hit  
25 the breaker with that. And then we started to back out

1 and there was still breakers that were close, so I just  
2 kept hitting those with the butt of the flashlight, and  
3 probably broke the bulb because the light went out.  
4 But, the third breaker that I hit sparked, it was a  
5 pretty big spark. So, we decided that that we should  
6 back out, and not attempt to open any more breakers.

7 And when we got out, I had a discussion with  
8 the Chief about just killing the generator, turning  
9 the, hitting the stop switch on that generator so we  
10 don't have that power secure for that bus and to that  
11 board. And that is when we turned that generator off.

12 And --

13 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Which generator?

14 MR. SCOTT: Number one. And then we were, I  
15 was still concerned about our location, whether we were  
16 heading for the rocks or the beach. And so, I went  
17 down and started lining up pumps for that starboard  
18 engine, because that is our emergency engine. All our  
19 pumps on the E circuit are on that engine. So, I  
20 started opening the values for the salt water cooling,  
21 and the jacket water cooling, and then I tried to test  
22 that fire pump. The fire pump is what we use for our  
23 salt water cooling and that is the one that we always  
24 test during our drills, that is the one, once a week we  
25 line those valves up, and we run on the emergency

1 system on our regular power, not the emergency  
2 generator, but just our pumps. And we test those once  
3 a week. And we always run that main engine fire pump.  
4 Well, that didn't start. So, I thought, you know,  
5 what is wrong with this? It should run on this  
6 emergency circuit, emergency generator. So, I reported  
7 to the car deck and told the mate, I said, we don't  
8 have a fire pump. And I asked one of the other  
9 engineers that was standing up there, I said, let's  
10 find this controller for this pump and find out what is  
11 wrong with this, and it won't start. So, we checked  
12 our motor controllers down there in the engine room.  
13 We found two of them, and we have three fire pumps.  
14 And we tried to start them locally at the controller,  
15 and neither one of those started. I said, there is a  
16 third one, let's find that third one. And so, I just  
17 gave the order, I said, find that third controller and  
18 let's get this fire pump going. And I think at that  
19 point we decided to go back in and, with the Co2. So I  
20 got involved back in the, fighting the fire, cooling  
21 things down.

22 So, we entered the control room again. There  
23 was some alarms that were going off. One was just for  
24 the sound powered phone when the bridge tries to call,  
25 anybody tries to call, we have rotating beacons and

1 enunciators, alarms down there that sound. I wanted to  
2 silence those so, we didn't have all that extra noise  
3 to deal with. And I am not sure if it was after we  
4 shot it with the Co2, after we entered and all we could  
5 do, we just went in a short distance and put the Co2 up  
6 through the vents of the control board because all of  
7 those panels were still in tact at that time. So, that  
8 is the only access we had with the vents.

9 And then we backed back out again and I knew  
10 where the alarm, the breaker for those alarms was  
11 around closer to the other door on the port side, so, I  
12 went around on the port side and I entered again in the  
13 control room and got to that breaker and turned off the  
14 alarm.

15 There was another alarm for, I think low  
16 boiler pressure, and that was close by, so I went in  
17 there and secured that alarm for the boiler.

18 And then I think that, well, the Coast Guard  
19 then, I am not sure what time they arrived, but their  
20 fire fighting team showed up. And I took them down and  
21 assessed them of the situation up on the car deck, and  
22 then I took them down and showed them the control room,  
23 where it was. And then they opened the door up to see  
24 how bad it was. And at that time, I think we could see  
25 maybe a foot underneath the smoke for maybe 10, 15

1 feet. And at that time, I think we might have seen  
2 some glowing embers or small flames on the control  
3 board, on the breakers. And they entered the control  
4 room and shot Co2 on them. So, there was still a lot  
5 of heat in there and up high. The concern was of the  
6 overhead, maybe the overhead could be on fire.

7 So, I think before we addressed the overhead,  
8 they wanted to start pulling the panels off, so, we  
9 could assess the interior of that control board. So,  
10 Stan Jones and myself, went in with screw drivers. At  
11 that time the visibility was improved quite a bit. At  
12 one point they opened the emergency escape hatch and  
13 let some smoke out that, through the hatch. And so, we  
14 started pulling the panels off, the breakers were  
15 coming with it, on some of them. They were just  
16 falling out. And some of them, I had to put screw  
17 drivers on them. Some of them were, had flames coming  
18 off the back of the bottom and they wanted to take  
19 those off. They kept hitting them with Co2 but they  
20 wouldn't go out. But, they wanted to remove them from  
21 the area. And everything was dropping on the floor at  
22 our feet. So, I picked up one that was still, was on  
23 fire, small flames, so high, baked like material and I  
24 just turned it upside like that and carried it out, set  
25 it on a steel bench so they could deal with it then,

1 smother those flames. And so, we got all the hot stuff  
2 off the board and they were able to shoot more Co2 in.

3 And I think at one point there was some dry chemical.

4 I think it was about four o'clock, four hours  
5 later, that there was concern about that overhead being  
6 still so hot. And I said, well, there is probably some  
7 type of insulation and what not, so we tried to get  
8 that steel panels off of that overhead, but the screws  
9 weren't coming out very easily. We got a few of them  
10 out, so, we could pry one edge down, pry it down until  
11 we could look in there, you know, determine that  
12 nothing was on fire in there. And they wanted to cool  
13 down the car deck, the overhead, because there was cars  
14 parked right over the top of it.

15 And I think that is when I went back into the  
16 shaft alley, to start the third fire pump. I didn't  
17 know that they had already found the controller, so  
18 when I told them to go find the controller, I didn't  
19 tell them to turn the pump on, but they did find the  
20 controller, which was located over in the steward's  
21 quarters aft, and it was outside of the engine room.  
22 And when I had found out and what I had forgotten was  
23 that there is a selector's switch on that E circuit,  
24 and you have your choice of two fire pumps, one in the  
25 shaft alley, and the one in the main engine room. And

1 it was set, on the one in the shaft alley, so that is  
2 why we couldn't start that main engine fire pump. But,  
3 they had located that quite a bit earlier.

4 But, I had gone down into the and opened the  
5 water tight door, the shaft alley, I had to have  
6 somebody hold the switch to keep the door open for me  
7 when I went in, because it will automatically close  
8 because it is tripped up at the bridge, until they  
9 reset, it wouldn't stay open. So, I had somebody just  
10 hold the electric part opener. And so, I went in there  
11 and started the fire pump locally. And it worked. I  
12 left it on slow speed, to give us about 30, 40 pounds  
13 of pressure. I figured that would be enough water to  
14 cool down the, you know, to flood the car deck to cover  
15 the deck.

16 I went back up and told the mate, we have  
17 water available. And that is when they, they already  
18 had, they had their hoses out since the start. So,  
19 they just started to put water on the car deck, right  
20 over that area of the control room. And he asked me,  
21 shall we do the outboard sites of the two aisles and I  
22 said, yes, just get everything. And there wasn't any,  
23 very little steam, and I think that might have been  
24 residual from just the temperature of the decks, the  
25 floor. I don't think there was much heat that had gone

1 up there because the water, it didn't, it was boiling,  
2 it wasn't steaming. It was just, there was some  
3 evaporation to the water.

4 And I think that is when they started their  
5 evacuation. I noticed that they let the passengers  
6 down on the, the after stairwell, so there was people  
7 walking through of the cars, trying to get their way  
8 forward. And I just remember telling the passengers,  
9 watch their step because the car deck was wet. And I  
10 think at that point, they determined that the fire was  
11 out. I think there was a couple of reports to the  
12 bridge that the fire was out way before that because we  
13 didn't see any flames until actually opening it up.

14 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Just a couple of  
15 follow up questions.

16 You said that when you first entered the  
17 control room, shortly after you got down there, which  
18 doors did you enter through?

19 MR. SCOTT: It was on the starboard side.

20 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Now that is the door  
21 closest to the switchboard panels that were affected?

22 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

23 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And you said that Stan  
24 said he saw a blue flash, did he tell you that while  
25 you were in this phase or afterwards?

1           MR. SCOTT: No, no. I know I jumped back and,  
2           and, I don't know if we had voice communication. Yeah,  
3           I am sure we had voice communication and he says, no, I  
4           can't touch that, or something to that effect, that it  
5           is hot. But, at that point he didn't say he saw a  
6           spark. And I didn't see a spark. It was later on when  
7           he related that to me.

8           MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, when he told  
9           you that, you thought it was hot temperature and that  
10          is why --

11          MR. SCOTT: No, I thought it was electrically  
12          hot. And I didn't want to touch it either. I had a  
13          plastic flashlight, and I just hit the top of it, of  
14          the breaker.

15          MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Did you see any kind of  
16          arc or spark when you did that?

17          MR. SCOTT: Not on that one. No.

18          MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: At that time were the  
19          main lights, lighting system still on or were they  
20          still flickering or what did you see and when do you  
21          recall the lights actually going out and staying out?  
22          And did they come back at any time?

23          MR. SCOTT: They flickered a few times when we  
24          were down there. And I couldn't say exactly when they  
25          did settle out. Because there are lights down there

1 that will, aren't on the E circuit, they are just on  
2 the main generator. And I couldn't say whether they  
3 were all out at that time and it was just on the  
4 emergency lights. I know after, you know, we secured  
5 the ship service generator, that the lights weren't  
6 flickering anymore. We were just on the emergency  
7 lighting.

8 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And when you first, you  
9 were having lunch and you noticed the lights were  
10 flickering, how long did that flickering off and on,  
11 dimming, etc., how long did that go on, how long did  
12 that, did you notice that condition?

13 MR. SCOTT: I noticed it all the way down to  
14 the engine room, and when I got down to the engine  
15 room.

16 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: When you stopped in to  
17 have a look at the emergency diesel generator, you say  
18 it was running, you looked at the gauges, do you happen  
19 to remember if the breaker was closed and what the  
20 status of the bus tie was?

21 MR. SCOTT: No, it is an internal breaker. It  
22 is all automatic and --

23 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Did you happen to look at  
24 the, do you have a KW or amp meter ratings on that, did  
25 you happen to look at those?

1 MR. SCOTT: Yes, they are, but there was such  
2 a low load, I, you know, barely noticeable. I know it  
3 was up off zero. But, I couldn't say what it was. And  
4 I didn't want to, want to take the time to study it  
5 that hard.

6 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: So, essentially the  
7 generator was supplying power.

8 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

9 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Now, before you  
10 made entry, you said that you peeked in the first time  
11 and there was too much smoke to enter and that some  
12 OBAs showed up. Where did those OBAs, actually there  
13 self contained breathing apparatus, right? Where do  
14 they, who brought those down and where do they come  
15 from?

16 MR. SCOTT: The fire and emergency squad  
17 brought them down. We have an emergency gear locker,  
18 just aft of the engine room, and I think maybe one of  
19 our crew that was on the scene first might have grabbed  
20 the scott air pack and brought it to the scene. And  
21 then the emergency squad showed up, and we told them we  
22 needed more bottles and more extinguishers. So, they  
23 were bringing all that to the scene. And then one of  
24 the deck crew was all suited up too, and that was, he  
25 was all suited up, but we didn't want to send him into

1 the control room, because he wasn't familiar with the  
2 location of the breakers and all of that. So, we  
3 decided that we should go in ourselves.

4 I know somebody had --

5 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: After you had suited up,  
6 put on your SCBA, did you and I know it was very dark,  
7 the smoke was completely filling the room, is that  
8 correct?

9 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

10 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Did you see any smoke or  
11 flames as you were passing by that --

12 MR. SCOTT: I didn't see any flames, no.

13 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Any arcing or anything  
14 going on in the interior --

15 MR. SCOTT: No.

16 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: i.e. the switchboard?

17 MR. SCOTT: No.

18 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: So, basically it was  
19 thick, black smoke.

20 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

21 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: That is about all I have  
22 for the actual fire event. I would like to now ask you  
23 a few questions about, before the fire event, any sort  
24 of electrical problems that you may have had, that you  
25 can recall either on the main switchboard or any other

1 electrical panels, you know, within the last six months  
2 or so.

3 MR. SCOTT: Well, we were in the yard for the  
4 last six months. So, we had the problems with number  
5 two and three generator after the shipyard put them  
6 back together. I am sure you heard about those from  
7 Alan.

8 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Yes, I think if you would  
9 please, I think you were there at the time, were you  
10 relief chief or --

11 MR. SCOTT: I was working first and I was in  
12 charge of doing the main engine overhaul and running  
13 the rest of the crew.

14 (Tape #1 ended. Continue on Tape #2.)

15 MR. SCOTT: I'm one of the few crew members that  
16 experienced an overhauling of these main engines so I  
17 was involved, pretty involved, in pulling wrenches on  
18 that and then trying to line up the rest of crew with  
19 the various jobs that we have. I have an overhaul list  
20 of jobs that were done.

21 I was working relief chief when they had the  
22 problem with the panel that the shipyard installed.  
23 The one shipyard worker that had to go the hospital, I  
24 have a record of that in the logbook. I made an entry

1 in there. That morning we were working on the elevator  
2 and so we were in that control panel, all of the  
3 switchboard up there just, cleaning contacts and trying  
4 to figure out why that wasn't operating correctly. So  
5 we were doing some troubleshooting on that problem.  
6 Nothing on the main switchboard. We've had problems in  
7 the past on those breakers and the main generator  
8 breaker, the mechanics in there, the spring's not  
9 recharging, things like that. We carry a spare on  
10 board that we use and we always send those out;  
11 anything that goes wrong with those we send them out to  
12 have them rebuilt. Unless it's an obvious broken wire  
13 or something, maybe the holding coil or something,  
14 broken shear pin, or something obvious to us that we  
15 can fix, we'll fix it here. Most of the time we'll  
16 send it out to an electric shop to have those repaired.

17 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, the number two  
18 generator has a spare breaker in it now. Do you call  
19 that a spare breaker because it's different than one  
20 and three?

21 MR. SCOTT: It depends on the rotation --

22 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Right.

23 MR. SCOTT: -- I mean, we'll take one out and  
24 put the spare in and then when we get the repaired one

1 back, it becomes our spare.

2 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And when was that number  
3 two breaker installed? Was that the last one that you  
4 rotated out?

5 MR. SCOTT: I couldn't say for sure.

6 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: It's been a while?

7 MR. SCOTT: It's been well over a year. I'd  
8 have to check the computer, our maintenance log, to  
9 see. It would be entered in there and it would have a  
10 serial number of the breaker and the date.

11 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Have you had any  
12 problems with the synchronizer or the voltage  
13 regulators in the past few years that you can recall?

14 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

15 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe these  
16 problems as best as you could?

17 MR. SCOTT: The SPMA synchronizer, they're  
18 located at the generator. There are two contacts in  
19 there, the terminal board where all the wires are  
20 hooked up. There's a normally open switch in there and  
21 they have failed on us before and they've welded shut.

22 I guess they're just a really fine contact and we've  
23 had problems with those over the years. And so, when  
24 they start a generator up and go up the parallel one,

1 they'll put it over on check and that automatic  
2 synchronizer will -- with the lights and it will take  
3 up to twelve o'clock and you know it's synchronized and  
4 it will automatically close when you put it over into  
5 the closed position. But you put it in the check  
6 position first.

7           What would happen is that as soon as you put  
8 it over into the check, that breaker would  
9 automatically close before you put it over in the  
10 closed, because those contacts are welded shut. So,  
11 but they brought in an electrician, Tech Rep, and what  
12 he's done is he determined that there was just too much  
13 voltage for such small contacts in the SPMA and so he  
14 put a relay in so it would be able to handle that  
15 initial charge and it would take the load. So we had  
16 all three generators installed with these new relays  
17 and we haven't had any of that problem since.

18           MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Any other problems with  
19 the synchronizers or voltage regulators or any of the  
20 controls to the generators that you may recall?

21           MR. SCOTT: Other than when they had put  
22 those generators in and they didn't get the wiring back  
23 in correctly and I wasn't involved directly with what  
24 they've done. Our other first engineer was involved

1 with that and I know he spent several days trying to  
2 get that straightened out. Evidently, whoever took all  
3 the wires apart are not the same person that put them  
4 back and they weren't marked very well so things didn't  
5 get put back properly. And we found this out before we  
6 went on the run. So, as soon as the job was completed,  
7 we were testing everything.

8 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And were you aboard for  
9 the Certificate of Inspection testing to be done by the  
10 Coast Guard?

11 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh.

12 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: And can you describe  
13 that, if there were any problems, and what they might  
14 have been in the area of electrical equipment,  
15 switchboards, reverse power relays and any of the  
16 testing that you did for that COI, if you could?

17 MR. SCOTT: No, it all tested out. We tested  
18 all the reverse current relays and low lube oil  
19 shutdowns and all that prior to the inspection and when  
20 they come on board everything worked properly. Tested  
21 all those reverse current relays and low lube oil  
22 shutdowns, over-speed.

23 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Can you recall what  
24 setting you put on the reverse power, how many seconds

1 before they shut?

2 MR. SCOTT: No, it's -- the way that we test  
3 them is we parallel to and then we'll go down and we'll  
4 turn the selector switch for the idle and slow speed,  
5 idle and run speed and we just turn it on idle and when  
6 the RPM's, the engine slows down, then it will trip,  
7 ultimately, on the one that's going off-line. The one  
8 that you're losing. The power thing, that will open  
9 up, that reserve power relay.

10 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Do you know if there are  
11 835's or discrepancies written during the COI by the  
12 Coast Guard?

13 MR. SCOTT: No, I don't. From the  
14 engineering, I don't think we got any 835's. I know he  
15 was making a lot of notes because when we tested the  
16 low lube oil shutdown, there was not a remote, an alarm  
17 up the control booth, but I don't think that we got an  
18 835 for that. It was something that we had to check to  
19 find out and I determined that the way that we tested  
20 it, we weren't actually testing the alarm, we were just  
21 testing the shutdown because that was on a different  
22 switch. You weren't going to get the alarm by testing  
23 it the way we did. We were actually just testing the  
24 shutdown is what we were doing.

1                   MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, I'm going to go  
2 ahead and let one of the other investigators -- I may  
3 have some other questions and then we come back to it.

4                   MR. SCOTT: Okay.

5                   MS. MCATEE: Okay, just a couple of questions  
6 about the work down in the yard. You mentioned that  
7 there was an injury. Do you know what the nature of  
8 what work that they were doing, I mean, what exactly  
9 happened?

10                  MR. SCOTT: It was the new cable that they  
11 brought up from the control board that we're all aware  
12 of, the one that come in through the auxiliary engine  
13 room, through the bulkhead, so that P4-13 breaker and  
14 it feeds the P2 power panel in the auxiliary engine  
15 room. They upgraded, I mean, not the auxiliary, the  
16 emergency generator room, it's where the P2 panel is.  
17 They upgraded from a 200 amp to a 400 amp to supply  
18 power to our high speed rescue boat and service boats.

19                  One of the workers, evidently, I didn't  
20 witness it, but the cable was hot when they were  
21 pulling, try to pull it through the stuffing box or to  
22 the breaker panel, the new panel that they put in  
23 there, and went through the insulation and shorted it  
24 out and he was sent to the hospital and I have that

1       documented in our official log book.

2               MS. MCATEE:   Could you get a copy of that?

3               MR. SCOTT:   Uh-huh.

4               MS. MCATEE:   What happened as a result?  What  
5       other changes or repairs had to be made in that panel  
6       because of that?

7               MR. SCOTT:   Well, they had to remove the end  
8       of that cable because it was destroyed.  They couldn't  
9       use it.  So that made the cable too short so they had  
10       to bring in another piece and splice it.  So they had  
11       to go back about fifteen feet to get a straight run or  
12       where wasn't any bends or anything where they could get  
13       a good splice.  And they used the approved splice kit  
14       to put it together.

15               MS. MCATEE:   At the time of the fire, when  
16       you went down below, you said you had checked the  
17       emergency generator to make sure that it was running  
18       properly.  Did you also happen to notice the operating  
19       conditions of generators one and two?

20               MR. SCOTT:   When I went down to the engine  
21       room, I went down there with the chief engineer and  
22       number one was running, but it was rocking back and  
23       forth abnormally, picking up a load and dropping and  
24       just -- it was not normal in the way it was operating.

1       Number two was off and I found out that it had been  
2       shut off previously.

3               MS. MCATEE:   Okay, what could cause a  
4       generator to rock like that?

5               MR. SCOTT:   The voltage draw or the amperage  
6       draw, the load on it would make it rock.

7               MS. MCATEE:   You said as you were turning off  
8       breakers that, when you re-entered the space, fully  
9       geared, that you stopped after the third one because it  
10      sparked. Do you recall, by any chance, the general  
11      area, whether it was the panel number one, which is the  
12      one right near the door or panel number two?

13              MR. SCOTT:   It was just at the starboard side  
14      of the emergency bus tie.

15              MS. MCATEE:   Okay.

16              MR. SCOTT:   Because we hit, we opened that  
17      one up first and then we just started working our way  
18      back and the ones that I could see that were down low -

19              MS. MCATEE:   Uh-huh.

20              MR. SCOTT:   -- and I wasn't standing up at  
21      all in that space, we were just crawling out on our  
22      hands and knees backing out and, as we were going,  
23      there were still some that were closed and I hit two  
24      more of those after the emergency bus tie.

1 MS. MCATEE: That's all I have for now.

2 MS. WEAVER: I'm Terry Weaver and I'm a  
3 Survival Factors Investigator and I just want to ask a  
4 couple of questions concerning emergency procedures and  
5 escape from the engine room and a little more  
6 information on fire fighting.

7 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh.

8 MS. WEAVER: Have you fought a fire in an  
9 engine room before?

10 MR. SCOTT: No, I haven't.

11 MS. WEAVER: Are you a member of the fire  
12 team on board the Columbia?

13 MR. SCOTT: No, I'm not.

14 MS. WEAVER: Okay, have you ever had a drill  
15 with the fire team on the Columbia?

16 MR. SCOTT: Yes, I have.

17 MS. WEAVER: Can you describe what occurred,  
18 what caused that to happen if you're not a part of the  
19 fire team?

20 MR. SCOTT: I attended one of the drills, and  
21 just observed. I was up at the scene when they had a  
22 galley fire here once, small galley fire and I was just  
23 up there to help.

24 MS. WEAVER: You mentioned that one of the

1 deck crew, who was a fire fighter --

2 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh.

3 MS. WEAVER: -- wanted to come down, but you  
4 didn't want him to come down?

5 MR. SCOTT: Well, he was ready. He was just  
6 standing by for orders. He was just ready to go in and  
7 fight a fire.

8 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

9 MR. SCOTT: And he did follow us down. He  
10 did come down. He was standing by the doorway. I  
11 didn't want to send him in there to start opening  
12 breakers. He didn't know the location of them.

13 MS. WEAVER: So that was your decision, he  
14 was following your direction?

15 MR. SCOTT: Pretty much. You know, we didn't  
16 give him any order other than, you know, he just was  
17 standing by there and we made the decision to go in  
18 ourselves. He wasn't ready to go charging into the  
19 fire. He was just standing by ready if we needed him.

20 MS. WEAVER: So it was three of you from the  
21 engine room actually fighting the fire?

22 MR. SCOTT: Yes, it was just two of us first  
23 had air packs on.

24 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh. Who was the other

1 person --

2 MR. SCOTT: The chief engineer was just  
3 standing by the door to open the door for us and then  
4 we went in. He didn't have a Scott air pack on at that  
5 time.

6 MS. WEAVER: Was there smoke where he was  
7 standing?

8 MR. SCOTT: It did roll out when we opened  
9 the door up and he related to me later that it got to  
10 be too much for him and he went and got a Scott air  
11 pack too.

12 MS. WEAVER: Who was in charge of the overall  
13 fire fighting methods from the Columbia standpoint?

14 MR. SCOTT: The chief mate.

15 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

16 MR. SCOTT: We had two mates, I believe, on  
17 the scene with all the emergency squad.

18 MS. WEAVER: Did you communicate at any time  
19 with anyone outside the fire area about what was going  
20 on down there?

21 MR. SCOTT: No, I just reported right  
22 directly to the chief mate, who was at the scene. He  
23 had a radio. He was able to communicate with the  
24 bridge.

1 MS. WEAVER: Okay, and so what type of things  
2 were you reporting to him at this point?

3 MR. SCOTT: Probably the first thing is that  
4 we didn't see any flames.

5 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

6 MR. SCOTT: And the second thing I told them  
7 that we didn't have water to fire main. I figured he  
8 show know that. And they would ask about our  
9 conditions. I think I went through seven air bottles  
10 and so they would ask us how it looked and, you know,  
11 how you doing.

12 MS. WEAVER: Was anybody monitoring the use  
13 of the air bottles, to know who was coming in and out,  
14 how much air you might have left?

15 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, yeah, we had a real good  
16 support team.

17 MS. WEAVER: Can you explain what went on  
18 with that?

19 MR. SCOTT: As soon as they came up on the  
20 car deck and they asked me how I was doing on air and I  
21 just said, "Well, check the gauge," so I just turned  
22 around so they could look at the gauge. If I was below  
23 a thousand pounds of pressure, they changed it out.  
24 They had them all organized, the used bottles and the

1 fresh ones and they were rounding up more all the time.

2 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh. How far did you have to  
3 travel from the engine room to the car deck to where  
4 the chief mate was?

5 MR. SCOTT: They were right there at the  
6 door. As soon as you got up the ladder --

7 MS. WEAVER: -- up the ladder?

8 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, and they were standing  
9 right around in that area. Chief mate, both mates,  
10 were on the other side of the car that was parked  
11 there.

12 MS. WEAVER: Did you see any documentation or  
13 keeping any logs or anything that when people were down  
14 there as to what was going on from the chief mates'  
15 perspective?

16 MR. SCOTT: No.

17 MS. WEAVER: So the only way they could  
18 monitor what was going was when you came out to show  
19 them the air packs?

20 MR. SCOTT: That's correct. Yeah, I didn't  
21 have a radio.

22 MS. WEAVER: You didn't have a radio?

23 MR. SCOTT: No, I didn't. I didn't have one  
24 personally.

1 MS. WEAVER: Did somebody have a radio down  
2 in the space where you were fighting the fire?

3 MR. SCOTT: I don't recall one. I don't  
4 know. I don't think so.

5 MS. WEAVER: But you didn't have one?

6 MR. SCOTT: No.

7 MS. WEAVER: Okay, when the Coast Guard came  
8 in, you said initially you thought the fire was out, is  
9 that correct?

10 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh, yeah.

11 MS. WEAVER: And then when the Coast Guard  
12 came in, they started removing panels?

13 MR. SCOTT: No, they didn't immediately start  
14 to remove it. They entered and they shot the Co2 into  
15 the vents just like we did.

16 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

17 MR. SCOTT: And that was when the air had  
18 cleared enough, they let some smoke out that escape  
19 hatch.

20 MS. WEAVER: Okay.

21 MR. SCOTT: And it was clear enough to see  
22 the board. We could the see small flames burning,  
23 going on some of the breakers.

24 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

1           MR. SCOTT: And that's when they asked if we  
2 could start removing those panels and how we get the  
3 panels out. And I said, "Well, they're just screwed  
4 on. There is just four screws that can be taken out  
5 and they can be pulled off." And that's when we  
6 entered with the Coast Guard and started removing the  
7 panels so they could get access.

8           MS. WEAVER: Based on the procedures of  
9 responding to a fire, what would have happened if the  
10 Coast Guard weren't able to assist in a situation like  
11 this, are you aware of any procedures, how it would  
12 have been handled if they weren't able to assist you  
13 down in the engine room?

14          MR. SCOTT: Well, I think we would have  
15 continued right along the same avenue as the Coast  
16 Guard would have.

17          MS. WEAVER: You said the deck personnel went  
18 down and you said they weren't familiar with that  
19 space. Are any of the other fire fighters trained to  
20 fight an engine room fire?

21          MR. SCOTT: I'm sure they are.

22          MS. WEAVER: And the team?

23          MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh. Not that they weren't  
24 familiar with the engine room.

1 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

2 MR. SCOTT: We went in particularly to open  
3 some breakers and I knew he wouldn't know where those  
4 breakers were.

5 MS. WEAVER: Right, okay. I have one  
6 question about the safety equipment in the engine room.  
7 What type of safety equipment do you have?

8 MR. SCOTT: Well, right by the door, we have  
9 an evacuate hoods.

10 MS. WEAVER: How many of those do you have?

11 MR. SCOTT: I think there's two right by that  
12 starboard door.

13 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

14 MR. SCOTT: Those are the only ones I can  
15 think of right now. I'm not sure if there's two on the  
16 other door.

17 MS. WEAVER: Anything else in there?

18 MR. SCOTT: I think there's a Co2  
19 extinguisher inside the space. I'm not 100 percent.

20 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

21 MR. SCOTT: There's some right outside the  
22 door, both areas and they're all marked real clearly.  
23 The bulkheads are painted red so they stand out.

24 MS. WEAVER: Have you ever used a smoke hood

1 before?

2 MR. SCOTT: No, I haven't. I've had a  
3 demonstration of one. I've never had to use one in a  
4 situation.

5 MS. WEAVER: You have lifejackets down there?

6 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, uh-huh.

7 MS. WEAVER: How many people are usually in  
8 the engine room?

9 MR. SCOTT: During a watch, there's just  
10 three people in the engine room that are involved in  
11 the watch and after six o'clock at night until six  
12 o'clock in the morning, they're the only ones. During  
13 the day, there's maybe four or five. If we stop long  
14 enough I can count on my fingers how many day workers  
15 we have.

16 MS. WEAVER: That's all the questions I have.

17 MR. SCOTT: And they would be in and out.

18 MS. WEAVER: Right.

19 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

20 MS. WEAVER: Thank you.

21 MR. SCOTT: Your welcome.

22 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Glenn, I'm Jerry Gentile  
23 with the State Fire Marshall's office.

24 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh.

1 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And I'd like to ask you a  
2 few questions on stuff that you've been saying and so I  
3 might jump around a little bit, but now that you've had  
4 kind of a fire scene, we'll start from there.

5 MR. SCOTT: Okay.

6 MR. JERRY GENTILE: You're up having lunch,  
7 you saw the lights flicker and whatnot, how long was it  
8 that took you to get to the engine room in minutes,  
9 approximately, you know, from here going to the  
10 emergency generators?

11 MR. SCOTT: A minute, a minute and-a-half.

12 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, and do you know how  
13 the general alarm was sounded?

14 MR. SCOTT: No, I don't.

15 MR. JERRY GENTILE: You said that there was  
16 some problems with the ventilator and the heat in a  
17 state room. What was that problem?

18 MR. SCOTT: One of our duct heaters, we pre-  
19 heat our air with steam, there's pre-heaters, the air  
20 is drawn in with the supply fan from the outside and it  
21 runs through a steam heater. It's pre-heated to maybe  
22 55 degrees.

23 Then there's three heaters on the branch  
24 lines that go to the various spaces and that's brought

1 up to maybe 65 degrees. In the state rooms, there's  
2 individual electric duct heaters, with a 440 element in  
3 it. Four hundred and forty volt -- they had complained  
4 that it was too hot in their room and 99 percent of the  
5 time the problem is in a thermostat on the low voltage  
6 control side, which is 24 volts and it's stepped down.

7 A lot of times, it's just -- there's three  
8 dampers in the system. There's two manual dampers that  
9 you can set and lock in and there're open, wide open.  
10 There's an automatic damper that opens and closes,  
11 depending on the heat demand.

12 If it's calling for heat, it will close, it  
13 will close the damper so you have less air to the room,  
14 but it's being heated also. To cool the room, the  
15 heater element contact opens and the damper opens. The  
16 damper is run by the 24 volt. There's a small, maybe  
17 it's a 112 RPM little motor in there.

18 That opens your damper if it's real slow,  
19 turns real slow. A lot of times it's just a shear pin  
20 that goes through the shaft that turns the screw that  
21 opens the damper up. A lot of times that's been just  
22 sheared off so you go in there and replace, put the  
23 shear pin in and then it starts to operate.

24 The damper has two small micro-switches on it

1 that will -- on your control circuit, one has to open  
2 or close for the contacts to operate.

3 Most of the time, it's either that broken  
4 shear pin or it's the thermostat. Most of the time  
5 it's just the thermostat is bad. So we end up  
6 replacing the thermostat. In that case, it was the  
7 thermostat. So we just replaced the thermostat on it  
8 and everything started working the way it was supposed  
9 to.

10 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so then you're pre-  
11 heating this air, coming through with steam pipes,  
12 right, like a radiator or something like that?

13 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, right.

14 MR. JERRY GENTILE: When you came on board  
15 Monday and you talked to your relief, did he or she  
16 have any problems of an electrical nature with the  
17 panels in the control room, with any big major  
18 electrical problems that he or she passed on to you?

19 MR. SCOTT: The P2 panel that was installed  
20 in the shipyard. Evidently, they -- I have his notes -  
21 they lost some ventilation problem and they went into  
22 that P2 panel and found there was a loose connection  
23 that had to be tightened up.

24 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And did that solve the

1 problem?

2 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

3 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And did say whether there  
4 was any arcing?

5 MR. SCOTT: No.

6 MR. JERRY GENTILE: That was just behind --  
7 you had to take the panel, the face of the panel off to  
8 get back through the connections, I'm assuming that?

9 MR. SCOTT: I don't know.

10 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

11 MR. SCOTT: And he was trying to leave the  
12 shipyard, getting back on the run. A lot goes on  
13 coming out of the shipyard. I can't remember  
14 everything that he told me. The only problems that  
15 they had starting the main engines and various things.  
16 The starboard main engine didn't start for them.

17 At one point, the butterfly damper didn't  
18 open. And they found a pneumatic control, that was the  
19 problem. It wasn't electrical. Once they started the  
20 engine and that butterfly valve, which supplies air to  
21 the engine, was closed and it started out with a big  
22 puff of black smoke and it was reported to the engine  
23 room that they had all this smoke coming out of the  
24 stack and what was going on.

1           We pride ourselves with our clean emissions  
2           up there and we've gone through a lot of lengths to get  
3           those engines running good and so that was not usual  
4           for something like that to happen. They had to trace  
5           down the problem for that and they did solve that  
6           problem because, but that was pneumatic.

7           MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so would you happen  
8           to know what kind of water they were coming up in, from  
9           Katchikan? Was it rough, was there blow going on?

10          MR. SCOTT: No.

11          MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

12          MR. SCOTT: No, and they headed south first.

13          They went down to Bellingham and turned around and  
14          came back. I also have his written notes that he made.

15          MR. JERRY GENTILE: If we could get a copy of  
16          that, that would be great. And did you have any ideas  
17          on the elevator, the freight elevator, problem and what  
18          was causing that?

19          MR. SCOTT: No, this one had me stumped  
20          because I do pretty good with that freight elevator. I  
21          can usually figure out what goes on with that and a lot  
22          of times it's the limit switches in the car or a  
23          latching device on the door, the safety switches on the  
24          door that won't allow the car to move if the door is

1 open. And it wasn't any of those things.

2 At one time, we found that there was enough  
3 slack in the door on the second deck, which is the  
4 lowest level where the storeroom is, that an exhaust  
5 fan was pulling enough vacuum in that space to just  
6 crack that door open enough to open that safety switch.

7 This time, I just couldn't figure out why it  
8 would go to other decks and not to this particular  
9 deck. It didn't want to go between the boat deck here  
10 and the main deck, which is the car deck. It would go  
11 to the second deck and then back up to the main deck  
12 and vice versa, but it just didn't want to go from this  
13 deck to that deck.

14 So the other thing I did, I went in and just  
15 cleaned the contacts because we just come out of the  
16 shipyard, there was a lot of blasting sand, a lot of  
17 blasting, a lot of dirt, all over the boat from the  
18 blasting sand and I thought, well, maybe, you know, the  
19 contacts are dirty. And this is a real old contact  
20 system. They don't use that type of system anymore so  
21 all the contacts were all exposed right there where you  
22 can see them and look at them and see if they've been  
23 arcing or anything. It's not integrated circuits on  
24 this board. It's not your modern electronics. So it's

1 real easy to go in and spray electrical cleaner and  
2 touch up the contacts if they need them.

3 So we did that. We went through each one and  
4 made sure that they were closing properly. This, of  
5 course, was with the power secured. We put it back  
6 into service and that didn't solve the problem either.

7 So we starting looking around the card to see  
8 if there were limit switches and the day third did find  
9 a roller that had come off. When the car comes down,  
10 it will touch a plastic roller and then move the arm  
11 over to put it into slow speed. You've got the slow  
12 speed and the high speed limit switches, level  
13 switches, to where it starts to slow down and come to  
14 the floor and he found a roller that was loose. So we  
15 replaced that.

16 I think we still -- I don't think we've got  
17 the problem completely solved as to why it's not going  
18 to that one floor. Sometimes it does and sometimes it  
19 doesn't.

20 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And you're saying that it  
21 bypasses the floor?

22 MR. SCOTT: No, it just won't go to that  
23 floor. When you push the button to go to the main  
24 deck, it doesn't want to go. Sometimes it will,

1 sometimes it won't.

2 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, is this 120 volt  
3 stuff?

4 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, on the control circuit,  
5 it's 110, 120. The motor itself is a 440. It runs the  
6 winches.

7 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, when you said that  
8 the lights were flickering and the emergency generator  
9 is running and it's not normal for them to continue to  
10 flicker once the emergency generator kicks back in, do  
11 you have any idea what might have caused that?

12 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, well, it wasn't just the E-  
13 lights because the other generator was still powering  
14 our, ship's service generator was still powering the  
15 other lights is what I suspect. What flickering I was  
16 seeing was coming from the main generator. It wasn't  
17 the emergency generator and that's what was causing it,  
18 was that other generator down there. Whatever went on  
19 in that circuit board was causing it to run erratically  
20 like that.

21 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, what my  
22 understanding, when the emergency generator starts up,  
23 it should throw that breaker in the panel  
24 automatically?

1 MR. SCOTT: On the emergency bus, yeah.

2 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Right, where the --

3 MR. SCOTT: And that's where the --

4 MR. JERRY GENTILE: -- yellow tape is?

5 MR. SCOTT: Well, it's right in the emergency  
6 generator room also. There's a switch in there. It  
7 automatically switches. The way we tested with that  
8 emergency bus tie down on the control board, that is  
9 your normal generator load that feeds up to this  
10 breaker that's in the emergency generator room. So, to  
11 test to see that your emergency generator comes on,  
12 what you do is that you open that breaker down in the  
13 engine room. That cuts your power to that switch up  
14 here in the emergency generator room. It senses a loss  
15 of power. That's the way that we test it, to make sure  
16 that it comes on automatically.

17 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, have you noticed,  
18 have you been up in the generator emergency room, do  
19 you know whether or not that breaker up there is opened  
20 or closed?

21 MR. SCOTT: It has to be closed.

22 MR. JERRY GENTILE: It has to be closed in  
23 order for that to --

24 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, for these lights to work.

1                   MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, how else would that  
2 breaker trip if the one downstairs didn't fit.

3                   MR. SCOTT: Just a loss of power from the  
4 generator. The fact that the voltage had dropped due  
5 to the damage that was done inside the board. And it  
6 sensed a loss of power up here without opening this  
7 breaker down in the engine room because that threw that  
8 breaker up to the emergency generator room and with the  
9 voltage fluctuation, this breaker opened up here and  
10 the switch automatically took over.

11                  MR. JERRY GENTILE: But that would not go  
12 back down to close, to open that other breaker  
13 downstairs?

14                  MR. SCOTT: No, that would just stay closed  
15 and this one here took, opened up, switched over the  
16 emergency power. So it opened the circuit between that  
17 breaker down in the engine room and the emergency bus  
18 tie up here. So that one, down in the engine room,  
19 remained closed, but this one up here opened to cut  
20 that connection all the way down. Am I making it  
21 clear?

22                  MR. JERRY GENTILE: I think so.

23                  MR. SCOTT: As mud? But it started the  
24 emergency generator and then it's like a three-way

1 switch. It's either connected to that breaker down  
2 there or it's not. It opens this connection and then  
3 goes right to the emergency bus.

4 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

5 MR. SCOTT: From the emergency generator.

6 MR. JERRY GENTILE: So then it would be going  
7 through that --

8 MR. SCOTT: No, this generator -- the  
9 emergency generator wouldn't be feeding that breaker  
10 down there.

11 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Oh?

12 MR. SCOTT: No.

13 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

14 MR. SCOTT: It wouldn't feed back through  
15 that.

16 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, and when you looked  
17 at the emergency generator, you glanced at the gauges  
18 and whatnot, what was your immediate thoughts when you  
19 did that because lights were still flickering and  
20 whatnot and then you check it and you left, why?

21 MR. SCOTT: Everything looked good in there.

22 It was running. I wanted to make sure it was running.

23 I heard it start, but I wasn't sure that it continued

24 to run. And my first thought was that it wasn't

1 running, that it tried to start but didn't run because  
2 of the lights were flickering. So I just ran in there  
3 to check to make sure it was running and it was.

4 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And everything was fine?

5 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, and everything looked fine,  
6 so I knew there were more problems somewhere else so I  
7 headed down to the engine room.

8 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, and you said when  
9 you got down there, you knew there was a fire.  
10 Somebody told you that there was a fire in the control  
11 room?

12 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh.

13 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Who was that?

14 MR. SCOTT: It was one of the watch standers,  
15 Lee or Tom Cook. I'm not sure which one told me that.

16 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And so you already knew  
17 before you got to the control that there was a fire in  
18 the control room?

19 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

20 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, when you went down  
21 to look at generator one, what was number two doing?

22 MR. SCOTT: It had been turned off.

23 MR. JERRY GENTILE: It was turned off.

24 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

1 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And I think you pretty  
2 much explained that the fire pumps weren't working  
3 because the switch, that one switch was off, the ones  
4 that you were trying to start up?

5 MR. SCOTT: Right.

6 MR. JERRY GENTILE: But once that hit, they  
7 were fine?

8 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

9 MR. JERRY GENTILE: If you had to turn those  
10 switches open, okay?

11 MR. SCOTT: But it was located outside the  
12 space. It wasn't on our -- motor controllers, where I  
13 was looking, there was a separate motor controller that  
14 was back in the steward's quarters back there.

15 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so then you checked  
16 the engine, generator number one before you went into  
17 the control room, correct?

18 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

19 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And generator number two  
20 was shut down and generator one was still running?

21 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

22 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, the emergency  
23 generator was running, you got geared up, you went  
24 inside, you guys started to shut the panels down, you

1 got an arc off of the main breaker that you hit with  
2 the flashlight first, should that not have tripped all  
3 the power to those panels because you said that the  
4 third breaker you hit, arced again?

5 MR. SCOTT: Right, that emergency bus tie  
6 doesn't secure the power in that panel down there. It  
7 just supplies the power up to the emergency generator,  
8 emergency switchboard up here. That's all that does.

9 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, good.

10 MR. SCOTT: That's if we were still feeding  
11 it up through this system, we better open that up.  
12 But, no, that board is hot. As long as there's a  
13 generator running back there, all those bus bars  
14 behind, all those breakers, are still -- it's hot.

15 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Would it be helpful to  
16 draw the system?

17 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Probably and --

18 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Could you do that,  
19 Glenn? Just make a brief one line to help understand.

20 (SIDE THREE)

21 MR. JERRY GENTILE: What were you hearing and  
22 thinking when you guys first went in to try to shut  
23 that emergency breaker down and why was it important to  
24 shut that down?

1                   MR. SCOTT: I think the reason was we were  
2 concerned that, maybe, that it was still feeding  
3 through this emergency bus tie. We weren't sure that  
4 this -- I didn't make this decision, but this was the  
5 concern, I believe, that it was still feeding up  
6 through the emergency bus tie or the emergency bus up  
7 here. That could've been the only reason to open this  
8 up.

9                   MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so what were you  
10 hearing when you first --

11                   MR. SCOTT: I was hearing alarms when I went  
12 in there. Somebody, the telephone alarm, that if  
13 you're outside the space and somebody rings the  
14 telephone, you can't hear the little bell on the side  
15 of the telephone so there's an alarm in the engine room  
16 that will go off and beacon that'll light up. I was  
17 hearing that go off and then, at one point, the low  
18 boiler water alarm went off and maybe the generator  
19 alarms, maybe off the PMC board, the alarms on that  
20 board tripped half -- where the controls for the main  
21 engine are. I think there were alarms going off there  
22 too.

23                   MR. JERRY GENTILE: No popping, no arcing?

24                   MR. SCOTT: No, I didn't hear any popping.

1 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, the ~~bake~~  
2 ~~light~~bakelite was burning on some of the breakers on  
3 the outside, did you or the Coast Guard or you guys and  
4 the Coast Guard came in and tried to pull the panels  
5 off to get behind there?

6 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh.

7 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so the breakers  
8 were actually, physically on fire, flames were coming  
9 off of them, you said you brought one apart --

10 MR. SCOTT: Uh-huh.

11 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so then you pulled  
12 the panels off, what did you see inside there? What  
13 was burning? Where were the flames coming from?

14 MR. SCOTT: I didn't see any burning inside.  
15 It was just, the burning, the only burning that I saw  
16 was on the breaker itself.

17 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Once the panels were off  
18 and the breakers are down?

19 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

20 MR. JERRY GENTILE: So, when you looked  
21 inside, after they got the covers off and the breakers  
22 fell out and whatnot, you looked in the back there and  
23 you could not see any flames or sparks?

24 MR. SCOTT: No, I wasn't inspecting it. I

1 backed out of the way. The Coast Guard was still  
2 shooting Co2 in. But I didn't see any other flames,  
3 than what was on the breakers themselves.

4 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

5 MR. SCOTT: At that point, I was just  
6 assisting the Coast Guard.

7 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Did you guys interview  
8 the Coast Guard?

9 MS. McAtee: We tried to get a satellite  
10 phone but it didn't work. We'll call them tomorrow on  
11 the phone.

12 MR. JERRY GENTILE: You said you had problems  
13 with these breakers before and you send them for repair  
14 and that kind of stuff. How recently have you sent one  
15 out?

16 MR. SCOTT: It's been a year ago. I couldn't  
17 tell you for sure, without looking in the maintenance  
18 log. It's in the computer.

19 MR. JERRY GENTILE: But it's been a while?

20 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

21 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so --

22 MR. SCOTT: I'll take it back. I think, when  
23 they had the problems with number two and three, out of  
24 the yard, when they ~~yard~~ when replaced those --

1 MR. JERRY GENTILE: What's number two and  
2 three? Are these breakers?

3 MR. SCOTT: Number two and three generator --

4 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

5 MR. SCOTT: They took the generator ends off  
6 in the shipyard and then put those back on. I think,  
7 at that time, there might have been a problem. I  
8 wasn't involved in doing the work. I think they may  
9 have taken a spare and put in. I'm not sure.

10 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And this was while it was  
11 in dry dock?

12 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, I have some notes of the  
13 other engineer that was here at the time. You can look  
14 at that.

15 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so then that was  
16 generator one and two or two and three?

17 MR. SCOTT: Two and three theyat were  
18 removed.

19 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, and do you know  
20 what the results of -- when you send these breakers out  
21 and they repair them and they come back, do they give  
22 you a report of what was wrong with them and why they  
23 think it failed?

24 MR. SCOTT: Normally, they'll, yeah, they do

1 send a work list and what was replaced. They might say  
2 what failed in there, but, normally, it's a material  
3 list.

4 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Right, but they wouldn't  
5 necessarily say that they had to replace this because  
6 it caused, -- if we could copies of that --

7 MR. SCOTT: They might.

8 MR. JERRY GENTILE: -- for the last year or  
9 so, that will probably be good if all those breakers  
10 that were fixed. Which is number two breaker, for  
11 number two generator?

12 MR. SCOTT: It's one in the middle.

13 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Yeah, but, you know,  
14 which breaker -- oh, you're talking the breaker --

15 MR. SCOTT: Are you talking the P2 breaker or  
16 the P4-12 that they installed?

17 MR. JERRY GENTILE: No, I think, you  
18 mentioned, when you were talking earlier, you said the  
19 number two breaker, is that the number two generator  
20 breaker?

21 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

22 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And where is that  
23 located?

24 MR. SCOTT: That's right in the middle of

1       those two big units.

2               MR. JERRY GENTILE: With the big lever?

3               MR. SCOTT: Yeah, with the lever.

4               MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, I'm sorry, okay.

5       Now, when you were talking about the synchronizers, you

6       said that those old little contacts that kept melting

7       together were replaced with relays and then you stopped

8       having that kind of problem. How long ago was that?

9               MR. SCOTT: That was last year that they were

10       replaced.

11              MR. JERRY GENTILE: Before the season? After

12       the season?

13              MR. SCOTT: I believe they came in during

14       service last year, last summer.

15              MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, now, if one of

16       those failed, would it cause a large amount of voltage

17       to go back to the panel?

18              MR. SCOTT: No, no.

19              MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

20              MR. SCOTT: No, they're, I think ~~they're~~

21       mili-volts that operate them.

22              MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, and that would be

23       something that would be inside the panel on the side of

24       the generator itself, right?

1 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

2 MR. JERRY GENTILE: You had also mentioned  
3 that they had some problems -- that your relief, I  
4 believe it was -- was talking about some wiring that  
5 was not marked right and they had to go in and redo  
6 that stuff. Where was that at?

7 MR. SCOTT: That was on number two or three  
8 generator. ~~Can I look in my notes?~~

9 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Generator?

10 MR. SCOTT: Can I look in my notes?

11 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Yeah.

12 MR. SCOTT: It was on both, two and three.  
13 It was the two that the shipyard replaced.

14 MR. JERRY GENTILE: What did they replace?

15 MR. SCOTT: They took the whole generator set  
16 out; the electric ~~in~~end, the generator itself. They  
17 removed them from the diesel ~~ramp~~end.

18 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

19 MR. SCOTT: Took them up, threw a soft patch  
20 in the ~~dent~~deck --

21 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Rebuilt them?

22 MR. SCOTT: -- and sent them south and had  
23 them inspected ~~it~~ and serviced and then they were just  
24 sent back up here, shipped back up, and the shipyard

1 put them back in.

2 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so this wiring that  
3 was on there that wasn't tagged right, properly, and  
4 stuff, right, was the main generator wires or was this  
5 110 volt stuff --

6 MR. SCOTT: No, it's more of the control  
7 wiring that allows it to go on-line and the reverse  
8 power relay, some of the wires were crossed up on that  
9 and I think to the synchronizing switch --

10 MR. JERRY GENTILE: So it would be some of  
11 the lower voltage, 110 --

12 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

13 MR. JERRY GENTILE: -- okay.

14 MR. SCOTT: Right. It just wouldn't allow  
15 the breaker to close or parallel.

16 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, let's kind of  
17 change gear here and go back to the shipyard, when it  
18 was in dry dock, they said that while you were there  
19 overseeing the installation of that new breaker on  
20 panel one, what we're calling panel one, what did that  
21 entail? What is your supervision of that? Are you  
22 there with them while they're working on it all the  
23 time?

24 MR. SCOTT: No, no, I just happened to be

1 there inadvertently and observing, but they had to go  
2 dead ship and that's why I--

3 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Dead ship is?

4 MR. SCOTT: They secured all the power,  
5 shoreside power, to that board. So we didn't have any  
6 lights or services or anything. We were acting as a  
7 hotel ship at the time, people living aboard so we had  
8 to cut the power to that panel board so that they could  
9 get in there and hook their wires up to this new  
10 breaker. After the accident that they had up here in  
11 the P2 panel, in the emergency generator room, that  
12 they had installed and they had to go back in and  
13 replace -- they put the old breaker back in so they  
14 could restore services again, until they spliced their  
15 new cable, put the new cable in. They had to go dead  
16 ship during that time.

17 MR. JERRY GENTILE: During the splicing?

18 MR. SCOTT: No, just to take those cables  
19 loose and put the old breaker back in.

20 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

21 MR. SCOTT: And restore it back to the way it  
22 was and remove the source of power to that cable so  
23 that they could work on it and restore our services  
24 while they were working on it because it was going to

1 take them so long to do the repairs to it. So they  
2 wanted to restore our services for us so that we could  
3 continue to be the hotel ship and there are various  
4 other boats that are in the shipyard at the time and  
5 those people are living on board. So, to continue to  
6 be a hotel ship, we had to have running water and  
7 whatnot, so instead of taking away our capabilities to  
8 be the hotel ship, they put the old breaker back in,  
9 hooked those back up and got us up and running again.  
10 Then they went down to repair the cable.

11 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, who do you rent  
12 rooms to?

13 MR. SCOTT: We don't rent. It's for the  
14 crew.

15 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Oh, the crew that's  
16 working -- you guys working on the ship?

17 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, the shipyard crew, the  
18 Alaskan Marine Highway employees. They don't pay us  
19 full per diem to stay in hotels. They make us live on  
20 board, in the shipyard, while the repairs are taking  
21 place. If there is crew working on our vessel, we live  
22 on board.

23 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, okay. Okay, so  
24 then where did the power come from that sent this guy

1 to the hospital, the shipyard worker that was in there,  
2 where did that power come from?

3 MR. SCOTT: That come from that P4-13 breaker  
4 that they installed, the new breaker that they  
5 installed in the main switchboard in the engine room.  
6 It came from there --

7 MR. JERRY GENTILE: The one that we're  
8 looking at?

9 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, it came from there and the  
10 cable came all the way up to this P2 panel that's in  
11 the emergency generator room that they installed so  
12 they could supply power to these new service boats. So  
13 they put in the

14 MR. JERRY GENTILE: So the panel was hot  
15 while they were working on it, in the control room, the  
16 one we're looking at? That whole panel was hot?

17 MR. SCOTT: Yes, that was hot. Able ...

18 MR. JERRY GENTILE: From shore power?

19 MR. SCOTT: From shore power. The cable that  
20 they had pulled into the box, and I don't know at what  
21 point of the installation, that he was pulling on a  
22 cable in there -- I'm not a witness to this, I just  
23 heard this -- and he pulled that cable down through  
24 there -- I can't imagine that they were just pulling

1 that cable when it was hot and they haven't hooked it  
2 up to the breaker already. So I think they must have  
3 been just trying to get some more slack, to get more  
4 room, or something in there and they worked through the  
5 insulation and shorted it out.

6 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

7 MR. SCOTT: And it was hot.

8 MR. JERRY GENTILE: The cable was hot or --

9 MR. SCOTT: The cable. The cable was live.

10 MR. JERRY GENTILE: The cable was hot --

11 MR. SCOTT: It was live.

12 MR. JERRY GENTILE: -- the P2 panel, the P2  
13 panel?

14 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, it was already pulled from  
15 the P4-13, and that's the new 400 amp breaker that they  
16 installed down in the main circuit board.

17 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay.

18 MR. SCOTT: All the way up to the emergency  
19 generator room, which is one deck below us here --

20 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And that's where the  
21 accident happened?

22 MR. SCOTT: And that's where the accident  
23 happened.

24 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, I'm thinking it was

1 in the panel that we're looking at, okay.

2 MR. SCOTT: No, the accident happened up --

3 MR. JERRY GENTILE: At the other end -- the  
4 power

5 MR. SCOTT: -- the emergency generator room,  
6 one deck below us, yes.

7 MR. JERRY GENTILE: That kind of answers my  
8 next question, which was: What did it arc on? And  
9 yeah, didn't see any arcing in there so it was at the  
10 other end.

11 MR. SCOTT: No.

12 MR. JERRY GENTILE: I'd like to look at that.

13 Okay, so how often then would you check on the work  
14 they were doing at the panels and in the control room?

15 MR. SCOTT: That wasn't my concern with those  
16 guys because they have state inspectors, yYou've met  
17 Dave ~~Richlyckle~~ (ph) and Tim Polaski (ph). This was a  
18 Federal project, a Federal upgrade, with the new  
19 service boats. So they ~~have~~ had inspectors, state  
20 inspectors, that follow these guys around and make  
21 their own reports on the CIP. Basically, I was  
22 involved in the ship's overhaul, what we do annually on  
23 the boat.

24 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so maybe I'm

1 confused here. I was under the impression that you  
2 were actually there while they were working on the  
3 panel. Was there anybody from the Marine Highway  
4 System that was actually in that control room when the  
5 work was being done?

6 MR. SCOTT: I was there once when they were  
7 putting -- after they did the splice and they were  
8 putting that 400 amp breaker back in there.

9 MR. JERRY GENTILE: And where was the splice,  
10 in the emergency generator room?

11 MR. SCOTT: No, it's the fiddley uptake --  
12 there's a stairwell that comes all the way up and the  
13 way they routed the cable, came up three decks and then  
14 they went through a stuffing box, you know --

15 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Out of generator room?

16 MR. SCOTT: -- into the emergency generator  
17 room from there and then across the ~~waterway~~ wireway  
18 into that new panel.

19 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, so the splice is on  
20 the other end? I'm thinking it's on -- okay.

21 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, the splice is up here, but  
22 it's in that uptake. It's in that fiddley, by the  
23 stairwell.

24 MR. JERRY GENTILE: In the emergency

1 generator room?

2 MR. SCOTT: Near there. It's in a fiddley,  
3 that uptake. There's a stairway that comes up from the  
4 engine room, all the way up.

5 MR. JERRY GENTILE: Okay, when they arced the  
6 cable down in the P2 panel, what did they hit that  
7 arced it?

8 MR. SCOTT: My understanding was that it was  
9 the framework of the panel.

10 MR. JERRY GENTILE: So they replaced, they  
11 had to replace the framework of the panel too?

12 MR. SCOTT: No, it's still the same box.

13 MR. JERRY GENTILE: I think that's about all  
14 I got.

15 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Just a couple more  
16 follow-up questions and I think we'll be about done. I  
17 appreciate your patience. Do you want to take a break  
18 or anything?

19 MR. SCOTT: Well, that's all right I can hold  
20 it for a few more minutes.

21 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Is there anything,  
22 during the course of the accident and the response  
23 thereafter, that you think uses, like, a lesson  
24 learned? Did anything go wrong that maybe we could

1 take back, something that maybe we could have done  
2 better last, next time?

3 MR. SCOTT: One thing that I've learned from  
4 this experience was, during our drills, when we do our  
5 emergency backup systems and start those fire pumps,  
6 instead of standing in the control booth, when  
7 everything is hunky-dory and just pushing the button  
8 there to start that fire pump, I want to have each  
9 individual, different people, every drill, go down  
10 locally and start those pumps. Start them in a  
11 different location other than where it's convenient, up  
12 in the control booth. It's because of this you're not  
13 going to have those available. I mean, we took the  
14 heart of the boat right out by doing that. We couldn't  
15 start them from where we normally do. During our fire  
16 drills, they call down -- well, when they get the  
17 general alarm, we just automatically start the pump.

18 MS. WEAVER: What are the other options?

19 MR. SCOTT: We have other remote start  
20 switches. There's one at the pump and there's one at  
21 the motor controller. They can be started in three  
22 different places. When it didn't start locally, then I  
23 went to the motor controller and I looked where I  
24 thought the motor controller was, I found the other two

1 fire pump, but I had forgotten ~~exactly just~~ where that  
2 third one was. In the heat of the battle, I just  
3 couldn't think of it so I told somebody else, "Go find  
4 it," you know, find that motor controller. And I  
5 didn't, ~~And~~ that selector switch for between those two  
6 fire pumps, I had forgotten about. And so it wasn't  
7 on the pump that I thought was going to be on our  
8 emergency circuit. It was the one that was back in the  
9 shaft alley and that motor controller was over in the  
10 steward's quarters, it outside of the space. So that  
11 was a lesson that I learned from this, was, that we  
12 need ~~going during through~~ our drills is to go to the  
13 other locations and start those pumps.

14 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Anything else you can  
15 think of?

16 MR. SCOTT: Well, our communications -- we  
17 don't have a pull-alarm down there and in the  
18 excitement, we were cut off from our phones, our sound  
19 powered phones, and the first engineer that was down  
20 there, he was trying to think, where's the nearest  
21 phone and then he thought, well, it's up by the car  
22 door, the loading door on the car deck. So he ran up  
23 there and used that to call the bridge.

24 MS. WEAVER: And you said you had no VHF

1 radios?

2 MR. SCOTT: I didn't and the ones that we do  
3 have were in the control room. The mates and the  
4 emergency squad, they brought some with them so they  
5 had communications with the bridge at that point.

6 MS. WEAVER: I just had two more points to  
7 clarify. You said you weren't on the fire fighting  
8 team and you didn't participate in drills, but have you  
9 had formal fire fighting training?

10 MR. SCOTT: Yes, I have.

11 MS. WEAVER: Okay, what ~~do~~ have you had?

12 MR. SCOTT: I've gone through the advanced  
13 fire fighting training that they have here at the  
14 AGAVAK Center. The Coast Guard --

15 MS. WEAVER: When was that, do you recall?

16 MR. SCOTT: Well, it was three years ago.

17 MS. WEAVER: Okay, and you mentioned that you  
18 use life lines?

19 MR. SCOTT: Yeah.

20 MS. WEAVER: Could you explain --

21 MR. SCOTT: It's steel cable with clips on  
22 both ends that they use for entering a fire in the  
23 space where they can't see, something that you clip on  
24 to your belt.

1 MS. WEAVER: Uh-huh.

2 MR. SCOTT: They can drag you out if they  
3 can't get in there to get you or you can turn around  
4 and follow it back out if you can't see where you're  
5 going.

6 MS. WEAVER: How would you use it in this  
7 case?

8 MR. SCOTT: Well, we didn't really have to  
9 use it when we got in there. I mean, there's only one  
10 way in and one way out. I just -- I wanted to have it.

11 I just thought it was important we have it in case  
12 something happened and we did have to drag somebody  
13 out.

14 MS. WEAVER: Did you have pre-arranged  
15 signals that you use in using the life line?

16 MR. SCOTT: No. Well, there is pre-arranged.  
17 I mean, there's a tug, one tug for go ahead and two  
18 tugs for give me more slack or three tugs I'm coming  
19 out.

20 MS. WEAVER: You know about those, but you've  
21 never practiced them?

22 MR. SCOTT: No.

23 MS. WEAVER: Thank you, that's all I have.

24 MS. MCATEE: I just have one more question.

1 In the shipyard, when you were not in there, I mean,  
2 you were dealing with the repairs on number one, you  
3 mentioned that there was marine, state inspectors  
4 there, who was the state inspector, like, on duty the  
5 day of the incident with the worker?

6 MR. SCOTT: It'd be ~~think~~ Tim Polaski who  
7 was the inspector for the whole job.

8 MS. MCATEE: Was he there that day, do you  
9 recall?

10 MR. SCOTT: No, I don't.

11 MS. MCATEE: That's all I have.

12 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: One more question. Do  
13 you have any idea what caused the incident? We're not  
14 going to hold you to it, but do you have any thoughts,  
15 off the top of your head, that you would, yeah, it  
16 could have been that or it could have been this?

17 MR. SCOTT: I just think something come loose  
18 in there and shorted out. That's just speculation on  
19 my part.

20 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: There was a cable found  
21 and was laying on the starboard side --

22 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, I saw it.

23 EXAMINER TOM: -- do you know if that was --  
24 had you ever seen that cable in there before?

1 MR. SCOTT: No. No, I wasn't aware of that  
2 and I just -- somebody just -- I just, and found out  
3 that that was from the old AC units that they had in  
4 there for the air conditioning units, the power to  
5 that. And when they took those old units out and put  
6 the new ones in, they disconnected it and left that  
7 cable in there. I believe that's the one, -- well, I  
8 can't say myself 100 percent, that's the one that we're  
9 looking at.

10 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: Do you think it was tied  
11 up in another location than where it is now or just  
12 don't remember --

13 MR. SCOTT: I don't know.

14 MR. TOM ROTH-ROFFY: I think that's about it,  
15 Glenn, for now.

16 MR. SCOTT: Okay, I have a date of that  
17 accident. It was entered in the log on Tuesday, May  
18 2<sup>nd</sup>. ~~And I entered it when~~ I was working chief  
19 that week and normally, in the shipyard, the chief  
20 takes care of the official log and we're not taking any  
21 readings or anything because nothing else is running so  
22 we just make entries.

23 MS. MCATEE: Okay.

24 MR. SCOTT: What other copies other than the

1 main circuit breaker service reports did anybody want?

2 MS. MCATEE: Your notes that were given to  
3 you by the first that you relieved on the --

4 MR. SCOTT: About the accident?

5 MS. MCATEE: Well, about the accident and  
6 then you mentioned that they had to tighten up the  
7 loose connections.

8 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

9