Docket No. SA-531

Exhibit No. 2-E

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C.

Operations Group Chairman
Interview Summary – Director of Flight Standards
Jeb Barrett

(42 Pages)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

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Investigation of:                 *
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CRASH OF CONTINENTAL CONNECTION   *
FLIGHT 3407, OPERATED BY          *
COLGAN AIR, INC.                  * Docket No.:  DCA-09-MA-027
FEBRUARY 12, 2009, 2217 EST       *
CLARENCE, NEW YORK                *
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Interview of: JEB BARRETT

NTSB, Conference Room C
429 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C.

Monday
March 16, 2009

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: ROGER COX

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(3:00 p.m.)

INTERVIEW OF JEB BARRETT

BY MR. COX:

Q. Can I have your full name, please?

A. John Erwin Barrett, III.

Q. Your age, please?

A. Forty-three.

Q. Current title?

A. Director of Flight Standards.

Q. Can you tell me how long you've been in that position?

A. Four years.

Q. When were you hired at Colgan?

A. June 1992.

Q. Didn't know Colgan was that old. Can you tell us your certificates and ratings, please?

A. Airline Transport Pilot.

Q. Um-hum.

A. Multi-Engine Land, Beech 1900 Type.

Q. Um-hum.

A. SAAB 340 Type.

Q. Um-hum.

A. Dash A Type.

Q. Um-hum.

A. Airframe, Mechanic Airframe Powerplant.

Q. And your total flying time, please?
A. Ten thousand three hundred hours.
Q. Okay. PIC time? Roughly.
A. Seven thousand five hundred hours.
Q. Okay. And what's your flight experience or total time on the Q400?
A. Two hundred ten hours.
Q. Before being Director of Flight Standards, did you hold another position within Colgan?
A. I was a chief pilot.
Q. How long did you do that?
A. Approximately three years.
Q. Three years. So when you came to work in June of 1992, what were you hired to do at that time?
A. First officer.
Q. Which airplane was that on?
A. Beech 99.
Q. Okay. So let's see, going back four years as Director of Flight Standards and then more years as chief pilot, that's seven years ago, so that takes us back to what, 2002. Did you have any other managerial positions at Colgan at that time?
A. I've been the Director of Flight Training.
Q. Um-hum.
A. I served as the Director of Safety.
Q. Okay. And of course, like, you flew the line, too, of

course?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Can you just give me a brief synopsis of what your duties are as Director of Flight Standards?

A. Organize and manage the Flight Standards Department.

Q. All right. Can you give to me any more detail on that?

A. Coordinate all the checking events with the check airmen, proficiency checks, line checks. Coordinate and act as a liaison with other departments with respect to standardization and the efficiency of the operation.

Q. Okay. To whom do you report?

A. Vice President of Operations.

Q. And do you have people who directly report to you, as well?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you enumerate those?

A. Manager of Flight Standards, Manager of In-Flight Standards, SAAB 340 Fleet Manager, Q400 Fleet Manager.

Q. All right. Do you get involved in hiring pilots?

A. I have been.

Q. Do you do that now?

A. No.

Q. No. The flight training that's done at Colgan, does that come under your direct control?

A. No.

Q. No. So if you had an issue with changing flight training, how would you go about dealing with that?

A. I would coordinate with the Director of Flight Training with any proposals or changes to the training program.

Q. Okay. Have you -- can you recall making any changes or requesting any changes to the flight training program?

A. In terms of manual changes to profiles that affect the training program, yes.

Q. Can you think of a flight profile that you asked to be changed?

A. Not off hand.

Q. One of the issues that we're interested in is the training for stall recoveries. Apparently, there are two kinds of stall recovers. There's the conventional stall recovery and then there is a tail stall recovery. Do you have any procedures for tail stall recovery at Colgan?

A. No.

Q. Are any of your airplanes susceptible to tail stalls?

A. I don't know of anything that says our airplanes are not susceptible to tail stalls.

Q. Okay. So put it another way, are your airplanes susceptible to tail stall?

A. I've not been told that they are.

Q. Okay. Well, what do you think?

A. Be more specific when you say airplanes. We operate --

Q. Well, since you're the director of flight training --

A. -- two different types --

Q. I'm mean, I'm sorry, the Director of Flight Standards, I would come to you, I think, as one of the key people at the company who would be able to give me a pretty clear understanding about that. If there's somebody else that would be able to give me a clear understanding about that, then please direct me to them.

A. One of our aircrafts has hydraulic power flight controls and those hydraulic flight controls can mass the tactile cues that may come with an air flow separation that would result in a typical snatch of a flight control and I think that affects how easily or easy it is to identify a tail stall.

Q. Well, okay. Recognizing what you just said, I understand it perfectly, what I didn't quite get is whether or not the airplanes in your fleet are susceptible to tail stall, can they ever have tail stalls?

A. I don't believe our airplanes had been told -- when -- Colgan has been told one way or another if the airplanes are susceptible to tail stalls.

Q. I see. Have you gone to the manufacturers of the SAAB and the Q400 to ask them specifically?

A. I have not.

Q. Okay. So we've been talking, I'm sure you know, to everyone connected with Colgan in training or supervisory position

about a training video which you show -- one or more which you've shown that discusses the phenomenon. As I understand it, these were originally produced by NASA and they are shown as part of recurrent training, as I'm told, so what I'm trying to understand, in talking to all of you, is how does that training fit into your idea of what should be trained and taught to Colgan pilots?

A. That video is shown as a general icing awareness video that discusses stalls.

Q. Um-hum.

A. And part of that video includes information on tail stalls, when they occur, at what regimes in flight in relation to configuration changes and air speed.

Q. So do you believe that that is relevant to your fleet?

A. I believe our fleet is more susceptible to air foil stalls.

Q. Okay. Now, in talking to some of the other pilots and managers at Colgan, we tried to determine how far back in history that video has been shown and apparently it goes back fairly far. We haven't been able to find anybody that can tell us the earliest date at which that was incorporated into the recurrent training program. Since you're a person who's been here quite some time, perhaps you could tell me.

A. I'm uncertain.

Q. Would you know who, within Colgan, would have been the one who said this is what we want to put into our training?

A. Director of Training.

Q. Do you know a person?

A. Darrell Mitchell.

Q. Okay. Well, Darrell didn't seem to know, so I just wondered if you might know any other person that would've initiated the use of the film in your training. Nobody else?

A. No.

Q. So nobody knows where it came from at Colgan?

MR. z: I'm going to object. That calls for speculation. He can only testify to what he knows.

BY MR. COX:

Q. Um-hum. And you don't know?

A. I do not.

Q. Okay. Can you tell me who would know?

A. I've already told you. Darrell Mitchell.

Q. Um-hum. Do you know what the recovery procedure is that's suggested in that video?

A. Specifically for which type stall?

Q. Tail stall. That's what's discussed in the video.

A. To pull back on the yoke, reduce -- or return to the -- return the flap setting to the last assigned and use power judiciously.

Q. Okay. And how's that compare to your normal stall recovery that you teach in simulator?

A. It's different.

Q. It's different. So what, if anything, do you teach your pilots as to how to make that determination of which procedure to apply?

A. Explain the question, please.

Q. Well, you said you had two different procedures, one for tail stall and one for the normal stall recovery.

A. I didn't say that we had two procedures. The video discussed tail stall --

Q. Um-hum.

A. -- and air flow stall.

Q. Okay. So what do you, as Colgan, teach the pilots about how to determine which method they should use to recover from a stall?

A. Colgan doesn't teach the pilots tail stall recovery techniques.

Q. Okay. All right. In your experience, have you ever had any reports from crews who reported having a tail stall as a result of icing conditions?

A. No.

Q. All right. Does Colgan have any kind of a program for pilots who may have marginal performance who need to be monitored or watched?

A. Colgan's program, Colgan's training program, refers to pilots either as satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

Q. Okay. So if you had a pilot who went through training

and may have had several false starts or challenges, may have been what you sometimes refer to as trained to proficiency in which he may have taken a second attempt to complete a maneuver. Once he's completed with his training, you're considered satisfactory and there's no further follow-up, is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Does Colgan have any kind of a policy on whether or not a pilot should be retained if he has more than one failure of a checkride?

A. If a pilot's unable to satisfactorily complete a checkride, he will be terminated.

Q. Um-hum. So if he has an unsatisfactory checkride performance, he's terminated?

A. If he's unable to receive additional training and pass a second checkride, he may be terminated.

Q. Okay. So failure with second successive checkride?

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. You have situations where someone may have had an unsatisfactory performance, you know, previously and then succeeds in passing at that time and then moves on to another occasion down the road, in the future, and he has another, you know, unsatisfactory performance and then gets another chance and he goes back through and he passes, do you attempt to manage that or keep track of that?

A. We record all unsatisfactory events and when there is an

unsatisfactory checking event, Flight Standards, myself or the Manager of Flight Standards coordinates with the Director of Training to assign additional training. If somebody has successive failures, that's certainly considered in our decision to assign additional training.

Q. Okay. Well, did you have a consultation of that type with -- regarding Captain Renslow at any time during his tenure at Colgan?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Were you tracking Captain Renslow in any way in terms of his performance?

A. No.

Q. Is there any time that it's appropriate for a pilot monitoring to move the flaps without first being commanded to do so by the pilot line?

A. There should always be coordination between flight crew members with movement to the flight controls.

Q. Have you had made any changes to your procedures for setting air speed bugs?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever heard a report from any source that, on a Colgan flight, stick shaker actuated?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me when?

A. Last Tuesday night, the 10th of March.

Q. Okay. We're familiar with that. Any other time?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Are you involved in the ASAP program?

A. I have participated in it.

Q. Are you part of the committee that reviews ASAP events?

A. The event review committee, I'm asked to participate on when other -- when the Manager of Flight Standards is unavailable.

Q. I see, okay. Ever had occasion to review an event under those circumstances that had to do with a stall?

A. No.

Q. Okay. With poor speed control?

A. No.

Q. With regard to sterile cockpit?

A. No.

Q. What happens to training folders when pilots go through an upgrade or transition program once that pilot has completed his training?

A. The folder is following the progression through the training pipeline, various forms are removed by the instructors and by the check airmen and turned in to crew records for processing along the way.

For example, a ground instructor, after completing ground school, would remove the ground instruction portion and turn those in to crew records. A proficiency check airman, after reviewing a simulator training record and LOFT program and

administering a proficiency check would then turn those forms in to crew records at the completion of that proficiency check. An IOE instructor or an OE instructor, at the completion of operating experience, would turn those forms in to crew records.

Q. And what is the policy for retention of those records by your crew records department?

A. After they are entered electronically into our crew records, our crew qual system, those records are destroyed.

Q. So as the Director of Flight Standards, if you want to evaluate the historical performance of any crew member that works for you or works under you or under your supervision, what do you have available to you to evaluate him?

A. Could you rephrase that question?

Q. What records do you have to review the performance of a crew member throughout his history at Colgan?

A. A record of his training from the crew qual system.

Q. Is that it?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. What I have here is this crew qual printout, two-page document. Do you have anything else other than that?

A. No.

Q. Do you need anything else besides this to try to evaluate the history of a crew member?

A. There are records kept in the human resources department that pertain to his personal information and administrative

actions.

Q. But as flight standards, of course, your concern is their performance on their training checkrides, correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. So that's specific to what I was addressing. So about 400 pilots at Colgan?

A. Little more than that.

Q. Little more than that now. Growing. So essentially, as the Director of Flight Standards, you use this record alone to try to keep track of historical performance of your crews?

A. Affirmative.

MR. COX: Okay. Got some things you want to --

BY MR. BYRNE:

Q. Sure. Let me follow up on a couple things. Just picking up on that theme, I guess, a pilot receives an unsat. What specific actions are taken?

A. He's removed from the line. A discussion is made with the Director of Training to evaluate his training record, discuss he performance on a proficiency check or a line check to see what type of areas the unsatisfactory pertains to and that information is used to assign additional training or re-qualification training.

Q. Okay. And the record review that you're talking about, that goes on at your level, the training record, is that you looking back at the training record or is that someone in the

training department looking back?

A. Myself or the Manager of Flight Standards.

Q. And the documents that you're looking at are the -- whatever was entered into the crew qual system?

A. Yes.

Q. And is there any -- I guess, you know what the unsat was, the reason of the unsat, for the current checkride, for the current event. How, when you're looking at the crew qual system, do you come to an understanding of if there was a past failure what the reason for that failure was?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you learn whether you're dealing with the same mode of failure or something different?

A. There are notes in the system that describe the specifics of the unsatisfactory event.

Q. Who enters those notes?

A. Crew records.

Q. What do they base those entries on?

A. A completion of the proficiency check form or the line check form.

Q. And I guess how detailed are those notes in your experience? What level of information is provided to you, Director of Flight Standards, to understand the reason of a failure?

A. They will say the specific event or a specific -- the

specific maneuver that was unsatisfactory.

Q. Okay. Does it say why the maneuver was unsatisfactory or just the maneuver?

A. Just the maneuver.

Q. Anything else contained within the notes portion of the crew qual?

A. It can be any of the comments, any of the line items that are on a line check form or a proficiency check form. For example, a subjective area like CRM may be listed as well as the failed maneuver.

Q. I guess, does the work criteria exists at Colgan to guide records in what they extract from the form and enter into the notes on crew qual?

A. The form, itself, is the criteria.

Q. So if there are any qualitative notes or subjective notes on the form, they get coded into or typed into the crew qual system?

A. Only the line items on the form get typed into the crew qual system.

Q. Okay. And only for unsat or negative events or are comments also put in for satisfactory events, as well?

A. There are no comments put in for satisfactory events.

Q. Okay. Just revisiting -- I got confused as we were working through your career history at Colgan. You started out as a pilot on the 1900?

A. Beech 99.

Q. Beech 99. I guess, when, with respect to -- I've got Chief Pilot, Director of Flight Training, Director of Safety and then Director of Flight Standards as far as the management positions you've held. Can you walk through which one came first, for how long and your progression through the company at that level?

A. All right. In June of 1992 I was hired as a first officer. I upgraded to captain on the Beech 1900 in May of 1995 at just about three years. I became an instructor pilot on the Beech 1900 in 1996. In 1997, after the industry required 19 seat airline -- 19 seat operations to upgrade their certificate to 121 capabilities, I was placed as the Director of Safety.

I served in that position for six months. I then became the Chief Pilot in 1998 and served as the Chief Pilot until 2001. I left the Chief Pilot's office to be the Director of Training in 2001 and I left that office because I was working a dual role as an instructor pilot in APV and the Chief Pilot. The company the Chief Pilot and I chose to do the instruction work. After various audits, Colgan separated training and standards, and I believe that separation took place in 2004. Those are all approximate --

Q. Understand.

A. -- dates and I could be off a little bit.

Q. And so they separated in 2004 and then you became

Director of --

A. Flight Standards.

Q. At that time?

A. Yes.

Q. As far as your current duties and responsibilities, you're responsible for both the SAAB fleet and the Q400 fleet?

A. The checking duties, the company flight manuals fall under the standards department.

Q. What percentage of your time is allocated to the Q400 versus the SAAB?

A. I'd say it's 50/50.

Q. Okay. And are you qualified on the Q400, as well?

A. Yes.

Q. Is your Manager of Flight -- the person below you, Manager of Flight Standards, qualified on the Q400?

A. No.

Q. Is there a plan to qualify the manager on the Q400?

A. Any additional training we can give the Manager of Flight Standards will be helpful. At this time, there is no immediate plan.

Q. Does it affect the manager's ability to fulfill their duties and responsibilities not being typed on the aircraft?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. Our office is sharing the responsibilities, Q400 events.

We're able to bring additional check airmen or typed individuals in to provide guidance to the Manager of Flight Standards if there is a specific type related question.

Q. Is there -- let me back up. Do you fly the line now or not?

A. I am line qualified.

Q. You're line qualified. When was the last time you flew the line?

A. February -- I can't think of the exact date. Middle of the month in February.

Q. In the Q400 or the SAAB?

A. The Q400.

Q. How often have you observed Q400 line operations?

A. On average, every other week.

Q. Is it commuting to Newark or what's the purpose of your observations?

A. Whenever I travel to Newark, I make sure to observe Q400 flights on the way to Newark. When I'm at Newark, I sometimes observe Q400 flights out of Newark.

Q. Captain Renslow, did you know him?

A. I met Captain Renslow through visits to Houston operations. Last time I saw Captain Renslow was a visit by myself to Newark in the crew room for our February anniversary of the Q400 operation in Newark.

Q. Okay. You had not flown with Captain Renslow?

A. No, I have not.

Q. What about First Officer Shaw?

A. I've met First Officer Shaw passing in jet ways and in crew rooms, as well.

Q. As far as prior to the accident, did you -- or could you characterize anything you heard with respect to Captain Renslow's reputation?

A. I've not heard of any reputation for Captain Renslow.

Q. What about First Officer Shaw?

A. I've not heard of any reputation for Rebecca Shaw.

Q. When you were discussing the tail stalls, you mentioned that your aircraft were more susceptible to air foil stalls. I'm assuming wind stalls?

A. Yes.

Q. And by the aircraft, are you referring to both the Q400 and the SAAB or one?

A. I thought the discussion was about the Q400.

Q. Okay. I'm just trying to clarify. Is the SAAB susceptible to tail stalls?

A. I don't know if the manufacturer has stated that the SAAB is susceptible to tail stalls.

Q. How often do you attend recurrent ground school for the purposes of observing what's going on there?

A. I visit every ground school, every recurrent ground school, introduce myself and the department to the attendees for

class and generally observe a brief portion of that class.

Q. What about the recurrent COM, when was the last time you attended that class?

A. December of '08.

Q. What are your observations on that class?

A. That it was satisfactory -- event.

Q. We heard earlier this morning about proposed changes to the CRM curriculum. What changes are they and why are they being made?

A. We want to encourage more participation from the attendees in ground school. Our intention is to bring in line pilots to teach the CRM portion, specifically, to be facilitators. They don't have an instructor background or management background, but someone that is perceived as one of the pilots.

Q. We talked about ASAP. What about LOSA, how are you involved in the LOSA program?

A. I encourage the safety department to perform LOSA checks. At one point, we've allowed line check airmen to perform LOSA checks for the safety department.

Q. How does a check airman doing the LOSA affect the validity of the information being obtained?

A. Well, the check airmen are trained evaluators and that does give them an advantage. They are perceived by the line pilots as a threat even after introducing the line observation safety audit as a non-punitive event.

Q. How is the company, I guess -- what is the company doing to overcome that perspective or to change the method in which it collects data through LOSA?

A. The company has trained some non-check airmen individuals to be line observation safety auditors.

Q. Have those individuals begun -- is it something that is in plan or in preparation or have they actually started doing audits instead of check airmen?

A. I can't speak for how many audits the safety department has performed.

Q. What feedback do you get regarding the LOSA program?

A. I attend quarterly safety meetings presented by the safety department.

Q. What have you learned about your operations on the Q400 through the LOSA process?

A. I don't have any specific LOSA -- let me rephrase that. In August of last year we performed quite a bit of LOSA checks in both the Q400 fleet and the SAAB 340 fleet and that standardization push, which used the LOSA form -- and I believe that was April, not August -- identified some manual bulleting currency issues and it specifically was out to look for air speed exceedences on the Q400.

Q. That was the originating purpose for doing these extra checks?

A. It was a standardization push that used the safety

department's LOSA auditing tool as a means of tracking.

Q. Was there an initiating event -- or who made the decision to undertake a standardization push?

A. There were several air speed exceedences in the Q400.

Q. So it's fair to say that the standardization push was for the reason of these air speed exceedences?

A. Yes.

Q. How effective was that standardization push? What changes did you make, as Director of Flight Standards, as a result of the information you learned?

A. We brought general air speed awareness in terms of power management and during descents and operations below 10,000 feet. We recommended that during operating experience -- and we implemented the pilots during operating experience would fly VMO minus 10 knots as a target air speed.

Q. And the exceedences that you're talking about, they are -- they were over-speed events --

A. Yes.

Q. -- not low speed energy management events?

A. That's correct.

Q. Characterize standardization of Q400 operations among the Norfolk, Newark and Albany bases.

A. I believe standardization is good between all three bases. Pilots fly with crew members from other bases regularly and they all fly into the same hubs. We do not have any remote

operation that doesn't interact with the rest of the fleet.

Q. Have you received any reports, as Director of Flight Standards, about standardization at the Norfolk base?

A. No.

Q. What about at the Albany base?

A. No.

Q. How is the FO -- First Officer Evaluation Program initiated?

A. That program came about as a way to continue to improve standardization and evaluate the first officer group.

Q. What's been learned through that process?

A. I believe it helps promote the CRM between crew members in that the first officer is requesting an evaluation from a captain. That captain, by completing that form, is giving feedback to the company on that first officer and in most cases is passing the information on to that first officer, as well, in giving him valuable feedback.

Q. How is the company getting feedback about captains from first officers and flight attendants?

A. The chief pilot has an open door policy for any crew member to contact them and report any feedback.

Q. I think you mentioned the -- or I guess the communications -- we understand that there was monthly check airmen newsletters that go out to the check airmen?

A. They're posted on the website under the flight standards

tab.

Q. How do you ensure that the check airmen are standardized?

A. We communicate to them through e-mails, through the flight standards monthly newsletter to check airmen. We have quarterly check airmen meetings. We received operation experience feedback reporting forms from candidates that come though the training to give us feedback on their check airmen during -- the FAA observes our check airmen on a biannual basis.

Q. Have any check airmen been removed on the Q400?

A. No.

Q. The recent Q400 event, you said it was March 10, when did you come -- or how did you learn about that event?

A. The line check airman notified me.

Q. When?

A. Late that night.

Q. What actions did you take?

A. We removed the crew member that was unsatisfactory from their schedule.

Q. Who in the company did you notify?

A. The Vice President of Operations, crew scheduling department.

Q. Were those --

A. The chief pilot.

Q. Anyone else?

A. No.

Q. When did you make those notifications?

A. That night.

Q. Since the accident, what changes have you made with respect to Q400 operations?

A. The Q400 fleet manager issued Bulletin 09001 that details ice protection, equipment operation, icing definitions and introduces the concept of ice levels flight related to the operation of the equipment.

Q. That bulletin has an effective date of February 20, 2009. When was it disseminated?

A. I believe about that day.

Q. What proposed actions -- or I guess what actions have been decided upon but have not -- are in preparation, are still -- what proposed actions are there as far as changes?

A. The introduction of recommended speeds to fly on the arrival segment into the terminal area, restrictions on air speeds before configuring, more guidance on air speed with respect to a wind correction or wind increment in addition to ref.

Q. Your primary point of contact with the FAA is who?

A. Mike Jessie is the Q400 APM for Q400 issues. Doug Lundgren, our principal operations inspector for general issues. Inspector Richard Bell is the APM for SAAB 340.

Q. With respect to the Q400 side of the house and the POI, how would you characterize your working relationship with

Mr. Jessie?

A. Mr. Jessie's the APM and the -- his relationship with the POI.

Q. How would you characterize your working relationship with the APM?

A. As good.

Q. Why?

A. He has a Dash 8 experience and background. I believe he worked for another Dash 8 operator within the industry before joining the FAA and seems to be knowledgeable and understanding of the equipment. I've had the experience of seeing him, of having him observe flight operations with myself on board, discussed with check airmen that he has observed and have all heard supportive information that he is a knowledgeable inspector on the airplane and has a pilot background that understands operations in the Northeast.

Q. What areas of disagreement do you have with him?

A. I don't recall any areas of disagreement.

Q. How would you characterize your working relationship with the POI?

A. Good.

Q. Why?

A. He's very knowledgeable in terms of airline operations.

Q. What areas of disagreement do you have with the POI?

A. I don't have any areas of disagreement.

MR. BYRNE: Captain, thank you. That's all I have for now.

MR. COX: Mike.

BY MR. WICKBOLDT:

Q. Hey, Jeb. Within the flight standards group, by that I mean yourself down through the manager, fleet managers, APDs, line check airmen, PC check airmen, how do you describe the level of communication amongst the entire group?

A. As good.

Q. Have you ever had any check airmen that expressed concern regarding volume of read-and-sign memos and their effect on standardization among flight crews?

A. Yes.

Q. Any specific occurrences you can recall?

A. Just the volume of the read-and-sign memos.

MR. WICKBOLDT: All right. Thanks, Jeb. That's --

THE WITNESS: Okay.

MR. WICKBOLDT: -- all I got.

BY MR. CONWAY:

Q. Jeb, Gene Conway, you know --

A. Hi, Gene.

Q. -- me by name anyway. Just a couple of questions here. You mentioned that your check airmen, with respect to standardization, are seen or checked by the FAA biannually. Do we mean, just for the record, is that twice a year or every two years

that you mean that to be?

A. Every two years.

Q. Okay, each two years. And what about reviews in-house, that is to say do you have a program where your check airmen are reviewed, observed, doing their work by an APD?

A. At times we do have APDs observe the check airmen.

Q. Do you have a required schedule where that will happen for sure, do you have shepherds, a shepherd program or by any other name, where you have APDs assigned to certain check airmen and they actually will get observed and -- on, you know, a list of -- like a checkride form but designed for standardization certification. Is there any such program like that?

A. Only when the FAA is unable to schedule air observation do we use the APDs to observe the check airmen.

Q. Would the FAA always be an FAA person who is current and qualified on your SOPs and your particular teaching procedures and processes?

A. Yes.

Q. So it would be normally Jessie, got his last name -- or no, it's something Jessie, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Jessie. Has Inspector Jessie found occasion to give you feedback on standardization, however minor, with respect to the check airmen that he's checking?

A. Inspector Jessie attends our quarterly check airmen

meetings and he has given us feedback. I don't recall any specific feedback on any one individual check airman after a certification event.

Q. Would it be correct to assume, based on what you're saying, that he has been satisfied that the standardization has been satisfactory with regard to those various checks that he's done?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I think you answered this and I'm not sure that I heard all the words there, but regarding your statement, if I have it right, that you believe that our fleet is susceptible to air foil stalls, I believe you zeroed in on that with response to a question from somebody to clear -- to say that that was really meant to be wing stalls not air foils in a more general sense, but specifically wing stalls, is that true?

A. Yes.

Q. And then on the procedure, what you understand to be the recovery procedure stated on that NASA video with respect to a tail stall, do I have it right? Pull back on yoke, return flaps to last location and use power judiciously.

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean -- because I'm not sure if I understand what judiciously really implies. Does that mean, for an example, would that be the same as max power or power to the D-10 (ph.) on a Q400? Is that judicious power?

A. No, it means reduce power, if necessary.

Q. Reduce power. And so if you were at idle power, if you were -- you didn't have any -- yeah, if you were at idle power at the time of a stall, you would add power but not add very much power or would you go to full power at that time?

A. Are you describing a tail stall?

Q. Yes, sir. I'm asking what your understanding is of that procedure because I don't understand it.

A. My understanding of a tail stall is that it occurs at an air speed higher than a wing stall and that it is -- and that reason alone dictates the difference between a wing stall and a tail stall where a tail stall's going to occur at an air speed much higher than a wing stall in relationship to ref and you would reduce the power, you know, if pulling back on the yoke, returning the flaps to the last assigned position didn't correct the problem, then you would reduce the power.

Q. All right. So if you had no power on, what do you suppose that procedure was meant to imply, that you just leave it at idle?

A. That procedure in the video implies that a tail stall would happen at a speed higher than a wing stall and it doesn't address where the power's set initially.

Q. And pardon me for belaboring this, but just so I get it, so let's say if you were at cruise power and so you probably would've been at a higher air speed, it would imply that maybe you

would reduce the power in that sense, reducing the power to overcome this tail stall?

A. I associate the tail stall with a phase of flight where you would be configuring the airplane for landing and you would have an intermediate power setting well below a cruise power setting. There may be room there to reduce it.

MR. CONWAY: Okay, great. Thanks very much.

MR. COX: All done?

MR. CONWAY: Yeah.

MR. COX: Okay. Tim?

MR. DITTMAR: I have no questions right now.

MR. COX: Ken?

MR. WEBSTER: No questions from TSB Canada.

MR. COX: Harlan?

BY MR. SIMPKINS:

Q. Hey, Jeb. How are you doing?

A. Hello, Harlan.

Q. Hi. You talked about the LOSA that you had with the VMO exceedences. It was a specific sort of targeted LOSA that you were going out to do. Do you feel that that was a successful program?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Do you have any other future specific targeted LOSA events planned?

A. At this point, Harlan, we'd like to turn the LOSA events

over to the safety department. The flight standards department has planned a couple standardization pushes. One that we're on right now includes a briefing on the operation of the icing equipment and its use and the definitions.

Q. Okay. Plans on any follow-up line observations to see if that's being incorporated?

A. We're currently in a line observation program now.

Q. Okay. Do you have any plans of incorporating any for flight crews to keep their hands on the power levers when they reduce power towards flight idle?

A. That has been discussed. How we incorporate it into our manuals in the future has yet to be determined.

Q. Similar line of questioning. Do you have any plans on incorporating the flight crews, a procedure to keep their hands on the -- or shadow the flight controls while the autopilot is on at lower altitudes?

A. We currently specify in our flight operations policies and procedures manual that when the autopilot's on and the aircraft is within 1,500 feet of the ground that the crew will shadow the flight controls.

Q. Okay.

A. And our intention is to add to that.

Q. Okay. And just a final question. How many captains have been dismissed or let go from Colgan as a result of either an unsat line check or any type of other SOP deviation that required

a dismissal?

A. Did you say specifically for line checks?

Q. Either/or. I guess a total number of captains that would've been dismissed for either reason.

A. I'm not accurate on this number, but I believe three crew members have been released for unsatisfactory performance.

MR. SIMPKINS: Okay, thank you. I have no further questions.

MR. COX: Evan, you had something?

BY MR. BYRNE:

Q. Just a couple follow-up questions. The standardization push you spoke about, is that the same as the -- we heard from the Manager of Flight Standards said something about a random flight observation program involving 40 to 50 observations. Is that the same thing or are those two different things?

A. The standardization push that's going on currently?

Q. No, the one last year.

A. Yes. That's the -- I believe, for the line checks is associated with our standardization push in August of '08.

Q. And that's the one on the over-speeds or is that a different one?

A. No, that was a different one.

Q. What's the reason for the August -- or what was the focus for the August '08 standardization push?

A. We wanted to make our presence known in flight standards

to get out within the system, to see what affect we've had on crew members from our earlier push in April.

Q. What did you learn from the August observations?

A. We produced a report that detailed information that was discovered in that August -- I'd have to review that report right now to be accurate.

Q. Where did that report get disseminated to?

A. We posted some of the information on our monthly check airmen newsletter. We put some of the information out to the entire fleet on our quarterly newsletter.

Q. Was there a special FAA audit done last summer?

A. Yes.

Q. What's your understanding of the reason for that audit?

A. I don't have the -- I don't have any reason for why that audit was requested or assigned.

Q. The POI or the APM didn't discuss with you why the audit was being undertaken?

A. I don't recall.

Q. What information came in about that audit, what findings?

A. From the flight operations side, there were some ground handling events, lack of two-way radio communication between pushback crews. There were some maintenance findings to report. There were no adverse findings from the flight portion of the audit.

Q. And did the audit proceed or follow the August standardization push?

A. I believe it happened simultaneously with the FAA audit.

Q. Were you involved with the proving runs on the Q400?

A. Yes.

Q. How were you involved?

A. I led the tabletop exercise portion of them and initial --

Q. How did the proving runs go?

A. They were successful.

Q. What did the company learn during the proving runs that, I guess, changed operations?

A. As with any new aircraft, the introduction of it, we learned quite a bit. The specifics along the way were a need for more crew coordination with the additional flight attendant in the back, management of the technology that the modern Q400 brought to the company.

Q. How was the -- how did the proving runs progress in terms of the original timetable? Was the company on schedule or behind schedule?

A. I believe we were on schedule.

Q. And my last question is how, from your position as Director of Flight Standards, how would you characterize the safety culture at Colgan?

A. As good.

Q. Why?

A. The pilots that are out there every day performing the job flying the airplanes around wouldn't dream of doing anything but keeping it a safe operation for their -- themselves and their passengers and their flight attendants. The management, from the top down, has made safety a priority. The owners of the company have invested in safety programs such as ASAP and they've committed funds to implement a FOQA program.

MR. BYRNE: Thank you, Captain.

BY MR. COX:

Q. I just have one little thing I kind of wanted to follow up with you and I didn't quite get finished with. Look at this qual check for Captain Renslow and I got a couple of U's marked on here and I wonder, here's one that was on 17 October of '06. It says recurrent proficiency training FO. Can you tell me, on that particular event, what the unsatisfactory maneuver or issue was?

A. I would need to see a training record that had the notes display.

Q. Um-hum. And how would you go about getting that at this point in time? This is back in '06.

A. I would request, from crew records, that they produce a training record for me for Marvin Renslow with notes.

Q. Okay.

A. It's the terminology to use.

Q. With notes. So would that be a report that looks just

like this but it just has more detail?

A. It would look just like this and underneath this recurrent proficiency training U would be additional printed information that describes the unsatisfactory maneuvers.

Q. Without going to that, would you have any personal knowledge of what that was for?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Okay. Now, what about this one here, it's an upgrade proficiency check -- 3 October '07. Would that same response be true?

A. I would have to review the training record with notes attached.

MR. COX: Okay. We've got that --

MR. BYRNE: Yeah, it's already requested.

MR. COX: All right. Yeah, you're right. We talked about that before.

BY MR. COX:

Q. We've got an event here, 1 November of '06. It says re-qual proficiency training. Now, that's coded as a QPT, so can you explain to me how that would come about, would that normally be?

A. On the 17th of October '06 there was an unsatisfactory recurrent proficiency training event.

Q. Um-hum.

A. And he received a re-qual proficiency training 13 or 14

days later.

Q. Okay. So between -- and that period of time between there, the training events, I believe from 17 October until 1 November, those training events would all be listed here? That's what those were -- those were training events that would've assisted him in getting re-qualified?

A. It appears he attended a recurrent classroom training on October 28th.

Q. Okay.

A. So they would've assisted in his --

Q. So this recurrent special approach training that was on the 28th, is that part of recurrent training, special approach training?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So can you tell from this what specific training he might've had between the time he had this unsat and the time that he did the re-qual, can you tell from that what training he would've had to correct whatever it was?

A. He had recurrent ground school that included the segments listed and a re-qual proficiency training in the simulator.

MR. COX: Would you look on that re-qual proficiency training and see if there's any line items or comments that goes with that one? Okay, anybody else? We appreciate your time. Thank you very much.

MR. BARRETT: You're welcome.

(Whereupon, the interview in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	CRASH OF CONTINENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407, OPERATED BY COLGAN AIR, INC. FEBRUARY 12, 2009, 2217 EST CLARENCE, NEW YORK Interview of Jeb Barrett
DOCKET NUMBER:	DCA-09-MA-027
PLACE:	Washington, D.C.
DATE:	March 16, 2009

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to the recording accomplished at the hearing.

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Timothy Atkinson
Official Reporter