

Docket No. SA-531

Exhibit No. 2-J

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C.

Operations Group Chairman
Interview Summary – FAA Aircrew Program Manager
Michael Jessie

(87 Pages)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

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Investigation of:

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CRASH OF CONTINENTAL CONNECTION

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FLIGHT 3407, OPERATED BY

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COLGAN AIR, INC.

* Docket No.: DCA-09-MA-027

FEBRUARY 12, 2009, 2217 EST

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CLARENCE, NEW YORK

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Interview of: MICHAEL E. JESSIE

NTSB, Conference Room C
429 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C.

Tuesday
March 17, 2009

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: ROGER COX

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I N T E R V I E W

(9:00 a.m.)

INTERVIEW OF MICHAEL JESSIE

BY MR. COX:

Q. We've done our preliminaries. I wanted to say welcome and thanks for joining us. We appreciate your assistance as we conduct this investigation. What I'll do first is just kind of go through some basics about you.

A. Okay.

Q. Then we'll talk a little bit about Colgan and some of the issues, if we could. Your full name, please?

A. The first name is Michael, M-i-c-h-a-e-l, middle name is Edwin, E-d-w-i-n, the last name Jessie, J-e-s-s-i-e.

Q. Okay. My gosh, Tim, you got that one correct. Your age, please?

A. Fifty-four.

Q. Your current title?

A. Aviation Safety Inspector, specializing as Air Crew Program Manager.

Q. And specifically as APM?

A. For Colgan Air.

Q. For Colgan Air. And specifically specializing on what aircraft?

A. On the Q400.

Q. Do you have any other responsibilities or titles --

1 duties, besides that?

2 A. No, all the duties I have are associated with Colgan's
3 certificate.

4 Q. Okay. Are you a licensed airman?

5 A. Yes, I am.

6 Q. Can you tell me your certificates and ratings?

7 A. I hold an airline transport pilot certificate, airplane
8 multi-engine land, type rated on the DHC-8 and the DA-EASY.
9 That's D-A dash E-A-S-Y. It's a variant of the Dassault Falcon
10 900EX, with their --

11 Q. Oh.

12 A. -- Easy software --

13 Q. Oh, oh.

14 A. -- program on it.

15 Q. That sounds interesting.

16 A. Commercial privileges, single-engine land.

17 Q. Okay. And your flight experience? Basically your
18 flying time.

19 A. Total flight time is approximately 8500 hours.

20 Q. Um-hum. We always ask the PIC time.

21 A. Oh, let's see.

22 Q. Roughly.

23 A. My SIC time -- okay, PIC time is probably 7500 hours --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- plus.

1 Q. Okay, that's great.

2 A. SIC time, I've got a couple thousand, 1500.

3 Q. Okay. How about since you're talking specifically about
4 the Q400, do you have any flying time on the Q400?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Simulator time only.

8 Q. Um-hum. Can you tell me how long you've been in your
9 current position?

10 A. Approximately one year.

11 Q. Can you tell me what your last assignment was before
12 that?

13 A. My most previous assignment was as an air carrier
14 operations inspection, with geographical responsibility out of the
15 Teterboro FSDO. Primary airports were Newark International and
16 Stewart International and I handled a variety of air carriers that
17 operated under 121, until the ATOS transition. Then my primary
18 responsibilities were the Part 129 air carriers.

19 Q. What's Part 129?

20 A. Foreign air carriers.

21 Q. Foreign, okay. How long have you been at FAA?

22 A. It'll be nine years this September.

23 Q. Okay. And prior to that?

24 A. Prior to that I flew Dash 8s in the Caribbean, on
25 contract --

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. -- for LIAT, L-I-A-T, Leeward Island Air Transport.

3 Q. Uh-huh.

4 A. Prior to that I flew Dash 8s for Shuttle America --

5 Q. Uh-huh.

6 A. -- out of Windsor Locks, Connecticut.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Prior to that I flew Twin Otters for Scenic Airlines.

9 And prior to that I was chief flight instructor for a 141 school
10 in San Diego.

11 Q. Um-hum.

12 A. Prior to that, a flight instructor for the same school.

13 Q. Sounds like quite a varied background.

14 A. My licensing goes back to -- my first license was a
15 private pilot in 1974 --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- and added on additional ratings throughout the years,
18 culminating in -- my first CFI certificate was in late '80s, and
19 then early '90s is when I actually started teaching and get into
20 it full time.

21 Q. Terrific. Who was performing your APM duties before you
22 took over?

23 A. I have heard that it was a guy named Chris. And I can't
24 pronounce his last name. It starts with an M.

25 Q. Monteleone (ph.). And that would have been just prior

1 to your taking over?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And do you know how long he was doing it?

4 A. No.

5 Q. No, okay, all right. When were you first qualified on a
6 Q400?

7 A. That would've been -- well, the Q400 is not a separate
8 type rating.

9 Q. I understand.

10 A. It is a Dash 8 type rating.

11 Q. I understand.

12 A. I was first type rated in the Dash 8 back in 1998 or
13 '99.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So the Q400 is just a variant on the --

16 Q. I understand.

17 A. -- series.

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. I went through the FlightSafety training program in -- I
20 believe it was May 2008.

21 Q. Was that at Toronto?

22 A. No, that was at St. Louis.

23 Q. At St. Louis, all right. But was it FlightSafety
24 instructors?

25 A. It was FlightSafety.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. It was FlightSafety instructors for ground and sim.

3 Q. I see, okay.

4 A. And the checkride was also done with TC from -- I
5 believe it was the Toronto center, a guy named John Lorimar (ph.).

6 Q. Okay. Can you describe briefly for me your role as the
7 APM for Colgan, your duties and responsibilities?

8 A. Well, the basic job description is overseeing the
9 adequacy of flight crew training and being part of the management
10 of the ADE program, overseeing the APDs and check airmen.

11 Q. Okay. And you work with the POI?

12 A. And I work with the POI and the POI also assigns work,
13 as necessary, under the ATOS concept. There are quarterly working
14 assignments that include what are called EPIS, element performance
15 inspections, and SAIs, the safety attribute inspections. Those
16 are assigned by the POI, in addition to other normal duties. And
17 I'm not sure of the exact basis of how he and the data evaluation
18 program manager arrive at what needs to be looked at in a given
19 quarter, but that's their job function and they do assign that
20 additional work.

21 Q. You mentioned this data program evaluation manager. Is
22 that an inspector who's assigned to Colgan?

23 A. I believe that -- you know, I'm not sure if that person
24 is assigned with the Colgan certificate or not, or if they handle
25 the data evaluation for the entire office. Although I work for

1 EA-27, I'm physically located at Teterboro, as a remotely sited
2 inspector, so I don't really get to see a lot of the EA-27 office
3 and what the associations are down there. I'm drawing a blank on
4 the CMT roster right now.

5 Q. All right.

6 A. CMT is the certificate --

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. -- management team.

9 Q. Yeah, sure, I understand. But at Colgan, you have a POI
10 and we have you as the two inspectors who are permanently full-
11 time assigned, is that correct?

12 A. Yes, and there's also Dick Bell, who's the APM for the
13 Saab fleet.

14 Q. Okay. So is the POI qualified on the Q400?

15 A. Yes, he's rated in the aircraft.

16 Q. He's rated on the airplane, okay. In your role as APM,
17 I think we talked about one of the duties as overseeing the
18 training and the check airmen. Do you attend recurrent ground
19 school?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. Do you conduct checkrides yourself?

22 A. Yes. That is part of the job description.

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. But in the time that I've sequenced -- and there is a
25 regulatory requirement for me to conduct X amount of these events

1 per year. The way that I was sequenced into this job, it was at
2 the tail end of the major training push to get the 15 Q400s on
3 line.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Most of my focus after that has been if the pilots that
6 they had previously qualified were gaining enough sufficient
7 experience to become check airmen. So I spent probably two or
8 three months where I was doing a lot of check airmen observations
9 as well.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Towards the end of the year we had a couple of APDs that
12 we needed to get trained and on line and we had one APD that also
13 needed to be renewed. So in that respect there weren't a lot of
14 training events for me to actually conduct myself and still be
15 able to observe the new APDs coming on line and without taking
16 their events.

17 Q. So when you say observing APDs, I draw from that what
18 you mean is that you're not actually checking them?

19 A. Yes, I am checking them.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Like, for instance, on the renewal of Bill Honan, there
22 were no -- the way we want to do the observation, you know, check
23 this airman's performance, is to watch them conducting an actual
24 certification event.

25 Q. Um-hum.

1 A. There were no certification events left that we could
2 conduct. So I had to watch and conduct the next best thing, which
3 was a proficiency check.

4 Q. I see, okay. So I think what you're telling me is, for
5 the time you came on in May, the initial cadre had already been
6 qualified on the airplane?

7 A. Essentially, yeah.

8 Q. And then that wave had passed through --

9 A. Was their new line check airmen. And in fact, the Q400
10 training really slowed down after that, to the point where Colgan
11 was predicting furloughs in November. That didn't happen but it
12 still remained quite low.

13 Q. Okay. Tell me what the requirements are as a minimum
14 for a Colgan check airman to become a check airman.

15 A. Well, they have -- at a minimum, they have to be
16 qualified on that aircraft. They have to have served X amount of
17 time and then they have to be trained and then they have to be
18 observed by the FAA, generally. And the process is such that
19 Colgan will provide an application package outlining the potential
20 check airman's certificates, qualifications, experience, training,
21 and then will submit it to the POI, that package. Those go to the
22 POI. However, I am cc'ed on it --

23 Q. I see.

24 A. -- because, ultimately, I have to go out there and
25 observe these people in the conduct of the performance of their

1 duties as a line check airman.

2 Q. In the case of Colgan, where they had a new airplane,
3 they needed to qualify new check airmen. Can you recall
4 approximately how many overall that they had to get qualified to
5 do that as check airmen?

6 A. Oh, of the ones I did, I can recall maybe five to seven.

7 Q. Seven?

8 A. About. But I'm not sure how many they had previously
9 qualified.

10 Q. So of the ones that you observed, what was their
11 experience on the Q400 at the time that you saw them and were
12 considering them, observing them for check airman status?

13 A. The time ranged from -- I think I was seeing like four
14 to five hundred hours on the airplane, possibly more.

15 Q. Um-hum. Were any of the previously qualified as check
16 airmen in another airplane?

17 A. I believe some were. Possibly all were previous check
18 airmen on the Saab fleet.

19 Q. What would have been your primary interest or concern
20 when you were evaluating and observing the check airmen, in terms
21 of his abilities and performance?

22 A. The ability of the check airmen, particularly when
23 working with first officers, on the ability to keep up with the
24 aircraft and manage the relatively low time FOs that they had
25 coming up through the ranks, it appeared to me that they could

1 get, you know, a lot of tasks going simultaneously, if you had
2 someone sitting on the right seat but didn't have a lot of prior
3 experience.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. The airmen that I did observe, there were occasions
6 where an FO would be having problems setting up an FMS and the
7 captains that I was seeing were having no problems taking care of
8 the FMS and maintaining the overall awareness of the flight.

9 Q. Specifically in the case of these new check airmen that
10 you were observing and checking, your concern was their ability to
11 supervise and instruct new first officers?

12 A. Yeah, because these -- the applications were for line
13 check airmen, all seats. That means they would watch new
14 captains --

15 Q. Right.

16 A. -- and they would watch new FOs. The captains I was not
17 as concerned about, as I was with the lower-time FOs.

18 Q. I see. In your experience, did you observe that Colgan
19 was hiring some first officers directly into the Q400?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Would that have been pretty much all the time, I mean
22 all the new first officers who came in off the street?

23 A. That I can't say.

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. All I can say is that the group of FOs that went through

1 the training at the same time as I did --

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. -- were all hired off the street.

4 Q. Okay. So would you say, in your experience and the
5 check airmen that you observed, that they were satisfactory in
6 their ability to supervise a new FO?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. So moving step-wise here just a little bit, the
9 next issue would be your ability to observe line captains working
10 with first officers. Did you get the opportunity to go out and
11 observe line captains and first officers together?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What concerns would you have, if any, with regard to the
14 professional interaction of line captains with the first officers
15 that were coming in?

16 A. Concerns?

17 Q. Um-hum. Perhaps concern isn't the right word. You
18 know, as an FAA inspector, what were specific items that you were
19 looking for?

20 A. Just overall crew coordination. The Q400 was a new
21 aircraft to them. When I started with Shuttle America, that was a
22 totally new airline, the pilots didn't have prior experience on
23 that airplane, and my first impression of Colgan was that it was
24 very much like a startup airline.

25 Q. Um-hum.

1 A. So I was aware of some of the things that occurred, you
2 know, 10 years earlier.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And then, primarily, the big thing was crew
5 coordination. You want to be able to see if these guys could work
6 together and follow checklists and basic stuff, and for the most
7 part, it looked just like the startup airline that I saw 10 years
8 ago. They seemed to be conscientious of the fact that they were
9 low time and new to the airplane and therefore took their time in
10 doing things. So as far as in that respect, I really had no
11 concerns.

12 Q. Um-hum. Are you satisfied that the standard operating
13 procedures that Colgan has put in place to address such things as
14 checklists and call-outs are adequate?

15 A. Yeah, adequate. Would I like to see some changes or
16 improvements? Possibly.

17 Q. Um-hum.

18 A. And then I think I am seeing that. Almost since day one
19 there has been a push to rewrite their manuals and that's been an
20 ongoing task. In the last several months I have looked at
21 revisions for the QRC, the QRH, the CFM, the crew member
22 dispatcher training program, which is now going to be flight ops
23 training manual, it's been, you know, update after update, with
24 refinements to the current operation, some of them incorporating
25 things I have suggested and other times not.

1 Q. Okay. Speaking of the SOPs, you know, I use that term
2 to encompass such things as checklists and call-outs and
3 stabilized approach criteria and sterile cockpit, encompassing all
4 of those things. I think you know what I'm talking about. What
5 areas do you think could use some enhancement or need to be
6 addressed and improved?

7 A. I would like to see, for example, on configuring the
8 airplane on approach, I would like to see it tied into a specific
9 point on the glide slope. Currently that's not the case.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. You know, I'd like to see like dot and a half, gear
12 down, one dot, flaps X, and intercept, final flaps.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Something like that. It is not currently like that.

15 Q. Okay. How would you describe what is done now?

16 A. It's basically the guidance is to be configured prior to
17 the final approach fix --

18 Q. Um-hum.

19 A. -- which the crews are getting done and they are getting
20 it done once the glide slope comes alive. But it's not that
21 specific, you know, target that I'm accustomed to in air carrier
22 operations.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. You're looking for a specific call-out, a specific
25 event.

1 Q. Okay, I understand. Any other SOP issues that come to
2 mind?

3 A. Nothing that really comes -- you know, that jumps out
4 right now, that I can think of. That's not to say I won't
5 remember 10 minutes from now. If I do, I'll let you know.

6 Q. If you do, in the course, we appreciate your bringing
7 them up as we try to, you know, understand the Colgan operation.
8 Specifically with reference to the final approach, once the
9 airplanes are configured for landing and whatever that final flaps
10 heading is going to be, what airspeed do you expect the Colgan
11 pilots to fly down final?

12 A. The training calls for ref plus 10.

13 Q. Um-hum.

14 A. And it also calls for any deviations outside of that.
15 It's difficult to do that sometimes with ref speeds that are on
16 the order of, say, a hundred and twenty knots, or ref plus 10
17 would be a hundred and thirty. Approach control flying into
18 Newark has you screaming in. They want you a hundred and eighty
19 knots to the marker.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. And the guys do a good job of getting it slowed down to
22 the ref plus 10.

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. I do see that they're right on the edge and they tend to
25 fly it a little bit faster --

1 Q. Um-hum.

2 A. -- than I would like to see it. But I think that is
3 possibly a function of the environment that they're operating in.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. It's very difficult to get from a hundred and eighty at
6 the marker, down to, say, a hundred and twenty knots, you know,
7 right at the threshold.

8 Q. Yeah, that sounds to me like trying to lose 60 knots in
9 four miles or five miles would challenge anybody.

10 A. It's a task but, you know, they manage it and it's a
11 gradual slowdown to those limits within -- you know, once they're
12 within a thousand feet, it's, you know, generally close for ref
13 plus 10 and possibly a bit more.

14 Q. Um-hum. So is the ref plus 10 spelled out in this
15 company flight manual, do you know?

16 A. I don't recall. I would have to look.

17 Q. Okay. Is the process --

18 A. -- how it's trained.

19 Q. Yeah, okay, yeah. Well, I flipped through there and you
20 know, I did see some profiles but I didn't see a reference to the
21 ref plus 10 speed as a target. I've heard other people talk about
22 ref plus 10 but I hadn't seen it actually written down. So
23 although I didn't see it doesn't mean it doesn't exist. But this
24 discussion about how to conduct this bleeding speed or speed
25 reduction as a routine matter, I didn't see that really in the

1 profiles, either. That seems to be -- correct me if I'm wrong,
2 seems to be something we have to learn on the line.

3 A. It's primarily flying the airplane. I mean, it's coming
4 up on the terminal area, generally -- 200 knots, the guy's calling
5 for flaps five, it's slowing down, what, roughly 180. Maintaining
6 180, a typical vector is going to put you on the localizer and as
7 the glide slope starts coming in, as you start girding up, it, you
8 know, naturally starts decreasing the speed. They're not having
9 to make big power adjustments, if that's where you're going with
10 this.

11 Q. Well, really, I'm not trying to go in any particular
12 direction. I'm just trying to make sure I understand what the
13 typical Colgan pilot has to do, you know, on his environment he
14 flies at, to get himself configured and stabilized on a final
15 approach. So it sounds like, you know, he's going fairly fast, up
16 to fairly late in the approach and then he's going through a
17 fairly rapid configuration and slowing, to get the airplane
18 slowed.

19 A. It's no more rapid than any other aircraft. I mean, you
20 get the gear down.

21 Q. Um-hum.

22 A. They bring the condition levers to mass. That adds a
23 lot of drag there.

24 Q. Um-hum.

25 A. And then you get your flaps setting in. But typically

1 make a power adjustment on the order of down 25 percent, and once
2 they start down the glide slope, that'll, you know -- I've seen it
3 back -- adjustments back in the high teens and I've seen it down
4 in the low teens. I haven't really paid that close attention to
5 what the exact variables are causing that, but --

6 Q. Okay. So I guess to recapitulate, when we're talking
7 about Colgan guys, you know, flying -- and we'll say Newark,
8 especially. What would you like to see them do in terms of when
9 they get established on whatever that final approach airspeed is?

10 A. I'm not sure what you mean.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. What would I like to see them do once they are
13 configured for landing --

14 Q. Um-hum.

15 A. -- and established?

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. Maintain that configuration and target speeds and glide
18 slope and the localizer.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And touch down at, you know, ref plus about five.

21 Q. Okay. Other than Newark, in your experience going out
22 to the other outstations that they operate the Q on, do you find
23 that that needing to maintain your speed, you know, until fairly
24 close in is also necessary?

25 A. Yeah, and I've also seen instances where AT will slam

1 dunk them and it's virtually impossible to descend the amounts
2 they want them to descend and slow down at the same time.

3 Q. Right, um-hum.

4 A. Buffalo, I've noted that. Manchester, I've noted that.
5 Where else? I think Myrtle Beach. Those are the only three I
6 recall off the top of my head. Providence, that's pretty easier.
7 They keep them low level and they hit Newport and turn left
8 intercept.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. There's no problem there.

11 Q. But there are at least a few of the airports where they
12 have the same situation, where they're asking to, you know, stay
13 high and fast and then readjust and -- any thoughts about speaking
14 to the air traffic people there in those airports, about that?

15 A. My understanding is that they have had discussions with
16 folks up at Newark and 90. Whether or not there have been
17 discussions with the other entities, I don't know. I did talk to
18 one crew going into Manchester and they -- I don't recall the
19 specifics but they were talking -- kind of sketched out, well,
20 here's this block of airspace and you know, these guys don't have
21 control over it, so they can't send us into it any lower than this
22 point beyond there, and that's what sets up --

23 Q. I understand.

24 A. -- this high --

25 Q. Airspace considerations.

1 A. A high descent.

2 Q. Um-hum, okay.

3 A. Buffalo, they've been doing it like that since I've been
4 flying up there and that was more than 10 years ago. Why they
5 need to do it, I don't know.

6 Q. Maybe we ought to find out. So now getting back to the
7 way the airplane is flown, one of the steps you've mentioned in
8 getting the airplane slowed down is to get the condition levers
9 up. What's that do to the drag effects on the airplane?

10 A. Well, it increases it. It's noticeable.

11 Q. Pretty noticeable?

12 A. Um-hum.

13 Q. Is that a good technique if you need to really get
14 slowed up in a hurry, to do that?

15 A. Personally --

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. -- if I were flying the airplane, I would probably do
18 that. Rather than play around with the power and wait an extended
19 period, I might be inclined to bring the condition levers up, take
20 advantage of the drag and you know, if I get a little bit more
21 noise, oh well. That's technique.

22 Q. It's a technique, okay. Is there any pitch change
23 associated with that?

24 A. If there is, it's pretty minor. I don't recall. From
25 the sim and not having flown the aircraft, I really can't speak to

1 that.

2 Q. Okay. Did you ever have any occasion to meet
3 Captain Renslow?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Did you ever have any occasion to meet
6 First Officer Shaw?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. Have you had the opportunity to review
9 Captain Renslow's training records?

10 A. No, I haven't. The only thing that I have reviewed with
11 respect to Captain Renslow was the application package for the
12 type rating. That was sent in -- that's just essentially a --
13 type event, where you're making sure all the blocks are filled out
14 properly.

15 Q. So he was typed, I guess, in November and as a routine
16 matter you would've reviewed his paperwork before that, right?

17 A. I do review the paperwork, look at the application
18 package, sign off on it and forward it to --

19 Q. Is there anything specific that you're looking for when
20 you review that package?

21 A. Well, there is a lot of specific things that I'm looking
22 for; that all of the boxes that are required to be filled out are
23 filled out; that boxes that should not be filled out are not
24 filled out; looking for correct dates, signatures, you know,
25 anything that's required to be on there. If I miss it, it gets

1 kicked back to me.

2 Q. I see. Is cumulative flight time on there? Is that one
3 of the things that's on there?

4 A. Not normally.

5 Q. Not normally.

6 A. Sometimes the guy will include it on the flight time
7 block. Most of the ATP guys don't include it.

8 Q. Are there any things that -- when you review these
9 packages for pilots coming up to get this type rating, any things
10 that would come to your attention that might cause you to want to
11 look more deeply or review their background, their training or
12 their experience?

13 A. If there's a Notice of Disapproval, I would probably
14 want to take a look at that. The notices of disapprovals that
15 I've seen coming through, some were incorrect. They were for the
16 SIC-type ratings, which there should not be a Notice of
17 Disapproval on that. And the only other Notice of Disapproval
18 that came through was one that I filled out on one of their type
19 rating candidates.

20 Q. So when you get the package, is that Notice of
21 Disapproval only for the most recent training or does it go
22 back --

23 A. It would be for the most recent checkride.

24 Q. The most recent checkride. So in this case, a guy's
25 coming up for a type rating and it would pertain to the most

1 recent --

2 A. That particular --

3 Q. That particular training event.

4 A. Yeah. If they have -- if they, you know, failed the
5 type ride, you know, 10 years ago, I would never know about it.

6 Q. Okay, all right. That leads me to the next little area,
7 which is, does Colgan have a program to track or monitor pilots
8 who have, perhaps, proficiency issues that are not so great that
9 they cannot be certified to fly the line but which require
10 monitoring or watching?

11 A. As far as a program? That is a function of the check
12 airmen. Actually, more correctly, of the sim instructors.
13 They've got a program amount of hours of training and if, in the
14 opinion of the instructor, that candidate is not ready for a ride
15 at that point, they have to get in contact with Colgan's flight
16 office department, chief pilot, whatnot, and decide what they're
17 going to do at that point --

18 Q. Um-hum.

19 A. -- whether or not they're going to provide more training
20 and try again, or try the checkride, or whether or not to not
21 provide more training.

22 Q. Um-hum. So what you're describing is an individualized
23 approach to a particular candidate, as opposed to a program that
24 maintains, perhaps, a watch list or a group of people who need to
25 be -- who are line pilots who need to be, perhaps, observed more

1 often than normal or something?

2 A. Well, that sounds like it would be an internal program
3 that I would not be a party to. So I really don't know if Colgan
4 does that or not.

5 Q. Really? Would you say, as the FAA, that it would not be
6 appropriate for you to know about that?

7 A. It might be -- it might have worthwhile information,
8 yes, but as far as a specific watch list, I don't know what I
9 would be able to do with that. They do provide notices of
10 unsatisfactory checkrides. Now that, you know, gives me something
11 that I can work with. Yeah, I can examine that and say, okay,
12 what was the unsat about, and look at the specific event --

13 Q. Sure.

14 A. -- and then look at the training program from there and
15 take it from there.

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. But as far as a watch list, that sounds very vague.

18 Q. Um-hum.

19 A. I mean, in reality, we're all being watched. You know,
20 we're all on a watch list when we're flying.

21 Q. Well, I don't want to make it sound like something
22 that's pernicious. I'm just asking, does Colgan have a program
23 for people like that?

24 A. I'm not aware of one.

25 Q. Okay. Does Colgan submit to FAA a periodic statement of

1 checkrides successes and failures, in a statistical fashion?

2 A. Yeah, we get our -- actually what we do is we --
3 Dick Bell has been doing this and he pulls the statistics from the
4 FAA databases, as to airmen activity, and that's based on the PTRS
5 records for checking.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And I do know that Colgan does provide, directly to the
8 POI, the name and circumstances if someone does or has an
9 unsatisfactory checkride.

10 Q. Um-hum, yeah, I understand that. But what I was asking
11 was, to your knowledge, is the company required to periodically,
12 say quarterly or annually, give you a summary statement of total
13 checkrides performed, you know, total passed and that kind of
14 thing?

15 A. Yeah, that's basically the APD activity report and that
16 will contain this information.

17 Q. Okay. Do you ever look at that report?

18 A. Actually, I have not had the opportunity to, because the
19 APDs that were on line when I first came to Colgan, one is no
20 longer an APD and the other one is management and has just not
21 been conducting any activity reports. The newer APDs have not
22 been on line for more than six months, so we wouldn't have had an
23 annual report to review.

24 Q. Uh-huh. But Colgan's been in business a long time, so
25 they've been doing checkrides for a long time. And so from a

1 statistical standpoint, they've conducted X number of checkrides
2 in 2008 and you know, X percent were successful, and that sort
3 basic data-gathering kinds of things. So what I'm asking is, is
4 that data collected and is it reported to you?

5 A. Not to me because --

6 Q. Um-hum.

7 A. -- again, I'm the Q400. Granted, they do a lot of
8 checkrides, a lot of them were on Saabs. Dick Bell --

9 Q. Um-hum.

10 A. -- has been the caretaker of this information since I've
11 been there.

12 Q. Okay. And so would Dick be the guy that also has
13 information on the Q?

14 A. Yeah, he gets -- he's getting the statistics on all of
15 the. But again, you know, I've got to point, these guys -- the
16 current APDs, they haven't been there for a year, to look at them.
17 The former ones, yeah, but they moved into management.
18 Dean Bandavanis is no longer --

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. -- an APD, so there's really nothing to look at on his
21 annual event. Bill Honan, I looked at his. He got a handful of
22 events.

23 Q. Well, I don't want to spend a lot of time going around
24 on that. I just kind of wanted to talk about the general
25 statistical data collection on them, so we'll move on. Let me ask

1 you about training records. Are you familiar with the training
2 records, that system that Colgan uses to keep track of pilots'
3 training?

4 A. Only to the extent that it is a computerized system and
5 it is designed to -- there's data input, the date training was
6 completed and then it raises flags when training was required
7 again.

8 Q. A computerized system. Do you know what the name of
9 that system is?

10 A. I believe it is Crew Track.

11 Q. Crew Track, okay. In your experience, does it provide
12 you with adequate information about the history of any particular
13 pilot that you might want to find out about?

14 A. Yes. The record is provided as part of the application
15 package --

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. -- when they want a line check airman or an APD.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. You can actually go through the entire training record
20 and see what training was accomplished and when it was
21 accomplished.

22 Q. Well, you were speaking about an APD, but now I'm kind
23 of just speaking about, you know, any pilot that comes up for any
24 kind of an event that you might want to review prior to them
25 getting their rating ride. And what I'm saying is, do they

1 provide you that Crew Track record?

2 A. For?

3 Q. Let's say a captain that's coming up for a new type
4 rating on the Q.

5 A. Typically, I would not see that and they would not
6 provide it.

7 Q. Okay. Are there any occasions when you would want to
8 see it?

9 A. I think I might want to see it in the event of, say, an
10 incident or occurrence that I might be investigating. Or if there
11 were a checkride failure, that might be an appropriate time. But
12 generally, it's not so detailed that you would get a lot of
13 information off of it. You'd just be able to tell, okay, yes,
14 this person completed training or, no, he didn't complete it.

15 Q. So if you did have an individual that you wanted to look
16 into for some reason, whatever it might be, and you access -- this
17 is the system that you would use to get it, this Crew Track
18 system, does it tell you specifically what issues a person
19 might've had, if he had an unsat?

20 A. I can't answer that because I've never had to pull
21 that --

22 Q. You never had to pull it up.

23 A. -- specific report up and I don't know what it is
24 capable of pulling up. I can tell you what I have seen pulled
25 up --

1 Q. Um-hum.

2 A. -- with respect to the name of the training and the date
3 training was completed.

4 Q. Yeah.

5 A. Beyond that, I can't tell you.

6 Q. Okay. If you had a pilot where you had a concern about
7 his proficiency, would there be an occasion to go back and see
8 what his training was, to the extent of, you know, had he ever had
9 any prior training event failures or problems?

10 A. Actually, I have not had occasion to be in a position to
11 request that.

12 Q. Okay, let's switch over to training a little bit and
13 let's talk about recurrent. You said you went to the recurrent
14 ground school. When's the last time you went, do you recall?

15 A. It was shortly after Colgan started their in-house
16 recurrent, so that was probably in about October 2008.

17 Q. When did they start in-house?

18 A. I don't have the exact data, but that's about the
19 transition, sometime back there.

20 Q. One of the issues we've been talking about is what is
21 actually covered in recurrent training and one area that
22 apparently is covered every year is the winter operations, the
23 deicing, and part of that training is, of course, some kind of a
24 video that was originally produced by NASA, that talks about
25 deicing. Did you see that?

1 A. Yes, I have.

2 Q. We've had discussions that possibly there was more than
3 one of those. Do you know if there's one, two, three videos? Do
4 you have any idea?

5 A. I don't recall.

6 Q. Can you recall which one of those you might've seen, or
7 what you saw?

8 A. Well, definitely a NASA-produced, because it had the
9 NASA Twin Otter.

10 Q. Okay. You said you flew that Twin Otter, huh?

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 Q. Do you recall, with that video in there, it had the Twin
13 Otter and did that ring true to you, I mean the discussion about
14 how it ices up?

15 A. Yeah, I did see ice that I didn't believe possible to
16 form on an aircraft before, on that airplane. Never had any
17 indication of tail plane stall, which was another focus of that
18 video.

19 Q. Uh-huh. Back when you were flying the Twin Otter, how
20 long on that airplane?

21 A. I've got about 5,000 hours on that airplane.

22 Q. That's a lot.

23 A. If they'd paid me enough, I'd still be doing it.

24 Q. I've heard that. A lot of people like the airplane. So
25 you're highly experienced on the Twin Otter and I think you just

1 said you never had any event of tail plane icing on the airplane.

2 A. No.

3 Q. When you were flying the airplane, did the people you
4 were flying for ever talk to you about tail plane icing?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. They did. How was that training presented to you at
7 that time?

8 A. That training, to the best of my recollection, was some
9 handouts that I believe I still have.

10 Q. Uh-huh.

11 A. But I can't say with a hundred percent certainty. I
12 looked for those handouts recently and couldn't find them.

13 Q. Okay. Well, when was that, anyway? When were you
14 flying the Twin Otter?

15 A. Oh, that was in the early '90s, '93 to '95.

16 Q. Where was that?

17 A. That was with Scenic Airlines out of Las Vegas.

18 Q. Scenic. Do you get a lot of icing out in Las Vegas?

19 A. Not a whole lot. Mostly about the Grand Canyon,
20 Monument Valley, up at Bryce.

21 Q. Yeah, I've flown around that area. You have to hunt to
22 find ice up there, I guess.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In the wintertime, you know, Flagstaff gets some ice,
25 yeah. Did anybody you know flying an airplane ever have an

1 occasion to have a tail plane icing incident?

2 A. No.

3 Q. So would you say that you had any direct knowledge -- by
4 direct knowledge, I mean talk to another pilot or had any direct
5 experience with tail plane icing.

6 A. No.

7 Q. Okay. Did you find the video believable when they
8 presented it to you?

9 A. Yeah, the NASA --

10 Q. Yeah, the NASA video.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Yeah. Having, you know, flown Twin Otters and then you
13 see the video and it talks about that tail plane icing, it sounds
14 to me like, well, that's really interesting, I didn't know that.
15 Do you know if the presentation there about tail plane icing was
16 specifically directed towards just the Twin Otter or did it
17 pertain to other kinds of airplanes?

18 A. Well, it pertains to turboprops in general, was my
19 understanding. In fact, they said turboprops and then they
20 identified certain characteristics that were common in aircraft
21 that are susceptible to tail plane icing. One of those was
22 non-powered flight control services.

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. And two, they rely on trim tabs for aerodynamic balance.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. Okay. So the inference I would draw if I were flying
3 the Saab is I don't have -- I have trim tabs and I don't have a
4 powered elevator, so I might be susceptible? Would that be a
5 correct inference?

6 A. You'd have to someone --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- who flies the Saabs, because --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- I have no idea.

11 Q. All right, okay. Okay.

12 A. But if you're saying the Saab does not have a powered
13 flight control service --

14 Q. Um-hum.

15 A. -- and if you're saying the Saab does have trim tabs --

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. -- then it appears the video is saying that.

18 Q. It could be pertinent to that airplane?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Okay. Do you know if there was any specific, like,
21 training films or videos or material that was presented, that
22 specifically addressed the Saab?

23 A. I have no knowledge on the Saab.

24 Q. You don't know, okay. So to the best of your
25 recollection, I think you remember one video that you saw?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Okay. That was a NASA-produced video?

3 A. NASA tail plane icing.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And it was kind of interesting, you know, because it did
6 talk about the common characteristics, non-powered flight control
7 service, trim tabs. So you're thinking, okay, this might not
8 apply to the Q. Curiously, at the end of the video, it says,
9 however, in an airplane with powered flight control services, the
10 indications might be more subtle. So there's kind of an inference
11 that, okay, it might apply. The other curious thing that I noted
12 about the video was they don't address aircraft that has stall
13 protection systems. They don't address stick shaker. If I get a
14 stick shaker and my nose pitches down, they don't address that.
15 They're only addressing a nose pitch-down, with a change in power
16 and a change in flap setting.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. And the inference is that's a good indication of tail
19 plane icing. However, they very clearly state that tail plane
20 icing is not a wing aerodynamic stall.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. That wing is still flying, it's still producing lift out
23 the center of pressure and that's why this tail plane stall can no
24 longer overcome that moment. But they're silent on the issue of
25 stall protection systems.

1 Q. So having gone through all of that, how do you, as FAA,
2 view that video as it pertains to the training programs and the
3 SOPs that are provided to Colgan pilots? In other words, how do
4 you, as FAA, think that information should be incorporated into
5 Colgan's practices?

6 A. Well, I think it would be valuable for the Saab, based
7 on my limited knowledge of the Saab, because the NASA video seems
8 to have excluded powered flight control services, but then, at the
9 end of the video, seems to include it. I think it's better to err
10 on the safe side and hey, if NASA is saying that, you know, it
11 could happen and the indications might be more subtle, leave it
12 in. And you've got to also think about being -- as a pilot in an
13 aircraft that does have a stall protection system, I'm thinking as
14 a pilot, if I get a stick shaker, I'm going to respond to an
15 aerodynamic stall the way I've been trained to respond to an
16 aerodynamic stall.

17 If on the other hand I get a sudden nose pitch-down
18 while I'm configuring for approach and landing, but I don't have a
19 stick shaker, there's something in my mind saying that possibility
20 exists, that could be a tail plane. A recovery would be
21 different. But you know, unfortunately the NASA-produced video is
22 silent on the issue of aircraft that do have stick shakers.

23 Q. So when it comes to training pilots who fly these
24 airplanes and specifically -- well, let's speak specifically of
25 the Q400 first.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. Okay. When it comes to training that pilot on how to
3 respond to an incipient stall event, where he has to determine
4 whether or not he does one procedure or the other procedure, what
5 is the best way for Colgan to present that information to its
6 crews?

7 A. I don't know if I could tell you the best way. I could
8 tell you a way that I might want to present it and that would be,
9 if you've got a stick shaker, you respond with stall, check power
10 positive rate, gear up -- flap zero, and get away from the
11 terrain. If on the other hand I'm configuring for an approach and
12 I don't have a stick shaker and the nose drops at the same time
13 that I'm configuring, the possibility exists that it could be tail
14 plane icing, based on that suggestion in the NASA video, and the
15 signs might be more subtle than on an aircraft with a non-powered
16 flight control service.

17 MR. COX: I think I'm going to take a little hiatus here
18 and move on and let Evan ask you some things. Maybe I'll have one
19 or two things when I get back to you.

20 THE WITNESS: Before Evan starts, may I use the
21 restroom?

22 MR. COX: Of course, by all means. We'll take break,
23 please

24 (Off the record.)

25 (On the record.)

1 BY MR. BYRNE:

2 Q. Mr. Jessie, some follow-up questions.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. As far as First Officer Shaw, did you know her name
5 prior to the accident?

6 A. No.

7 Q. And Captain Renslow. Other than reviewing the paperwork
8 for his transition, did you know his name prior to the accident?

9 A. No.

10 Q. And you've never done any observations on either of
11 those two pilots?

12 A. No.

13 Q. You mentioned a Notice of Disapproval that you filled
14 out.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What was that? What happened there?

17 A. That was on a transition-type ride. I was working with
18 Tim as the APD and I was actually having -- letting Tim observe
19 the checkride and I briefed the applicant that I'm going to let
20 Tim, you know, conduct the oral and let Tim conduct the checkride,
21 and there's a 99.9 percent that I'm going to go along with
22 whatever Tim says as far as the outcome of the checkride. It
23 would have to be something very egregious for me to step in and
24 say, no, Tim, you're wrong, we're going the other way on this.
25 However, I did go ahead and fill out the paperwork because the

1 opportunity presented itself to show Tim exactly what you need to
2 fill on a Notice of Disapproval --

3 Q. Um-hum.

4 A. -- on this. And there were several items on it.

5 Q. What were the reasons for the failure?

6 A. Oh god, I would have to refer to the records, but there
7 were probably four practical test standard items, FMS usage, use
8 of checklists. And I really don't recall the rest.

9 Q. Was the candidate retrained and did they eventually
10 qualify?

11 A. Yes, the candidate was retrained, retested and I
12 actually happened to fly with the person last week, for the first
13 time since seeing them during the checkride failure.

14 Q. Any concerns observed when you flew with him last week?

15 A. No.

16 Q. As far as the reason for -- based on your experience as
17 an APM, what is the reason for the failures?

18 A. I believe that the crew became confused with respect to
19 the proper use of the FMS and they didn't understand what was
20 going on with it and as a result, they lost situational awareness.

21 Q. Was there any indication to you that there was a
22 systemic problem or, I guess, that there was a problem in the way
23 they'd been trained or trained up to that point and before being
24 presented to you?

25 A. No. And if I may, I just recalled a second event. It

1 was on an abnormal. I believe this was the checklist part of it
2 and I believe they had an annunciator and I do not recall what it
3 was for, but I believe they may have followed the wrong checklist
4 for the particular problem that they had. Again, I would have to
5 refer to the paperwork on it. It has been a while, but there were
6 multiple issues on this.

7 Q. Okay. How does your being in a remote location away
8 from EA-27 affect your ability to do your job?

9 A. Actually, it kind of enhances it, I think.

10 Q. Why?

11 A. Because I personally live 20 minutes from Newark Airport
12 and I can be down there and conduct a lot of surveillance very
13 easily. With respect to coming down to Manassas, it's, you know,
14 a one-hour jump seat. In reality, by the time I park my car, get
15 to the terminal and get on the airplane and come on down here, get
16 to the office, we're talking three hours. So as a result, I don't
17 go to Manassas frequently, but then again, we've got people that
18 can go to Manassas more frequently.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. They're right here. Colgan also conducts training in
21 Albany. That one, it makes for a long day, but I can go pretty
22 much on a moment's notice there, because I don't have to get any
23 approvals through -- I drive my car to the FSDO, pick up the car,
24 drive up to Albany and make a long day out of it. It's about a
25 two-hour, two-and-a-half hour drive from the FSDO to Albany. So

1 if I'm going to stay for an entire day observing anything up
2 there, it makes for a long day.

3 Q. What training is ongoing in Albany now?

4 A. They have flight attendant training up there.
5 Typically, they try to do the door-opening exercises and whatnot
6 when they have an airplane up there for maintenance. They were
7 doing the emergency drills there, but I believe they are now
8 conducting those in Manassas.

9 Q. And do your responsibilities cover the flight attendant
10 side of the operation of this airplane?

11 A. Not normally, but you know, I've got my normal job and
12 then, for any inspector in the agency, it's and other duties, as
13 assigned.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So there may be occasions for them to send me up there
16 to take a look at some of this stuff.

17 Q. How many en route inspections do you do?

18 A. It's really difficult to quantify that.

19 Q. Let's then get concrete and say in the last month after
20 the accident to today, how many en routes have you done?

21 A. After the accident until today, maybe 10.

22 Q. How many did you do in January?

23 A. Maybe five.

24 Q. And the reason for the increase?

25 A. The reason for the increase is we had -- we spoke

1 earlier about EPIs and SAIs.

2 Q. Um-hum.

3 A. Because I had spent a lot of time reviewing manuals, I
4 hadn't been doing certain EPIs and those EPIs were airmen duties,
5 and as a result, I'm then coming up on the deadline to get those
6 done.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. And then, you know, clearly priorities change. After
9 this accident, you know, manuals kind of fell by the wayside as we
10 had to go out and start looking at other things as well.

11 Q. What things are you looking at on a line when you aren't
12 doing your en routes? What are you looking for?

13 A. Again, I'm looking for overall crew discipline and I'm
14 looking for use of checklists, Colgan procedures, just all the
15 general stuff that goes en route, on the job, for like an en route
16 inspection. However, most of the times I'm out there are
17 specifically for different EPIs or SAIs. In this case it's been
18 the EPIs for check airmen. Or, not check airmen, for airmen
19 duties that I've been doing, and prior to that it was on -- the
20 January ones were primarily focused on dispatch procedures. So I
21 was paying a lot more closer attention to the flight releases and
22 looking at items on there. When doing the airmen duties, I'm
23 putting more emphasis on the actual what are they doing here on
24 this flight?

25 Q. Okay. And as far as Colgan's system with respect to the

1 Q400, what routes haven't you observed?

2 A. What do you mean, what routes?

3 Q. Have you done en route inspections on every route that
4 the Q400 flies?

5 A. Well, they're changing. They change on a regular basis.
6 I guess it's based on Continental's needs. So some routes that
7 have previously existed no longer exist. Let's see, let me start
8 from scratch here. I know I've done current ones. I have done
9 Norfolk. I've done Myrtle Beach. I've done Raleigh-Durham. I've
10 done Baltimore, but I don't think they're doing Baltimore now.
11 I've done Reagan. I've done Dulles, but I don't believe they're
12 doing Dulles now. Or did they ever do Dulles? I'm drawing a
13 blank on that. I've done Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Syracuse,
14 Rochester, Albany, Burlington, Providence, Manchester. And that's
15 about all I can recall off the top of my head.

16 Q. With the observations you've done, is there -- with the
17 observations you've done with the system, what concerns do you
18 have about standardization among Q400 pilots at Norfolk compared
19 to Newark compared to Albany?

20 A. Well, I generally don't make it a point to ask them
21 where they are based, and then they fly to all of these -- all the
22 cities here in the system. So I don't really see the need to look
23 specifically at someone from Norfolk versus someone from Albany
24 versus someone from Newark. I tend to look at procedures and see
25 if there is anything that's going on that I need to investigate

1 further.

2 Q. Okay. Moving on to training, when you -- I lost track
3 of when you last went through recurrent training.

4 A. I believe that was in October.

5 Q. In October. And when you went through that training,
6 did you go through the entire ground school footprint?

7 A. No.

8 Q. What parts --

9 A. And that was one or two days and I would have to --
10 probably two days. Whenever I'm down there it's got to be for an
11 overnight. So I would have to look at the records to see exactly
12 what was looked at in that.

13 Q. You don't recall what you saw?

14 A. I recall there were a lot of visuals that I was not
15 happy with, because they were extractions from a manual that
16 probably could've been enhanced by colorization.

17 Q. Um-hum.

18 A. I don't specifically recall if they normally would've
19 been colored, but these were in black and white. But I recall
20 that in my opinion there were an excessive number of just showing
21 PowerPoint slides and excerpts from manuals. What my specific
22 comments were, I would have to again go back and refer to the
23 records.

24 Q. Okay. What records would that be that -- did you send a
25 message?

1 A. I probably would've recorded that under -- in a PTRS.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I don't believe those were done under an EPI. If it was
4 done under an EPI, then it would've been recorded in the ATOS
5 database.

6 Q. Okay. And as far as the -- you did attend, in October,
7 the winter ops anti-ice/deice module where a video was shown,
8 discussing the tail plane icing?

9 A. In October, I don't recall seeing it then. You know, I
10 don't think I attended the winter module. They did have a winter
11 conference at Newark Airport, but that was just general Newark --
12 Newark operations was the host of that event. That's the last one
13 I can recall that I went to.

14 Q. When did you see that NASA video?

15 A. I reviewed it last night and I can't specially recall
16 the time I'd seen it before.

17 Q. Okay. So did you have any information, then, on what is
18 said about the video during recurrent training at Colgan?

19 A. I don't have any recollection specifically of what's
20 said about it.

21 Q. When was the last time that you -- in October, did you
22 attend the CRM module at Colgan, recurrent CRM?

23 A. I don't specifically recall that module.

24 Q. I guess my question is, you were mentioning the
25 importance to you of crew coordination. That's something that you

1 look for with respect to the operation of this aircraft --

2 A. Um-hum.

3 Q. -- when you came on line. What is your knowledge as far
4 as how the crews are being trained in communication coordination
5 and CRM?

6 A. It's included as a brief module. I believe it's a two-
7 hour block and it's, you know, very general in nature and then my
8 recollection is it goes into the historic need for CRM, the
9 outcomes that occurred when there wasn't CRM and just the basic
10 need to have free communication in the flight deck.

11 Q. Is it adequate, in your opinion, to provide the captains
12 at Colgan with the leadership and management skills that they
13 need?

14 A. Adequate, yes. Would I like to see something different?
15 Perhaps. Again, this is part of the ongoing evaluation where, you
16 know, there's a whole wish list of things that I would like to
17 see. Am I going to get them all? Probably not. But you take a
18 look at the ones that are very significant to you, for whatever
19 reason, and those are the ones that you concentrate on.

20 I don't know that taking a close look at that particular
21 module would be a high priority for me, unless there's something
22 going on that says, okay, we need to reevaluate this and then see,
23 you know, is this truly adequate or is there something that we
24 need to do. In its present state, I don't see anything suggesting
25 that I need to do anything more with it.

1 Q. Well, you said perhaps changes. Do any changes come to
2 mind, off hand, or --

3 A. I would like, I think, in general, more emphasis of the
4 way it was, because I think we've kind of lost sight of how CRM
5 really started and what the effect was. A lot of times I'll tell
6 the guys I'm out here with, that when I started off as a junior
7 FO, I had a lot of experience flying in the left seat and I
8 learned a lot of good things from these guys. One of them was a
9 former training captain for Trans World Airlines. He was 70 years
10 old at the time and he taught me more than I could ever state
11 here.

12 However, here's this guy with all this great, valuable
13 experience and I remember taking off out of McCarran with him and
14 his briefing on the emergencies was, and if anything goes wrong,
15 stay out of my way. And that's the mindset of the era that he
16 came up through the air carriers in.

17 You know, he was captain and it was just like he knows
18 more than you and there's nothing you can add to this procedure.
19 So I think I would like to see more of the historical background
20 and then just kind of to reemphasize why we have it. I think,
21 today, it's just like a lot of the guys coming through see it as
22 just another block or a checkmark, training checkmark, to fill.

23 Q. The configuration changes you mentioned, as far as in
24 your mind, you wanted to see more discreet points as far as when
25 to initiate configuration changes during approach. What

1 advantages are there to doing that versus what Colgan's doing now?

2 A. In my mind, the advantage is, well, one, you're
3 establishing a benchmark to conduct an event and then you can
4 assess, are you meeting that benchmark? And you've got both crew
5 members looking at it. You know, if the captain intends to call
6 for gear down at a dot and a half and does not, the FO is looking
7 at that and may go, Captain, dot and a half you want gear down.
8 So it's giving him a reference point that can be, you know,
9 checked and verified and then assessed to see if the flight is
10 progressing as you want it to progress.

11 Q. With respect to earlier today, you talked about the
12 workload, as far as manual revisions. You mentioned that you
13 suggested some things, some of which have been incorporated, some
14 haven't. What have you suggested that's been incorporated?

15 A. Getting rid of the circling approach in the Q. And that
16 goes back to my experience flying Twin Otters out at Las Vegas and
17 I had done the ILS runway two-five circle, runway one-nine at
18 McCarran, and even in a 19-seat airplane, it's not comfortable
19 being there 600, 700 feet ADL, turning from downwind to base to
20 final on these buildings. The thought of doing it in the Q, no,
21 don't do it.

22 Q. Um-hum.

23 A. And then, fortunately, it's worked out. Colgan's
24 checkrides have been so long, they're looking for ways to, you
25 know, reduce the amount of time they're conducting these

1 checkrides, which has run three hours in some cases. And you
2 know, just everything came together and they decided, tell you
3 what, we'll just issue the rating, circling VMC conditions only.
4 We're not going to train it and not going to check it. So there,
5 I don't have to worry about this Q400 circling at 700 ADL.

6 Q. Yeah. What else?

7 A. Let's see, what else have I been successful in lobbying
8 for? If I could bring up Colgan's bulletins, that would help
9 refresh my memory. A handful of other things.

10 Q. Okay. What's the biggest thing that you've asked for
11 that you haven't -- hasn't been realized yet?

12 A. Well, the biggest thing in my mind is the increase ref
13 speed switch or increase speed switch. I would like to see that
14 become a checklist item, simply for the fact that -- and they are
15 incorporating. A bulletin just came out, where it's being
16 incorporated into, I believe, the approach checklist --

17 Q. Um-hum.

18 A. -- which was part of my recommendation. I also wanted
19 to see it on the -- somewhere downstream after parking, that it
20 was in the off position so that they didn't inadvertently taxi out
21 with it in the on position. And my rationale for that is you've
22 got -- you're checking the peedo (ph.) heat switches, making sure
23 they're on and off.

24 Q. Right.

25 A. And given that the increase speed switch mechanically

1 changes to that low speed -- I'm thinking perhaps we should have
2 that on the checklist in both places.

3 Q. When did you make the recommendation?

4 A. It's probably been within the last 10 days or so.

5 Q. So after the accident?

6 A. Yes, that's post-accident.

7 Q. And who did you make the recommendation to?

8 A. That was Doug Lundgren. And that actually may have been
9 a telecom involving Colgan personnel as well. It's hard to say.
10 I spend a lot of time on the telephone communicating in --

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. -- a lot of telecons with Colgan folks.

13 Q. As far as communication telecons, how much do you
14 coordinate or communicate with other APMs for other Q400
15 operators?

16 A. Very little.

17 Q. Very little?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. We've learned in the last couple days that there was an
20 FAA -- a special FAA inspection last summer, of Colgan. Are you
21 familiar with that inspection?

22 A. No. That's part of the difficulty with being remotely
23 sited, you don't really get a feel for, hands-on, what's going on
24 down in the office.

25 Q. With respect to Colgan's efforts for oversight of its

1 own program, what's your knowledge of standardization drives that
2 they've done?

3 A. They are frequently out there conducting standardization
4 drives. I recall one was early on, when it had to do with
5 compliance with setting speed bugs. Before I came on board, they
6 were having, apparently, over-speeds exceeding the upper limit.

7 Q. Um-hum.

8 A. And there was a big push to let's find out what we can
9 do to eradicate this. So what they were doing was they were
10 having pilots bug 10 knots slower than the maximum speed, and then
11 everyone was being required to fly at that, and I believe they had
12 a big push to go out and check on that. I don't really recall
13 what the most recent one was, because they provide these
14 standardization reports to the POI and of course, I get cc'ed on
15 the results and I will scan through them to see, you know, if
16 we're seeing the same thing.

17 Q. And any other standardization drives come to mind?

18 A. They just had a recent one and I don't believe I've seen
19 the results on that.

20 Q. Define recent.

21 A. Within the last month.

22 Q. After the accident?

23 A. I believe so.

24 Q. The traveling road show for safety, did you attend that
25 when it was up in Newark?

1 A. What was the content? I have attended certain check
2 airmen meetings that are conducted by Sheri Baxter. I think I've
3 heard of that traveling road show for safety.

4 Q. This was high-level company personnel going around to
5 the bases, as we understand it, to talk about safety sometime last
6 summer.

7 A. No, I don't recall attending those.

8 Q. How would you characterize adherence to standard
9 operating procedures based on the observations that you've made?

10 A. In the vast majority of cases, good. In certain other
11 instances, I'm finding things that I think need attention. But
12 that's historically the way it's been since I was first assigned
13 to Colgan. If you're out there watching, you should start seeing
14 things that are raising flags or, you know, you start seeing
15 things but you say, well, I'm going to take a closer look at this
16 and then see what's going on.

17 A good example was when I was first assigned, it was
18 actually more a question of, hey, would you like to help out and
19 do some observations on the Q400, which I did and I flew with a
20 line captain. It was the FO's leg. The FO hand-flew the approach
21 into Baltimore, the shit job. They did an excellent go-around and
22 you know, back into IMC, came back around, set up for the
23 approach, the captain suggested that, you know, since that wasn't
24 the greatest hand-flown approach, why don't you let the autopilot
25 fly it? So they did. It had been a while since I'd flown the

1 airplane, but there was something nagging in the back of my mind
2 and after we landed I pulled out the AOM and I looked and right
3 there is a restriction on a flaps 35 approach and they had flown a
4 flaps 35 ILS approach down 200 and just connected a good landing.
5 So at that point I said, I'll tell you what, guys, time for you to
6 call your chief pilot, which they did.

7 Fast forward to a little bit farther down the road in
8 the future and I'm out doing two -- I'm doing observations on two
9 line check airmen candidates and you know, they didn't have actual
10 new captains that they could check, so I had them watch one
11 captain checking another captain. Well, they're coming into
12 setting up for approach and now I've read the restrictions, so I
13 know what it is and it is autopilot engaged, flaps 35 approach
14 mode prohibited, period.

15 So I've got two line check airmen now coming up on
16 approach and what do I see? I see them get configured, flaps 35,
17 the autopilot's engaged, approach mode, but they're outside the
18 final approach fix. And ultimately, what came of that was I found
19 that -- you know, I immediately knew we had a training problem.
20 You know, the first time I saw it with that first captain, I
21 thought, okay, they just screwed up, didn't retain their training
22 or whatever.

23 When I saw two line check airmen attempting to do the
24 same thing, I said, okay, we've got a training problem here.
25 These guys think it's okay to do this. And I ultimately was able

1 to track it down to, procedurally, in the Saab, it's okay to be
2 configured like that, so long as you just connect by the final
3 approach fix. That procedure was being carried over onto the
4 Q400.

5 Another fault was the wording in the Q400 study guide
6 that they had been using, which simply stated, flaps 25 coupled
7 approaches prohibited. Okay, in their mind a coupled approach is
8 from the final approach fix inbound, and that one line in that
9 study guide didn't echo exactly what was in the autopilot
10 limitation. So there's, you know, another example of things that
11 you find as you're out there looking around.

12 Q. What concerns do you have about Colgan's adherence to
13 sterile cockpit on the Q400?

14 A. That one is a difficult one to judge because, as a
15 former airline pilot, I know what the flight deck atmosphere is
16 like when there is a regular jump seater on board, and I know what
17 the flight deck atmosphere is like when there's a Fed on board.

18 So I know that what I am seeing is not actually the
19 clearest indication of what their sterile cockpit procedures might
20 be like. I can pick up clues, you know, with respect to the time
21 of certain things that are said or the subject matter might not
22 pertain to that particular regime of flight. But overall I'm not
23 seeing anything that raises a lot of red flags for me on that.

24 Q. What's your knowledge of the LOSA program? The LOSA
25 program at Colgan.

1 A. I forgot. What's --

2 Q. Line operation safety audits.

3 A. Line operation safety, yeah. That's where they go out
4 and they do their pushes. All I know is that is Colgan management
5 and check airmen to get out there and they are essentially doing
6 an internal audit of their procedures. Then they grade them on a
7 scale of -- I think it's one to four or four to one, with the
8 average score I'm always seeing as 3 point something.

9 Q. Are you involved in the ASAP program?

10 A. Colgan does have an ASAP agreement and they do use it,
11 but I am not a member of that program.

12 Q. As APD have learned anything about operations through
13 the Colgan ASAP program, that you didn't know prior?

14 A. That I didn't previously know, no.

15 Q. What internal meetings do you participate in? I
16 guess --

17 A. Internal meetings with?

18 Q. -- what meetings with Colgan personnel do you
19 participate in on a regular basis?

20 A. On a regular basis we -- I participate in the flight
21 operations telephone conference that they have every day of the
22 week, on Monday through Friday at 8:30.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. That's just a general, you know, how's their system
25 functioning, what, you know, types of MELs do we have on what

1 aircraft fleets, what are delays in these areas of operation,
2 what's the weather here, what's the weather here, how did our
3 head-starts perform. However, Doug Lundgren often takes advantage
4 of that to say, okay, operations and standards guys, let's stay on
5 the line and discuss whatever. It goes beyond just discussing the
6 performance.

7 Q. When was the last time there was a let's-stay-on-the-
8 line request -- topic?

9 A. Probably Friday or Thursday. It's very frequent. It's
10 more often the rule than the exception.

11 Q. Um-hum.

12 A. And of late, it's been again with a lot of manual
13 changes, things that we would like to see, but of course, we can't
14 tell them, you know, how to write their manuals. We can suggest
15 that, well, we think this is important, this important and this is
16 important. But ultimately it's up to the carrier to write it and
17 then to submit it to us for review. So oftentimes Doug is often
18 making suggestions. If we have had an instance or occurrences, he
19 will often try to incorporate a lesson learned into something.
20 But you know, this has been an ongoing type of thing.

21 Q. What communications have you received directly from
22 pilots at Colgan? Have pilots at Colgan come to you about any
23 safety or operational concerns with the aircraft?

24 A. No, not directly. And I see the pilots quite frequently
25 at Newark, but none have expressed any safety concerns per se. I

1 did have one pilot on a flight to Burlington and this was one week
2 after the accident and of course, every guy out the line is
3 probably speculating as to the cause of the accident and he did
4 bring up the question of the increase speed switch and the effects
5 that it had and he told me that, anecdotally, he had heard that
6 there had been pilots on the line that had been on approach and
7 had inadvertently left the switch in the on position and got a
8 stick shaker. So that kind of raised a red flag for me. And this
9 is not a usual occurrence.

10 Q. Um-hum.

11 A. So my response was, well, has this been communicated to
12 Colgan management, and he did not know. So I suggested -- okay,
13 you know, I have to review this every time with the guys. You've
14 got a feedback reporting form in every manual that you have. It
15 goes directly to the Director of Safety and that's how you get
16 changes to manuals, procedures, policies, et cetera, et cetera, et
17 cetera, and if you're not letting people know about stuff, you
18 know, it's not going to get taken care of.

19 But because it was anecdotal, you know, I didn't doubt
20 that it did happen, but you know, it was the first report and I'm
21 thinking, you know, it probably needs to be looked at a little
22 closer. So in addition to talking to the captain, I called Doug
23 and told him what I had been told. He then passed it on to Colgan
24 management.

25 Q. Um-hum. And I guess along that line, the event that

1 happened on March 10.

2 A. I've only heard -- you know, no one has really told me
3 what happened March 10th.

4 Q. You haven't been officially -- you weren't officially
5 notified or part of a notification chain?

6 A. No. But what I have heard is that virtually what was
7 described to me by this line captain, what he had heard
8 anecdotally, did occur.

9 Q. And prior to that line captain describing anecdotally to
10 you that that information did -- had you been aware of that --

11 A. No.

12 Q. -- scenario happening prior?

13 A. That was the first time I had heard of it.

14 Q. And other than the discussion earlier, as far as the
15 checklist addition on the status of the ref speed switch, is --
16 are there any other changes that you've recommended post-accident?

17 A. Okay, ref speed switch. Let's see, what else post-
18 accident?

19 MR. TOMICICH: While he's thinking about that, let me
20 answer. Are you asking about recommendations that are internal to
21 the FAA or recommendations to the carrier?

22 MR. BYRNE: That he's made -- recommendations that he's
23 made to the carrier.

24 MR. TOMICICH: Okay.

25 THE WITNESS: To the carrier. Okay. Now, okay, I guess

1 the ref speed, that was to the carrier, but realize that I go
2 through the principal. You know, we can't have like 10 sweat hogs
3 all talking to --

4 MR. BYRNE: Right.

5 THE WITNESS: -- different people at the company.
6 You've got to go to a focal point.

7 BY MR. BYRNE:

8 Q. Why don't we just say, what recommendations have you
9 made to the POI --

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. -- post-accident, as far as changes in procedures or
12 anything that would affect the operations of the Q400.

13 A. Okay, that's what we wanted to clarify. I can recall
14 that one. With respect to the briefing paper that came out on
15 Bulletin 09001, which was their internal bulletin just to
16 reinforce and reiterate their procedure and policies for flight in
17 icing conditions, I insisted that they put something in there just
18 to make it clear to each and every pilot out there that if a
19 situation exists where you can be flying at a valid ref speed
20 configured for landing in that airplane, the wing is flying
21 perfectly well, and if you reach up and you turn the increase ref
22 speed switch on, the possibility exists the low-speed Q can jump
23 up through your current airspeed and give you a stick shaker even
24 though your wing is flying just fine.

25 So I recommended that that be included in that briefing.

1 That was adopted. What else? Darn, I just had it on the tip of
2 my tongue, too. Oh, speed cards in the Colgan aircraft. As they
3 are in every carrier that I've ever seen, the numbers are based on
4 the default condition, which is dry runway. But I did notice in
5 the Bombardier AOM, under the same -- under charts that were
6 essentially the same as those charts, there's a notation that says
7 at 20 knots for flaps, you know, 15 and at 15 knots, flaps 35 in
8 icing conditions.

9 My recommendation was to put that notation on the speed
10 cards that are in Colgan aircraft. I believe that recommendation
11 is being adopted. Those are the only ones I can think of off the
12 top of my head.

13 Q. Just a couple more questions. Characterize your working
14 relationship with the POI.

15 A. It's good. I have a lot of respect for Doug and our
16 relationship goes back to the time that I was working as a
17 geographic inspector at Newark, for the Teterboro FSDO, one of the
18 carriers that I had oversight. Actually two of them were Atlantic
19 Coast Airlines/Independence Air. Doug Lundgren was the POI for
20 both of those and there were a couple of occasions where I had to
21 deal with him on some minor violations or, you know, station
22 operations questions.

23 And he's one of the few POIs where I would send an e-
24 mail and say, hey, I've got a question on this, this or this, and
25 he would actually get back to me very quickly. And those two

1 carriers, from my perspective, appeared to be very well run. I
2 attributed that in part to the oversight that they were receiving.

3 Q. How does that oversight compare to what Colgan's
4 receiving?

5 A. It appears to be the same. I see Doug is always -- like
6 I said, I'm on these telecons which he attends every day. He's
7 always running things through and then making suggestions as to
8 how the company might want to do something this way or they might
9 want to, like, back away from this or -- and it's always -- he's
10 very actively engaged in, you know, helping them out on whatever
11 process they are working on or just things that are coming to mind
12 for him.

13 Q. How would you characterize the safety culture at Colgan?

14 A. I would say it is acceptable. I still see -- my
15 perception may be clouded because I had heard that they were a mom
16 and pop-type airline. You know, it started out by the Colgan
17 family. And when I first started doing surveillance, you know,
18 all I ever heard was, you know, Chuck Colgan, Mikey Colgan and Dee
19 and you know, every other name was Colgan. I know she's a Colgan,
20 too, but she got married, so her last is not Colgan. So that kind
21 of stuck in my mind that, you know, perhaps they do have a mom and
22 pop mentality.

23 That was further reinforced by a lot of -- a lot of
24 times when we would be in discussion about, well, why do you want
25 to make this particular change to this particular checklist?

1 Well, that's the way we did it on the Saab. And there were many
2 times where I questioned that particular mentality. And their
3 rationale seemed sound and the reason was that they wanted to make
4 the transition for their Saab guys coming on to the Q as, you
5 know, easy as possible, give them something that they are familiar
6 with and keep it procedurally the same. So I can understand that.
7 You know, is that necessarily the best thing to do? I don't know.
8 Perhaps for that initial group, later on, it might not be and you
9 know --

10 Q. Are there any deficiencies in the safety culture at
11 Colgan?

12 A. I have not seen any, except for the company's ability to
13 get changes, you know, effected in the manner that they tell us
14 they intend to do it. They've got this, you know, elaborate
15 explanation in their manuals, of how they will do things, and
16 during surveillance I'm consistently seeing the feedback process
17 is not being done the way they are telling us that they are going
18 to do it. That could contribute to some safety issues.

19 Q. Can you give an example of what you're talking about?

20 A. Well, I just did. Like the captain who knew,
21 anecdotally, the stick shaker.

22 Q. Right.

23 A. And you know, was that reported to management? I don't
24 know. Well, you know, I haven't done any checking personally, but
25 I suspect that a feedback reporting form was not done on that. So

1 I have emphasized to every one of their responsible managers, when
2 the subject comes up, that, hey, you know, these guys, either they
3 don't know this thing is out there or you as a manager are not
4 emphasizing it enough to them. I went on their crew website last
5 night and I saw the regional chief pilot has embraced my
6 suggestion and he put out a new read-and-sign, that he has placed
7 a supply of these things up with their forms and he was
8 encouraging people to use them to effect changes.

9 MR. BYRNE: Okay, thank you, Mr. Jessie.

10 MR. COX: Why don't we go to Gene.

11 BY MR. CONWAY:

12 Q. Okay. Mike, do you interface with the principals, with
13 respect to op specs? Do you get involved in that at all,
14 reviewing them or familiarizing yourself --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- with them?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. It's kind of a touchy issue because I have found
20 numerous things in op specs that need to be cleaned up. But
21 Colgan has industry op specs and if you noticed in our e-mail, we
22 no longer have the contract for industry signature. So they can
23 submit changes to us; we've got no one at the FAA that can sign
24 those changes. But that's a little bit problematic. But yes, I
25 have gone through the op specs and one that I -- you know, I will

1 direct what I see as needing, you know, updating or correction or
2 whatnot, to the appropriate principal.

3 Q. Okay. With respect to -- there's one that I used to
4 deal with a little bit more. I don't now, because my job
5 description has changed somewhat. A-31, outsource training, is
6 that something you review from time to time or are particularly
7 familiar with?

8 A. You know, I am familiar with it and I do know that it
9 lists FlightSafety as the outsource training provider and I
10 believe it lists, you know, several different training centers.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Beyond that, I haven't taken a real, real close look.

13 MR. CONWAY: Okay. All right, I think that's all I have
14 for you, Mike. Let me just quickly see if there was one other
15 note that I had. You guys covered quite a bit in here. I think
16 that was everything. Thanks very much.

17 MR. COX: Mike, you've got any questions?

18 MR. WICKBOLDT: I don't have any questions.

19 MR. COX: How about you, Tim?

20 MR. DITTMAR: No, I have none.

21 MR. COX: Ken Webster?

22 MR. WEBSTER: I have a few questions and I'm just having
23 a hard time hearing Mike, so could you speak up a little bit?

24 MR. COX: Here we go. Okay, can you hear me now?

25 MR. WEBSTER: That's great, thanks.

1 MR. COX: This thing works pretty well, so --

2 THE WITNESS: Okay.

3 MR. COX: -- you don't need to stand if you don't want
4 to. I think we can twist it around here.

5 THE WITNESS: Let me sit and we'll do another volume
6 check. How do you hear me?

7 MR. WEBSTER: Good, thanks.

8 THE WITNESS: Okay.

9 BY MR. WEBSTER:

10 Q. In your position with the FAA, have you ever had to
11 provide any oversight for the approval of the training syllabus?

12 A. Well, what do you mean by oversight for the approval?
13 And the reason I'm asking is I have reviewed the current crew
14 member/dispatcher training program and have reviewed the proposed
15 flight operations training manual, and I have made recommendations
16 with respect to the content of both of those.

17 Q. More specifically the sim training syllabus, have you
18 had any input with that, simulator training?

19 A. No, the general modules list what will be covered, but
20 beyond how specifically those items will be covered, no. However,
21 we are in the process of reevaluating how we train and check the
22 stall series in the aircraft.

23 Currently, we're using the Bombardier profiles, which
24 are identical to the Bombardier profiles that I first flew, you
25 know, 12, 13 years ago when I was initially typed in the Dash 8,

1 which essentially is -- you enter it at a level altitude, constant
2 speed, constant heading, and the recovery is to the same, you
3 know, altitude and heading. The Q400 is a technologically
4 advanced aircraft and in my opinion it's very much designed to be
5 flown by automation.

6 Partially in response to the accident, we've reviewed
7 the stall training series and have come to agreement that we are
8 going to teach at least two of them entered from automation and
9 we're going to retain a third manually flown. There was some
10 discussion of having all three of them done by automation and I
11 fought for having at least the takeoff stall flown manually,
12 partly because I have personal knowledge of people that I've known
13 that have died in an over-rotation scenario, and partially because
14 the two other stalls are very easily entered from flight regimes
15 that are very frequently seen in actual line operations.

16 Q. Okay. With that revamping the stall series that you
17 mentioned, how about the recovery procedure? You know, I'm
18 talking about how it would be entered. What about the recovery,
19 would that be, you know, staying the same or changing?

20 A. Well, the general call-outs should still be the same.
21 We're still kind of discussing -- the final document has not come
22 out, as to whether or not to recover to, you know, an altitude or
23 a climb away from terrain. They also are looking at incorporating
24 this into a module with a EGPWS terrain warning and the wind sheer
25 model as well. So it really has not been finalized. But the

1 bottom line is I want the same standard call-outs because it's
2 going to apply. It's going to be, you know, call out the stall,
3 check power, call for a positive rate, call for gear up, call for
4 flap retraction and get away from the terrain. That has always
5 been the basis for stall recovery.

6 So I would not like to see a change from that. If it
7 means that we have to recover from an altitude, you know, higher
8 than where the stall occurred, I personally am okay with that.
9 But I think what we were going to do is we are going to have reach
10 a consensus on it and I don't know if everybody agrees with my
11 thoughts on it.

12 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any other companies that operate
13 the Q400, if their stall training or stall recovery may differ
14 from Colgan?

15 A. To the best of my knowledge, Horizon is also flying the
16 Bombardier profiles. I am not sure about links. Doug Lundgren
17 has been in contact with the POIs of both of these companies and
18 has been since, you know, the Q first came on line with Colgan.
19 You know, there have been certain things that I believe existed at
20 Horizon that were adopted and certain things that were not.
21 Specifically which ones, I don't know, they predate me and I can't
22 recall anything that they are currently doing that we may or may
23 not incorporate into the training program.

24 Q. Okay. As far as the pusher, are you aware of any other
25 companies that do pusher training as part of their syllabus, in

1 reference to the previous question?

2 A. My recollection from FlightSafety, when I was initially
3 typed, was that we did a push demo. Beyond that, there was no
4 specific training that I can recall. I don't specifically recall
5 if we received a demo, or not, on the Q when I went through the
6 FlightSafety program, but I'm glad you mentioned that because
7 that's another one of the items that is being kicked around to be
8 incorporated into the stall recovery. Also make sure that there
9 is a demonstration of not only the push but also the forces
10 required in overcoming a push.

11 Q. Um-hum. Okay. When you observe line checks and
12 checkrides -- well, I guess checkrides more specifically, what is
13 the stall recovery technique that you've observed during the
14 initial checkrides?

15 A. They're the same as what I've trained and have observed
16 in training in the past and that is the level flight entry
17 configure for whatever type of stall it is, and then the standard
18 call-outs and recovery procedure to the same altitude and the same
19 airspeed, a hundred and eighty knots.

20 Q. Okay. How about recurrent rides, are they addressed in
21 recurrent rides?

22 A. Yeah, they always do at least a stall in the recurrent
23 rides. They conform to -- 121, Appendix F, is what they are using
24 and they are also in the process -- and it may be completed -- of
25 developing the specific job aids for type rides and recurrent

1 rides. Currently they've got a sheet that covers all of the items
2 on the recurrent ride.

3 Q. Okay. Are you aware if a candidate has ever failed a
4 checkride or a PC for improper stall recovery?

5 A. No.

6 Q. For my information, do you know what --

7 A. I take that back.

8 Q. -- the FAA PTRS standards are for stall recovery?

9 A. Can we back up just a moment? I take that back. I am
10 aware of someone that did fail for a stall recovery on the Dash 8,
11 but it was not with Colgan. This was when I went through my
12 initial type ride, a person in my class got a stall warning on the
13 ILS approach two times in a row and failed the checkride on that
14 basis.

15 Q. Okay. So that wasn't part of a scripted maneuver, that
16 was something that --

17 A. That was just that they flat-out blew the approach.

18 Q. Okay. Okay, then, back to my other question there. The
19 FAA PTRS standards for stall recovery, could you outline what they
20 are?

21 A. Just essentially recovery with minimum loss of altitude
22 and no secondary stall.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Or avoid secondary stall.

25 Q. What would you describe as a minimum loss of altitude?

1 A. That depends on the conditions. I mean, you know, an
2 airplane can stall in, you know, any altitude, any airspeed.
3 Typically, in a check-ride scenario you're not going to see a nose
4 low with high speed. You know, a minimum loss of altitude in that
5 could be several hundred or more feet. From a straight and
6 level-type thing, it might be a hundred feet. In a climbing, you
7 know, it might be 50 feet. It all depends.

8 But I guess if I had to pick a number as a
9 generalization of what I would expect to see in a simulator and
10 something entered from straight and level flight, I would expect
11 something in the order of maybe a hundred feet. But I would also
12 have to say that I would be primarily concerned with the second
13 stall. That I don't like seeing.

14 Q. So if a candidate was to break the hundred-foot altitude
15 that you had just discussed, but the technique used was proper and
16 there was no secondary stall, would that constitute a fail or a
17 pass?

18 A. That would be satisfactory, in my opinion.

19 Q. Okay. Were the standards always -- did the standards
20 always describe a minimum loss of altitude or was there any hard
21 limits, specifically plus or minus a hundred feet?

22 A. You know, I'm drawing a blank on the always part of
23 that. So I would have to say right now, I don't know.

24 Q. Okay. When you're observing these checkrides, what is
25 your understanding of what Colgan uses for PTRS standards? Have

1 you seen anything --

2 A. Say again.

3 Q. When you observe checkrides with Colgan, have you seen
4 anything else other than a minimum acceptable loss that they
5 describe as -- for PTRS standards for the stall recovery?

6 A. What do you mean, have I seen? In the recovery itself
7 or in writing?

8 Q. Have you seen, have you talked, has there been general
9 discussion about what the standards may differ from as a minimum
10 of acceptable loss?

11 A. Not to my recollection, no.

12 Q. Okay, just a few things on line checks there. Have you
13 ever operated -- have you ever been on a line check when icing
14 conditions were present?

15 A. Not a line check per se. In the performance of --
16 elements of performance inspections, yes.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Which incorporates the elements of "line check" under
19 the PTRS concept.

20 Q. Was the icing equipment turned on in that case, then?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Was the icing equipment left on to the landing?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Okay. At what point was it turned off?

25 A. The one I can specifically recall was a climb-out after

1 departure, entered icing conditions several thousand feet up,
2 broke out on top and it was clear on top, clear at the
3 destination, no evidence of icing, and the icing protection was
4 turned off, except for the Colgan standards, which are the peedo
5 heat and the -- opening the intake doors.

6 Q. Okay. In that case, can you recall what speed would've
7 been bugged, as far as not a specific number but an icing or non-
8 icing or deicing?

9 A. Well, I believe on that, on the particular flight that I
10 am recalling, it was non-icing. And I don't specifically recall
11 what the temperature was at the destination, but I do recall that,
12 after we broke out on top, it was clear for, I don't know,
13 probably 45 minutes at least. I do recall recent flights into
14 airports, in icing conditions, where the icing numbers were
15 requested via ACARS and used on landing, in conjunction with all
16 the ice protection on, as well.

17 Q. Okay. That leads up to the next question, then. Have
18 you ever observed a crew forming an approach with the increase ref
19 switch on and clean speeds bugged?

20 A. No, I haven't.

21 Q. Okay. And have you ever suggested or recommended any
22 changes to operating procedures or training, as a result of a line
23 check?

24 A. Let me think about that one. Well, yeah, and that goes
25 back to the flaps 35 issue, recommended to change it to that.

1 There was another time on a line check that I recommended a change
2 to their training program because there were incorrect pressure
3 requirements on their oxygen for two and three crew members,
4 because they actually had a different cylinder than they thought
5 they had. So that had to be reincorporated into their training
6 program as well.

7 Operationally, I also made a recommendation that their
8 checklist be modified because, during a line check, I observed
9 that aircraft were being pushed back from the gate, with
10 passengers on board, engines being started and it wasn't until
11 they were just about ready to taxi, when they noticed that the
12 emergency lights were not armed. And I made a recommendation that
13 they get that incorporated to assure that emergency lights are
14 armed prior to pushback with passengers on board. Beyond that, I
15 can't recall any other recommendations and implementations off the
16 top of my head.

17 Q. Okay. Was the company receptive to your suggestions and
18 recommendations?

19 A. Yes.

20 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you, I have no further questions.
21 Thank you for your time.

22 MR. COX: We have Harlan remaining.

23 MR. SIMPKINS: Yeah, I am still here. You can hear me
24 okay?

25 MR. COX: Yeah.

1 BY MR. SIMPKINS:

2 Q. I have a couple of questions for you regarding training.
3 Did Bombardier conduct, to your knowledge, any ground school
4 training?

5 A. Not that I'm aware of.

6 Q. And did Bombardier conduct any simulator training?

7 A. Not that I'm aware of.

8 Q. And did Bombardier conduct any checkrides for Colgan?

9 A. Not that I'm aware of.

10 Q. Okay. Did Bombardier approve or certify any of the
11 ground school training for Colgan?

12 A. That I don't know.

13 Q. Okay. And similarly along the lines, any -- did
14 Bombardier certify or approve any simulator training syllabus?

15 A. Again, that I don't know.

16 Q. Okay. You mentioned that Colgan is training to the
17 Bombardier profiles for stall and stall recovery. Do you know
18 where in the aircraft flight manual those profiles are?

19 A. Actually, I may have misspoken on that. I do recall
20 seeing them in the FlightSafety profiles and I am not a hundred
21 percent certain that I have seen them in the Bombardier AOM. And
22 I would have to look in that document to refresh my memory.

23 Q. Okay. You mentioned one of the changes that you're
24 looking for is a note about the increase ref speed switch in the
25 taxi check as well the approach check.

1 A. Not the taxi. That would be after landing and you know,
2 somewhere down the line as they're coming into the gate, just to
3 assure that that is not left in the increase position when they
4 taxi out and depart for the next flight.

5 Q. Okay. Currently, in the after-start check for the
6 Colgan checklist, they have two areas where it potentially could
7 be caught, the PFD/MFD/E.D. --

8 A. Um-hum.

9 Q. -- checklist. As I'm sure aware, the increase ref speed
10 switch --

11 A. It's the increase.

12 Q. -- would be shown on the E.D., so it could be caught
13 there.

14 A. At the bottom.

15 Q. As well as in the ice protection section for the after-
16 start checklist. Do you feel that that is not a sufficient
17 position to cover any inadvertent switches in the wrong position?

18 A. I'm not suggesting that it's insufficient. My intent on
19 this is to highlight the existence and importance of that switch.

20 Q. Okay. But you don't feel that the importance of that
21 switch would be caught in those two line items in the after-start
22 check?

23 A. Well, I didn't say that. You know, as you know, there's
24 a lot of information presented on all of the display units on that
25 aircraft and on many aircraft. Do pilots miss information that is

1 presented on those DUs? My guess is yeah, they do. So the fact
2 that it is displayed on a display unit is good, but I don't see
3 anything, you know, inherently wrong with some redundancy as well.

4 Q. Okay. Are you are of the supplements for the aircraft
5 flight manual?

6 A. Some of them.

7 Q. Are you aware of Supplement 75? It has to do with Cat 1
8 flight director and autopilot approaches using flap 35.

9 A. Yeah, I believe if -- when this first occurred with the
10 flap 35 landings, one of the first things I did was inquire about
11 that particular supplement to see if, you know, conducting an
12 approach with flaps 35 in that aircraft was inherently dangerous.
13 What I found was that that particular supplement, nothing --
14 according to the information I received, nothing changes
15 operationally with the aircraft. What happens is the operator
16 hands money to Bombardier, Bombardier hands the supplement to the
17 operator, and then they can go along and they can fly the flaps 35
18 coupled approach all day long if they want.

19 Q. That's correct. Are you aware if Colgan has purchased
20 that supplement?

21 A. I don't believe they have. There was initial discussion
22 after these early incidents, to do it, but I don't believe they
23 have purchased that particular supplement.

24 Q. Okay. Regarding winter operations, do you get all of
25 the Colgan bulletins and read-and-signs?

1 A. Yes, those are sent out by their tech pubs guy.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And I also have --

4 Q. Did you write the Colgan winter ops exam?

5 A. Pardon?

6 Q. Did you write the Colgan winter operations exam?

7 A. No, I did not.

8 Q. Are you aware of that exam?

9 A. Yes, I am.

10 Q. And lastly, I just want to discuss the tail plane icing
11 video that we were talking about, in the regional aircraft or in
12 one of the three videos where they discussed tail plane icing. I
13 recall you saying that there were some curious information in
14 there about powered flight controls and whether or not -- how it
15 reacts with a stick shaker system. Have you personally contacted
16 NASA for further information or clarification?

17 A. No, I haven't.

18 Q. Do you know if anyone from Colgan has contacted NASA for
19 further information or clarification?

20 A. I don't know if anyone has or not.

21 Q. Okay. Have you specifically contacted Bombardier for
22 any further information or clarification regarding flight
23 characteristics of the Q400?

24 A. No. Well, hold on, let me think. I may have contacted
25 Bombardier. Again, this would've been with respect to the flaps

1 35 operation. Recently, no, I have not.

2 Q. Specifically regarding tail plane icing, though, have
3 you contacted Bombardier for further information about flight
4 characteristics in -- for the tail plane?

5 A. I have not contacted Bombardier, although I have made
6 notes that I might, because I seem to recall seeing something and
7 I don't know who produced it, I believe it to be Bombardier,
8 indicating that the Q400 was not susceptible to tail plane icing.
9 I have not verified that. It's just something that I recall
10 seeing at some point and I don't know specifically where. But
11 yeah, that would be a follow-up item for me. Have I done it yet?
12 No.

13 Q. Okay. If it is that the Q400 is not susceptible to tail
14 plane stall, do you feel that the video, then, should be removed
15 from the training program?

16 A. Well, again, that's a tricky call because I have to
17 respect, you know, NASA's knowledge of and their research into
18 icing conditions. Again, at the beginning of this video, they
19 said they examined numerous accidents, tail plane accidents, and
20 then found common characteristics. One of the characteristics was
21 un-powered flight control services and aerodynamic balance relying
22 on trim tabs. As you know, the Q400 doesn't have either of those.

23 However, as an APM and deferring to NASA's knowledge and
24 expertise in icing, I have to listen to that ending statement that
25 is also on the video, that states, powered flight -- aircraft with

1 powered flight control services may have a more subtle indication.
2 That suggests that, okay, even in my airplane here, you know, I
3 might want to leave that in. And then another -- you know, one
4 other point on that is, also, I have looked at the Transport
5 Canada website and I have found that same NASA video is posted on
6 the Transport Canada Aviation website, with a statement saying
7 this is of interest to all pilots who may fly in icing conditions.

8 Q. Understood. With two unique and different recovery
9 procedures, if you feel it's relevant to show the video and
10 provide a little bit of information, in your opinion, do you not
11 feel that it should be followed up with training, being addressed
12 in training in a simulator as well?

13 A. I'm not sure if I follow that. It seemed like a
14 negative question or something, so I'm not sure.

15 Q. There's two different recovery procedures for a tail
16 plane stall versus an aerodynamic main wing stall. Do you agree
17 with that statement?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. With two unique procedures, then, that are being
20 provided to crews, one through just a video and the other one
21 being trained and checked in a simulator, do you not feel that it
22 would be -- or do you feel it is relevant to also then train the
23 tail stall in the simulator?

24 A. Not necessarily. Remember, this video is very general
25 in nature and it states -- you know, in a very general nature it

1 applies to turboprop aircraft. Q400 is a turboprop aircraft. And
2 then again, we go back to the issues of powered flight control
3 service and trim tabs, un-powered services, et cetera, et cetera.
4 So from that respect I'd say, well, you know, no, we don't have to
5 train it. But you know, my thought on that may change. I do need
6 to resolve this big question that I have on why they are silent
7 with respect to aircraft that have a stall protection system. As
8 a pilot, based on if all I had -- if all the training I had was,
9 you know, okay, I know how to recall from the stick shaker and I
10 know how to recall from a tail plane stall. Now given that, if
11 I'm flying along fat, dumb and happy and I get a stick shaker, I'm
12 going to respond stall, check power and then the procedure from
13 there. If I'm configuring for an approach and my nose suddenly
14 drops as I'm bringing the flaps down but I don't have a stick
15 shaker, I'm going to be thinking, hey, I may have tail plane icing
16 here, and attempt that type of recovery.

17 Q. So you feel that the video being shown is effective
18 training for pilots to recognize that scenario, and watching the
19 video alone is sufficient for them to determine the recovery
20 procedure without actual practice?

21 A. No, you're reading words into my mouth right now.

22 Q. I'm just trying to get a better understanding of the
23 relevance of this video and whether or not this procedure should
24 be trained on aircraft whether it's relevant or not.

25 A. The relevancy of the video is that these aircraft

1 operate in conditions conducive to icing. I think some of the
2 depictions of that icing forming on the aircraft is very valuable.
3 I think some of the depictions of the molds that were made of
4 actual icing, that were fashioned into devices that were installed
5 on actual aircraft, are valuable as a training aid. I think the
6 fact that NASA is conducting research into icing and recovery
7 techniques is valuable to training. So I wouldn't exclude it from
8 the training just because we may not be training on that
9 particular maneuver. I think it's valuable in the sense that, you
10 know, these people know that icing affects aircraft and it affects
11 different aircraft in different ways.

12 Q. Do you see any potential of misleading information for
13 crews?

14 A. I don't particular see any misinformation. And again,
15 it's for the reasons I've previously stated. If I've got an
16 aerodynamic stall --

17 MR. COX: Let me cut in here, if you would. I think
18 he's trying to make point and what I'd like you to do is just
19 answer the question --

20 THE WITNESS: Okay.

21 MR. COX: -- and don't elaborate, because we discussed
22 this at length.

23 THE WITNESS: Okay. Go ahead and repeat the question.

24 BY MR. SIMPKINS:

25 Q. The question is -- and this is a hypothetical question.

1 I don't know if you can answer this one. If an aircraft is deemed
2 not susceptible to tail plane icing because it has powered
3 elevator surfaces and does not fly by a spring tab or use a spring
4 tab, do you feel that it would be potentially misleading to advise
5 crews on a recovery procedure that would not be applicable to that
6 aircraft, for those specific reasons?

7 A. If that hypothesis were correct, I might be in agreement
8 with that, yes.

9 MR. SIMPKINS: Thank you. I have no further questions.

10 MR. COX: Okay.

11 MR. DITTMAR: I just have one.

12 MR. COX: Okay, Tim.

13 BY MR. DITTMAR:

14 Q. On that video, Mr. Jessie, did you say that it says it
15 is not susceptible or it is less susceptible to tail stalls?

16 A. What's the it we're referring to?

17 Q. Aircraft with powered flight controls.

18 A. Well, see, that's the thing about the video and it's
19 quite vague and I really need to, you know, at some point delve
20 further into this. At the beginning of the video, it in general
21 terms states turboprops, and then it lists characteristics that
22 are common to the tail plane stalls that they've observed, and
23 that those characteristics that are common are un-powered flight
24 control services and they rely on trim tabs for aerodynamic
25 balance.

1 Q. Right. But I'm just referring to a specific spot in the
2 video where it specifically talks about powered flight controls.

3 A. At the very end, it doesn't say powered flight controls
4 are not susceptible.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. It says that powered flight controls may react more
7 subtly than --

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. -- un-powered.

10 MR. DITTMAR: Thank you.

11 BY MR. COX:

12 Q. Okay, Mike, just one or two little things before we wrap
13 it up. I looked up a search on exemptions and according to the
14 FAA website, there's an Exemption 95.24 that was granted in '07 to
15 Colgan, for exemption to 121.434(c)(1)(2), which is this area.
16 Are you familiar with an exemption for Colgan on that particular
17 part of the regulations?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Do you know what that's about?

20 A. Basically, if they've had an FAA inspector conduct an
21 observation when they were previously upgrading -- and this
22 example, I believe this is specifically for captains that were
23 previously qualified on the Saab --

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 A. -- and were observed by the FAA, on the Saab. When they

1 transitioned to the Q400, the Colgan airmen can go ahead and --

2 Q. Okay. So that's what that's for. Okay, all right.

3 Would it be true that this exemption would be allowed to have an
4 initial captain, on his first captain upgrade, to be observed by
5 an APD rather than an FAA inspector?

6 A. On his first?

7 Q. Uh-huh.

8 A. Okay, he's never been a captain with Colgan before?

9 Q. Right.

10 A. My interpretation would be no.

11 Q. Okay. And just finally, just to recapitulate on the
12 training records, the training records we discussed earlier that
13 Colgan maintains. Given your understanding of those records, are
14 they adequate for your use?

15 A. For the use that -- for what I use them for, yes.

16 MR. COX: Okay. Well, I think we've reached the end.

17 Tim.

18 (Whereupon, the interview in the above-entitled matter
19 was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: CRASH OF CONTINENTAL CONNECTION
 FLIGHT 3407, OPERATED BY
 COLGAN AIR, INC.
 FEBRUARY 12, 2009, 2217 EST
 CLARENCE, NEW YORK
 Interview of Michael E. Jessie

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-09-MA-027

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: March 17, 2009

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to
the recording accomplished at the hearing.

Timothy Atkinson
Official Reporter