

Docket No. SA-531

Exhibit No. 2-D

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C.

Operations Group Chairman
Interview Summary – Former FAA APM

(5 Pages)

Interview: Christopher James Monteleon
Date/Time: March 19, 2009, 1336
Location: NTSB offices, Washington, D.C.
Present: Cox, Ward, NTSB; Soucy FAA; Crook, Colgan
Via telephone: Byrne, Wickboldt, Webster, Simpkins
Represented by: Robert Moten, AFSCME

During the interview Mr. Monteleon stated the following information:
His full name is Christopher James Monteleon, Jr. He is 64 years old and is currently an aviation safety inspector for the FAA. He is a CFI-ME, instrument, airplane and an ATP with type ratings on the Dash 8-400, BE-1900, Shorts 360, DO328 Jet and Jetstream 4100. He has about 8000 hours total time as a flight instructor, corporate pilot and part 135 pilot. He was also a check airman and director of operations for a Part 135 operation, and was Chief Pilot for two different companies. He managed a small airport. He doesn't know his PIC time specifically, but estimated it to be about 6000-6500 PIC. He has not flown the Dash 8-400 in the sky – only in the simulator.

He was assigned to Colgan July 23, 2007 through about May 2008. He was relieved of his assignment to Colgan in stages and the final separation was in March. From 2003 through 2005 he was the POI at Colgan. Before 2003 he was the APM for Atlantic Coast Airlines on the J4100 and the DO328. He started with FAA in 12/7/1997 and started in the San Jose FSDO. He was a GA ops inspector through 1999, then transferred to the Washington FSDO as a GA ops inspector and then became an air carrier inspector. Before FAA he was a corporate pilot and Director of Operations for W & L Construction and Paving Company at Tri-City Airport in Tennessee, where he flew a Navajo. He had previously worked as a cattleman and farmer in Virginia and as a stockbroker in Washington, DC. He had no accidents but was terminated from CC Air in 1987 for landing at the wrong airport. That was the only violation on his record. He had flown BE99's, Shorts 360's and Jetstream 31's in North Carolina.

He was the APM when the Q400 began service at Colgan. He said he was fully qualified as an APM. He trained in September and October 2007. He was an APM candidate until completing all training. He said that an APM's qualifications, beyond a type rating, is you have to go through the same ground and simulator training program to acquire a type rating as the pilots working for the company do. An APM's training is modified due to fact that you are not to fly the actual aircraft; however, you are subject to recurrent training as it is set up by the company. He also did check airman training. The training file is maintained by the training department for the airline.

He completed his training in Toronto. It was the Colgan training program but the instructors were contracted from Flight Safety to Colgan. He doesn't recall details of the winter operations training program he attended, but if they gave it, he got it. He wasn't there long enough for the 6 month training.

He has heard of a tail stall. He said in ground school at Colgan the subject should have been brought up and likely was. He doesn't remember specifics in terms of training in simulator for tail stall, or any specific slide about it, and he doesn't remember getting any training in ground school on the subject.

He said they did do normal stall training in the simulator. He remembers the recovery standard for heading was approximately 10 degrees, and airspeed was on the bottom side – no secondary stall and top side within 10 knots of the speed assigned, and altitude he doesn't recall if there was a minimum but you did not want to be over 100 feet from your assigned altitude when you recovered.

He conducted simulator check rides, but not training. He completed about 6 check airman rides and 2 APD rides. He would just observe whatever was going on in training in the simulator. He did some line observations too, estimating about 10. When you're observing OE you're observing the check airmen, whose job is keeping the captain straight. They were mostly OE. During the certification process bringing the dash on to the certificate he was observing proving tests. He did not include the proving test rides in the 10 mentioned above. He observed an APD candidate or check airman candidate (it was on the west coast) who graded upgrading captains unsatisfactory on his ride in the simulator. He said there were a number of issues, including heading, airspeed, stall recovery, and command authority. He concurred with the call although he didn't make the call. He doesn't remember the names of anyone involved. The event happened in late '07 or early '08. During the proving runs for the dash the first 3 runs that he observed were unsatisfactory. This was because the crew performance was not in compliance, primarily the PIC who was sitting in all 3 cases in the FO's seat and was conducting, depending on who you ask, training flights, proving flights or whatever it was. He was assigned to observe proving flights. He observed items egregious enough in competency and attitude and primarily in competency that he opened enforcement for the aircrew designees the first day.

Regarding the upgrade captain he observed in Seattle, the issues were "a lot." They included his ability to hand fly the aircraft, maintain heading and air speed and recover from stalls, sometimes on ragged edge and then sometimes on wrong side of ragged edge and he seemed to get lost in the procedures a bit. One of the things that was salient in this was his command authority: he lost it. This was in 2007 or early 2008 on the q400. He did not recall any names.

Mr. Monteleon said there were two failures in initial training, one of which was his own. He did not pass his own practical test the first time, and that was before he ever got in the airplane. There were 2 unsats that were properly called in the sim; one was a pretty good job except that there was 1 really unsat event and the other one the pilot just gave up.

In observing Operating Experience (OE) at Colgan he doesn't remember anything he would consider to be unsafe or not in compliance. Part of that was because of him wearing the white hat as APM. Minor deviations in airspeed, altitude, he'd debrief. Also sterile cockpit, he'd debrief. You are inside the company closer than any other member of

the team. You will see things that are characterized as violations that you would not see in any other capacity. But, doesn't remember seeing anything he considered unsafe or not in compliance within the venue of the APD program.

He said he has knowledge as an APM/POI that they didn't as a group have the hard training and grounding that he believed was in compliance. They brought this with them. The egregious safety violations he observed over the year were systemic. Pilots either did not know better or were subject to the culture at Colgan. He said the director of operations and the APD – should be as close to role models as they can. The DO was consistently unprofessional, in that he would push back so much and so hard to him as the POI and the subsequent POI. When there would be an investigation of the infraction, the DO would do everything he could to keep it from the FAA. For example, there was a pilot one time who did something, and he doesn't remember what it was but it was a clear violation, and the pilot after the fact was given some sort of reprimand, grounding, retraining, he didn't know what it was. The POI needs to hear about it from the company before hearing it from another FAA office or NTSB. The DO would try to keep that from Monteleon. A good ADE program would assure that that info went to the POI and APM. On January 19 after the 3 unsat proving run flights, he tried to debrief the crew.

Asked for specific examples of poor operating practices, he said he could give two. He and the PAI were on the ramp at IAD and noticed patches on the deice boots of left wing that were not airworthy and brought it to the attention of the crew. The crew had completed the preflight check of the aircraft and were going to fly it. He expected that they would fix it but instead they took off and flew with passengers. Dispatch was involved. They took off in violation. He did not recall if he issued a violation. Another event was at an out station; crews were swapped in a Saab or 1900 and the right engine remained turning during the crew change while pax got off and on. The arriving crew could not conduct a post flight and the departing crew could not conduct a pre-flight.

Boots and the swap are examples of things that went on at Colgan that were pretty egregious. Colgan complained and he was relieved and there were no violations. As a culture the problem starts all the way at the very top. You have young pilots coming in and the next thing you know they're swapping seats with the engines turning.

Almost every flight, just because someone would make a comment about the world series wouldn't mean a catastrophe was about to happen. There'd be extraneous chatter. Anecdotally you get on board other airlines in the cockpit you don't hear it. In majors, you don't hear it. At Colgan, even with an FAA inspector on board – but he can't name a particular flight or day. What he does about it is correct on the spot. He doesn't talk back if they talk to him to provide a clue. At the end of the flight he'd debrief it. He said it was coming from the top – it was a culture that you can kind of slide by, cut corners, wink and nod when the FAA is not there. He saw the talking as a symptom of what was going on in the company. You talk to the DO or to your APD's and check airmen. Their crews were spread out all over the place and it made it an impediment to getting pilots together or to having check airmen meetings. So due to lack of meetings information was not shared easily or effectively.

He doesn't remember if there was a meeting called a check airman meeting from the time he was there between 2007 and 2008. He didn't feel it was a problem as there were just a handful of pilots and they were doing proving runs. But they were in meetings all the time because of that so that didn't necessitate the need for check airmen meetings.

He did not know FO Shaw or Captain Renslow.

He wrote up the unsat proving runs in the PTRS system He noticed yesterday that there was a PTRS entry for an email where the POI had emailed him and had entered the proving runs into PTRS for him.

He does not have specific recall either way about whether he received tail stall training. He has observed another two failed GA procedures which are essentially the same as recovery from landing configuration stall.

His last flight in an actual aircraft was a long time ago.

Why does he feel tail stall topics should be brought up? Because they cause accidents and to understand the subject is to prevent the accident to some measurable degree. He said he does not know whether the Q400 is susceptible to a tail stall. He said he thinks it should be taught because it is widely known in the professional pilot community that some of these aircraft are more susceptible than others. If the Q400 is an aircraft they should not be concerned about it the pilots should be told that.

He was not aware of the allowable numbers of patches on the deice boots. Asked how you determined the dispatch was against regulations, he said he had an airworthiness inspector with him and they discussed the peeling of the patches and he believed it was a violation and it may have been quashed by my management.

He is not aware of any Bombardier instructors doing ground school training or simulator training for Colgan.

He was in the first full Q400 class at Colgan. The Chief Pilot and POI went through type training as an initial group earlier. He doesn't remember what training classes he sat through after he went through training. He does think he went to some but doesn't remember the specific courses – it all runs in together. He said the training was a mess and it wasn't all Colgan's fault. The FAA certification team did not do a very good job in this regard. Twice the POI would make up a training manual on his own and literally cut out an abnormal procedure in the flight ops manual and scotch tape it in a bombardier manual. I said how can you do this? How can you just stick something in the manufacturer's manual and how do you track it for revisions? During initial pilot training it was changed in mid stream twice while he was sitting in the sim. Flying along sweating and crying and the guy would leave and come back and use different new procedures when they swapped seats. The training program was a mess. The pilot has to rely on the manual. There were 3 different sets of post ground school changes in the sim training.

The Colgan manual that was not approved and Flight Safety was unhappy, so went to the manufacturer's procedures. So a third set must have been where the documents were made into Colgan procedure and properly approved, but they weren't properly approved because they had this other stuff in it. The POI was aware and he was the one who approved the pilot training program.

He was asked about flights with sterile cockpit gaffs and what kind of conversations occurred. He said that it was enough that he characterized it as systemic. Most of the time it would be chatter at pre-take off and not so much on roll out and taxi in. One of the issues that he had that Colgan resisted was that they should have the aircraft stopped before they did any heads down work. There were too many instances where you see this insidious thing where they would talk about anything just as you and I would. An issue was getting on and off the radio and giving up the controls and giving a briefing. Example: FO goes to company freq and there was no transfer of controls. They don't do that. They just come back on without a quick little brief on what occurred while they were off the ATC frequency. Sometimes the captain might say "no change" but usually he did not even do that. There was this undisciplined cockpit environment. He saw all of these things before he was assigned to Colgan. He said these things had been documented for years.

End 1525.