



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: October 6, 2008
To: ALL CONTROLLERS, CICS AND SUPERVISORS
From: David S. Maddox, Acting ATM
Subject: LESSONS LEARNED/ACTION PLAN REF ACCIDENT 9/28/08

At 0357Z on September 28, 2008 Trooper2 crashed while on a two mile final to runway 19R at Andrews. The accident is subject to ongoing investigation. The investigation includes reviewing actions taken and procedures utilized by controllers and Front Line Managers as the scenario unfolded. While the operation here was overall satisfactory and so far not considered contributory to the accident, the investigation shed light on areas we can all improve on, so that in the rare event an accident or incident should occur again, we are better prepared.

Here are some of the noted problem areas;

- The Midnight shift controller/CIC was not given a briefing on a recorded line. Without a recorded briefing we cannot legally ensure situational awareness.
- Trooper2 reported not receiving the Glide Slope and eventually disappeared from radar on final, and the controller did not advise the pilot Radar Contact Lost in accordance with FAAO 7110.65, Paragraphs 5-3-7b
- The windows in the Tower Cab had become fogged to the point where the controller was unable to see. This was due to the weather/outside air temperature and the HVAC system settings.
- The Pilot asked about getting an ASR approach. The controller was not current on the ASR position and therefore advised the pilot unable to provide the approach.
- Trooper2 was on an instrument approach, scratchpad indicated RF (Indicates right runway, instrument approach, full stop), and was cleared for the option. Also, no determination was made as to whether he was VFR or IFR.
- (note: ASR Approaches are not authorized during the late evening and Midnight shifts In accordance with the Air Force Base instruction 13-101 and the ADW/PCT LOA. This is due to the fact that staffing goes down to a single controller and with the T-7 ASR scope and discreet frequencies being a requirement to perform the approach, a single controller would be unable to oversee the airport environment. Recognizing this, ASR certification and use is not a requirement to work the Midnight shift. USAF will publish ASR available hours in the next Facility Directory.).

After reviewing the ASR run logs and ART position reports it was discovered that the majority of controllers are not current on ASR approaches. In Accordance with FAAO 7210.3, Chapter 2, Section 3, in particular Paragraphs 2-3-1 and 2-3-3b5, it is the ATCS's responsibility to ensure they are current on all positions of responsibility in the tower. Currency on ASR is three total approaches per calendar quarter, one of which must be a non-gyro approach.

- Use of FAA Form 8020-3 was somewhat out of order given the situation. Some parties should have been called sooner than others. There were also some phone number typographical errors discovered that have been corrected.
- Potomac TRACON issued weather to Trooper 2 that was 5 hours old. Due to updating issues of ASOS weather in the IDS5 system, updating ATIS Code is no longer adequate to confirm correct weather is issued by other facilities. Base weather had coordinated earlier in the evening that they were experiencing automation issues.

We do a great job here overall, and rather than changing things all that is necessary is to review and refine our existing procedures to bring them in line with how the agency expects them to be done, and ensure that they are consistently applied. This will make us an even better facility.

The Action Plan:

- IAW ADW SOP, Paragraph 2-1-2a, ensure all position relief briefings are accomplished on the recorded line. No exceptions.
- All hands review FAAO 7110.65, Paragraphs 5-3-7b, Radar Contact Lost.
- Members of Tech Ops Environmental will be visiting the tower this week to give everyone a mandatory briefing on HVAC operation and proper use of the Vent Deflectors, which is the mitigation for window fogging. There will be quarterly refreshers.
- In the event of the Tower becoming IMC for window fogging, Controllers should utilize IFR procedures such as:
 - Advising aircraft on final "not in sight, report runway/approach lights in sight" or "report landing assured".
 - Advising vehicles to report clear of runways. In accordance with FAAO 7110.65, Par 3-6-3, ASDE may be used to provide some aircraft and vehicle position assistance. Use it in conjunction with reports.
 - ADW/PCT LOA is currently in negotiation. To be Added; ADW tower will confirm the current METAR information is posted on the Mount Vernon (MTV) sector Weather section of the IDS-5, or coordinate with MTV Watch Supervisor/CIC that they have received the current METAR information (ex. "confirm you have the Andrews 0255 weather?")
 - Controllers are required to be certified and current on all positions of operation in the control tower. Use of ART -10 Position Log is mandatory, and shall be used when ANY tower position is occupied, including ASR. The ASR Run Log is also mandatory for each approach conducted. That is how we track gyro/non gyro approaches for your currency. As with any operational need, controllers will solicit via frequency, landline and ATIS when approaches, especially ASRs are required for proficiency. This is not an option, it is a requirement. Do not lose currency on any position due to "slow traffic" or "lack of opportunity". Reach out and get what you need to be successful. The Air Force has agreed to help us to the greatest extent possible. If there is a problem getting currency, advise your shift Supervisor so they can do something about it. The use of the position is under review. If after a reasonable amount of time (30 days), recertifications and currency cannot be maintained, based on available flights and staffing, considerations will be made to discontinue the position.

- FAA Form 8020-3 is undergoing improvements to guide controllers to call priorities in specific situations. It will also contain additional persons to contact in the event of an incident or accident.
- The Midnight Shift is as important as any other shift and must be approached with the same level of situational awareness. According to the NTSB in the outbriefing, the operations were casual and sloppy at all three facilities involved (DCA, PCT, ADW). Complacency is dangerous. We should all be proactive and go for any additional service that can be rendered 24/7. Come in for the Mids ready to give 100%. If unable, advise.
- In case of any incident or accident that occurs on a shift not covered by a Front Line Manager, please contact the closest one first, so that they may quickly come in and assist in the operation and notifications.

David S Maddox